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## Roman Kodet

### Yamada Torajirō and Japanese Influence in Istanbul<sup>1</sup>

#### Abstract

*During their history the Ottoman Empire and Japan had almost no mutual contact and were hardly aware of each other. This situation changed at the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, when the Ottomans were interested in Japanese modernization according to the western model in order to apply the Japanese model on their own crumbling empire. On the other hand, some Japanese viewed the Ottoman Empire as an exotic oriental country and were eager to discover its history and culture. On this basis the relations between both countries were established. One of the most important proponents of Ottoman-Japanese relations was Yamada Torajirō, who came to Istanbul in 1892. He was to stay there for next 22 years. Although he wasn’t able to secure any radical political or economic interests for Japan in Istanbul, his activity brought a period of intensifying contacts between both countries. He also introduced Japanese culture and customs to Istanbul and after his return to Japan he wrote a lot of books about Turkey, in which he promoted the idea of Japanese-Turkish friendship. His work is therefore considered to be the fundamental basis of the good relations of Japan and Turkey up to the present time.*

*Key words: Japan, Ottoman Empire, diplomacy, economy, culture*

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The Question of the Japanese-Ottoman relation is almost forgotten by contemporary historiography. Only in Japan and Turkey the names of Yamada Torajirō and his compatriots who stayed in Istanbul before the First World War are still remembered. At the first glance both countries had almost nothing in common at the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. They had no mutual interests; the great geographic distance between them hindered any mutual cooperation, trade or cultural exchange. In fact their “awareness of each other [even in the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century] was minimal”.<sup>2</sup> On the other hand, in the first half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, the conditions of both countries were quite similar. Both were to a certain degree isolated from the western world and this led to their underdevelopment in comparison with the West. In both countries the central government crumbled, which can be documented on the process of disintegration of the Ottoman Empire<sup>3</sup> and the growing power of local daimyos in Japan.<sup>4</sup> As for their internal situation, privileged classes – samurai in Japan and janissaries and traditional structures in the Ottoman Empire – governed both states. Clash with the West meant a harsh experience for both states and had similar military, political and cultural impact, although it must be stressed that Japan had geographical advantages and the Ottoman Empire was never wholly isolated from Europe.

The impact of the European imperial challenge was also similar – the fall of the existing ruling classes (although parts of them created new ruling elites) and the endeavors for reforms. In this process Japan was much more successful thanks to its illustrious reformers, geographical advantage, national unity and the ability to utilize its meager resources to maximum. During the 80s and 90s of the 19<sup>th</sup> century Istanbul became aware of the success of the Japanese reforms and began to look at Japan for inspiration. The interest of the Ottoman public in Japanese success to embrace the western methods and in transformation its society according to the European model, grew surprisingly when Turkish and Arabic newspapers regularly discussed the Japanese situation and progress.<sup>5</sup> “It was widely believed that the example of Japan could instruct the

*Ottoman Empire in its quest for true enlightenment. Japan’s history, national culture, heritage, and religion, as well as its political organization, military, and economy, were just a few of the topics examined in these texts, which illustrated what Ottomans writers of different backgrounds proposed to be successful development into a modern nation and state. Japan was perceived to have accomplished these two objectives through a successful integration of Eastern cultural heritage and the appropriate Western material attributes.”*<sup>6</sup> Even the Hamidian regime noticed the Japanese success and sought to teach its methods to implement them to the Ottoman reform efforts. Therefore in response to the visit<sup>7</sup> of a member of the Japanese imperial family Prince Akihito Komatsu (in my paper a use the Japanese system putting the family name first) to Istanbul (where he presented the Japanese highest Order of Chrysanthemum to the Sultan Abdülhamid),<sup>8</sup> the Porte decided to send frigate Ertuğrul to Japan.<sup>9</sup> This almost 30 years old vessel,<sup>10</sup> which was considered to be barely seaworthy by British observers,<sup>11</sup> anchored in Yokohama with its more than 600 seamen and a special mission which task was to establish good and permanent relations with Japan.<sup>12</sup> On 13<sup>th</sup> June 1890 Emperor Mutsuhito received its commander Admiral Ali Osman Paşa. The three-month visit to Japan was a diplomatic success and in September 1890 the ship was prepared to start its voyage back to Istanbul. On its way the frigate was caught in a storm in which the main mast of the frigate collapsed and due to the inexperience of its crew the immobilized ship hit a reef split in half and sank near Oshima Island on the 18<sup>th</sup> September 1890. The Japanese government sent a rescue mission that was capable of salvaging 69 men from the sea – the rest of the crew, 533 seamen including Ali Osman Paşa, died.<sup>13</sup>

of 1876 (Lewis 2002, 206–207).

6) Worringer 2004, 210.

7) The first greater interest of the Japanese in the Near East was sparked by the Iwakura mission to Europe and America, which on its way back stopped in Egypt (see Nish 1998).

8) Esenbel 1996, 240, compare with Erdemir 2011, 219.

9) Esenbel 1996, 239.

10) The frigate was build in the years 1854–1864 by Istanbul’s Taksizak shipyard. It was a 79 meters long vessel of 2,344 tons (Lledó and Pulak 2007, 35–36).

11) Although the ship was overhauled before the start of the voyage, it suffered many maintenance problems. The frigate was damaged after it ran ashore in the Suez Canal and the damage of the hull was not completely repaired. The ship had also problems with its almost a quarter of century old machinery (Lledó and Pulak 2007, 36).

12) Erdemir 2011, 219.

13) Lledó, Pulak 2007, 36, compare with Esenbel 1996, 240. The survivors were brought to Turkey on board of Japanese battleships Hiei and Kongo in January 1891 (see Erdemir 2011, 220). A detailed account of the Ertuğrul voyage and catastrophe can be found on

2) In previous centuries the Japanese had only slight information about Turkey from the accounts of the Dutch and Portuguese traders. Also the Ottomans had only knew about Japan only by hearsay and their scarce information were limited to some popular travel accounts (Esenbel 1996, 238).

3) To the process of the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire at the turn of the 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> century see Hanioğlu (2008, 6–18).

4) To the situation of Japan in the first half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century see Keene (2002, 1–9).

5) Hundreds of references to Japan and its success could be found in the Ottoman books and newspapers articles during the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century (Worringer 2004, 208). After the Japanese victory over Russia, the radical officers leading the Young Turk movement used the Japanese example to promote the idea of restoring the constitution

The catastrophe brought about a wave of compassion in Japan where a beneficial collection was spontaneously initiated to help the families of the drowned sailors. Altogether a considerable sum of 5,000 Yen was donated.<sup>14</sup> The task to bring the money to Istanbul was entrusted to Yamada Torajirō, who already in the 80s urged to establish Japanese-Ottoman relations. He was born in 1866 in a traditional samurai Nakamura family in the town Numata and after his father decided to move to Tokyo, he was given a mixed education both classical and western. He learned several foreign languages including French, German and English and became a master of the tea ceremony in the Yamada School from which his name was derived from.<sup>15</sup> As a person of higher society origin and as a contributor to the newspapers Nihon Shimbun and Tokyo Nichinichi Shimbun he became well known in the reform circles of Japan.<sup>16</sup> Because of his participation in organizing the collection and his far-reaching knowledge he was sent to Istanbul on a partially official mission initiated by the Japanese foreign minister Aoki Shūzō.<sup>17</sup> With a task to hand over the collected money to the Ottoman government and to establish direct mutual relations between both countries Yamada left Japan on board of a cruiser Matsushima. After a brief stay in Egypt, where he was warmly welcomed, Yamada reached Istanbul on 4<sup>th</sup> April 1892 probably not knowing that his mission to the capital of the Ottoman Empire would last more than 20 years.

Yamada than 25 was warmly greeted in Istanbul, where he presented his gift to Şerif Paşa (a son of the Ottoman foreign minister Mehmed Said Paşa) who arranged Yamada's audience at the Sultan, whom he presented a gift of the traditional Japanese armor and a sword, which can be now seen in Topkapi Palace Museum.<sup>18</sup> Yamada's charming behavior and noble performance at the court made him many supporters who appointed him to teach the Ottoman sailors and military men Japanese for them to be able to go to Japan to be educated there.<sup>19</sup> During next month Yamada was able to master Ottoman Turkish, although he was able to communicate in French in which the Ottomans were fluent. His mastery of the Turkish earned him quite a lot of sympathy from the educated Ottomans who appreciated that Yamada is able to communicate with them with their own language.

While he was in Istanbul Yamada slowly changed over this time into a well-known expert on the Ottoman policy, culture and life. He even got well known in the Ottoman high society with which members he started to maintain close relations. Thanks to this he became some sort of "a mediator between the Turkish and Japanese bureaucrats and intellectuals".<sup>20</sup> He published his knowledge about Turkey – its political, economic and cultural realities – in several papers in Japan – for example Toruko zūshin (News from Turkey) and in popular magazine Taiyō. Later he also published several books including Kaikōyōen (The world of Islam) in 1939, which was very popular during the Pacific war when the Japanese interest in Islam grew due to the fact that they came into direct contact with Muslim population of the Dutch East Indies which were under the Japanese occupation.<sup>21</sup> "Probably Yamada's most interesting work is also his first, the beautifully illustrated *Toruko gakan* or *A pictorial look at Turkey*, published in Meiji 40 (1910).<sup>22</sup> A narrative and pictorial introduction to the sites and people of Istanbul, its 179 pages are liberally sprinkled with Yamada's own etchings and drawings of people and sites of the city during the Hamidian era. The originality of the book lies in these sketches. They are scattered through the text in a charmingly idiosyncratic manner (Byzantine coins for example illustrate his discussions of Muslim wedding customs). Yamada says of this free approach in his introduction that he chose to illustrate according to personal taste rather than attempt to integrate the sketches into the text logically. His illustrations are usually based on photographs taken with his Kodak camera, although some are sketches of people and faces met in the streets of Istanbul."<sup>23</sup>

Although Yamada's publications were designed to be a precise picture of the Ottoman life it must be said that they in some way romanticized the Ottoman realities.<sup>24</sup> But may be thanks to this fact, they gained a lot of popularity among Japanese public which was keen on reading about the exotic oriental life. It was due to this popularity that the interest of Japanese public in the Near East resulted in growing popularity of the Ottoman Empire in Japan. The Japanese became interested in the Ottoman political realities and culture. The peak of this interest initiated by Yamada came in the 30s of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, when there was even established an Islamic Printing House in Tokyo, where a group of Turks of Tartar origin printed Turkish Islamic books in Arabic characters.<sup>25</sup> There were even thoughts among young radicals supporting The Great Asian Movement in Japan to utilize these endeavors of Turkish intellectuals in Japan, to the purpose of Ja-

Tragedy – Ertugrul Frigate, <http://www.turk-japan2003.org/rel/ertugrul.htm>, 11. 2. 2012.

14) Esenbel 1996, 241.

15) Erdemir 2011, 219. Yamada alone became a head of Sōhenryū School of the tea ceremony (Mizuguchi 2002, 93).

16) Erdemir 2011, 219.

17) Esenbel 1996, 241.

18) Esenbel 1996, 241.

19) Esenbel 1996, 242.

20) Erdemir 2011, 221.

21) Esenbel 1996, 245.

22) A contemporary tradition in Japan was to date the years by an era of ruling Emperor.

23) Esenbel 1996, 246–247.

24) Esenbel, 248.

25) Misawa 2009, 39.

panese interests, but eventually these thoughts were abandoned.<sup>26</sup> In the 90s of the 19<sup>th</sup> century the Japanese newspapers started to publish regular information about the political development on the Balkans and in Istanbul. The impression of most of the articles was pro-ottoman and due to the worsening Japanese-Russian relations anti-Russian.

The main interest of Japanese public laid in the culture of Turkey (this demand was on the first place satisfied by Yamada's books) and especially in the political events in the Near East. Every main political event was closely observed, although the diplomats of the Great powers claimed that some of the Japanese newspapers were not well informed and restricted themselves only to reprinting the messages of the European news agencies.<sup>27</sup> The overall impression of the Japanese articles concerning the Eastern Question was pro-British and unfavorable not only to Russia, but also to the powers of the Triple Alliance – especially Germany. These anti-German tendencies in the Japanese press were caused by the participation of Berlin in the Russian intervention in 1895, which forced Japan to abandon the most important gains from its victorious war with China.<sup>28</sup> As for the individual newspapers (which called the Near East as "Far West") the most anti-German was the nationalistic Nichi-Nichi, while the others tried to maintain neutral stance, although even such newspapers as Japanese Chronicle or Asahi criticized the foreign policy of Berlin and Vienna in Istanbul especially in context of the great international crisis such as were the Sanjak railway crisis or the Bosnian annexation crisis.<sup>29</sup> The political stance of Yamada and many Japanese in Istanbul was on the side of Great Britain, Yamada therefore criticized several times the policy of the Central Powers especially Germany. This was made clear for example during the Sanjak railway crisis, when Japanese residents came to a conclusion that Vienna abandoned reform programs on the Balkans in favor of her own interests.<sup>30</sup> The Japanese watched the Balkan turmoil carefully, because they were concerned that the rivalries of the European Great Powers could lead to the outbreak of a war, which would negatively influence Japan.

Although Yamada's activity in Istanbul had a considerable cultural impact – he even performed traditional Japanese tea ceremony for the members of the Ottoman ruling class<sup>31</sup> – his mission had also economic and politic importance. With regard to the

fact that Japan had no diplomatic representation in Istanbul (this was established in 1921),<sup>32</sup> Yamada started to play a role of semi-official Japanese consul to the Ottoman government. He therefore participated in signing of two treaties of Japanese-Ottoman Friendship in 1893 and 1895, which were negotiated through the Japanese embassy in Berlin.<sup>33</sup> He also unsuccessfully tried to persuade the Ottoman government to sign a commercial treaty with Japan. Yamada claimed that Japan could export to the Ottoman Empire some good quality pottery, luxurious goods and rice (on the other hand Japan could import peppers, tobacco or valuable metals). However, he was somewhat disappointed, when he wrote, that "*the Japanese goods exported to Turkey are mainly rice and miscellaneous goods. The amount of Japanese rice export to Turkey is increasing every year [...] However, their Japanese rice is not imported by us, but by German and English hands.*"<sup>34</sup> As for the possibilities to import Japanese pottery to the Ottoman Empire the situation was even more unfavorable: "*Pottery, lacquer work and general goods gained fame once. The demand was not small, but in our products there were defects [...] On the other hand, the imitation goods of ours produced in Germany and France have great deal of delicate design, therefore, their design is equal to our goods, and they are adequate in practical use than ours. Hence our market in Turkey is badly affected [...]*"<sup>35</sup> According to Yamada Japan was losing its opportunity and he urged for negotiations of Japanese-Ottoman commercial treaty.

The government in Tokyo was however unable to reach such an agreement. Its failure was due to the fact that Tokyo was trying to establish commercial relations on the ground of the capitulations,<sup>36</sup> which were granted to the European powers. This was however unacceptable for the Ottomans, whose goal was to get rid of these unequal commercial treaties with the west. Japan itself gained equal commercial rights vis-à-vis the western powers in the 90s and at the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. However, this Japanese success was viewed as an example in Istanbul, which was "*in no position to accept a new international capitulationist treaty*".<sup>37</sup> The Japanese-Ottoman negotiations lasted throughout the 90s of the 19<sup>th</sup> and were terminated by the Ottoman side, be-

26) Misawa, 40.

27) Ambró to Aehrenthal, Tokyo, 24<sup>th</sup> February 1908, Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv, Vienna (hereafter: HHStA), Politisches Archiv (hereafter: PA), Türkei Kt. 345.

28) Ambró to Aehrenthal, Tokyo, 2<sup>nd</sup> März 1908, HHStA, PA, Türkei Kt. 346. To the question of Treaty of Shimonoseki and the so-called Triple Intervention see Paine 2005, 247–293.

29) Ambró to Aehrenthal, Tokyo, 24<sup>th</sup> February 1908, HHStA, PA, Türkei Kt. 345.

30) Ambró to Aehrenthal, Tokyo, 24<sup>th</sup> February 1908, HHStA, PA, Türkei Kt. 345.

31) Esenbel 1996, 242.

32) The first Turkish envoi Hulusi Fuat Tugay came to Tokyo in 1925.

33) To the question of Ottoman-Japanese diplomacy see Deringil 2003, 42–48.

34) Erdemir 2011, 221.

35) Erdemir 2011, 221.

36) Capitulations – unequal commercial treaties made with the European powers during the end of the 16<sup>th</sup> and 17<sup>th</sup> century giving those some considerable advantages over the domestic traders. This system of the Ottoman foreign trade was abolished only after the outbreak of the First World War. To the origins of this system see İnalçik and Quataert (2006, 480–483).

37) Esenbel 1996, 244.

cause the Japanese were not willing to yield in the question of the unequal treaties, which in their eyes should have been the base of economic relations of both countries.<sup>38</sup>

In spite of this failure Yamada tried to start the Japanese-Ottoman commercial relations himself. He supported his friend Nakamura Ejirō to open the first Japanese shop in the Ottoman capital.<sup>39</sup> Later there were even two Japanese shops in Istanbul's commercial district Pera and in the old city. In these there were traditional Japanese goods such as silk or tea sold.<sup>40</sup> Yamada was also able to capitalize his connections in the circles of the Ottoman high society and imported the Japanese art and luxurious goods directly to the court of Sultan Abdülhamid II.<sup>41</sup> Nakamura's and Yamada's store also became an important center for the Japanese tourists and new residents in Istanbul who were given useful advice about the city and the customs of its inhabitants: "*Yamada always made a point of bringing his guests to the ceremony of the Friday prayer, the selamlık. Japanese visitors were a rarity in the 1890s, and he was the city's only long term Japanese resident. On a bright May morning, Yamada and his guests stood spellbound as the Albanian Horseguards trotted up to the palace and took up their stations. The sun glinted on their spears as the band struck up the Hamidiye march. Next came the officers of the Imperial Guard, mounted on splendid Arab horses in their impeccable uniforms, and they too took up their positions inside the Yıldız Palace. Finally the sultan, accompanied by the empress dowager and the reigning empress emerged from the palace in his landau and proceeded to the mosque. As the clear cry of the muezzin sounded the call to prayer, the sultan alighted and all his troops in one voice shouted a loud acclaim. When his guest asked Yamada what they were shouting he replied 'They shout Long Live the Sultan!, just as we shout Tenno Heika Bazai! in the presence of our emperor.'*"<sup>42</sup> The climax of Yamada's commercial effort came in January 1906, when he established successful Oriental Papers Making Company, which produced rice paper for tobacco. Yamada was able to get support of Japanese businessmen from the Kansai Region (with the center in Osaka) who supported his enterprise.<sup>43</sup>

Maybe the most important task of Yamada Torajiro in Istanbul was entrusted to him during the Russo-Japanese war by the Japanese ambassador in Vienna Makino who instructed him to guard Bosphorus and report any passing Russian ships and to monitor Russian movement in the Black sea.<sup>44</sup> After the Japanese victories at Port Arthur

the representatives of the Combined fleet worried that the Russians could send not only the Baltic but also the Black sea fleet to the Far East and gain a decisive numerical superiority.<sup>45</sup> Yamada handled his task with considerable energy – he hired a house near the mouth of Bosphorus into the sea of Marmara and he utilized other Japanese in Istanbul most notably the journalist of newspaper Jiji Noda Shotaro (who had come to Istanbul in 1891 along with the survivors of Ertuğrul disaster) along with hired about 20 men to monitor the sea passage and report any Russian shipping. In his later account of espionage activity in Istanbul "*Yamada explains that he ... every day scanned the northern horizon through binoculars to see whether the Russian Black Sea Fleet would sail down towards the Mediterranean to join the Baltic Fleet on its way to do battle with the Japanese in Port Arthur*".<sup>46</sup> These monotonous activity was however fruitless because the Russians decided not to send the Black Sea fleet to the Far East. Despite of this Yamada's surveillance of the Bosphorus was highly praised even by the leadership of the Combined Fleet.<sup>47</sup>

During the war Yamada also informed the Sultan (who accepted him at an audience at least at three opportunities) about the progress of the war. Although he noted that the Ottoman officials tried to be neutral during the conflict not to enrage Russia, the majority of the Istanbul population was openly supporting Japan, which was in their eyes defending the Asian people against the European imperialism.<sup>48</sup> Japanese victory sparked a wave of admiration of Japan and was celebrated by most of the Ottomans as a victory of Asia over Europe – the name of admiral Togo (victor at Tsushima) even became popular among Turkish intellectuals who gave it to their newborn sons. For the Turks the Japanese victory was an example that a modern Asian power could defeat even the most powerful army in the world. Japan's success was also celebrated as an important victory against the European imperialism.<sup>49</sup>

Japan, which had risen from a weak Asiatic country to a Great Power status, became to be viewed as a model for the Ottoman Empire. The victory of Japan sparked a new phase of interest in this country in Istanbul, where some members of the ruling class studied the Japanese culture, history, politics and military in order to adopt them into the Ottoman system. The Hamidiyan regime wanted to implement a Japanese civil education

38) Esenbel 1996, 244.

39) Esenbel 1996, 237.

40) Esenbel 1996, 241–242.

41) Erdemir 2011, 222.

42) Deringil 2011, 16.

43) Erdemir 2011, 222.

44) Esenbel 1996, 242.

45) This anxiety was not without justification. At the end of 1904 the representatives of Russian Admiralty really considered the possibility to form a Third Pacific Fleet from the ships and men of the Black Sea squadron. However the international situation and the closure of the Straits to the warships of any Great Power compelled them to abandon such plans (Connaughton 2004, 327).

46) Esenbel 1996, 242.

47) Esenbel, 2008, 20ff.

48) Esenbel 1996, 242.

49) Esenbel 1996, 243, compare with Findley 2010, 163.



in order to adopt a Japanese form of “civil morality” – the loyalty of the inhabitants (or citizens) to the state.<sup>50</sup> The Ottoman liberals noted that the main advantage of Japan was its constitutional system and hoped that the Ottoman constitution of 1876 (suspended by the Sultan Abdülhamid in 1878) would be restored. Such a step would in their eyes symbolize a reformation of the country in the same way as the Meiji Restoration of 1868 in Japan.<sup>51</sup> The imitation of the Japanese example should in their eyes lead to modernization and strengthening of the Ottoman Empire, some Ottoman newspapers as *Yeni İkdâm* claimed that the Ottoman Empire could even seek an alliance with Japan, although it assessed the chances as slight because of only a few common interests.<sup>52</sup> This appreciation of Japanese success over historical enemy of the Ottomans was shared throughout the whole Islamic world. This was illustrated by the admiration of many Muslim liberals. An Egyptian nationalist Mustafa Kamil praised the Japanese victory as an important step to the defeat of European colonialism: “We are amazed by Japan because it is the first Eastern government to utilize Western civilization to resist the shield of European imperialism in Asia.”<sup>53</sup>

Yamada tried to exploit this situation to promote Japanese-Ottoman relations, but in vain due to the Japanese insistence on signing only unequal treaties with Istanbul modeled on the similar agreements of the Porte with the West, although Japan itself in the same time tried to get rid of her own unequal treaties with the Great Powers. His effort was also impaired by the fact that both countries did not establish official relations. His position in Istanbul was therefore still only of a private person, although he was protected by the Porte.<sup>54</sup> After the outbreak of the Young Turk revolution Yamada hoped to achieve some of his goals, because he had viewed the movement to be similar with the process of Meiji Restoration. He even claimed in his works that the Young Turks were strongly influenced by Japanese success and encouraged Japanese visitors of Istanbul to promote this good impression, which Japan made in Turkey.<sup>55</sup>

In his assessment of growing Japanese impact on the Ottoman ruling class Yamada was to some degree right. The new regime in Istanbul presented itself as progressive and innovative. It also tried to persuade the western diplomatic representati-

ves that the Ottoman Empire was the future “Japan of the Near East”.<sup>56</sup> Despite the fact that the Young Turks looked at Japan with admiration<sup>57</sup> mutual relations of both countries deteriorated slowly after 1910, when Japan after the collapse of economic negotiations with the Porte concentrated on much promising and nearer gains in Asia and the Ottomans were paralyzed by the war with Italy and especially the Balkan wars. With the diminishment of the Japanese-Ottoman relations declined even Yamada’s influence in Turkey. However, his articles and messages from Istanbul represented an interesting and to some extent unbiased view of current political events.

Yamada’s anxiety about the possibility of the outbreak of a Great War (mentioned above) came to be true in 1914, when he left Istanbul.<sup>58</sup> In several following years he tried to promote the idea of the Japanese-Turkish friendship and to educate Japanese public in the Ottoman realities and customs. In spite of his effort most educated Japanese viewed the Ottoman Empire and the whole Near East (in Japan called Far West) as a far exotic country with which Japan has almost nothing in common. Paradoxically this caused soaring popularity of books and articles describing these countries, which inspired Japanese imagination. Yamada did not return to Istanbul immediately after the war ended, although he became a chairman of the newly founded Japan-Turkey Trade Association in November 1925.<sup>59</sup> He visited Istanbul for the last time in 1931 with a Japanese economic mission. He was accepted with honors by the president of the Turkish Republic Kemal Atatürk and met many of his old friends.<sup>60</sup> However, due to his growing health issues this was the last time he came to Turkey although he still published articles and books about Turkey and the world of Islam as a whole. He died in Tokyo on the 3<sup>rd</sup> February 1957.

The relations between Japan and the Ottoman Empire are almost unknown in the West. However, in Turkey and Japan there are surprisingly a lot of people who commemorate these events. The memorial of the sinking of *Ertuğrul* frigate was enlarged in 1974 when a Turkish museum was established at this site. The monument itself was even visited by Turkish president Abdullah Gül at the occasion of a state visit in Japan in 2008.<sup>61</sup> The wreck of the ship itself was subjected to an underwater archeological re-

50) *Deringil 2011, 109.*

51) *Findley 2010, 165.*

52) *Pallavicini to Aehrenthal, Constantinople, 30<sup>th</sup> November 1911, HHStA, PA, Türkei Kt. 205. The Austro-Hungarian ambassador cited that Yeni İkdâm in an article “With which power we should make an alliance”. Its author however claimed that the chance to conclude an alliance with Japan was slight because both countries had only minor common interests.*

53) *Esenbel, 2008, 22ff.*

54) *Esenbel 1996, 245.*

55) *Esenbel 1996, 247.*

56) *Worringer 2004, 208.*

57) *Worringer 2004, 215.*

58) *After the end of the war Japanese diplomats participated on concluding the peace treaties of Sèvres and Lausanne which formed the present Turkish Republic (Mango 2009, 161).*

59) *Esenbel 1996, 243.*

60) *Esenbel 1996, 243.*

61) *See Turkish President Gul in Japan, <http://www.worldbulletin.net/?aType=haberArchive&ArticleID=23482>, 11. 3. 2012.*

search in 2007.<sup>62</sup> Although the name and life of Yamada Torajiro lies now almost in obscurity his legacy of maintaining of good Japanese-Turkish relations continues and the question of the Japanese-Ottoman relations is not forgotten, which could be considered as the legacy of the efforts of his whole life.

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## Drahomír Suchánek

### Mariano Rampolla del Tindaro – der exkludierte Papst

#### Abstract

*The object of the essay is an analysis of the person of the cardinal- secretary of state Mariano Rampolla del Tindaro and his exclusion from the papal election in the conclave in the year 1903. The topic of this thesis focuses on one aspect of state interventions in papal elections, which is generally called “the right of exclusion” – Jus Exclusivae. The papal conclave of 1903 retained considerable importance, when the veto right was applied for the last time, and the subsequent legislative process that removed the exclusion right. Mariano Rampolla died suddenly in Rome on December 16, 1913 at age seventy. The Rampolla’s heritage and successful papal diplomacy continued with his friend and closest collaborator, Cardinal Giacomo della Chiesa, later elected as Pope Benedict XV.*

*Key words: conclave, papacy, papal election, Mariano Rampolla del Tindaro, Pius X, Leo XIII, church history, right of exclusion*

*„Ich glaube, man übertreibt nicht, wenn man die Ansicht ausspricht, dass ein Konklave im Jahre 1908 oder 1910 nur aus einem einzigen Wahlgang mit einer einstimmigen Wahl Rampollas bestanden hätte.“<sup>1</sup>*

62) See Lledó, Pulak 2007.

1) Cramer-Klett 1914, 3.