University of West Bohemia in Pilsen

Faculty of Philosophy and Arts

Dissertation Thesis

Democratic People's Republic of Korea in International Politics

Analysis of the Changes of North Korean Foreign Policy between 1994 and 2015
Using the Role Theoretic Approach

Plzeň 2016   **Lenka Caisová**

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Study Programme Political Science

Field of Study International Relations

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Sworn Statement

I hereby claim I made this dissertation thesis (topic: *Democratic People's Republic of Korea in International Politics*; subtopic: *Analysis of the Changes of North Korean Foreign Policy between 1994 and 2015 Using the Role Theoretic Approach*) together with enclosed codebook by myself whereas I used the sources as stated in the Bibliography only.

In certain parts of this thesis I use extracts of articles I published before. In Chapter 1 and 2, I use selected parts of my article named "

Severní Korea v mezinárodních vztazích: jak uchopovat severokorejskou zahraniční politiku?" which was published in Acta FF 7, no. 3 in 2014. In Chapter 4, I use my article named "*Analysis of the U.S. Foreign Policy towards North Korea: Comparison of the Post-Cold War Presidents*" which was published in Acta FF no. 3, 2014 and article named "*Poskytovatelé humanitární a rozvojové pomoci do Korejské lidově demokratické republiky*" published in journal Mezinárodní vztahy 49, no. 2, 2014. All these articles are properly stated in the Bibliography.

Walton on Thames, August 2, 2016.

<div align="right">Lenka Caisová</div>

Acknowledgements

I would like express my sincere gratitude to my supervisor, doc. PhDr. Šárka Cabadová-Waisová Ph.D. for her advices, patience and continuous support during my Ph.D. studies.

I would like to acknowledge whole Department of Politics and International Relations of The University of West Bohemia in Pilsen for creating stimulating and friendly environment and for enabling me to realize research stays in the Republic of Korea that massively broadened my academic knowledge. In particular, I am very grateful to Magda B. Leichtová for her invaluable insights and advices of all kinds, to Marta Kollerová for her excellent managerial skills, helpfulness and never ending support and to Martina Poníźilová and Jirka Zákravský for being the greatest friends and colleagues one could ever wish.

Special thanks also go to Boyeon Na from the University of North Korean Studies, Seoul, Republic of Korea for not ignoring my e-mails and enabling me to spend hundreds of hours in the library as well as to all the library employees. Without their help, I would not be able to proceed with this thesis at all.

Last but not least, I would like to thank to my family and friends for supporting me during all these endless years of studies. Very special thanks goes to my beloved husband Štěpán for being caring, patient and sympathetic to my constant wailing and moaning along the journey of my studies. His encouragement and love made the completion of this thesis possible.

"Yet why, then, do states do what they do? The only thing which Wendt offers by means of clarification here is the concept of 'roles'. It is the socially recognized role which a state adopts that gives it a certain script to follow" (Ringmar 2005, 304).

"For the writer, the DPRK is not a case study that cannot be analysed" (Lewkowitz 2007, 100).

Contents

List of Abbreviations

LWR	light water reactor
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
U.S.	United States
KEDO	Korean Energy Development Organization
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
PSCORE	People for Successful Korean Reunification
CANKHR	Citizens' Alliance for North Korean Human Rights
ICNK	International Coalition to Stop the Crimes against Humanity in North Korea
CoI	Commission of Inquiry
UN	United Nations
UN GA	United Nations General Assembly
WPK	Workers' Party of Korea
CPU	Communist Party of Uruguay
NAM	Non-Aligned Movement
CMEA	Council of Mutual Economic Assistance
KT	Korea Today
PT	The Pyongyang Times
SPT	Six Party Talks
NPT	Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
DNO 3000	Vision 3000 through Denuclearization and Openness
NKHRA	North Korean Human Rights Act
NRC/NRCs	National Role Conception/National Role Conceptions
FPA	foreign policy analysis

NR	national role
WMD	weapon of mass destruction
KCNA	Korean Central News Agency

Introduction

In last twenty or thirty years, the North Korean foreign policy has become a popular topic for researchers all over the world. Very often, papers published in that particular field outnumber those dealing with the North Korean domestic politics. For example, there have been historical works mapping the developments of North Korean diplomacy (e.g. Armstrong 2013), publications dealing with the DPRK's relations with particular countries (e.g. Suh 2014), increasing bulk of studies whose authors try to detect crucial processes and determinants influencing North Korean foreign policy formation (e.g. Frank 2010) and many more.[1] Nevertheless, not much attention has been paid either to North Korean perceptions of its own *role* in international politics or to the evolution of those perceptions. As I want to fill the existing gap, I focus on the issue of the North Korean foreign-political roles and their projection to the practical foreign politics of the DPRK. I aim to pay special attention to the patterns of changes that have appeared in the composition of the North Korean role sets. In order to grasp this phenomenon, I will use the conceptual framework of the role theory that was introduced in the field of foreign policy analysis by Kalevi J. Holsti (Holsti 1970).

The role theory[2] enables us to approach the study of North Korean politics in a unique way which has not been used for the DPRK's foreign policy analysis yet. The only exception was a tangential analysis made by Holsti (1970) in the beginning of 1970s. Nevertheless, I will demonstrate later in

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[1] If I should mention some of the most recent works, it would be Kwak and Joo (eds.) 2009; Park (ed.) 2010; Kim 2011; Suh 2014; Lee Y. S. 2014; Bechtol 2014, or Cho 2016.

[2] The term *role theory* can be misleading as the role theory is not a *theory* in the strict sense. This is because the theory should mainly function as an explanatory model (Beneš 2009, 24). The role theory rather functions as a conceptual framework which enables us to analyse the complex world of the foreign policy. Nevertheless, the explanatory potential is not completely absent which I will demonstrate later in this thesis.

this thesis (see Chapter 1.3.1) his approach to the national role conceptions[3] was different from the one I intend to work with.

The role theory innovativeness lies mainly in the way how it suggests we should approach the foreign policy. It proposes using the perspective of self-presentation of a nation in the international environment. Besides the innovativeness, the role theory also helps us to grasp non-material aspects influencing the foreign political behaviour of the states (Breuning 2011, 22) and enables us to grasp the stable patterns, continuities and the changes of their foreign policies. Furthermore, it bridges various levels of analysis, i.e. the level of individual, society and system: the way the elites (individuals) understand the foreign political role of his or her nation or state (unit) is closely connected with his or her interaction with the international environment (system) (comp. Le Pestre 1997, 6–7). Chafetz, Abramson and Grillot (1996) also mention that the role theoretic approach enables us to explain the foreign political actions of the states as the roles may function as relatively stable stepping stone providing certain guidelines for the foreign policy formation.

Another strength of the role theoretic approach can be directly connected with *North Korean* foreign policy analysis. When searching for suitable analytic tools for the foreign policy analysis of the Third World countries, Sofiane Sekhri (2009) mentions the role theory as the useful analytic framework and her conclusions can be linked to North Korean foreign policy analysis too. She deals with the existing obstacles such as the regime closeness in the Third World countries, unavailability of reliable data as far as the decision-making processes and bureaucratic networks are concerned or with the usability of speeches of the official representatives who are not genuine about their motivations of actions their undertake. In particular,

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[3] I cannot avoid using the role theoretic terminology in the introduction. Therefore, if some questions or doubts arise regarding to the definitions of particular concepts, I recommend reader to refer to Chapter 3 of this thesis where I deal with the operationalization of these concepts.

Sekhri (2009, 431) argues that neither dishonesty nor irrationality is pretext to decline the usefulness of the role theoretic approach. This is especially relevant for this thesis too. Besides the fact those features can easily be found even in Western democracies, the *sincerity* is not really the issue I aim to investigate in this thesis. Rather, I focus on how the North Korean elites represent the role the DPRK should play in international politics and how this representation impacts the way how they conduct the actual foreign politics. Therefore, the starting point for me in this thesis is the analysis of North Korean roles perceived as self-presentations of a nation on the international scene. I will make clearer later in this thesis that I perceive roles mainly as products of the DPRK´s interactions with other actors on the international scene. This is closely connected with my methateoretical background which I will also discuss later on in this introduction. Last but not least, the usefulness of the role theory for the foreign policy analysis of the authoritarian regimes is confirmed by the existence of studies dealing with China (Shih 1988, or Beylerian and Canivet 1997), Belarus (Chafetz, Abramson and Grillot 1996), Russia (Grossman 2005) and many other cases. As I have already mentioned above, the pivotal article written by Holsti (1970) also analyses the foreign policy of authoritarian countries.

Of course, the role theoretic approach suffers from weaknesses as well. At this place, I will try to briefly depict those ones that are relevant for my case study of North Korean foreign policy. Thies (2009, 35) mentions the vagueness of the concept of "role" itself when arguing that many interpretations of it appeared. Although the role theory offers "(…) rich conceptual language complete with numerous built in propositions for foreign policy analysts to explore" as Cameron Thies (2009, 35) states, the approach suffers from the lack of its own methodological apparatus which could be used for coherent studying of the roles (Wehner and Thies 2014, 413). Nevertheless, this problem can be surmounted relatively easily by supplementing the role theory with content or discourse analysis methods.

Many authors using the role theory do so this (compare for example Holsti 1970; Le Pestre 1997; Wehner and Thies 2014, or McCourt 2012) and this thesis will not be any exception.

Another problem that requires some attention is connected with the constructivist background which many scholars using the role theory recently adopted. As Breuning (2011, 22) points out, the border between the constructivist writings on identity or self images and constructivist works dealing with the national roles is rather vague. Moreover, the constructivist or interactionist wave in the role theory introduced a gap in understanding the definitions of the key role theoretic concepts (such as role change) (ibid.). I address this problem in detail when I grasp the issue of the *role change* later in this thesis (see Chapter 1.3.3). Last but not least, Breuning claims the potential of role theory to grasp the non-material aspect of foreign policy behaviour has not been sufficiently exploited yet (ibid.). I try to deal with this reproach by paying more attention to the process of social construction of roles. First, I hope I will be able to contribute to the debates about social sources of roles and their changes and second, to bring an alternative interpretation of the North Korean foreign policy based on the social constructivist positions in the role theory. The second mentioned is especially relevant as this approach has not been used for the DPRK´s foreign policy analysis yet.

Let me now approach to the articulation of the goals of this dissertation thesis. My goal is to better understand how North Korea perceives the part it plays (or should play) in the international politics and how its interaction with other actors impacts that. I aim to do so as I argue that the revelation of these aspects can potentially help to facilitate the communication with the DPRK. I will achieve the above mentioned goal by using specific tool for interpretation of the DPRK's foreign policy, i.e. the *role theory*. To be more

specific, I adopt the role theory prism[4] in order to find and grasp the patterns of continuities and changes in the roles North Korea declares. After I identify the roles North Korea speaks out, I aim to examine the correlation[5] between these roles and actual foreign policy of the DPRK. In particular, I aim to identify the situations where significant changes in the role saliency occur, where the DPRK either starts to emphasize some role over another, or where the old roles are refused and new roles show up. After I do so, my goal is to contextualize these role shifts with the shifts in actual North Korean foreign policy and with North Korean interaction with its significant others. I claim the identification of the formative moments or situations of the role shifts can help me to better understand the dynamic of North Korean foreign political processes and reveal and interpret some sources of their changes that turn up.

Right at this place, I feel obligated to make clearer both my metatheoretical commitments and my position as far as the existing approaches inside the role theory are concerned. I perceive myself as a moderate social constructivist. I believe I can generate useful knowledge about the world we live in, i.e., I can actually approach the roles North Korea declares using the method of content analysis of North Korean discourses. Therefore, from epistemological point of view, similarly as Alexander Wendt (1999, 39–40) does, I believe in science in the framework of socially constructed world. As it has probably become obvious after reading the previous paragraph, my aim on the field of science is the *understanding*: I want to better understand how the North Korea perceives the part it plays in the international politics and how its interaction with other actors impact that as it can potentially facilitate the communication with the DPRK.

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[4] It has probably become clear after reading the previous pages that the role theoretic approach is rather broad and rich in interpretations. For now, it is sufficient to declare I incline to the interactionist tradition of the role theory. I will elaborate this statement in the methodological and theoretic section of this thesis which follows after the introduction.

[5] In the past, there have been several studies whose authors searched the correlation between declared roles and actual foreign policy. Studies of Walker (1987), Chafetz, Abramson and Grillot (1996), or Wish 1980 are just some examples.

It results from my metatheoretical stances that I am interested in social roots of North Korean foreign policy. Thus, I incline to the interactionist tradition of role theory (which I call *second wave of role theory* later in this thesis). Of course, adopting the interactionist or constructivist approach brings certain implications for my investigation. First, I approach roles mainly as products of actor's interaction with its significant others, i.e. the primary socializing agents for particular role beholder (Harnisch 2011a, 1; for further explanation see Chapter 1.3.1). Second, in my point of view, roles cannot be understood as objectively existing facts but rather, as North Korean expressions of the part it plays (or should play) in the international politics. Again, these expressions are co-constituted in the process of interactions with the significant others. Furthermore, arising from the constructivist background of the second wave of the role theory, I claim these expressions can change and do change which may be the result of the North Korean interactions with the significant others. I choose role theoretic approach to the study of North Korean foreign policy as I want to offer more social interpretation of this phenomenon. Majority of existing works[6] do not approach the DPRK in that manner although it might bring us to useful and alternative understanding of the DPRK's foreign policy.

Of course, by admitting the significant others are the important source of the roles North Korea declares, the need emerges to find out who the significant others are in the North Korean context. Some actors (such as the United States or South Korea) seem to be very obvious representatives of this group whereas the influence of other actors (such as various human rights groups or coalitions) on the North Korean role formation is much less apparent. So far, there has been a serious lack of literature dealing with this issue and thus, it is one of my component objectives in this thesis to determine who

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[6] One exception is the article written by Young Chul Cho (2011) which interprets the North Korean identity formation as a product of its delimitation against the United States and South Korea.

the significant others were in the time period I examined. The content analysis I use in this thesis is an instrument that will help me with this task.

The main goal I delimited above will be accomplished in two steps. First one is to identify the roles North Korea declared between 1994[7] and present, i.e. 2015 using the method of content analysis of two kinds of texts. First, I concentrate on the discourses delivered by the regime elites. I located these texts in North Korean periodicals because the original full text recordings or transcriptions were with some exceptions unavailable. Second, I analyse carefully selected general[8] and on foreign policy focussed articles or extracts of the articles published in The Pyongyang Times newspapers and Korea Today magazine. With respect to the fact news redactions members' statements articulated in articles function as a regime bullhorn, it is possible to accept them as relevant resources where I can also look for the roles. I thoroughly explain the process of selection of relevant materials later in this dissertation (see Chapter 2). Similarly as Aggestam (1999), I assume the deep analysis of roles nation declares can help us to trace down changes in the operational framework of its foreign policy. Furthermore, the analysis and identification of the roles North Korea declares also seems to be a feasible instrument for tracking down the long term patterns of North Korean foreign political behaviour.[9] The first step will result in the formation of a codebook which will follow the developments and changes in sets of North Korean national roles. This codebook is enclosed as an appendix in the very end of this thesis.

[7] I selected year 1994 as a starting point for my analysis as it was the year of death of Kim Il Sung. Owing to these circumstances, it is possible to expect the occurrence of significant speeches and statements where the elites will articulate the important determinants of future course of the DPRK's foreign policy. Therefore, year 1994 is a good stepping stone for searching for the baseline texts (see Chapter 2.5 for further explanation) where the salient roles will be identified.

[8] It is suitable to work with rather general texts that usually include a broad spectrum of issues instead of all the foreign policy-related discourses as our goal is not to follow individual events/DPRK relations with any particular state in detail. Rather, the foreign political course and trends are important for our purposes (comp. Thibault and Lévesque 1997, 17, or Chafetz, Abramson and Grillot 1996, 740).

[9] The role theoretic approach does not enable us to observe particular foreign-political decisions. Nevertheless, this does not constitute any problem for the purposes of my analysis which is supposed to observe the patterns and trends of foreign policy rather than particular steps.

Once the codebook is created, I will be able both to identify certain preliminary patterns of continuities and changes that occurred in the role sets and to concretize the significant others against whom the DPRK delimits itself. After that, the second step will follow. I will further work with the codebook as I will try to examine the changes in the role sets and I will contextualize them with North Korean (social) interactions with the significant others. Similarly as Cho (2011, 315), I understand the DPRK as an actor constantly engaged in the debate about its role with the significant others. Last but not least, I focus on how the roles North Korea declares projects in its foreign policy. This is also connected with the issue of role saliency: it will be interesting to observe how strongly the most salient roles (i.e. the roles regime declared the most often) impact on the foreign policy formation.

In sum, I will map the changes together with their time classification and I subsequently put them in the context of North Korean relations with its significant others. By mapping of changes in the operational framework of North Korean foreign policy, I should be able to assess the trends and patterns of these changes which will help me to better understand the dynamics of North Korean foreign policy formation. At this moment, several practical questions arise: What is the composition of the North Korean role sets? Are there any roles that have been constantly present in the North Korean role sets? If the change in the role set composition occurred, was it a result of certain "traumatic events" (Breuning 2011, 20) or was it rather product of gradual vanishing of roles? To be able to answer these questions, the codebook mapping North Korean role set will be used.

To sum up, the goals I identified above imply four research questions:

1) What were the national roles North Korea declared in the time framework I examine and how the composition of North Korean role

sets looked like? (this question will be answered after accomplishing the first step mentioned above)

2) How the saliency of particular roles within the role sets changed over time? Were the national roles subjected to any changes? (this question will be answered after accomplishing the first step mentioned above)

3) Which roles declared by North Korea projected into its foreign policy the most? (this question will be answered after accomplishing the second step mentioned above)

4) If any changes occurred, what were the patterns of these changes with regard to North Korean interactions with significant others? (this question will be answered after accomplishing the second step mentioned above)

The first two research questions are rather descriptive and instrumental in their character. Nevertheless, the identification of the national roles via the content analysis is demanding both in terms of time and abilities of researcher when considering the fact that I will search for the roles in relatively extensive dataset. Both second and third question refer to the issue of *role saliency*. As Harnisch (2012, 55) points out, the role saliency refers to the fact that roles are not of the same importance to their beholder (in our case, it is North Korea) and consequently, not all the roles have the same influence on the foreign political behaviour. Thus, it seems to be meaningful to pay attention to the role saliency by observing the occurrence frequency of particular roles in.

Finally, the third and forth question does offer the explorational potential which mainly lies in the searching for the patterns of role changes in relation with the significant others, impact of those changes on the North Korean foreign policy and in searching for the actual influence of roles declared to the foreign policy of the DPRK. If I am able to identify the particular

moments of interaction causing the role changes, it will be very helpful for obtaining more comprehensive picture of North Korean foreign policy formation.

The structure of this dissertation will be as follows. In the first chapter, after the brief overview of relevant literature, I introduce the developments and theoretical waves of the role theory-oriented foreign policy analysis as this approach presents my broadest analytical perspective. Afterwards, I operationalize the crucial concepts I work with and link them to the North Korean case study whereas the special attention is paid to the conceptualization of the *role change*. The issue of the role change is important for this thesis (which is also reflected in research goal and questions) but at the same time, it has not been elaborated on the theoretical level in satisfactory way yet (comp. Breuning 2011, 22). Therefore, I pay special attention to this *problematique*. In the second chapter, I proceed to the content analysis as a method which constitutes the stepping stone enabling the subsequent course of my investigation. I aim to describe both the methods of texts' selection and sorting and the methods of identification of national roles.

After dealing with theoretical and methodological questions, I will approach the third chapter which can be mainly perceived as a presentation of the data which arose from the content analysis. In this chapter, I pay attention to the national roles I have previously identified. As my work with the coding of texts is *referential* and the code (i.e. the particular national role which roofs the relevant text extracts) is formed "on the fly" (comp. Hájek 2014, 63–64), I am unable to vouch for the roles' content before I analyse the North Korean texts. Therefore, I delimit both the content of the particular roles and possible changes the roles underwent after I do the content analysis.

Finally, in the fourth chapter, I will explore the dynamics of roles North Korea declares. I will try to contextualize the particular moments of change I identified before with the North Korean interactions with significant others. This part should help me to better understand the dynamics of North Korean foreign political roles' formation and transformation in the light of the DPRK's interactions with its significant friends and foes (see below). In the very end of this thesis, I will naturally proceed with the summarization of my conclusions and answering my research questions.

Last but not least, the integral part of this thesis is actual codebook which is crucial for the identification of North Korean national roles in the depicted time framework. The codebook is enclosed in the very end of this dissertation thesis.

Note to the Transcription of Korean Names and Terminology

The official language in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is naturally Korean which uses a specific alphabet named *Hangul.* As this alphabet is completely different from the Roman letters, there is a need to deal with its transcription to the roman letters. There are several methods of transcription in use but I decided to adopt so called *Revised Romanization* of Korean as it is the most common and accepted way for Korean language transcription into English.

1. Evaluation of the Role Theoretic Literature, Role Theory Background and Delimitation of the Crucial Concepts

1.1 Role Theoretic Literature

Even before I introduce the approaches present in the role theory, let me proceed with a short overview of existing works of scholars who use the role theory in the foreign policy analysis. To begin with, there is the already mentioned article written by K. J. Holsti[10] (1970). Together with his team of researchers, he created a list of national role conceptions (17 in total) on the basis of content analysis of speeches of foreign political elites from 71 countries. Moreover, he focused on search of correlation between the particular types of national role conceptions and activity/passivity of the particular state on the international scene. Holsti admits the national role conceptions can be used for anticipation of diplomatic steps to certain extent which can be useful. As I have already indicated above, Holsti also searches for North Korean national role conceptions between 1966 and 1967 whereas he argues the DPRK enacted roles "*bastion of revolution-liberator*", "*anti-imperialist agent*" and "*liberation supporter*" (Holsti 1970, 275).[11]

The analytic framework created by Holsti was subsequently adopted by several authors in order to grasp states' foreign policy. Although it would not be meaningful to name all the works of all the scholars working with Holsti's legacy, it is reasonable to mention at least those that were somehow ground-breaking or important with regard to our dissertation. The first book whose authors use Holsti's foundations is collective monography edited by Stephen G. Walker (ed. 1987) named "Role Theory and Foreign Policy Analysis". In this book, authors further elaborate Holsti's approach

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[10] Even before Holsti published his pivotal article, several authors (for example, James N. Rosenau, see below) worked with the notion "role". Nevertheless, they did not contemplate it properly and used it in rather marginal way.

[11] In order to achieve as much clarity as possible in the text that follows, I always write the name of individual roles in *italics*.

and use it for the foreign policy analysis of several countries. As Beneš (2009, 25) points out, this publication actually confirms the usefulness of the role theory in foreign policy analysis. Although the reflection of the role theory was rather weak in 1980s, some important works were published, for example the article of Noami B. Wish (1980) who offers more extensive typology of roles, or Chih-yu Shih's paper (1988) which presents the case study of Chinese foreign policy and puts special emphasis on the relation between the Chinese cultural psychology and diplomacy. Similarly to Holsti, Shih mainly discusses the sources of national role conceptions arising from the domestic environment.

In the 1990s, the role theory experienced a comeback in many works of scholars focused on foreign policy analysis. If I should mention at least some of the most frequently quoted publications, it would be the collective monography edited by Le Pestre (ed., 1997) or the article by G. Chafetz, H. Abramson and S. Grillot (1996) where authors analyse correlation between national role conceptions articulated by elites and foreign political actions of Ukraine and Belarus with a particular emphasis on the probability of proliferation of nuclear weapons. Important (but rather implicit) contribution to the field of the role theoretic foreign political analysis was also introduced by Alexander Wendt (1992 and 1999). His work is one of the first ones that grasp both socially-conditioned roots of national roles and the issue of role identity change and thus, it is highly relevant for this thesis.[12] Last but not least, when dealing with the national identity of post-Soviet Russia, Glenn Chafetz pays attention to social origins of national role conceptions as well (comp. Chafetz 1996–1997, 664–665). Generally speaking, some new issues have penetrated the role theoretic approach in the 1990s which foreshadowed a new course that the role theory-inspired foreign policy analysis was supposed to take later. I call this new course *the second wave of role theory* later in this thesis.

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[12] For more, see Chapter 1.3.3.

Since 2000, more attention has been paid to the role conflict, role changes and especially, to the intersubjectivity and social conditionality of the national roles. In this regard, it is needed to mention the book edited by Sebastian Harnisch, Cornelia Frank and Hanns W. Maul (eds., 2011) named "*Role Theory in International Relations: Approaches and Analyses*", articles written by David McCourt (2012), or by Leslie E. Wehner and Cameron G. Thies (2014). Together with the contribution of Alexander Wendt (1999), their work is highly relevant for the purposes of this thesis. Nevertheless, even in 2000s, some behaviorally-oriented works appeared, such as the book by S. Walker, A. Malici and M. Schafer (eds., 2011).

If I should reflect the response to the role theory in the Czech environment, it has been rather weak so far. The role theory-inspired research firstly appeared at the Czech academic scene in 2009 thanks to the dissertation thesis written by Vít Beneš who used the role theory to analyse the relations of Russia and Turkey with the European Union (Beneš 2009) and to his rather theoretically oriented article focused on the ontological and epistemological issues connected with the role theoretic approach (Beneš 2010). Furthermore, the authors of collective monography written by Vladimír Handl (Handl ed., 2011) apply the Holsti's categories of national role conceptions when analysing the German foreign policy. In sum, I can say the role theory has had rather marginal position in the Czech academic sphere so far.

1.2 The Role Theory, Its Roots and Development

1.2.1 The First Wave of Scholars

The role theory approach has its roots in the middle of 20th century in the social psychology, sociology and anthropology (comp. Gross, Mason and McEachern 1958; Goodenough 1965, or Sarbin and Allen 1968) but we can track its origins back to George H. Mead's conceptualization of social roles in

1930s (comp. Mead 1934). Nevertheless, it was not until 1970s when Kaalevi J. Holsti systematically[13] used the approach in the field of foreign policy analysis (hereinafter referred to as FPA) in his path-breaking article "National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy" (Holsti 1970) which has already been mentioned in the Introduction. After publishing of this article, several authors (I have mentioned a handful of them in the Introduction as well, for example Wish 1980; Shih 1988, or Walker, ed. 1987) followed up Holsti's approach.

The "first wave"[14] scholars were often (but not always) based at the American universities (Thies and Breuning 2012, 2) and usually focused on how the international *system* compelled states to adopt certain roles. Those scholars also perceived the structural influences on a particular role beholder as rather rigid and the relationship between structure and actor as deterministic (comp. Tewes 1998, 118). Thus, the majority of works of the first wave of role theory remained connected with the positivism/objectivism and structural realism on the field of the international relations theory. This approach naturally suffered from similar difficulties and became subject of similar criticism as the structural realism itself such as neglecting the actor's side as far as the "actor–structure" debate is concerned.[15] Moreover, some proponents of the first wave of role

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[13] The concept of *role* itself in the IR was occasionally used on the field of international relations even before 1970s, as Holsti (1970, 255) points out. However, the concept of role used to be accepted rather uncritically and supplementarily to their existing approaches. It was Holsti (1970) who actually elaborated the concept in detail. Besides him, one should not forget about the work of James Rosenau who also contributed to development of the concept of role on the field of foreign policy analysis (comp. Rosenau 1966 and 1987).

[14] Roughly speaking, the works of the first wave of role theoretic approach were elaborated between the beginning of 1970s and 1990s whereas the writings of second wave scholars have been expanding since the very end of 1990s till present. However, this time classification should not be taken as a rigid one as some first wave scholars show certain degree of diversion from traditional structural approach and vice versa. Even Holsti (1970, 240) takes account of social relations between ego and alter in the international environment which is rather present in the works of the second wave scholars. Nevertheless, he still pays more attention to objective (eg. size or location) and systemic factors as far as the sources of the national role conceptions are concerned (comp. Holsti 1970, 245).

[15] Even the above mentioned Noami B. Wish (1980) suffered from excessive reliance on the influence of international structure or the states' status in the international system as also Breuning (2011, 17) points out.

theory resorted to behavioral methods of excessive quantification (especially Walker 1979, and Walker ed., 1987) which can be also perceived as the "heritage" of the positivist/objectivist background. The reliance on excessive quantification not only led to distorted conclusions or measurement errors, as Walker (1979, 204) himself admits but made the findings of the research somehow less comprehensible for the readers too (comp. Walker 1979, 194). Last but not least, McCourt mentions another problem connected with the first generation of role theory scholars, i.e. their conceptualization of roles as something which is simply hold by the actors who play them (McCourt 2012, 374). This issue is closely connected with the term *national role conception* that will be discussed later in this thesis.

To sum up, the first wave scholars often focused on proving the existence of relationship between roles and actor's foreign-political behaviour (comp. Wish 1980; Shih 1988, or authors in Le Pestre, ed. 1997) and believed in the influence of structural and material aspects as far as the origins of roles were concerned. Nevertheless, they did not pay much attention either to the role change processes or to the actual sources of this change. They simply did not perceived roles as social entities, worked on the presumption that international politics has rather sparse social density and thus did not really deal with the alter part as far as the roles' formation is concerned as Harnisch (2012, 52) points out.

The disproportionate attention to influence of international structure on the national roles' formation was also criticized by more sociologically-oriented Peter Gaupp (1983). Although he could be rather integrated to the first wave of role theoretic scholars in terms of temporal classification, his approach is more compact with the second wave. That is because he seems to be much less concerned with the objective (such as states' size or material capacities) and structural factors as the sources of national role conceptions and subsequent foreign political behaviour. On the contrary, he pays attention to

the relational and social factors as sources of national role conceptions (comp. Gaupp 1983, 109). His legacy leads us to the second wave of scholars using the role theory in the FPA, i.e. to the relationarily-oriented one.

1.2.2 The Second Wave of Scholars: Relational and Interactionalist Turn

Chart 1 placed in the end of this chapter summarizes both the differences between the two waves of role theoretic approach and it also grasps the disagreements inside the second wave. As we can see, the second wave of role theory in FPA to which I incline in this dissertation was largely influenced by social-constructivist ideas that started to manifest themselves mainly since the late 1980s in the field of international relations and brought a new emphasis on *the others* (or so called *significant others*, see below) and their interaction with *self* in mutually influential relationship as far as the self's role formation is concerned.

Although it has not been any strict rule, the second wave scholars were often based in Europe and stressed the relevance of role demands and alter expectations when contemplating about the role enactment. Still, the emphasis to the relational origin of roles differs from author to author. On one hand, the works of some authors remained *partially* but yet, not deterministically, tied with structural explanation. Alexander Wendt (1992 and 1999) whose contribution to the role theory is discussed below represents one example.[16] On the other hand, the works of those who prefer interactionism usually pay more attention to the process of role learning where the actor's decision to accept or not to accept a role is shaped *both* by the Others' expectation *and* by their own judgement of particular situation (Wehner and Thies 2014, 415; Harnisch 2012, 49; McCourt 2012, 379). Thus,

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[16] Nevertheless, the existence of the structure-oriented category of the second wave of role theory is questionable. First, the contribution of Alexander Wendt on the field of role theory was rather implicit as he has never claimed his allegiance to the role theory as such. Moreover, he seems to be the only representative of the structure-oriented category which makes its value even more problematic. Still, I decided to establish this category in order to depict the existing diversity in the framework of the second wave of role theory.

it is possible to see that the way how the second wave scholars deal with what I call *relational turn* later in this chapter differs from author to author. Let me explain those divergent streams in more detailed way.

Sebastian Harnisch (2011b, 36, or 2012) mentions George H. Mead's symbolic interactionism as a significant source for the second wave of role theory as the Meadian approach brought some innovative claims. First, it is the assumption of the mutually constitutive relation between the actor and (international) society. In this regard, the *relations* between actors at the international scene became increasingly important factors that are needed to be taken into consideration if we contemplate the origins of national roles (Harnisch 2012, 52). Second, the Meadian approach brought somehow different point of view to the "(...) shifts in state behavior through role taking and making"[17] (quoted according to Harnisch 2011b, 36). This refers to the fact the Meadian approach contributed significantly to the debates about the processes of role change as a product of social interaction.

To sum up, the main contribution of social constructivist ideas to the role theoretic FPA lies in the understanding of foreign political roles as *emerging social objects* (Harnisch 2011b, 38). What is crucial here is that influence of international structure[18] on actors' roles is much less rigid (in comparison with the first wave of scholars) and the role making is perceived as much more creative process which is subject of "(...) constant negotiating and renegotiating" (Tewes 1998, 118). Generally speaking, the *relational turn* significantly broadens possible *sources* of national roles. They can no longer been perceived as mere products of structural and/or material/objective aspects' influence as a lot of first wave scholars argued. Rather, they have to be understood and grasped as increasingly social entities and products of social interaction between ego and alter's expectations (Harnisch 2012, 52).

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[17] The notions of role taking and role making will be explained later in this dissertation.
[18] It is needed to point out at this place that I do not perceive the international structure in the Waltzian way. I further discuss this issue and explain my stance in Chapter 1.3.1, pages 26–27 of this dissertation.

The relational turn also gives a rise to something called *foreign policy culture*[19] which can be defined as "(…) a set of attitudes, beliefs and sentiments which give order to the foreign-policy process and which provide the underlining assumptions and rules that govern behaviour in the international system" (Tewes 1998, 119). What is also interesting here is that those actors' roles actually influence the foreign policy culture (ibid.) which reasserts the relevance of roles' states take.

As far as the proponents of the *second wave* are concerned, one can begin with rather implicit enactment of this approach by Alexander Wendt in his pivotal article (Wendt 1992) and more explicit one in the book he published a few years later (Wendt 1999).[20] What is important here is that Wendt presents social view on the transformation of roles/identities. He perceives the transformation of actor's identity/role which is incremental and very slow process as a product of the mutual interaction between actors. On the example of the evolution of cooperation, Wendt shows us that the positive transformation only occurs if the actors cease to identify negatively with one another and when the atmosphere of distrust disappears. However, as it is very difficult to change the relational patterns between actors, the roles and identities they enact tend to be relatively stable and actors generally do not want to change them because they usually shape their image and character. Consequently, Wendt concludes that the *conscious* transformation of roles is rather exceptional (Wendt 1992, 417–419).

Furthermore, Jepperson, Wendt and Katzenstein (1996) implicitly contemplate roles states take in the international environment too. They speak about the concept of identity which comes from social psychology (as does the role theory) and perceive it as a "(…) crucial link between

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[19] The issue of foreign policy culture is broadly discussed in Katzenstein ed., 1996.

[20] In his book, Wendt presents his typology of roles which is however too narrow as he just proposes the roles of enemy, rival and friend, the roles that are actually derived from his conceptualization of three cultures of anarchy, i.e. Hobbesian, Lockean and Kantian culture (Wendt 1999, 247). Nevertheless, as McCourt points out, Wendt's overall work with the notion of role is sometimes confusing and too vague (comp. McCourt 2012, 374).

environmental structures and interests" (Jepperson, Wendt and Katzenstein 1996, 14). They also capture crucial relational aspect valid even in the role theoretic environment, i.e. that the identity refers to "(…) the images of individuality and distinctiveness ("selfhood") held and projected by an actor and formed (and modified over time) through relations with significant others" (ibid.). They conclude this with an assertion that those relations refer to "(…) mutually constructed and evolving images of self and other" (ibid.). Wendt's (1992 and 1999) and Jepperson's, Wendt's and Katzenstein's (1996) works also show us the tendency of some scholars to merge the notions *role* and *identity*, especially whilst contemplating the modes of their changes[21] (comp. Wendt 1992, 417 or Jepperson, Wendt and Katzenstein 1996, 14, especially n. 85). If I should mention other authors who can be included in the second wave of role theoretic approach to FPA and who enact this approach in a more explicit way, I would highlight authors in Ole Elgström's and Michael Smith's book (eds. 2006) who adopt relational view while they apply the role theory to FPA of European Union,[22] Trine Flockhart who deals with the reconstruction of roles of NATO (Flockhart 2011) or rather theoretical chapter of Dirk Nabers (2011) dealing with the role change processes and many others.

Nevertheless, even the second wave scholars are subjected to criticism. In particular, Wehner and Thies (2014, 412–413) present three points of criticism whereas two of them may be relevant for this thesis. First, some

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[21] The merging of concepts of role and identity is relatively common feature of the constructivist role theoretic FPA (comp. Wehner and Thies 2014, 412). David M. McCourt (2012, 372–373) also points out that several authors (such as Jeffrey Legro or Mlada Bukovansky) who use term "identity" when speaking about states in international environment define this notion in a way that is actually interchangeable with the term "role". This is also very obvious in case of Tewes (1998) who seems to be inclining to some statements typical for the first wave scholars (comp. ibid., 118). Nevertheless, McCourt argues that despite those notions are related, they cannot be perceived as synonymous (McCourt 2012, 373). Last but not least, Dirk Nabers perceives the role as a basis for identity which is however filled with meaning through identity (Nabers 2011, 83). I argue that identities are much broader phenomenon than roles whereas the roles accepted by particular state have to make sense within its identity (or better set of identities). Otherwise it might shake the basic principles on which the particular regime rests.

[22] Very often, the proponents of the second wave often focussed on the analysis of European integration process.

scholars (such as Wendt 1999) remain too tied with structural/material explanation. Second, the role theory still suffers from methodological poverty as there has never been any attempt to develop coherent methodological tools in addition to its rich conceptual tools. This is however not insurmountable problem as the scholars often use existing methods such as process tracking, content analysis or discourse analysis (Wehner and Thies 2014, 413). I have already pointed out above that this dissertation is not any exception.[23] Finally, they mention the negligence of domestic contestation and debates as far as the origin of national roles is concerned (Wehner and Thies 2014, 413). The issue of domestic debates and their influence on the role change is also discussed by Hollis and Smith (2000, 182–183). However, there is significantly less space left for the domestic debate in the North Korean case when we consider the authoritative regime character itself, although some form of debate within the North Korean ruling elite probably exist. The analysis of roles I implemented actually shows that the broader space for influence of internal dynamic opened the year immediately after the death of Kim Jong Il. Again, I will discuss this issue later in this thesis. To sum up, the second wave of role theory both broadened the spectrum of possible sources of national roles whilst the scholars pay significantly higher attention both to the social origins of the national roles and the role change process.

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[23] In Chapter 2, I dedicate proper space to the method of content analysis I use.

Chart 1: Waves of Scholars on the Field of the Role Theory in Foreign Policy Analysis

	First wave	Second wave	
		structure-oriented	*interactionalist*
Approximate time classification	from 1970s till 1990s	from 1990s till present	
Theoretical and methodological background	structural realism (strong positivism)	thin constructivism	thin constructivism
Inclination in actor-structure debate	strong structural determinism	enlightened structural approach; structure still perceived as an formative element for the roles actors enact but structural influence is not deterministic	interactionist approach; accounting both actor and structure as equally valid aspect influencing roles enacted;
Role change	rare	problematic but possible	roles are subject of gradual but omnipresent forming and reforming
Sources of NRCs/roles	predominantly material	rather social/ideational	predominantly social/ideational
Sources of NRCs/role change	N/A	rather social/ideational	predominantly social/ideational
Field of interest	attempts to prove/grasp the correlation (or even causality) between the NRCs and foreign political behaviour;	role identity transformation	role change, role conflict, processes of role formation
Example of authors	Noami B. Wish, Stephen G. Walker, Philippe Le Pestre	Alexander Wendt	Sebastian Harnisch, Dirk Nabers

Source*:* created by author.

1.3 Role Theory Approach as an Instrument for the North Korean Foreign Policy Analysis: Operationalization of the Key Concepts

As it has already been mentioned earlier, the conceptual framework of the role theory can be perceived as a valuable and innovative instrument with potential to grasp the complex reality of states' foreign policy. However, before we start to work with it in our analysis, there is a need to grasp the key notions and operationalize them with regards to specifics of the North Korean foreign policy case study.

1.3.1 National Role Conceptions, Roles and Their Formation: Considering the Interactionalist Legacy in the Role Theory

First concept that requires attention is the *national role conception* (hereinafter referred to as NRC or NRCs). Broadly speaking, this is a notion primarily defined, developed and used in the first wave role theoretic tradition by Kalevi J. Holsti (1970). Due to its relationship with the first wave scholars, the original definition of this concept is quite intensely connected with the strong structuralism and positivism, respectively (see Chart 1) which makes its use in my analysis questionable. Still, there is a need to explain this concept before I start to critically evaluate it.

Originally, the NRCs were defined as "policymakers' own definitions of the general kinds of decisions, commitments, rules and actions suitable to the state and of functions, if any, their state should perform on the continuing basis in the international system or in subordinated regional systems" (Holsti 1970, 245–246). Noami B. Wish (1980, 532) proposes another definition: role conceptions can be defined as relatively stable "(…) foreign policy makers' perceptions of their nations' positions in the international system". Last but not least, Le Pestre (1997, 5–6) perceives NRCs as duties and responsibilities of a country articulated by its foreign-political elites. To sum up, in the framework of the first wave, the NRCs were mainly perceived as expressions of commitments, tasks or duties of a state in the international system. The role theory in its original version goes on: once declared, the NRCs start functioning as general categories foreign political elites rely on. As Chafetz, Abramson and Grillot (1996) emphasise, after being declared, the NRCs are transformed into certain operational principles that subsequently contribute to the formation of particular diplomatic steps which actually makes them to a stimulating point of interest for foreign policy analysis.

However, as I pointed out, those definitions do not seem to be quite fitting for the constructivist role theoretic FPA. In particular, roles are not and cannot be limited just to the duties and responsibilities given actor actually *holds* because only little space is left for the influence of (social) interaction on the roles' formation. As McCourt (2012, 376) argues, "(…) role playing is not in the main about doing what must be done, or what it is permitted to do; it is for the most part about doing what is *expected[24]*, appropriate or possible in a given situation". Also Le Pestre (1997, 5) points out that the states need *both* to define a role *and* "(…) having it accepted by other actors". Thus, we should not accept roles are *just* responsibilities and duties hold by states because if we do so, a significant aspect is missing in our conceptual framework, i.e. the aspect of an interaction of actor with his or her environment, his or her perception of the others' expectations and in general terms, the dynamics of interaction itself.

Above mentioned considerations lead me to the problematic nature of the notion of national role conception itself which is the reason I will work with a mere notion of *national role* (hereinafter referred to as NR or simply *role*). I omit the word "conception" as it could lead reader to an incorrect conclusion that I adopt the original conceptualization of NRCs. For me, the NR stands for the North Korean regime's expressions of its commitments, tasks and duties that are formed in the process of North Korean interactions with the significant others. In other words, the roles should be understood as a combination of self-conceptions held by Ego and expectations of the Alter (comp. Kirste and Maull 1996). By accepting the interactionist point, the claim of Noami B. Wish that the NRCs are *stable* perceptions held by foreign policy makers (see above) becomes increasingly challenged. Again, S. Harnisch argues that the roles are inherently contested "(…) because roles and their enactment are closely related to the roles of other actors"

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[24] Italics added by author.

(Harnisch 2011a, 8). Thus, it is possible to see that the interactionist approach makes the space for the role change significantly broader.

This leads me to question of the processes of formation and transformation of the national roles. As it has probably become obvious from the previous part where I introduced the two waves of the role theory, there is a disagreement between the second wave scholars about what are the main impulses for formation and transformation of the NR. When looking at the second wave of the role theory in Chart 1 again, we can see the *structure-oriented scholars* tend to prefer the influence of a structure to the influence of significant others to the roles' formation whereas the *interactionists* try to pay equal attention to structure, significant others and judgement of actors (comp. Wehner and Thies 2014, 415). I do not want to rely excessively on structural influences but at the same time, I cannot neglect their influence either. Therefore, I pay attention to both actor's judgements and structural influences[25] and the structure in the form I grasp it (see next paragraph) seems to stay highly relevant in my approach.

I argue that the structure cannot be understood in structural-realist terms as Kenneth Waltz perceives it, i.e. as a rather abstract set of limitations that determine actor's behaviour that should be separated from its constituting units, their actions, behaviour and characteristics (Waltz 1979, 74 and 79). Furthermore, I do not think we can simply omit the way how the units interact as Waltz proposes (ibid., 80). By contrast, I believe the structure as I work with it in this thesis is based *mainly* on the interaction between the units. To be more specific, I believe the mutually constitutive relation

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[25] However, I will not be able to fully grasp one of the factor that is typical for the interactionists in the role theoretic FPA, i.e. the already mentioned domestic contestation and debate about the content of roles which is typical for democratic regimes. This is understandable with regard of the fact I analyse the foreign policy of North Korean regime which is authoritarian.

between an actor and his or her significant others can be perceived as a core aspect that defines the structure.[26]

At this point, I finally come to the notion of the *significant others*[27] I have already mentioned several times above. Sebastian Harnisch (2011a, 11) provides useful definition based on the legacy of George H. Mead's work. He argues that in the interpersonal relationships, the significant others (such as parents or siblings) are the primary socializing agents for particular role beholder. To put this assertion in the context of the international relations, the significant others are the actors that are the crucial reference point for the role beholder[28] as the role beholder forms the roles with regard to the significant others. Harnisch also adds the selection of the significant others is usually based on role beholder's past experience and the whole process of change of significant others may be connected with shock or crisis situations (Harnisch 2011a, 12).

Alexander Wendt also discusses the issue of the significant others arguing that "(…) the identities are learned and then reinforced in response to how actors are treated by significant Others" (Wendt 1999, 327). Furthermore, Wendt pays attention the interaction between given actor and others. He argues that if the (significant)[29] other treats us as we were an enemy, we reflect that and we are likely to accept this belief in our own role identity in relation with the other (ibid.). In short, the significant others are crucial

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[26] This definition leads us to what Waltz (1979) calls the reductionist conception of structure. However, I think this conception is much more suitable for my analysis as it can help me to understand the actor's foreign political behaviour which is the goal of this thesis in general terms.

[27] Erving Goffman uses the notion "role others" (comp. Goffman 1961, 75).

[28] It is useful to delimit the two key concepts closely connected with the concept of the significant others and interactionist or Meadian tradition of the role theoretic FPA, i.e. the notions of "I", "me" and "self". As I have already stated above, those terms arise from the work of George H. Mead. Briefly speaking, Mead understands the "*I*" as "(…) the response of the organism to the attitudes of others" (Mead 1934, 175) and "me" as "(…) the organized set of attitudes of others which one himself assumes" (ibid.). What is highly relevant here is Mead's assumption that "the attitudes of others constitute the organized "me" and then one reacts toward that as "I"" (ibid.). Finally, those two elements meet in what Mead calls the "self": "The self is essentially a social process going on with these two distinguishable phases (ibid., 178).

[29] The attribute "significant" is crucial in Wendt's work too as he admits that not all others in the international environment are equally important for given actor (Wendt 1999, 327).

actors that the role beholder needs in order to be able to actually delimit the roles he or she intends to play. The importance of the significant others for one's role formation also corresponds with the Median conception of self which is elaborated in note 28.

The implication of the previous paragraph for my analysis of North Korean foreign policy and role sets[30] is that I necessarily must delimit who are the significant others for the DPRK as a role set beholder. When I do so, it opens me a way to better understanding of North Korean foreign political steps. The identification of the North Korean significant others in the time framework I analyse[31] arose both from the exploration of the original North Korean foreign political texts and from examination of the secondary resources dealing with the North Korean foreign political vectors.[32]

First, the DPRK needs to delimit itself against the significant others in a *negative way* (which contributes to formation of rather inimical roles). At the same time, however, the DPRK obviously needs to identify itself with some parts of the international community in a *positive way* (i.e. to form amicable roles). When compared with the "foes group", the concrete delimitation of typical proponents of the "friends group" seems to be more complicated but yet, it is possible. I deal with the delimitation of concrete members of both groups of significant others in Chapter 3.3.

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[30] The role theoretic scholars generally agree the individual national role conceptions form so called *role set*, i.e. the sum of national role conceptions in a given time framework. The main time unit we work with here is the year and therefore, our role set is a sum of national roles that were identified with the DPRK in twelve months. Later in this thesis, I work with both plural (role sets) and singular (role set). By notion role sets, I refer to sum of North Korean role sets for selected temporal period. By using notion role set, I only refer to one role set for single year.

[31] The composition of a group of actors that can be called significant others does not has to be constant as also Harnisch (2011a, 12) points out and the group of a role beholder's significant others may be transformed. However, I can say from our experience that the North Korean group of significant others remained stable in the whole time framework I analyse (i.e. between 1994 and 2015).

[32] The text of Young Chul Cho is especially relevant as he uses the both interactionist and interpretative approach when analysing the North Korean policy (comp. Cho 2011). I discussed and analysed his contribution elsewhere (comp. Kudláčová 2015).

1.3.2 Role Enactment and Its Correlation with the NRs

The *role enactment* (or in Holsti's terms *role performance*) was previously defined as "(…) attitudes, decisions, and actions governments take to implement" (Holsti 1970, 240) or as actual behaviour of given actor with regard to its roles and role set composition. To be more specific, the role enactment encompasses various foreign policy actions, inactions and speech acts (Harnisch 2011a, 15) and can be perceived as actual foreign political behaviour of given actor.

The relationship between NRs and role enactment was in the centre of attention mainly in the works of the first wave role theoretic scholars (again, see Chart 1) as they examined the correlation (and even causal relationship in some cases) between them whereas the role enactment usually functioned as a dependent variable and NR as the independent variable. To begin with sociological literature that created a basis for role theory in FPA, even Erving Goffman accepted the existence of correlation between the role performance and something which was later called the role conception (compare Goffman 1961, 77). If I should mention some later authors who actually examined this relationship, Stephen Walker did so when analysing the foreign policy of third countries towards two superpowers during the Cold War era. He claimed we can observe a group of countries whose foreign policy is convergent with the role sets they declare but also a group of countries that evinces the divergent tendencies (Walker 1987, 82–83). Moreover, Chafetz, Abramson and Grillot (1996) investigated the ability of the role theory to anticipate foreign political behaviour on the case study of likelihood of the nuclear proliferation of Ukraine and Belarus after the end of the Cold War. They reached the conclusion that the NRCs function as useful indicators to foresee the future foreign policy. Finally, Noami B. Wish concludes that there is a strong correlation between some types of NRCs and foreign political behaviour (Wish 1980, 549).

As there were numerous studies that demonstrated the correlation between the national roles and foreign political behaviour, I accept this assumption as the starting point for our analysis. Thus, I assume there is the correlation (however, not the causal relationship!) between the NRs and foreign policy behaviour. The adoption of this assumption is truly crucial for me. This correlation works as a Popperian *basic assumption* (comp. Popper 1997, 94–96) for me on which I build my subsequent analysis.

1.3.3 Change of the National Roles

Whereas the previously mentioned concepts were present both in the works of first wave and second wave scholars, the issue of role change was elaborated in the framework of the constructivist role theory, i.e. it has been a domain of the authors of the second wave. The role change stays in the core of constructivist (and *interactionalist* in particular) literature on the role theory as well as of this thesis as my aim is to explore the processes of changes which appear in the North Korean role sets. After reading the following paragraphs, we will find out the role change is closely related with the issue of sources of NRs' formation which I have discussed earlier in this thesis. The conceptualization of the role change can still be perceived as one of the aspects of the role theoretic approach which has not been comprehensively elaborated yet and the existing contributions on this field still seem to be in its infancy. Let me firstly outline the existing contribution in this field. After I do so, I will try to concretize and stretch them to the North Korean case study.

✥ *Role Change Conceptualization: The State of the Art*

Dirk Nabers (2011, 84) defines the role change as "a change in the shared conception and execution of typical role performance and role boundaries". Thus, in Nabers' view, the role change encompasses both the change of NRs and role enactment (or performance). He also urges us to carefully distinguish the role change from the *deviance* which can be understood as behaviour which is not connected with given role and thus falls outside its frame (ibid.). Nevertheless, he fails to elaborate the issue of role deviance in detail. Furthermore, Nabers argues that the role change is likely to appear when the role performance stops to correspond with actor's identity. He also claims that the roles are located as structural positions inside the social structure. Similarly to identities, the roles cannot be understood as static entities. Their content is always subject of forming and reforming and they are very likely to change in case of crisis, insecurity or dislocation (ibid., 85–86).

As we can see, Nabers interprets the roles as inherently instable categories. Chafetz, Abramson and Grillot (1996) adopt less radical position as far as the possibility of role change is concerned. Firstly, they set three categories of factors that contribute to the formation and reformation of roles: *social* (i.e. past and current experiences the nation has with other countries, and social and economic pressure arising both other countries and citizens), *nonsocial* (i.e. material aspects such as population, economics strength, or values and traditions,[33] and *contextual*. At the same time, they argue the social elements probably have the strongest influence on the role formation as the material factors do not have any meaning without the social experience: "Social interaction is particularly likely to produce change when the centrality or saliency of given role conceptions is unclear or when a given state's national

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[33] Let me just point out at this place that I perceive the values and traditions as social aspects. Therefore, I do not fully agree with the classification provided by Chafetz, Abramson and Grillot (1996).

role conceptions do not match international expectations of the state's role" (Chafetz, Abramson and Grillot 1996, 736).

Ulrich Krotz (2002) arrives to similar conclusion arguing that there are three main origins of the NRCs: history, memory and socialization. As we can see he does not perceive the material aspects as important determinants for role formation at all. Wehner and Thies (2014, 419) also emphasize the external expectations of the significant others are key source for construction of the roles. Chafetz, Abramson and Grillot argue that the changes of NRCs tend to be gradual. If the NRCs were subjects of constant changes, the world would become highly instable and unpredictable. Although authors seem to arrive to the same conclusion as Dirk Nabers does, i.e. that the role changes are likely to appear in the time of crisis, at the same time, they do not think states abandon their instantly. Rather, they slowly downgrade their saliency (Nabers 2011, 86).

Also Alexander Wendt (1992) touches the issue of the role change although rather indirectly. He argues that the conscious transformation of roles is rather exceptional and occurs under two conditions. First, there must be a reason for given actor to think of oneself in novel terms. This seems to stem from the presence of new social situations that simply cannot be dealt within pre-existing conditions. Second, expected cost of role change cannot exceed the rewards (Wendt 1992, 419). The second argument is connected with rational choice of given actor. Last but not least, Wendt claims state is more likely to undergo (role) transformation if there is a breakdown of consensus about its identity at home (ibid., 420).

In his later work, Wendt elaborated the issue of role identity[34] change in detail. Briefly speaking, he identifies two modes of role identity formation.

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[34] Wendt is not the role theoretic scholar and therefore, he uses terminology which differs from the one of the role theoretic scholars (such as "role identity"). However, his findings are useful for my role theoretic approach too. This is further confirmed by the fact that he arrives to similar conclusions about the possibilities for (role) change as the role theoretic scholars.

First, it is the *natural selection* which correlates with the rational actor model which has already been mentioned in previous paragraph: actor simply follows his or her strategic and rational choice whereas the identities and interests are exogenously given. This implicates actor is able to carefully consider the risks, opportunities and conditions in which he or she find himself or herself. However, this view on the identity formation (and transformation) does not seem to be crucial for Wendt (1999, 324) any longer. On the other hand, he pays much more attention on so called *cultural selection* mode of where the *imitation* (i.e. the situation when the actors adopt the positions of those whom they perceive as successful [ibid., 325]) and *social learning* constitute two core sources of identity formation. The concept of social learning is especially relevant for Wendt. He argues that in this process, "(...) the identities and interests are learned and then reinforced in response to how actors are treated by significant Others" (Wendt 1999, 327). This leads us back to the interactionist legacy and to the formative influence social interaction as far as the role formation and reformation is concerned.

The question of social learning and *role learning* in particular in relationship with the role change has recently been elaborated by Sebastian Harnisch (2011b and 2012). He perceives the role learning as rather gradual and slow process in which the role beholder changes its roles on the basis of social experience.[35] When contemplating about the role change, he introduces new term *as-if role taking* (or *role making*) which can be roughly understood as an actor's attempt to adopt a new role (Harnisch 2012, 54). Similarly to his predecessors, Harnisch argues that this attempt is often connected with situation of risk and/or uncertainty (Harnisch 2011b, 43). Thus, he perceives the as-if role taking as a mechanism of self-reflection via which an actor deals with the insecurity and indeterminate situations. Nevertheless,

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[35] It is needed to point out that the learning is not restricted to socially accepted behaviour as it can entail learning role which are unacceptable to others (Harnisch 2011a, 12). This seems to be especially relevant in the North Korean case.

the success of the new role-taking process is dependent on the acceptance of a new role by significant others at the same time.[36] If the role taking is successful, the new role starts to function as an institution that enables the role beholder as well as his or her significant others to act predictably.

❧ *Transformation of the NRs: Existing Framework for Analysis and Its Shortcomings*

After reading the previous paragraphs, we can say the debate about the role change basically revolves around *four* questions:

1) Are role changes gradual and slow or rather sudden and quick?
2) When the role changes occur?
3) Why the role changes occur?
4) If the role change occurs, what were the means via which it comes into the existence?

As far as the first question is concerned, the answer is relatively uncomplicated. As I have already mentioned above, the scholars concur in the claim that the role changes are rather slow and gradual but they do not rule out the possibility of sudden shifts. This assertion confirms that if we want to focus on the dynamics inside the role sets, we should do so in a longer time period as it is more probable we will be successful in grasping them. Furthermore, if a sudden change appears, the scholars argue that it is a result of the moment of crisis or shock when actor's existing role set is challenged and stops to reflect the newly developed situation.

The researchers also addressed the second and third questions. If the role change is to occur, there must be a reason for the as-if role beholder to think of oneself in a novel terms (comp. Wendt 1992 discussed above), the rewards (either material or non-material) which the as-if role beholder

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[36] At this place, we can obviously notice the legacy of interactionism in the conceptualization of the role change Harnisch introduces.

would gain exceed the costs of abandoning of the existing role and given actor is no longer able to function in the framework of existing role set, i.e. the existing role set stops to reflect the current social reality and his relations with the significant others. Last but not least, the role change may occur if the actor faces a situation of insecurity or risk. The last mentioned is rather connected with a sudden change in the role set but yet, not limited to it.

As far as the forth question is concerned, the answer seems to be the most complex. It has probably become obvious that the scholars have recently acknowledged that the *social interaction* is very important source for the role transformation. Again, it was S. Harnisch (2011a) who elaborated this issue, although not without any problems (see below). Chart 2 represents his conceptualization of the modes of role change.

Chart 2: Conceptualization of the Modes of Role Change by S. Harnisch

Source: created by author according to Harnisch 2011a.

First, he speaks about *normative persuasion* defined as a process when the entrepreneurs of existing normative order try to negotiate a consensus or

agreement with the non-members[37] (Harnisch 2011a, 13). The second mode of change is *altercasting* which he defines as a technique when the significant other is consciously manipulating his or her own role performance with an aim to shape the role of given role beholder and vice versa (comp. Harnisch 2011a, 13 or also McCourt 2012, 380). To put it simply, altercasting is a tactic of the *role ascription* and it is closely related to the normative persuasion. The difference between the normative persuasion and altercasting seem to lie in more manipulative character of the latter. Third, as we already briefly mentioned above, Harnisch pays attention to the *role learning* (or social learning) defined as a process when the role beholder changes his or her roles on the basis of social experience. The last mode of transformation Harnisch proposes is *socialization[38]* i.e. "the process by which an outsider internalizes the behavioral rules previously set by a community of insiders" (Harnisch 2011a, 13).

Nevertheless, Harnisch's classification of modes of role change suffers from certain difficulties that arise when we examine his definitions in depth. Those difficulties seem to be relatively grave as they prevent us from practical use Harnisch's modes of changes categorization. If exploring the four modes of change he introduces in more detailed way, we soon find out there is strong overlap between them. The problem lies in the very way how Harnisch presents them as his explanation often seems to be incomplete or unclear. Let us now present some examples of these ambiguities.

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[37] However, this mechanism of the role change seems to be highly demanding. To be successful, the basic precondition for normative persuasion is an existence of shared worldview between the norm entrepreneur and the actor who is supposed to be persuaded (Harnisch 2011a, 13).

[38] There is a plethora of approaches to socialization in the international environment Let me mention at least some of them. First one, i.e. the rationalist approach was elaborated mainly by Frank Schimmelfennig (2005) although in fact, Alexander Wendt (1992 and 1999) mentions it too (see above). According to Schimmelfennig (2005, 828), socialization refers to a process when actors react on the material incentives when considering changes of behaviour. The second mode of transformation was elaborated by A. Wendt who calls it the *cultural transformation* that can be perceived in two ways: either as the imitation or as the social learning (see above). Harnisch (2011a, 13–14) introduces two categories of socialization whereas the first one is compatible with Schimmelfennig's rationalist approach and the second one is compatible with Wendt's imitation.

First, it is problematic to properly distinguish between the socialization and role learning as the borderline between the two concepts in the way Harnisch defines it is blurred. Second, both altercasting and normative persuasion can be seen as the role ascription practices, i.e. practices used by significant others to assign particular role to as-if role taker. Thus, they should rather be perceived as two sides of one coin. Moreover, if we grasp the concept of social learning as a process when the as-if role beholder interact with his or her significant others in mutually constitutive way, we find out that the altercasting and normative persuasion may occur as possible ways of social learning. Last but not least, the conceptualization of socialization and its subcategories as proposed by Harnisch (2011a, 13–14) partially overlaps with the normative persuasion which he presents as different category at the same time. To sum up, as the Harnisch's conceptualization of the modes of role change is problematic and unsatisfactory for us, a need emerges to deal with it and to try to grasp whole issue from different angle.

⤫ *Social Interaction as a Source for the Role Change: Alternative Perspective Applicable to the Study of North Korean Foreign Policy*
My critique of Harnisch's attempt to delimit modes of role change should result in proposal of alternative conceptualization of the role change modes. Although I refuse the way how he delimits the means of role change, I do not reject his interactionist background. Thus, I will try to grasp it in a way which better suits my purposes. Doing so, I will borrow some segments of Wendt's work on the identity change as I think he provides more comprehensive and feasible framework for role theory FPA I intend to do. Moreover, it is needed to point out at this place I interpret roles and the changes that occur in the role sets as products of interaction between the

DPRK and its significant others, i.e. between the *ego* and *alters*. Chart 3 below represents the modes of role change as I grasp them.

Chart 3: Role Change: Alternative Conceptualization

M o d e s   o f   t h e   N R C s '   c h a n g e

	sudden	crisis and shock situations	may lead both to role change and deviation	
Change of NRCs		strategic/rational choice	imitation of success	imitation of material success
	gradual			imitation of status success
		socialization	social learning (altercasting and normative persuasion may occur as techniques)	shallow learning (may lead to role deviation)
				deep/complex learning (may lead to role change)

Source: created by author.

Basically speaking, I distinguish between sudden and gradual role change whereas I claim that the majority of changes are gradual processes resulting from social interaction of the DPRK with the significant others. The particular modes arise both from sudden and gradual role change. I suppose the sudden change is result of crisis and shock situations functioning as the only mean of sudden change in the role set. To put one example of a moment of crisis or shock in the North Korean case we can observe this in the period immediately after the death of Kim Jong Il when Kim Jong Un came to the highest leadership position in the DPRK. Nevertheless, as we will find out after going through the results of the content analysis in Chapters 3 and 4, the reconfiguration of the role set was rather transitional. This further confirms the claim that the role changes tend to be gradual and slow and conditioned by interactions.

As far as the gradual change is concerned, larger space for the role change opens. First, there is strategic/rational choice mode. Nevertheless, this mode is rather contradictory to my interactionist background as it allows possibility of a role change arising from the pre-social self-interest. Although I feel it is necessary to introduce this mode as many would probably suggest it can be important source for role transformation, I believe it is a dead end. The existence of any pre-socially existing purely rationally given reasons for the role change is unlikely. This is because every actor including the DPRK enters the interaction with the significant others who have substantial influence on the roles formation and on North Korean perceptions of strategic behaviour on the daily basis. This makes the pure strategic decisions and choices as the modes of role change much less credible. This is also the reason why this mode of change is drawn in grey in Chart 3.

Second, I propose *socialization* as a crucial mode of gradual role change. In the beginning, it is needed to point out the socialization is very complex process. Consequently, there is a huge diversity of delimitations of this concept and as Flockhart (2006, 111) or Alderson (2001, 415) notice, the contradictory definitions often occur as the research regarding to this issue is still rather young. Let me briefly introduce several definitions of this process.

To begin with, there is the above mentioned definition provided by Harnisch who is the only scholar explicitly working with socialization directly on the field of role theory. In his view, socialization refers to a process "(...) by which an outsider internalizes the behavioral rules previously set by a community of insiders" (Harnisch 2011a, 13). Wendt (1999, 324) equals the socialization with the cultural selection I have already mentioned above. He borrows a definition from Boyd and Richerson defining it as a gradual mechanism of "involving the transmission of the determinants of behavior from individual to individual and thus from generation to generation, by

social learning, imitation or some other similar process" (Boyd and Richerson quoted according to Wendt 1999, 324).

Furthermore, Kai Alderson provides us with useful outline of existing approaches to socialization starting with realist conceptualization as proposed by Waltz[39] and finishing with the constructivist grasping of the concept and defines state socialization as "process by which states internalize[40] norms arising elsewhere in the international system" (Alderson 2001, 417). Finnemore and Sikking (1998, 902) define socialization as a mechanism when "(...) norm leaders persuade others to adhere" and argue that this involves diplomatic praise or critique which may include material incentives.

If I summarize the above mentioned conceptualization of socialization and link it to my role theoretic background, I define it as a complex procedure composed of several processes and sub-processes in which the actor *can either* adopt a new national roles on the basis of the *patterns* of mutual interaction with his or her significant others who can be defined as the actors of socialization *or* he or she can actually adjust the saliency of existing roles which may cause the reconfiguration of the role set as well. Thus, I basically identify two categories of change arising from the actor's interaction with the significant others. First, it is the emergence of a brand new role. Second, it is a bit more conservative change *inside* the role, i.e. the change of existing role's *saliency*. The concept of role saliency was elaborated by Sebastian Harnisch (2012, 55) who argues that the roles are organized hierarchically in the role sets whereas the roles appearing on the top of hierarchy have the strongest impact on the role behaviour. I argue we

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[39] Waltz (1979, 74–76) grasps the socialization in structural-functionalist logic when states are socialized into the international (anarchic) structure that moulds their behaviour to be egoistically-oriented.

[40] Alderson proposes three processes that are part of norm internalization, i.e. the individual belief change, political persuasion, when the domestic actors pressure governments to abide by the norm and finally, the cementation of the validity of norm at home (Alderson 2001, 418).

can grasp the saliency of individual roles by measuring the occurrence frequency of particular role in the framework of North Korean role sets for every year examined.

By inserting the verb *can* into the definition of socialization as a mode of role change above, I want to emphasize that the whole procedure does not necessary have to lead to adoption of a new role. Very often, the socialized actor accepts just certain aspects of behaviour and at the same time, it is likely he or she will also influence the significant others (or the actors of socialization). When I speak about the *patterns* of mutual interaction, I want to emphasize the gradual character of the process as it is dependent on a previous course of interactions with the significant others.[41]

Right now, let me proceed to the categories of socialization. In this regard, I decided to borrow from the work of Alexander Wendt (1999) as he successfully grasps the complexity of socialization procedure in a way which can be adjusted to the DPRK case too. He identifies two categories of socialization, i.e. the imitation and social learning (see Chart 3 again). I have already discussed this briefly earlier in this chapter but now, the whole issue needs to be elaborated in more detailed way. In the process of *imitation*, identities and interests are acquired when actors adopt "the self-understanding of those whom they perceive as successful" (Wendt 1999, 325). Furthermore, actors can imitate two different kinds of success: material success (i.e. the success in acquiring wealth and power in its material dimension) and status success, which is a function of prestige and power in its nonmaterial dimension (ibid.). If I apply this to my role theoretic FPA, I can define imitation as a process when the new roles are acquired by following the perceived successes of the significant others. It

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[41] In the North Korean case, the socialization is obviously underway on two stages. First, the DPRK seem to be socialized in what we called a group of friends or peers above. Second, the DPRK enters to the socialization with the group of foes. Consequently, in the North Korean context, socialization can be perceived as a two stage process which is going on simultaneously, although separately. We will elaborate those processes in the other section of this dissertation in detail.

has probably became obvious after reading this definition that it is more likely for the DPRK to imitate the behaviour of members of the friends or peers group of significant others rather than to imitate its foes.

As a second category of socialization, Wendt proposes the *social learning.* Again, I have already mentioned this process several times including its grasping by Sebastian Harnisch which I nevertheless do not perceive as satisfactory for the purposes of our analysis. Based on Wendt (1999, 327), we can define social learning as a process in which the new roles are learned, reinforced or weakened in response to how is the as-if role beholder treated by his or her significant others. As this definition is still relatively vague, Wendt elaborates his conceptualization of social learning relying on the principle of the *reflected appraisal* or *mirroring* (ibid, 327). In Chart 4 below, I tried to draw the whole process to be more comprehensive.

Chart 4: Mechanism of the Reflected Appraisal

Source: created by author using Wendt 1999.

In the framework of the reflected appraisal process, the as-if role beholder (in my case, the DPRK) comes to see itself as a reflection of how it thinks the significant others appraise or perceive it (ibid.). Following up the principle of reflected appraisal, if the significant others treat the role beholder as if it

was enemy/friend, then the role beholder is very likely to accept this belief in his or her role set.

Let me now briefly describe the process of the interaction between the as-if role beholder and significant others which is also depicted in Chart 4. As Wendt puts in, both parts of the interaction have some "*body*" which consist of needs and ideas of who they are and of certain beliefs about the roles of others that are based on previous interactions and experience. Thus, it is highly important for us to realize that by taking particular role, the as-if role beholder is "at the same time casting alter in a corresponding counter role" and vice versa (Wendt 1999, 329). To put it differently, when ego (or role beholder) acts, he or she gives a signal for alter (or significant other) about role the role beholder wants to play in this particular interaction. As a result, alter enacts a corresponding role. As Wendt aptly puts in: "the underlying logic here is the self-fulfilling prophecy: by treating the Other as if he is supposed to respond a certain way Alter and Ego will eventually learn shared ideas (…) and [*take them*][42] as their starting point they will tend to reproduce (…) in subsequent interaction" (Wendt 1999, 331). To sum up, the social interaction between the as-if role beholder and his or her significant others creates certain culture of interaction which shapes the subsequent interactions too (ibid.).

To put a practical example of above described mechanism, the DPRK is confronted with being casted in the role of isolated state or proliferator of WMDs which actually creates basis for subsequent enactment of roles that I later named as *isolate* and *internal developer*. This is further cemented by the "body" the DPRK enters the social interaction in the international scene I mentioned above. If I return to the debates about the stability and change-proneness of the roles now, the mechanism of self-fulfilling prophecy captured by Wendt actually confirms both the tendency of the role sets to be

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[42] Added by author.

stable and the slow and gradual character of their changes. Unfortunately, the described mechanism and its linking to the DPRK case leave a little space for learning new roles.

2. Semantical Content Analysis[43] and the Identification of the National Roles

As I already mentioned above, the content analysis stands for crucial methodological instrument which helps me to identify the role North Korea declares. Basically speaking, there are two approaches to how to identify the roles: inductive approach and deductive approach. The *inductive approach* is present in Holsti's (1970) work: on the basis of the content analysis of the foreign political discourses, he defines 17 NRCs in total. At the same time, he points out this number does not necessarily has to be final. The *deductive approach* is present in the writings of Martha Cottam (1986): she suggests 7 categories of role conceptions in total. However, her work is criticized by Shih (1988, 600) who perceives her typology as arbitrary as it is not supported by cross-cultural research. In general, Cottam's approach is rather marginal on the field of role theoretic FPA as the majority of authors use inductive approach which is closely connected with the method of content analysis. This dissertation thesis will not be any exception. Let me now describe how I implement the sorting of the relevant texts.

2.1 The Texts

Generally speaking, the scholars working with the role theory in FPA often analyse the discourses of the top-level foreign political elites. However, when approaching the North Korean foreign policy, I am confronted with a situation where I cannot unequivocally say who are the top level foreign policy representatives with the impact on the roles' articulation. As Lim (2002) or Koga (2009) point out, we are not able to determine the precise mechanisms of duties and responsibilities in the DPRK political system. The important foreign political statements are delivered by various authorities on various levels. Moreover, some crucial discourses such as the New Year

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[43] Semantical content analysis refers to the processes enabling the classification of symbols (or in my case, references to NRs) according to their meaning (Janis 1965 according to Krippendorff 2013, 50).

editorials,[44] which are generally perceived as one of the most important objects of reference for the DPRK's policy analysis of the Kim Jong-il's era (and in the first year of Kim Jong-un's era), were published with no reference to particular author and had institutional authorship. Last but not least, after Kim Jong Un came to power in the very end of 2011, he probably initiated various changes in North Korean decision-making structure which became more obvious recently.[45] This situation leads me directly to the first challenge regarding the content analysis I intend to do: the North Korean settings make an *a priori* selection of the principal elites *consistently* in charge of foreign policy (comp. Le Pestre 1997, 13) questionable. Facing this problem, certain modifications of the existing approach are necessary. On which texts should I focus when doing the content analysis?

It was my focus on the North Korean national roles' presentation *abroad* which helped me to reduce the spectrum of sources suitable for the content analysis. First, there are not many easily accessible platforms where the DPRK consistently and regularly presents its national roles. I argue that the North Korean English-written newspapers and magazines are the only place one can use for consistent and long term period-oriented content analysis. [46]

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[44] The New Year editorials are jointly published by *Rodong Sinmun* (the official organ of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea), *Josoninmingun* (the newspaper of the Korean People's Army), and *Chongnyonjonwi* (the organ of the Central Committee of the Kim II Sung Socialist Youth League) and subsequently translated and published in every North Korean printed and online medias. They are perceived as crucial materials where the DPRK formulates intended political course for the following year.

[45] It became obvious that in the framework of the process of consolidation of his power, Kim Jong Un initiated the changes in the decision-making structure as well. Most recently (in the end of June 2016), this resulted in the establishing of a new lead government body named the *Commission on State Affairs* chaired by Kim Jong Un which actually replaced National Defence Commission which stood for the crucial decision-making organ of Kim Jong Il´s era. (comp. Grisafi 2016, or Kim 2016).

[46] The international bodies never publish the full texts of the speeches of the DPRK representatives. This was a reason for me to contact the relevant North Korean authorities in charge and to ask them to provide me with any kind of recordings of speeches. Nevertheless, I have never received any answer. The only exception are the speeches of North Korean representatives at the UN General Assembly as some of them (alas not all of them, the speeches were only available in 1999, 2004, 2006, 2007, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2013, 2014 and 2015) are available online at the Cable-Satellite Public Affairs Network (C-Span) (comp. for example Pak 2013). Nevertheless, in order to maintain the consistency of the dataset, I decided to not work with these transcriptions and I rather used the UN General Assembly speeches as published in The Pyongyang Times and Korea Today.

Additionally, my focus on the DPRK's roles abroad actually eliminated various Korean-written newspapers such as *Rodong Sinmun* (Workers' Newspapers in English) that are often used by the DPRK-oriented scholars from the scale of potentially useful resources as these are primarily dedicated to the *domestic* audiences. I agree with Young Chul Cho's (2011, 315), claim that "North Korean texts are statements of record by which information that regime judges to be important is made public".

In particular, I scanned relevant parts (see above) of one North Korean English-written newspaper (The Pyongyang Times) and one North Korean English-written magazine (Korea Today). [47] After I did so, I thoroughly went through these texts for the first time and eliminated those that were too tied with particular foreign political measures. This step I made is also supported by the method used by authors in the book edited by Le Pestre (Le Pestre /ed./ 1997). In his chapter, Le Pestre points out all the authors in the book made an effort to select "(…) only general foreign policy pronouncements, that is, the speeches that embraced a variety of issues" (Le Pestre 1997, 13). By identification of such general statements, I was also able to reduce the spectrum of elites who delivered the relevant texts. In particular, Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong Il, Kim Jong-un, North Korean Foreign Ministers, their deputies,[48] members of the Workers' Party Korea Central Committee, National Defence Commission, Presidium of the DPRK Supreme People's Assembly, Korean Peoples' Army General Political Bureau/Supreme Headquarters, Cabinet and the North Korean representatives/delegations at various international

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[47] As there are many more English-written materials published by the DPRK that are dedicated to foreign audiences, there is a need thoroughly explain why I decided to work with the two mentioned resources only. I do so in Chapter 2.2 of this thesis.

[48] North Korean Foreign Ministers and their deputies regularly deliver speeches at the UN General Assembly and other international bodies (such as the ASEAN Regional Forum, the Non-Aligned Movement Summits and occasionally also the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization or the Executive Council of the Asian Parliamentary Association for Peace) that can surely be classified as the important, by the international community observed and on foreign policy oriented speeches that we should analyse in compliance with the role theory. In the time period I analyse, there were four foreign ministers of the DPRK: Kim Yong Nam (1983–1998), Paek Nam Sun (1998–2007), Pak Ui Chun (2007–2014) and finally, Ri Su Yong (2014–2016). The present foreign minister Ri Yong Ho was appointed in May 2016 (BBC News 2016).

bodies were the elites who usually gave the general speeches focussed on the foreign policy. These texts subsequently functioned as a stepping stone for the searching for the North Korean national roles.

As I have briefly mentioned above, I also worked with the *articles* focused on the foreign politics written by the given magazine/newspaper's redaction members. With respect to the fact news redactions members' statements articulated in articles (again, these articles cannot be too tied with description of any particular foreign political measures) are regime-controlled, it is possible to accept them as relevant resources where one should also look for the NRs. To give just one example, in the beginning of the year (mainly in January or February), The Pyongyang Times usually publishes an article emphasising the crucial principles of the foreign policy for the given year where the NRs are articulated very clearly. If I omitted this kind of materials from my analysis, I would lose important resource where the NRs are articulated.

In The Pyongyang Time datasets, 14 texts (i.e. foreign political statements plus articles) per one year on the average were located as a source of NRs whereas I was able to identify 12 individual roles per year on the average. In Korea Today dataset, it was 6 texts per year on the average whereas I was able to identify 7 individual roles per year on the average (see Chart 5 below).[49] Let me now proceed with an overview and evaluation of North Korean English-written media landscape in order to thoroughly explain why I selected The Pyongyang Times and Korea Today for my analysis.

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[49] The authors in Le Pestre's collective monograph (comp. Le Pestre ed. 1997) work with about ten discourses per year which is roughly the same number as I ended with.

Chart 5: Overview of Number of Analysed Texts and Roles Identified

Year	The Pyongyang Times		Korea Today	
	No. of text analysed	No. of individual roles identified	No. of texts analysed	No. of individual roles identified
1994	18	11	6	8
1995	17	15	4	6
1996	10	12	7	10
1997	12	12	4	11
1998	17	11	3	3
1999	17	10	6	4
2000	20	15	5	3
2001	11	10	6	6
2002	12	11	7	9
2003	8	8	6	5
2004	10	9	9	9
2005	12	10	12	13
2006	15	11	9	7
2007	15	10	7	7
2008	11	12	11	7
2009	16	14	5	4
2010	12	11	5	10
2011	15	11	5	11
2012	22	11	5	3
2013	17	12	9	10
2014	15	10	5	7
2015	10	12	4	4
average	14	12	6	7

Source: created by author.

2.2 North Korean Primary Resources: Suitable and Unsuitable Materials

First of all, there is the *Korean Central News Agency (*hereinafter referred to as *KCNA)* website. Generally speaking, KCNA is North Korean state press agency which provides news adopted by North Korean medial scene and it reports in Korean, English, Spanish and Japanese. On the first sight, it might seem the KCNA could function as ideal source where one should search for the NRs. Nevertheless, this resource has many issues. First, the reports are not available for the whole time period I analyse as the online archive goes back to 1997 only. Second, the reports published by the KCNA are generally too short and very often, they do not provide sufficient space for NRs to appear. Third, the reports relevant for the purposes of my investigation (i.e. the foreign political texts that are rather general) seldom appear. More often than not, the KCNA publishes either insignificant news (for example about the floral baskets or congratulations received by regime) or propaganda articles focused mainly against the United States, South Korean conservative political scene or Japan. If the foreign policy-related reports appear, they usually announce the past foreign delegations' visits to the DPRK or similar events austerely.

Last but not least, there is serious problem with availability of the online archive. Up to June 2015, the online archive of reports going back to year 1997 was available on the official KCNA website. Nevertheless, the website had been transformed thoroughly in the end of June 2015 which resulted in deletion of the archive.[50] Additionally, even when the archive had been available, the DPRK authorities were known to alter or delete content which made systematic long-term investigation based on the KCNA online archive even more unfeasible. Recently, the website called *KCNA Watch* has been

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[50] Approximately between September 2015 and the very end of February 2016, the archive going back to 1997 was accessible on http://deathnotesapp.com/. Nevertheless, it is not known who created it and if the archive was complete. Moreover, when I tried to access it again in the end of March 2016, this website was no longer in operation and no other substitution appeared as of August 2016.

launched by the web *NK News*[51] (comp. KCNA Watch n.d.) Nevertheless, the KCNA Watch cannot be used for the purposes of our analysis either as the systematic searching in the archives has been practically impossible so far.[52] To conclude, due to above mentioned difficulties, I decided to omit the KCNA as a source for searching for the NRs.

Besides the state news agency KCNA, there are some other periodicals published by North Korean regime that could be perceived as a relevant platform where the roles are declared too. First, there is the English written series of the *Rodong Sinmun* (newspaper). Whereas The Korean language version of the Rodong Sinmun is understood as a leading newspaper inside the DPRK (which is however meant to be delivered to the domestic audience), the English series is very young with the archive going back to January 2015 only. Second, there are English-written magazines called Foreign Trade, The People's Korea, or DPR Korea. The *Foreign Trade* magazine does not report about the foreign policy and thus, it is irrelevant for me. *The People's Korea* (or originally *Choson Sinbo* in Korean, see The People's Korea n.d.) is published by the General Association of (North) Korean Residents based in Japan (*Chongryon* in Korean). Therefore, it cannot be perceived as a platform where North Korean regime itself presents its image which makes it useless for my analysis. Finally, we mentioned the magazine *DPR Korea* which provides mainly pictorial materials and focuses on apolitical topics.

Furthermore, there are basically two websites that also need to be mentioned: Uriminzokkiri (in English: Our Own Way) and Naenara (in English: Our Country) News. The *Uriminjokkiri* (comp. Uriminjokkiri n.d.) is

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[51] The NK News is the biggest privately owned site providing the relevant information and analyses about the North Korea with a significant contribution of some North Korean studies scholars and even North Korean defectors. For more information, see NK News n.d.

[52] The KCNA Watch archive can be perceived as a good and ambitious attempt to systematize the primary materials going from the DPRK. Nevertheless, the platform is still quite young and suffers from some imperfections.

North Korean website based in China and its content is inconsistent and incomplete. It also runs its Facebook and Twitter profiles but the contributions here are again irregular and often irrelevant as far as the foreign policy is concerned. Reportedly, there were several hackers attacks to this website too which contributes to dubiousness of the information presented on this platform. On the other hand, the *Naenara News* (*My Country* in English, comp. Naenara n.d.) website was partially used for our analysis, as it provides comprehensive archive of PDF versions of The Pyongyang Times and Korea Today going back to 2012. I used the online accessible issues of both periodicals published between October 2015 and the end of December 2015 as I was not able to approach them physically during my stay in Republic of Korea which ended in the end of September 2015. Lastly, there is the *Voice of Korea*, the radio broadcast from the DPRK which runs on the same server as the Naenara website. Again, this radio broadcasting does not offer archive which would cover all the period we aim to analyse.

With respect to the abovementioned issues, The Pyongyang Times newspaper and Korea Today magazine both stand for the most suitable materials for my analysis. *The Pyongyang Times*, an English-written newspaper published weekly in the DPRK is dedicated mainly to foreign audiences and as a matter of fact, it is a crucial constantly available material representing the image of the DPRK abroad. In my research, it serves as a main source where I search for the national roles the DPRK declares. As it has already been mentioned above, The Pyongyang Times publishes substantial statements or their extracts delivered by the North Korean elites at the international bodies that are virtually inaccessible in any other platform. It also adopts and further elaborates the relevant articles from the KCNA which prevents us from omitting texts perceived by regime as important.

The monthly published *Korea Today* magazine serves as complementary source for searching for the NRs, in particular, as a control dataset which I use for the testing of the consistency of the data acquired in The Pyongyang Times (see below). In comparison with The Pyongyang Times, the articles focused on politics (and foreign policy in particular) constitute relatively smaller share in this magazine. This is represented in the Chart 6 below: the total amount of roles I identified in the Korea Today constitute approximately one third of those identified in The Pyongyang Times only. Nevertheless, Korea Today still provides a solid basis for NRs' articulation. The significant strength of both The Pyongyang Times and Korea Today also lies in the fact they are both continuously available[53] in the printed editions for the whole time period we analyze. The actual availability[54] of both periodicals in printed version enables me to turn away from the inconsistent and often unreliable online materials whose shortcomings have already been described above.

I have mentioned above that I use Korea Today dataset a control one. I do so as the process of national role identification (or coding) is complex, possibly even error-prone and the consistency check is therefore needed. This was the reason why I decided to extract the national roles for the period of 20 years between 1994 and 2015 from both The Pyongyang Times and Korea Today which resulted in two datasets that I subsequently could compare as far as the consistency is concerned. In particular, I checked both if the roles I

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[53] Although the availability and relevance of both periodicals is the best among the existing materials, some issues were missing in the library where I scanned them. In two appendixes at the end of this dissertation, I provide the list of issues that were not available. The number of missing issues was rather small (with exception of Korea Today issues of 1995 which functions as control dataset anyway) and thus, it should not distort the results of my investigation. Moreover, as we already know from the previous part of this thesis dealing with my theoretical background, the roles are relatively stable categories whose change is a matter of longer time horizon which is also the reason for me to think the marginal drop-outs will not affect the analysis.

[54] I approached both periodicals in the library of the University of North Korean Studies based in Seoul, Republic of Korea. I had been gathering the relevant materials in the library during my research stays in the Republic in Korea in summer and autumn of 2014 and 2015.

identified in The Pyongyang Times and Korea Today datasets and the role saliency were approximately the same.

The results of this "consistency check" are available in Chart 6 below. As we can see in the chart, the national roles identified and the role saliency were approximately the same in both datasets which reinforces the validity of the data I acquired and the validity of codes/roles I identified, respectively. Of course, there were some variations in saliency, for example, the role *bastion of revolution – liberator* holds the fourth position in The Pyongyang Times dataset but the seventh position in Korea Today dataset. Nevertheless, the variations are rather small or they appear in case of roles that occurred rather scarcely and thus, they do not undermine my research findings. Furthermore, some less significant roles that I identified in The Pyongyang Times did not turn up in the Korea Today. This can be explained by the fact that the texts where the roles could be identified constitute much smaller share in the Korea Today.

Chart 6: The Role Occurrences and Saliency in Both Datasets

Sequence	The Pyongyang Times	Sequence	Korea Today
1.	*internal developer (184)*	1.	*internal developer (105)*
2.	*independent (139)*	2.	*independent (38)*
3.	*active independent (106)*	3.	*isolate (35)*
4.	*isolate (95)*	4.	*active independent (32)*
5.	*bastion of revolution - liberator(94)*	5.	*anti-imperialist agent (29)*
6.	*anti-imperialist agent (76)*	6.	*bastion of revolution - liberator(27)*
7.	*global peace protector (64)*	7.	*global peace protector (22)*
8.	*regional peace protector (48)*	8.	*faithful ally (13)*
9.	*powerful country (28)*	9.	*regional peace protector, defender of faith (9)*
10.	*liberation supporter (19)*	10.	*liberation supporter (8)*
11.	*nuclear disarmament supporter (17)*	11.	*peaceful country (7)*
12.	*defender of faith (16)*	12.	*nuclear disarmament supporter, powerful country (4)*
13.	*peaceful country (15)*	13.	*example (3)*
14.	*South-South cooperation supporter (8)*	14.	*South-South cooperation supporter, fighter against enemy, anti-terrorism agent (1)*
15.	*faithful ally (7)*		
16.	*Example, fighter against enemy (5)*		
17.	*anti-terrorism agent, developer (3)*		
18.	*civilized country (1)*		
Total no. of roles identified in the dataset	933	Total no. of roles identified in the dataset	348

Source: created by author. In brackets, I stated the total occurrences of particular role.

2.3 The Pyongyang Times and Korea Today Datasets: What Does Their Specifics Imply

I have already discussed above why I selected these two sources for my analysis. Nevertheless, there are a few things that one needs to be conscious about when processing the data which arose from the content analysis. There is a need to be aware of different character of both periodicals (The Pyongyang Times is a *newspaper* and Korea today is *magazine*) and by a weaker overlap of Korea Today to the field of international politics. Consequently, the speeches of foreign political representatives that The Pyongyang Times does publish do not often appear in Korea Today. Again, this is closely connected with different character of both resources mentioned above.

Thus, there are some discrepancies between The Pyongyang Times and Korea Today graph lines which is demonstrated in Chapter 3. They result mainly from the lower total amount of roles identified in Korea Today magazine. In general terms, the Korea Today gave me considerably smaller data sample (about one third of The Pyongyang Times) as the Chart 6 illustrates as well. This factor may cause a false impression about high relevance of a role which is in fact rather low. As an example of this situation, let me use year 1997 in Korea Today dataset as depicted in the Chart 7.1.

Chart 7.1: 1997 Role Set in the Korea Today

code name (role)	occurrences in total	occurrences as in %
global peace protector	3	21
active independent	2	14
anti-imperialist agent	1	7
bastion of revolution - liberator	1	7
defender of faith	1	7
faithful ally	1	7
independent	1	7
liberation supporter	1	7
nuclear disarmament supporter	1	7
peaceful country	1	7
regional peace protector	1	7
Total	**14**	**100**

Source: created by author.

As we can see, I was able to identify 14 role statements and 11 roles in 1997 Korea Today editions. According to my analysis, the *global peace protector* was the most prominent role in the role set that year. However, there is not sufficient difference between the role occupying the first place and these nine roles sharing the last place. Very similar situation emerged in year 1998 as depicted in Chart 7.2.

Chart 7.2: 1998 Role Set in the Korea Today

code name (role)	occurrences in total	occurrences as in %
independent	3	60
faithful ally	1	20
liberation supporter	1	20
Total	**5**	**100**

Source: created by author.

Simply speaking, the Korea Today gave me very small data sample in some cases which leads me to following conclusion. Although the data (or roles) identified in Korea Today are very useful as a control sample, the dataset that actually validate the data acquired from The Pyongyang Times (such as the trends mapping development of given role, i.e. the macro indicators), it is not suitable for observation of micro data (such as particular fluctuations in roles' saliency) as it could lead to misinterpretations. Therefore, the Korea

Today dataset will be used for validation of both trends and relevance of individual roles only.

Last but not least, when I approach to the roles that occupy rather marginal positions in the role sets, it naturally becomes much more difficult to observe their trends and developments in the Korea Today dataset. Again, this may be linked with the weaker international overlap of Korea Today and above all, with the lower amount of roles identified here.

2.4 Data Assortment Mechanism and Coding

As it already became obvious after reading of previous pages of this dissertation, I assume that in its foreign policy-focused texts, the DPRK declares the roles which it believes it should be playing. Furthermore, I claim these NRs are co-constituted in the process of North Korean interaction with its significant others. Last but not least, I claim I am able to analyze the North Korean foreign policy in the light of the roles it declares. So far, I have already explained how I selected the particular primary materials for our analysis. However, I have not clarified how I will carry out the content analysis itself nor I explained which type of the content analysis I selected. Let me now proceed with this task.

Generally speaking, the main aim of the content analysis I conduct is to find the statements consistent with the national roles. My research is mainly interpretative and qualitative. After sorting out the relevant extracts of the texts, I ascribe certain "qualities" or to them which I call the national roles. On the basis of this ascription of "qualities", I subsequently interpret the North Korean foreign policy. In order to delimit sufficiently representative sample of statements and articles for the content analysis, I sort out the texts according to *location, language and thematic relevance*. I have already described this process above. Therefore, it is sufficient to state here I search

for rather general statements of the DPRK's regime elites and articles focused on the foreign politics in the North Korean periodicals The Pyongyang Times and Korea Today.

Let me now proceed to the description of the process of identification of the roles in the assorted texts. Again, there is a scale of possible ways we can implement. There is a possibility to *a priori* adopt Holsti's typology of 17 roles (comp. Holsti 1970) together with their delimitation. Nevertheless, if I did so, I would have become both overly tied with his categories and unable to consider the specifics of the North Korean case. Therefore, I am favorable both to taking account of the North Korean specifics when I work with Holsti's categories and to the identification of the new roles' categories if they fit North Korean case.

In particular, I start actual analysis with the identifying the relevant key words in the *baseline texts* (i.e. the texts from year 1994[55]). These texts function as so called *referential texts*, i.e. the texts that set the standard used for subsequent comparison with the texts of the following years (comp. Hájek 2014, 41). I carefully analyse the baseline texts and locate the extracts where the role-expressing statements are present. Afterwards, I look at these extracts identifying rather general *key words* that regularly occur in correlation with the occurrence of a role. Like Le Pestre (1997) I believe that the observation of the key words surroundings enables me to localize the relevant extracts of texts where I can expect the occurrence of NRs. This claim is further supported by Martin Hájek who argues that "(...) the application of such a categorized vocabulary helps us to distinguish the passages of text which deal with specific topic" (Hájek 2014, 39).

The key words identified in this process are: "duty", "responsibility", "world", "motherland", "people", "country", "nation", "international",

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[55] Year 1994 was selected as the starting point for our analysis as it is the year of death of Kim Il Sung. Owing to this we can expect that significant speeches and statements will occur.

"foreign", "we" and "DPRK", whereas the most relevant key words, i.e. key words whose surroundings most frequently implied the role statement, seemed to be "people", "nation", "country", "we" and "international".[56] Having identified the roles expressed in key words' surroundings, I label the relevant text extracts by *codes*, i.e. by the name of particular role. Subsequently, I continue with the content analysis using the key words in the following years of our dataset (i.e. the relevant texts published between 1995 and 2015). Firstly, I observe the presence of roles articulated and identified earlier. Secondly, I examine whether some new roles occurred. As the role theoretic scholars generally perceive the roles as relatively stable categories, I can expect that the roles that the majority of roles that were present in previous years will probably occur in the following years as well. Using this method, I gain a picture of the North Korean role sets which provide me with a good stepping stone for a subsequent analysis.

Let me now explain how I understand the function of the codes in my analysis. As Hájek (2014) claims, codes can have two possible functions: factual and referential whereas the latter is more relevant for my analysis. The *factual coding* requires exact definition of the actual content of the codes in advance. On the other hand, the *referential coding* refers to those codes that are created "on the fly" which implies we cannot guarantee the exact contents of the referential codes in advance. Therefore, if I accept the referential function, the code labels particular text extract as relevant with regard to the analysed topic and it actually represents rather heuristic tool which one can use for the construction of categories (ibid, 63–64). What are, however, the implications of accepting the referential function of the codes?

If I accepted the code in its factual function, I would have to exactly delimit and define the content of the individual NRs (used as codes) in advance. Nevertheless, with adopting of this approach, I would loose the elasticity of

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[56] I aimed at selecting relevant key words that are as general as possible in order to prevent me from extensive focus just on the foreign-political particularities.

roles' categories, i.e. I would *a priori* decline the possibility of the meaning transformation in the framework of particular role. Therefore, I decided to work with the codes in the referential way. This means I will not guarantee the *a priori* exact meaning of the roles. Rather, I let the codes "develop on the fly". I believe this approach is more fruitful if my aim is to observe the patterns of transformation and change of North Korean roles and role sets. I provide the definitions of individual roles in following chapter.

As my analysis is qualitative, I have to go through the texts manually in order to grasp the changing qualities of roles in a satisfactory way. Nevertheless, I used the Scantailor and Adobe Acrobat Pro 9 for the preparation of the scanned materials. *Scantailor* was mainly used for refining of the scanned materials. It helped to erase the imperfections which occurred during scanning process as these imperfections could hinder the transfer of the scanned materials to the plain text later. After refining, I transferred the materials to the plain text using *Adobe Acrobat Pro 9*. This step is especially helpful as it enabled me to explore the key words' surrounding using the search engine built in the Adobe Acrobat Pro 9 which made the content analysis a bit easier.

3. The Roles North Korea Declares

3.1 North Korean Role Statements: General Overview

The content analysis I implemented according to the methods and procedures described in the Chapter 2 helped me to identify the roles North Korea declared between 1994 and 2015. In total, I was able to detect 20 national roles in the whole research period. Some of them constitute crucial and stable part of North Korean role sets, some seem to be less significant and the others are rather marginal or role deviations. In the dataset for The Pyongyang Times newspapers, I was able to identify 606 extracts of texts where the roles were declared. In the Korea Today magazine which mainly serves as a control dataset (see above), I identified 222 texts containing the role statements. On the average, I detected twelve roles per year in the Pyongyang Times and eight roles per year in the Korea Today magazine (again, see the Chart 5 above).

Broadly speaking, the North Korean case supports the assumption of role theoretic scholars (comp., for example Holsti 1970, 284, or Harnisch 2012, 55) that states usually adopt more then one role at the same time. In a few role statements, it was relatively difficult to delimit the borders between individual roles. For example, there was a statement expressing the need to "(…) contribute to the establishment of a new international economic order by taking active part in South-South cooperation (Hwang 2001, 7) which combines role *bastion of revolution – liberator* with *South-South cooperation supporter* role. Nevertheless, I was still able to delimit the borders between individual roles in the end.

The Charts 8.1 and 8.2 below illustrate role occurrence and saliency for the whole time period I analyse for The Pyongyang Times and Korea Today datasets. I created these charts in order to better illustrate that roles I identified have approximately the same saliency in both datasets. In general, it is possible to say the roles implying passivity (such as *internal developer*,

independent, or *isolate* etc.) prevailed over the roles indicating active foreign political involvement (such as *active independent*, *bastion of revolution – liberator,* or *global peace protector* etc.).[57] Nevertheless, the DPRK tended to declare rather activity-implying roles in the beginning of the researched period (especially between 1994 and 1996, see chapter 3.3).

Let me now proceed with an overview and detailed description of the roles I identified. I will start with the role that has the highest number of occurrences in the researched period, i.e. *internal developer* and I will continue in descending order until I reach the least frequently declared roles. When describing the North Korean roles below, the attention is also paid to the shifts in the role saliency across the temporal period analysed. After the identification of the moments indicating changes in the North Korean role sets, I will continue with their contextualization with the DPRK's relations with the significant others in Chapter 4.

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[57] The delimitation of individual roles on the scale active – passive foreign policy is available in Chart 20.

Chart 8.1: Role Occurrences between 1994 and 2015 for The Pyongyang Times Dataset

Source: created by author. The category "others" includes following roles: faithful ally, South-South cooperation supporter, example, fighter against enemy anti-terrorism agent, developer, and civilized country. The number of occurrences of these roles is available in Chart 6.

Chart 8.2: Role Occurrences between 1994 and 2015 for the Korea Today Dataset

Source: created by author. The category "others" includes following roles: peaceful country, nuclear disarmament supporter, powerful country, example, South-South cooperation supporter, fighter against enemy and anti-terrorism agent. The number of occurrences of these roles is available in Chart 6.

3.2 The Meaning of Roles, Role Saliency and Changes

In this chapter, I both define individual roles I was able to identify and describe the trends and changes of particular roles by observation of the graph lines. I also link individual roles in context with group of significant others. Subsequently, I delimit particular members of friends and foes groups in Chapter 3.3 which follows. For every major role (see below) I describe, I present three charts in total illustrating the development of given role in time.

First graph depicts the development of given role for every year in both The Pyongyang Times (referred as "PT" in the graph legend) and Korea Today (referred as "KT" in the graph legend) datasets. It helps me to observe trends of particular role's development together with the major shifts. The second graph illustrates development of given role for every year in The Pyongyang Times dataset only. The graph line for the Korea Today dataset was omitted here from the reasons described in the Chapter 2.3. Lastly, there is the third graph depicting the changes for given role for The Pyongyang Times dataset. The graph line here helps me to identify both moments of changes and intensity of role saliency changes. I obtained the numerical expression of change as the difference between the role saliency figures expressed as a percentage for the adjacent years. For example, when I wanted to depict the change that occurred between 1994 and 1995 in case of *internal developer* role, I proceeded as follows. *Internal developer* role constituted 4 % of North Korean role set of 1994 and 10 % of North Korean role set of 1995. Thus, the role *internal developer* increased its saliency by 6 % which is the numerical expression of the change. On the other hand, *independent* role constituted 16 % of North Korean role set of 1994 and 11 % of North Korean role set of 1995. Therefore, the role *independent* decreased its saliency by 5 % which stands for the numerical expression of change again.

All the charts I drew below are the graphic expression of the data I acquired using content analysis respecting all the methods as outlined in Chapter 2 of this thesis. For the reference purposes, the codebook which is enclosed at the end of this thesis contains the tables with numerical expression of saliencies and changes for all the roles identified.

❧ *Internal developer*

This role has been relatively stable part of the North Korean role sets especially in later years of the datasets although there were some fluctuations as far as the incidence of this role is concerned. As Holsti (1970, 269–270) points out, *internal developer* role does not refer to any particular task or function in the international environment. It implies the given actor puts emphasis on the issues connected with the internal development rather than on his or her tasks in the international arena. However, by being an *internal developer*, the actor does not automatically rules out international cooperation, particularly in technical and economic matters (Holsti 1970, 269).

Basically speaking, I identified this role in North Korean commitments to build a "thriving nation/country", "powerful nation/country", "prosperous nation/country", "civilized nation/country" etc. If I should mention some examples of these role statements, it would be the North Korean commitments to "(…) make our country, our motherland, which Comrade Kim II Sung liberated, more prosperous" (The Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea 1995, 2), to build a "(…) prosperous country with a firm determination that nothing is out of (…) reach if they make up their minds and set to work in a revolutionary spirit of fortitude to brave out any difficulties" (Kim 1998a, 2), to "(…) step up the building a thriving socialist nation" (Choe 2006, 2), or to "(…) step up the cultural revolution and build a

civilized socialist nation by our own efforts so that we can be proud of ourselves before the world" (Kim 2015a).

Let me now link this role to particular group of significant others as this should help me later in this dissertation when I will try to contextualize moments of changes with North Korean interactions with significant others (i.e. the group of friends and group of foes). In the beginning of the researched period, it was problematic to assess this role's relationship with the significant others. Nevertheless, the *internal developer's* incidence had been often accompanied with the roles that may be perceived as protective or defensive (such as *isolate*) or as directly connected to the group of foes (such as *anti-imperialist agent*). When the strong connection occurred with the North Korean effort to develop and boost its military capacities facing "complicated international situation" (Choe 2011, 8) in the later years of the researched period, the affiliation to the group of foes became more obvious. This claim is also supported by Koh (2005) who points out the North Korean effort to build a "powerful and prosperous nation" is mainly connected with the development of military power.[58] Therefore, it is safe to link this role to the group of foes.

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[58] Koh (2005) also mentions the dimension of "prosperity" in North Korean *phrase powerful and prosperous country* (*kangsong taeguk* in Korean) building. He argues that the powerfulness (*kang* in Korean) is connected with the need to boost military capacities. The prosperity (*song* in Korean) may be linked with economics whereas the Kim Jong Il's North Korea obviously put stronger emphasis on the first mentioned.

**Chart 9.1: Internal Developer. Role's Development and the Trends**

Source: created by author.

Chart 9.2: Internal Developer. Role's Development as in The Pyongyang Times (PT)

Source: created by author.

Chart 9.3: Internal Developer: The Role Changes as in The Pyongyang Times

Source: created by author.

When closely analysing the North Korean enactment of the *internal developer* role, the interesting aspect is how the meaning of this role has been transformed and how its saliency changed over time (see Charts 9.1–9.3). As Chart 9.1 illustrates, the role shows upward trend. When focussing closely on the role development as depicted in Chart 9.2 above, we can see the saliency of this role was significantly lower in the first years of researched period (mainly between 1994 and 1999). At that time, even the meaning of the role had been strongly variable going from need to develop ideology or political strength (Kim K. N. 1994, 3), to the need to boost the prosperity and military capacities of the country (Pak 1995, 2; Kim T. I. 1995, 1) or the need to continue with (socialist) revolution and construction (Korea Today 1994, 4; Kim J. I. 1997, 4).

With the strengthening of *internal developer's* position in North Korean role sets, the meaning of this role started to be somehow unified and settled as it tended to be tied with the phrases indicating "powerful country/nation building", "prosperous country/nation building", or "thriving nation/country building". Although these phrases may seem to be quite vague, they are closely linked with the need of strengthening of military (and especially, nuclear) capacities (comp. for example Kwon 2004, 2, or Hong 1999) which was one of the features of Kim Jong Il's military-first policy. [59] Therefore, the meaning of the *internal developer* role was closely connected with the military build-up between 2003 and 2013.

Nevertheless, the meaning of the role started to change slowly from 2013 when increasing emphasis was put to "economic giant building", "civilized" or "powerful/thriving/civilized nation" building. This shift in the meaning partially reflects the tendency of Kim Jong Un regime to put equal emphasis

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[59] Mainly from the half of 1990s until the death of Kim Jong Il, there was a "golden era" of so called *songun chongchi* (military/army first policy in English) in North Korea which was the main political direction of Kim Jong Il. By emphasizing the military build-up and fundamental role of the army in the DPRK in form of *songun*, Kim Jong Il slowly shifted the main power centre of his regime from the Worker's Party of Korea to the Korean People's Army (for more, see Roehrig 2013).

on both economy and development of nuclear weapons and it is widely known as the *byungjin* policy[60] (or policy of parallel development of economy and military in English).

In sum, the strongest changes in the role saliency occurred in period of 1996–1997 and 2008–2009 (strongest upswings) and in period of 1995–1996 (strongest downswings). Last but not least, the swing in periods of 2003–2004 and 2010–2011 may also be relevant again, because it occurred when the role meaning was stable.

 ❧ *Independent*

As Chart 10.1 demonstrates, the role had been stable part of the North Korean role sets in the whole researched period. This is probably not that much surprising as the independence constitutes cornerstone of majority of the DPRK's foreign political statements and of its foreign policy itself (see below). Holsti (1970, 268) identified this role in his pivotal role theoretic research as well and defined it as an expression of state's effort to do the policy decisions according to its own interests "(…) rather than in support of the objectives of other states" (ibid.).[61] As in case of previously mentioned *internal developer*, the role *independent* refers rather to a passive foreign policy.

Besides the North Korean explicit commitments to the independence and self-reliance, I connected other statements to the role *independent*, such as a need to develop "(…) socialism of our country by our people's own efforts, not by imitation of other countries nor by instructions or pressure of someone" (Kim K. N. 1994, 3), to preserve "(…) national characters in all

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[60] *Byungjin* policy firstly appeared on March 31, 2013 during the plenary session of the Korean Workers' Party (comp. Cheon 2013, 1).

[61] Although Holsti incorporated the statements where states declare commitments to idea of non-alignment as an expression of the role *independent*, I believe these are rather expression of defender of faith role which I will deal with later in this chapter.

fields of state activities (...) to defend national independence in the revolution and construction (The Pyongyang Times 1998a, 1) or to "(...) advance dynamically along the road of their own choice (Kim 1999, 3).[62]

The role *independent* may be linked to the group of foes as well. This is because by playing the role *independent*, the DPRK aims to assure its rivals on the international scene it is not willing to accept any advices or impulses from them and that it is able to cope with its own issues by itself. Even Holsti (1970, 297) argues that one of the sources are anti-colonial sentiments and threat perception which further supports its linking to the group of foes. The meaning of this role remained stable during the whole researched period.

Chart 10.1: Independent. Role's Development and the Trends

Source: created by author.

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[62] In this place, it is also suitable to emphasize the principles of self-reliance and independence have been cornerstones of the North Korean policies since 1950s. The importance of these principles was further confirmed in the middle of 1960s, when the *Juche* (which is often translated as self-reliance) became the official policy of Kim Il Sung's North Korea (Armstrong 2013, 53). The fact that the DPRK never joined the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) is just one example of how the self reliance and independence impacted the DPRK's foreign policy (ibid., 61).

Chart 10.2: Independent. Role's Development as in The Pyongyang Times (PT)

Source: created by author.

Chart 10.3: Independent: The Role Changes as in The Pyongyang Times

Source: created by author.

The developments of the role *independent* are depicted in Charts 10.1–10.3. On the average, the role counted for 15 % of the North Korean role sets as identified in The Pyongyang Times and it shows rather stagnating trend in the saliency. As Charts 10.1 and 10.2 illustrate, the role had more prominent position in the North Korean role sets until 2003 when the saliency peaked. Between 2004 and 2006, the role showed significant decline followed by slow re-increase of its saliency. Apparently, the strongest changes occurred in periods of 2005–2006 (strongest downfall), 2002–2003 and 2006–2007 (strongest rises) as Chart 10.3 demonstrates.

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❧ Active Independent

Active independent has been another constant part of the North Korean role sets through the researched period. Like *internal developer* and *independent*, the *active independent* was also identified in Holsti´s comparative study. He defined this role as an expression of an effort of particular nation to stay *independent* and uninvolved in the military and ideological commitments together with an effort to cultivate relations with as many countries as possible (Holsti 1970, 262). In North Korean context, I identified mainly two dimensions of this role. First, it combines DPRK's willingness to establish multiple diplomatic relations with multiple countries whereas very vague[63] or no conditions are laid for this (see below). Second, this role can be also perceived as an expression of an effort to avoid any impact of increasing diplomatic ties on North Korean right to self-determination and independence.

To put just a few examples of North Korean statements according to which I identified this role, there were those expressing DPRK's willingness to "(…) develop friendly and cooperative relations with peoples of different countries of the world, including socialist and non-aligned countries, on the principle of independence" (Rodong Sinmun, Josoninmingun and Rodong Chongnyon 1995, 4), to "(…) work hard to increase unity and solidarity with the peoples of all countries who champion independence and promote friendship with the DPRK" (Hong 1999, 1), or to "(…) establish and develop friendly and cooperative relations with all the countries which respect its sovereignty and are friendly towards it in the ideal of independence, peace and friendship" (The Pyongyang Times 2000a, 7).

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[63] If at all, the DPRK's role declaring actors typically laid very vague conditions for establishment of new diplomatic ties. For example, they spoke about the "friendly countries", "peace-loving countries", "independence-loving countries" or "progressive countries" (comp. Hong 1999, 1; Kim C. 2000, 7, or Kim 2015b, 3).

As far as the meaning and content of this role is concerned, there have been some shifts especially in the definition of the group of states the DPRK wanted to create ties with. When expressing the statements correlating with the *active independent* role between 1994 and 1996, the DPRK often declared its wish to expand the relations with socialist and revolutionary people and countries all over the world (comp. Kim I. S. 1994, 3, or Song 1996, 8). Later in the dataset, these references gradually vanished and the meaning of *active independent* role shifted mainly to the effort to expand relations with "progressive countries", "friendly countries", "countries and nations that respect the justice and DPRK's sovereignty" or "the countries that aspire after independence" (comp. Jon 2007a, 8, or Choe 2009, 7).

To link this role to the significant others, it is definitely connected with the group of friends. Furthermore, the DPRK practically always refers to *states* only when pronounces statements correlating with *active independent* role. As I have already mentioned before, the North Korean delimitation of the particular countries is vague as it refers to "independence-loving countries", "progressive countries", "friendly countries" or "peace-loving countries". The DPRK probably aims not to restrict the spectrum of states with whom the cooperation might be feasible. Ming Lee (2009, 166) deals with the concept of "friendly countries" shortly in his chapter as well. He argues that North Korean definition of "friendly countries" is judged by their willingness to support "(...) the DPRK's ideological commitment to build up a socialist fortress in the North, (...) the DPRK's bid for national unification and (whether or not, added by author) they join the United States and its camp in 'interfering with North Korean internal affairs' (like exerting pressure about North Korean human rights)" (Lee M. 2009, 166). By accepting these criterions, the range of the most significant "friendly countries" becomes a bit easier to delimit: the most important allies (or friends) for the DPRK would probably be China and Russia.

**Chart 11.1: Active Independent. Role's Development and the Trends**

Source: created by author.

Chart 11.2: Active Independent. Role's Development as in The Pyongyang Times (PT)

Source: created by author.

Chart 11.3: Active Independent: The Role Changes as in The Pyongyang Times

Source: created by author.

Again, this role's development is depicted in three graphs (Charts 11.1–11.3). The saliency seems to have a decreasing tendency (see Chart 11.1) with several shifts, however. The first upswing occurred between 2000 and 2001 followed by steep decline in 2002. Between 2006 and 2009, the role's position in North Korean role sets became stronger again which is nicely illustrated in Charts 11.1 and 11.2. When focusing on the role changes, we can say the most obvious ones occurred in periods of 2001–2002, 1996–1997, 2011–2012 (the strongest downfalls) and 1999–2000 (the strongest rise) (see Chart 11.3).

    ✍ *Isolate*

Once again, the role *isolate* was present in Holsti's typology. He defined it as a role which implies the demand of "(…) minimum of external contacts of whatever variety" (Holsti 1970, 270). I identified it according to North Korean references to "(…) never tolerate any moves that encroach upon the dignity and sovereignty of the country and the nation" (Kim T. I. 1994, 3), to "(…) defend the bulwark of socialism" (Kim J. I. 1995, 4), to "(…) make the whole country an impregnable fortress" (Kim 2006, 2), or the declarations of North Korean peoples' will to "(…) risk their lives to defend the national dignity [*and*][64] never trade their national dignity for fortune" (Kim 2003, 2). It is also possible to notice that the role *isolate* is often declared together with the *anti-imperialist agent* role thorough whole dataset (will be discussed later on) which helped me to link it with particular group of significant others (see below). To sum up, this role mainly refers to North Korean need to show the international audience that it perceives its sovereignty, dignity and political system as crucial values it is fully prepared to protect and that it is not willing to make any concessions in this respect at all.

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[64] Added by author.

Furthermore, it is also interesting to observe the role conflict present in North Korean role sets containing both the role *active independent* which implies DPRK's effort to establish relations with as many countries as possible (see above) and the role *isolate*, which creates significant limits for the external contacts. The DPRK even had been putting approximately equal emphasis on both roles in several years of the dataset (namely, in 1998, 2002, 2006, 2007, 2013 and 2015) and the roles consisted approximately same share of the North Korean role sets which further underlines the role conflict.

Once again, meaning of the role remained relatively stable during the researched period as it constantly referred to defence of the national dignity and sovereignty, rejection of the outside pressure, or to the need to preserve the country as a "impregnable fortress" (comp. Kim 2006, 2).

The role is connected with the group of foes of significant others. That is because the role usually correlates with statements where the DPRK explicitly protests against the pressure of the United States and its allies or against possible harmful influence of capitalism (comp. Rodong Sinmun and Kulloja 1999, 2).

Source: created by author.

Chart 12.2: Isolate. Role's Development as in The Pyongyang Times (PT)

Source: created by author.

Chart 12.3: Isolate: The Role Changes as in The Pyongyang Times

Source: created by author.

Let me now focus on the role saliency developments and changes as demonstrated in Charts 12.1–12.3. As we can see in Chart 12.1, this role's saliency shows increasing trend. Although it was rather stagnating in the beginning of the researched period, there was significant shift in this tendency between 2002 and 2005 when the position of the role *isolate* strengthened which was followed by slight decrease. As Chart 12.2 illustrates, the role saliency peaked in years 2003 and 2012. On the other hand, it reached the lowest points in years 2000 and 2010. The most obvious changes occurred in 2002–2003 and 2011–2012 (the strongest growth) and

in 2003–2004 (the strongest downfall) (see Chart 12.3). Additionally, there were strong downswings in periods of 1999–2000 and 2012–2013.

    ≋ Bastion of Revolution – Liberator

This is another role the DPRK had declared implying active foreign politics. Holsti defined it as an expression of willingness of a state to lead various types of revolutionary movement abroad and to liberate other nations or states and provide them with physical, moral, political or ideological support or inspiration (Holsti 1970, 260–261). Furthermore, he points this role has its source in anti-colonial attitudes, desire for ethnic unity and ideological principles (ibid., 296).

The North Korean statements expressing the readiness to build the forces against the domination and subjugation of great powers, especially the United States, and the emphasizing of particular activities that need to be done in order to liberate the world correlate with this role. To use just a few examples, there is DPRK's stressing of the need to "(…) build up the forces of global independence and promote the solidarity with them (Ri 1994a, 8), to (…) work actively to destroy the old international order of domination and subjugation, establish a new order based on equality, justice and fairness (Rodong Sinmun, Josoninmingun and Rodong Chongnyon 1995, 4), or to "(…) make positive efforts to build a just and equal world under the ideal of independence, peace and friendship" (Choe 2007, 7). All these statements indicate the *bastion of revolution – liberator* role.

The meaning remained relatively stable during the researched period although it is possible to observe the North Korean commitments to this role became more vague and symbolical in the later years of the dataset. In particular, strong declarations of a need to "(…) make a concerted effort to destroy all the old international political and economic orders of domination

and subjugation and establish new ones (The Pyongyang Times 1994a, 8) gradually changed to vague phrases declaring the need to "(…) make a positive effort to build just and equal word" (Choe 2007, 7) or to "(…) promote the cause of independence and peace for humankind" (Choe 2009, 7). This meaning transformation can be also related with the general decrease of the saliency of the *bastion of revolution – liberator* role which is discussed later in this chapter.

After reading North Korean statements correlating with the *bastion of revolution – liberator* role, we can see it is somehow linked to both group of foes and group of friends. By declaring this role, the DPRK expresses its disagreement with the current international order which is mainly represented by the United States, its allies and the United Nations in its current shape (comp., for example, Kim 2013, 1). Those actors obviously stand for the members of the group of foes.

At the same time, this role implies the need of existence of a group of actors that actually needs to be liberated or the group of actors that the DPRK is sympathetic with (i.e. the group of friends). In this respect, the references to the "world revolutionary people" (Korea Today 1994, 4), "people of the world who advocate independence" (Kim 1996, 4), or of justice-loving and peace-loving people (Han 1996, 8) can be found in the North Korean statements referring to the role *bastion of revolution – liberator*. Once again, North Korean delimitation of the particular actors that could be associated with the group of friends is mostly absent like it was in the case of *active independent* role statements. Existing North Korean ties with the Third World countries (such as Cuba or Ecuador in Latin America or for example Tanzania or Zimbabwe in Africa) give us certain clue in this regard. Basically speaking, the DPRK tries to cultivate relations with the countries or actors we may call "similarly thinking", i.e. rather leftist, radical, anti-colonial and

anti-imperialist countries that often support the idea of non-alignment (comp. Owoeye 191, 633).

Considering this situation, which group of significant others should we factor when contextualizing this role's development with North Korea relations with them later in this thesis? Holsti (1970, 296) argues in his article that one of the sources of the role *bastion of revolution – liberator* are anti-colonial attitudes. Thus, this role serves as another mean for delimitation against the group of foes that North Korea often accuses of "dominationism and highhandedness" (comp. Kim 2001, 7). Therefore, I will contextualize this role to the DPRK's interactions with group of foes.

Chart 13.1: Bastion of Revolution - Liberator. Role's Development and the Trends

Source: created by author.

Chart 13.2: Bastion of Revolution - Liberator. Role's Development as in The Pyongyang Times (PT)

Source: created by author.

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**Chart 13.3: Bastion of Revolution - Liberator: The Role Changes as in The Pyongyang Times**

Source: created by author.

As both the trend and graph lines in Chart 13.1 demonstrate, the saliency of *bastion of revolution – liberator* in the DPRK's role sets has been slowly but constantly dropping since 1994. Moreover, we can also see there have been many ups and downs in this role's development. The role saliency peaked in 1998 whereas it reached the lowest level in 2014 (it disappeared from the North Korean role set completely). The first period when the saliency dropped significantly occurred between 2002 and 2005 which was followed by increased emphasis on this role in period of 2006–2008 and in 2013 (see Chart 13.2). There were quite significant changes in case of this role. The strongest downswings occurred in 1998–1999, 2008–2009, 2002–2003 and 2012–2013 whereas the most obvious upswings were present in 1997–1998, 2005–2006 and 2009–2010 (see Chart 13.3).

 Anti-Imperialist Agent

This is an example of a role which can be perceived a Cold War relic to some extent. It was also defined by Holsti simply as an expression of given country's will to act as an agent of struggle against imperialism (Holsti 1970, 264). I identified it in North Korean statements referring to a need to "(…) frustrate the imperialist manoeuvres of aggression, inference and disturbance" (Rodong Sinmun, Josoninmingun and Rodong Chongnyon 1995, 4), to "(…) smash up the vicious and cunning policy of the imperialists who seek to obliterate nations and the reactionary doctrines which try to justify this policy" (Kim J. I. 1997, 5), or to "(…) take the road of independence against the imperialist domination and subordination is an unpreventable trend of the times in the international arena and a new peaceful world can be built only by upholding the banner of antiimperialism" (Kim 2007, 7).

There have not been any changes in the role's meaning which is naturally connected with strict definition of the significant others that actually arises from the very term "*anti-imperialist agent*". It is probably obvious this role is connected with the group of foes where the actors North Korea refers to as imperialist ones (again, the United States and its allies) are the particular representatives of this group.

Chart 14.1: Anti-Imperialist Agent. Role's Development and the Trends

Source: created by author.

Chart 14.2: Anti-Imperialist Agent. Role's Development as in The Pyongyang Times (PT)

Source: created by author.

Chart 14.3: Anti-Imperialist Agent. The Role Changes as in The Pyongyang Times

Source: created by author.

Again, Charts 14.1–14.3 demonstrate the developments in saliency of this role and the changes that occurred. It is apparent the relevance of this role shows downward trend thorough the researched period (see Chart 14.1). For The Pyongyang Times dataset, this role formed 13 % of North Korean role sets in 1990s on the average and it dropped to a mere 7 % on the average for period between 2000 and 2015. The trend for Korea Today was approximately the same (12 % in 1990s and 6 % between 2000 and 2015). When looking on the role saliency in the Chart 14.2, we can see it peaked in 1999. This was followed by strong decline of the role saliency lasting between 2000 and 2001, respectively. There was another slight shift between 2002 and 2003 when the role's position in the DPRK's role set had

been strengthening again but only temporarily as its saliency had been dropping since 2005.

If we focus on the moments of changes as illustrated in Chart 14.3, we can see the strongest one occurred in period of 1999–2000 (downfall). On the other hand, the strongest rise was present between 1998 and 1999. The other changes are relatively weak.

✍ *Global Peace Protector*

This role was present in Holsti's typology as "defender of peace". He claims he was able to identify this role according to the American and Soviet references to "universal commitments to defend against aggression or threat to peace, no matter what the locale" (Holsti 1970, 272). Nevertheless, the DPRK does differentiate between the global peace protection and regional peace protection in its statements. As a mere reference to *defender of peace* would be insufficient in North Korean case, I delimit both the *global peace protector* and *regional peace protector role*. I define the *global peace protector* role as North Korean universal commitment to defend peace around the world.

It is also needed to point out here the DPRK's interpretation of peace-oriented roles (i.e. global and *regional peace protector* and marginal role peaceful country) and peace itself is specific. In particular, it speaks about "independent peace" and also claims it "loves peace but never begs for it" (Kim T. C. 2000, 7). Thus, North Korean conception of peace is predatorious rather than harmony-oriented. Seongji Woo (2011, 201–202) further confirms this assertion when arguing North Korea too heavily insists on the need to maintain "peace by power" or "peace by deterrence".

I identified the role *global peace protector* according to North Korean references to make "(…) unremitting efforts for global peace and security"

(Kim 2001, 2), or to "(…) discharge their responsibility for world peace and security (Choe 2002, 7). Moreover, it is interesting to observe how the meaning changed over time. Mainly between 1995 and 1997, the DPRK tended to link its mission to defend the global peace with the task to make the world free of nuclear weapons (comp. Rodong Sinmun, Josoninmingun and Rodong Chongnyon 1995, 4, or Kim H. C. 1997, 8). However, later on in the dataset, the logic of North Korean statements reversed and the connection had been created between North Korean nuclear program and global peace protection in the DPRK's foreign political statements. Especially after 2000, North Korea tended to link its efforts to posses the "nuclear deterrent" and to "build up the military strength" with its task to safeguard the peace and security in both global and regional scale (comp. Mun 2005, 5).

Moreover, at many places thorough the whole dataset, the role *global peace protector* was connected with *bastion of revolution – liberator* role. This is because the DPRK linked its mission to create a new and fair international order with a need to establish a new peaceful world where no unilateralism of the United States is present (comp. Rodong Sinmun, Josoninmingun and Rodong Chongnyon 1995, 4, or Jon 2007b, 7).

This role seems to be rather linked with the group of foes. This is because the connection is often created between the DPRK's need to protect the world peace and fighting against aggression "of war fanatics" and domination (comp. The Pyongyang Times 1997, 1; Kim 1997, 8, or Hong 1999, 1). This is further supported by deliberations of K. J. Holsti (1970, 296) who argues the tendency of a state to protect peace arises from its perception of threat, besides other factors.[65]

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[65] He also mentions geographic location, traditional policies and needs of threatened states as sources of give state's tendency to protect peace.

Chart 15.1: Global Peace Protector. Role's Development and the Trends

Source: created by author.

Chart 15.2: Global Peace Protector. Role's Development as in The Pyongyang Times (PT)

Source: created by author.

Chart 15.3: Global Peace Protector: The Role Changes as in The Pyongyang Times

Source: created by author.

Let me now focus on development in this role's saliency and changes illustrated in Charts 15.1–15.3. As we can observe at Chart 15.1, The Pyongyang Times and Korea Today datasets show different trends in case of

this role. [66] As the *global peace protector* is one of the marginal roles in the North Korean role sets, it has not been sufficiently reflected in the Korea Today dataset which is the phenomenon I have already discussed earlier in this thesis (see the Chapter 2.3). Generally speaking, there was the trend of falling saliency of this role between 1994 and 2000 (as Chart 15.1 demonstrates), slight increase between 2000 and 2007, and finally, the decrease between 2007 and 2015. Taking the data as of The Pyongyang Times, the role's saliency obviously peaked in 2007 and reached its lowest level in 2012 when it disappeared completely from both datasets. The most obvious changes occurred in period of 2006–2007 (the strongest rise) and 2011–2012 (the strongest downswing).

    ❧ *Regional Peace Protector*

Similarly to *global peace protector* role, the *regional peace protector* refers to the North Korean commitments to defend the peace, this time in the regional scale only and it refers to the North Korean claims about the strong confrontation in the region which exists despite the end of Cold War (Woo 2011, 196).[67] I identified this role according to DPRK's statements where it claims it strives for "(…) peace and security on the Korean peninsula and in the Asia-Pacific region" (Spokesman for the Foreign Ministry of the DPRK 1995, 1), for "(…) peace and security in Northeast Asia" (DPRK delegate at the UN GA 1997, 8), or for building of peaceful Asia and Korean Peninsula (Paek 2000, 7). It is possible to see that North Korean regional radius reaches up to the Asian continent here.

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[66] In The Pyongyang Times dataset, *global peace protector* role's relevance was higher until 1999 (about 8 % of the role sets in average) and lower after 2000 (about 6 % of the role sets in average) whereas the Korea Today dataset shows reverse tendency, i.e. lower relevance till 1999 (about 4 % of the role sets in average) and a bit higher after 2000 (about 6 % of the role sets in average).

[67] This relates to overall revitalization of regional dynamic in Northeast Asia after the end of Cold War, which is the issue broadly discussed by Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver (2003, esp. chapter 6).

As far as the meaning transformation is concerned, some changes occurred in case of this role. Most often, the DPRK referred to the peace protection of Korean Peninsula and Asia as a whole. Occasionally, the references to defence of peace in Northeast Asia and Asian Pacific region occurred as well. Moreover, it was possible to observe in the later years in The Pyongyang Times dataset (mainly after 2010) that the North Korean definition of "its" region became more tied with Korean Peninsula.

When considering the affiliation of this role to the group of significant others, we are confronted with the same issue as in the case of *global peace protector* role, i.e. the link with particular group of significant others is rather weak. Nevertheless, when emphasizing the need to protect regional peace, North Korea sometimes claims it is doing so *against* the imperialists *in unity with* so called "world's peace lovers" (comp. for example, Kim 1998, 8). Furthermore, even Seongji Woo (2011, 196) argues that the DPRK strives to fight for the peace in the region against the reactionary forces. Thus, *regional peace protector* role can be rather linked with the group of foes.

Source: created by author.

Chart 16.2: Regional Peace Protector. Role's Development as in The Pyongyang Times (PT)

Source: created by author.

Chart 16.3: Regional Peace Protector: The Role Changes as in The Pyongyang Times

Source: created by author.

Charts 16.1–16.3 illustrate the development of role saliency and changes. The role's saliency has been growing thorough the researched period as the trend lines in Chart 16.1 demonstrates. At the same time, the position of *regional peace protector* in North Korean role sets is not settled. This claim is supported by the irregular occurrence of this role in the datasets and by many significant shifts in saliency as well (see Charts 16.1 and 16.2). Consequently, the observation of changes becomes harder due to many fluctuations. When seeing the graph line illustrating the saliency as in The Pyongyang Times dataset, we can see the *regional peace protector*'s saliency peaked in 2011 and 2013 respectively. However, it dropped significantly in 2014 and 2015 again.

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❧ Marginal Roles in the DPRK's Role Sets: Brief Overview

So far, I have been describing and analysing the *major roles*, i.e. the roles that had significant position in North Korean role sets, i.e. those whose total occurrence thorough the researched period in The Pyongyang Times dataset exceeded at least 5 %. Right now, I proceed with the brief overview over the roles whose total incidence did not reach 5 % but they occurred at least in three subsequent years of the researched period.[68] I call these roles as *marginal* as they usually neither occupied significant position in DPRK role sets (the role saliency was low and shows dropping tendency) nor their position in the role sets was settled and thus, their influence on the foreign politics is low as well.

There were eight roles that fulfil the above mentioned criteria: *powerful country, liberation supporter, defender of faith, nuclear disarmament supporter, peaceful country, South-South cooperation supporter, faithful ally* and *fighter against enemy.* Let me now proceed with short description of these roles.

I assigned the role *powerful country* to these statements, where the DPRK simply labelled itself as "powerful country" (comp. Kim K. J. 1995, 2), "ideological/political/economic/military power" (comp. The Pyongyang Times 2000b, 1). The developments in terms of saliency together with the trend lines are illustrated in Chart 17.1. Powerful country is the other case where the trend lines of The Pyongyang Times and Korea Today datasets are different which most likely results from influence of several aspects that has already been discussed in chapter 2.3. North Korea did not linked this role with any group of significant others.

Liberation supporter role was defined by Holsti as an expression of rather vague and further unspecified symbolical support for liberation movements

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[68] I define the role as marginal one according to its compliance with these criteria for The Pyongyang Times dataset.

abroad (Holsti 1970, 263). Simply speaking, it can be defined as much more passive form of above mentioned role *bastion of revolution–liberator*. As Chart 17.2 demonstrates, statements correlating with this role were sometimes present in North Korean statements but the saliency of this role has obviously been dropping. I identified this role in DPRK's statements where it opposes violation of sovereignty of other countries (Han 1996, 8), "(…) remains faithful to the cause of global independence" (Ri 1997, 8) or where it declares its support for the "(…) world´s people aspiring for independence" (Ri 2001, 7). This role is naturally linked with the group of friends with whom the DPRK declares its solidarity.


Chart 17.1: Powerful Country. Role's Development and the Trends

Source: created by author.

Chart 17.2: Liberation Supporter. Role's Development and the Trends

Source: created by author.

Defender of faith is the role via which the DPRK declares its support to the principle of non-alignment. It was defined by Holsti as a willingness to defend particular value systems from attack or to guarantee certain ideological/ideational purity for certain group of states (Holsti 1970, 264). In North Korean case, I identified this role according to expression of its duty or obligation to strengthen and develop the principle of non-alignment (comp. Song 1995, 8). As Chart 17.3 illustrates, the saliency of this role is slowly dropping as well. This role can be linked with group of friends whereas the friends are delimited here relatively clearly (i.e. all the members of the Non-Aligned Movement).


Chart 17.3: Defender of Faith. Role's Development and the Trends

Source: created by author.

Nuclear disarmament supporter is another marginal role of the DPRK's role sets. Although it was not present in the Holsti's typology, I was able to identify it in the datasets simply according to North Korean commitments to "(...) do all (...) to realise humankind's desire to live in a world free from nuclear weapons by advocating disarmament, especially nuclear disarmament" (Rodong Sinmun, Josoninmingun and Rodong Chongnyon 1995, 4) and alike. As Chart 17.4 shows us, there were just a couple of incidences of this role: between 1995 and 1997, in 2006, between 2009 and 2011, and in 2013. When occurred mainly after 2000, this role often stood in

contrast with *internal developer role* which indicated the need to develop nuclear capacities (see above). Once again, North Korea did not linked this role with any group of significant others.

Peaceful country is the case of role which correlates with North Korean statements about its the peacefulness: "A lofty ideal embodying the people's wish for peace, the country's peace-oriented ideal of foreign policy encourages the peace campaign of the world's progressives" (Kim 2014, 7). This role seems to increase its saliency in recent years as both Korea Today and The Pyongyang Times occurrence lines show us (see Chart 17.5). The affiliation of this role to particular group of significant others is unclear.

Chart 17.4: Nuclear Disarmament Supporter. Role's Development and the Trends

Source: created by author.

**Chart 17.5: Peaceful Country. Role's Development and the Trends**

Source: created by author.

In couple of years, the DPRK's role statements correlated with something which I labelled as *South-South cooperation supporter* role. I identified it

according to commitments "to discharge the duty to expand the S-S cooperation" (Ri 1994b, 8) and alike. As we can observe in Chart 17.6, the role was mainly present in the statements of 1990s.

Faithful ally role was defined by Holsti as the commitment to "(...) support the policies of another government" (Holsti 1970, 267). For the purposes of my investigation, I substitute the word "government" with "actor" as it but I agree this role's enactment requires the as-if role beholder to *precisely* define the ally. In statements relevant for the purposes of my investigation, North Korea only occasionally expressed its support that much clearly. To put a few examples, it expressed its support for Cuba, Iran, Libya, Syria and Colombia "(...) in their just cause for national sovereignty and dignity" (Choe 1996, 8) or it also articulated its backing for "(...) workers all around the world"[69] (The Pyongyang Times 1994b, 1), or for members of the Non-Aligned movement (Kim 2009, 2). The saliency of this role has been dropping as well as Chart 17.7 demonstrates.

Chart 17.6: South-South Cooperation Supporter. Role's Development and the Trends

Source: created by author.

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[69] The expression of solidarity with the „world´s working class was present mainly in the 1990s whereas it disappeared later. It can be perceived as a Cold War relic.

Chart 17.7: Faithful Ally. Role's Development and the Trends

Source: created by author.

The last role which can be added between the marginal roles is *fighter against enemy*. Its incidence in the role sets is rather recent as Chart 17.8 shows us and I identified it in those statements, where the DPRK sharply delimited itself against some actors: "The WPK's new strategy is a reflection of his will to (…) resolutely smash the wicked charts of the US and its followers to *isolate* and stifle the DPRK" (Pak 2013, 4). This role is one of the very few ones where the DPRK namely delimits particular actors. Clearly, this role can be linked with group of foes whereas the United States is the main representative even at this case.

Chart 17.8: Fighter against Enemy. Role's Development and the Trends

Source: created by author.

⤷ Deviances in North Korean Role Sets

I have already pointed out sooner in this dissertation that there is a lack of knowledge as far as the issue of *role deviances* is concerned and I promised to grasp this issue better in North Korean case. I labelled as the role deviances these roles in the North Korean role sets which neither exceeded 5 % in their incidence thorough The Pyongyang Times dataset nor fulfil the criteria set for the marginal roles (i.e. they did not occur in three subsequent years of the researched period). Simply speaking, the role deviances can be defined as the roles which were present very scarcely (or even randomly) in the role sets in very small number of occurrences.

There are four roles in the DPRK's role sets that can be classified as role deviances: *example, anti-terrorism agent, developer* and *civilized country*. There is no point in drawing any charts capturing developments of these roles which arises from their deviant nature.

Example was first case of deviant role I linked it mainly to DPRK's statements about how it demonstrates its national strength and dignity to whole world (comp. Rodong Sinmun and Kulloja 2000, 4). *Anti-terrorism agent* naturally correlates with North Korean declarations of its effort to either oppose or fight against all forms of terrorism (comp. The DPRK Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2008, 4). North Korean pledge "(…) to promote the common development and prosperity of humankind" (Pak 2011, 8) refers to role *developer* which was really rare in the DPRK's role sets. The same can be told about *civilized country* which is the very last role that occurred only once in whole researched period and refers to only one statement where the DPRK labelled itself as "(…) highly civilized, socialist country" (Rodong Sinmun, Josoninmingun and Rodong Chongnyon 2012, 6).[70]

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[70] The particular occurrences of these roles are depicted in the codebook in the sheet named "role deviances".

3.3 North Korean Roles, Role Sets and Significant Others: Summarization

In the previous chapter, I defined the individual roles I was able to identify in the datasets and I focused both on the developments in their saliency and their linking to particular group of significant others. Let me now briefly summarize the findings I made.

In the period between 1994 and 2015, I was able to identify 20 roles in total whereas only eight of them were constant and relatively stable part of the North Korean role sets. At this place, let me put forward the finding of Sebastian Harnisch again. He argues that the roles are not of the same importance to their beholder whereas they are organized hierarchically "(…) with those roles on the top effecting most on role behavior" (Harnisch 2012, 55). In harmony with this assertion, I claim these eight major roles with the highest saliency can be perceived as the roles with the strongest impact on the North Korean foreign policy.

I have already mentioned earlier in this thesis that various studies showed correlation between national roles states declare and their and foreign political behavior. If I contextualize both composition of North Korean role sets and saliency of individual roles with actual foreign political developments, it is possible to see North Korean case in not any exception. To make this linkage a bit more obvious, let me present at least one example. The composition of role sets between 1994 and 1996 reflect the foreign political isolation or lack of allies or friends in the international environment (comp. Lee M. 2009, 162) which resulted from North Korean loss of the major friend, i.e. USSR/Russia[71] and also from the disintegration of the socialist camp.[72] In this period, the DPRK was keen on establishing new

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[71] The North Korean hopes for the exclusive relationship with Moscow were terminated by establishment of Russian diplomatic relations with South Korea in June 1990 whereas the same was done by China in 1992 (Lee M. 2009, 163).

[72] Also, the newly established Chinese policy of open doors and reforms made the DPRK increasingly nervous as it was afraid "(…) of being 'sold out' by China's conciliatory policy towards the United States (Lee M. 2009, 162).

Chart 18: Delimitation of Major Roles on the Scale of Activity – Passivity

role	scale active–passive foreign policy				group of the significant others
	very passive	rather passive	rather active	very active	
internal developer		X			foes
independent		X			foes
active independent				X	friends
isolate	X				foes
bastion of revolution - liberator				X	foes
anti-imperialist agent			X		foes
global peace protector			X		foes
regional peace protector			X		foes

Source: created by author.

diplomatic ties in order to end up this isolation. This is reflected in the fact the roles *active independent* and *bastion of revolution – liberator* occupied significant share of the role sets between 1994 and 1996. These are roles indicating very active foreign policy (see Chart 18) and in case of the *active independent*, even a strong effort to "cultivate relations with as many countries as possible" (Holsti 1970, 262).

In Chart 18, I tried to grasp the major roles on the scale of active – passive foreign policy as well as to summarize their ling to particular group of significant others. Let me deal with the group of foes first as the majority of relevant roles in the DPRK's role sets were linked to them. First, it is needed to point out the DPRK not always referred to a specific actor in its role statements as it often spoke about "imperialists", "dominationsists" and the like. Nevertheless, some references were more than obvious. The United States surely stood for the main representative of the group of foes. In its statements connected with "foes roles", North Korea also often referred to it as "the United States and its allies" or "the United States and its vassal forces" (comp. Kim 2013b, 1, or Han 2013, 4) but it scarcely determined who these "allies" or "vassal forces" were. When it did so, it was usually Japan or South Korean "puppets" (comp. The Pyongyang Times 1998b, 2). In several cases, it also delimited itself against the UN in its current shape.

As far as the group of friends is concerned, North Korea was even less specific when referring to it although some important clues are visible. For example, in the statements referring to the *active independent* role (which is the most prominent and obvious example of the role connected with group of friends) references to the unity with members of *The Pyongyang Declaration*[73] of 1992 were occasionally made (comp. Song 1994, 3). Thus, the signatories of the Declaration [74] could be perceived as the representatives of group of friends, at least in 1990s. Nevertheless, the relevance of The Pyongyang Declaration is too low to be perceived as a lead and North Korean references to it vanished in late 1990s. Afterwards, the DPRK referred to the "progressive/peace-loving/ friendly" countries or to the members of the Non-Aligned Movement and the Movement itself[75] which traditionally has been very important platform for the DPRK (comp. Kim 1986, 328).

Basically speaking, countries or actors we may call "similarly thinking", i.e. rather leftist (but yet, not necessarily!), radical, anti-colonial, anti-interventionist and anti-imperialist countries that often support the idea of non-alignment that North Korea cultivate relations with may be perceived as members of the group of friends. In particular, Cuba or Iran represent recent examples of this group (comp. Jung 2013, 114–115). What is interesting here is that the DPRK never refers namely to China or Russia in the statements where I identified roles. Nevertheless, these countries are usually perceived as major patrons for the DPRK, especially as far as China[76]

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[73] The Pyongyang Declaration was a joint statement of 30 countries signed during the celebrations of the 80th birthday of Kim Il Sung on April 20, 1992. The declaration mainly referred to the need to defend the socialism whereas the signatories expressed their commitment to socialism. By initiating The Pyongyang Declaration, the DPRK attempted to "portray itself as the patron of world communism" (Kim 2011, 86).

[74] Briefly speaking, the Declaration was signed by communist and socialist parties of Third World Countries around the Latin America, Africa, and Asia but also by some Western communist parties.

[75] This was mainly the case of role defender of faith.

[76] However, the China-DPRK relations underwent significant transformations after the end of the Clod War. As Lee (2014, 192) points out, the unconditional alliance rooted in ideological concord shifted to rather pragmatic relations which means that China would support North Korea

is concerned (comp. Lee 2014, 191) and thus, they can be incorporated among those countries the DPRK refers to as "progressive, peace-loving or friendly". This is also supported by Ming Lee (2009, 166) who explicitly links China to North Korean definition of "friendly countries". Moreover, thorough whole researched period, I noticed North Korea always strongly highlighted and carefully reported its meetings or negotiations with Russia and China in both Korea Today and The Pyongyang Times (comp. for example, Korea Today 2001a, 1–4, or Korea Today 2001b, 1–4). Thus, it is possible to argue that the DPRK puts strong emphasis on its relations with these countries.

To sum up, the DPRK deeply identifies itself with the group of friends, i.e. it mainly perceives itself as a citadel of progressives and, as Woo (2011, 192) aptly points out, it "(…) pictures a fierce struggle between independence-respecting and imperial forces, peace-loving and war-mongering forces, and progressive and reactionary countries". This is how it presents its image to the international audiences.

When looking at Chart 18 again, the major roles North Korea declared are linked with the group of foes of significant others (represented mainly by the United States) with only one exception. Thus, it is possible to say the group of foes embodying the unfair and unjust international order against which the DPRK delimits itself (ibid., 195) is essential for the existence of majority of the most important roles the DPRK declares. Nevertheless, one should not forget about the group of friends as they function as the secondary (still essential, however) base for remaining role the DPRK declares.

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mainly when the existence and maintenance of North Korea is endangered. In other cases, China declared it is willing to support the DPRK only selectively. Lastly, the new dimension of the relationship also allows China to oppose North Korean "dangerous actions" but as the same time, it is also determined to block the Western sanctions against the DPRK which could cause collapse of the North Korean regime (ibid, 206).

4. Roles and North Korean Foreign Politics: Interactions, Role Changes and Fluctuations

In this chapter, I put the changes that occurred in the major roles discussed in Chapter 3 in the context with North Korean interactions with significant others. Using the data which have already been presented in graphs depicting role changes in The Pyongyang Times dataset, I created Chart 19 (see the following page).

As I have already linked the roles having significant position in North Korea role sets to particular group of significant others, I can now take these roles one by one and contextualize the major role changes as depicted in Chart 19 with the interactions with the group of foes/friends. To make whole process clearer, I identified several spheres of interactions according to which I will subsequently proceed with my analysis. I summarize these spheres in Chart 20. In accordance with formerly mentioned work of Chafetz, Abramson and Grillot (1996, 736), I took (North Korean) past and current experiences with other countries into consideration. Nevertheless, two points have to be mentioned in this regard.

Chart 19: Changes in the Role Saliency: Downfalls and Rises

	1994-1995	1995-1996	1996-1997	1997-1998	1998-1999	1999-2000	2000-2001	2001-2002	2002-2003	2003-2004	2004-2005	2005-2006	2006-2007	2007-2008	2008-2009	2009-2010	2010-2011	2011-2012	2012-2013	2013-2014	2014-2015
internal developer	6	**-10**	**14**	-3	9	6	-6	0	0	7	-2	-2	**-8**	-6	**15**	5	**-8**	11	-7	1	5
independent	-5	5	3	-3	-5	-1	5	0	**7**	-1	-4	**-12**	**6**	-1	-1	3	2	-5	4	**6**	**-6**
active independent	-1	3	**-13**	4	-9	**12**	6	**-17**	1	**8**	-6	1	6	5	-7	0	3	-10	5	-1	7
isolate	-5	5	0	-5	6	-9	3	0	**17**	**-16**	5	-3	5	-6	-5	-1	4	**14**	**-11**	3	0
bastion of revolution - liberator	-2	-2	-2	**12**	**-11**	1	5	-5	-9	0	2	**11**	-5	-1	**-10**	9	-2	-7	7	-9	2
anti-imperialist agent	**8**	-2	4	5	**10**	**-22**	-2	7	6	-4	-3	1	-1	0	**-7**	1	2	-3	4	-3	1
global peace protector	-2	-2	2	**-6**	3	-5	1	4	-3	0	5	**-6**	**10**	-4	-2	2	-2	**-7**	**7**	-2	1
regional peace protector	6	-2	-2	2	-4	7	-7	10	**-10**	4	2	4	-6	-4	**11**	-2	3	**-12**	**12**	-9	-1

Source: created by author. The shades of red in the cells stand for the downfalls, the shades of green stand for the rises. The highest downfalls and rises are depicted in bold and are written in larger font.

First issue is connected with the human rights criticism as one of the spheres of interaction. One should be aware that the consistent human rights criticism of the DPRK is still very recent issue. In particular, the concerted pressure of international community on North Korea due to its human rights record did not obtain stronger contours until March 2013 when the Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the DPRK (hereinafter referred to as CoI) was formed as a part of the United Nations Human Rights Council. Although there were some hints of human rights pressure on North Korea even sooner, for example, 2004 U.S. North Korean Human Rights Act (see below) or various civil society initiatives that were criticizing the situation,[77] the consistent pressure did not materialize until 2013. Furthermore, the coherent human rights criticism occurred when the power transition was under way in North Korea which significantly shook the composition of role sets. Therefore, it is problematic to observe the correlation in its full scale here. Nevertheless, I argue that we should not fully give up the factoring of human rights pressure as we might loose a part of the picture of North Korean interactions with the significant others.

Second issue relates to the aid provision as one of the spheres of interaction as delimited in Chart 20. It is problematic to observe the correlation between aid provided by China as main representative of group of friends and composition of North Korean role sets. The exact data about the assistance provided are unavailable as China classifies them as a matter of national secret. Sophisticated estimates show that Chinese aid to DPRK is most likely massive (comp. Lee M. 2009; Reilly 2014, or Haggard and Noland 2009) whereas China probably provides energy assistance, sponsors

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[77] The civil society organizations focussing on North Korea have often both humanitarian and human rights dimension. They started to be more active mainly after 2000 in the United States and South Korea. One of the oldest ones is Citizens' Alliance for North Korean Human Rights (CANKHR), or for example, People for Successful Korean Reunification (PSCORE). Although their human rights activities were quite limited during the Sunshine Policy era, their influence grew after 2008. In 2011, they created a network called *International Coalition to Stop the Crimes against Humanity in North Korea* (ICNK) which involves more than 40 organizations nowadays (ICNK n.d.). ICNK significantly contributed to the establishment of the UN Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in North Korea.

infrastructure projects, food aid, training programs and provides emergency aid (Reilly 2014, 1167). Nevertheless, existing aid/assistance data alone are not sufficient for proper observing of correlation between the aid provision and development of particular role on regular basis. Thus, it is useful to supplement the existing estimates of aid quantity with trade figures in order to obtain more complex picture of economic dimension of Sino-North Korean relations. This is also approach that students of Chinese aid to the DPRK often choose (comp. Hong 2014; Lee J. 2009; Reilly 2014, or Choo 2008).[78] For example, Julia Lee's claims that there are three types of China's energy assistance: grant type aid, trade at "friendship prices", and exchange with alternative natural resources for oil (Lee J. 2009, 51). Combining the figures depicting the trade between the China and North Korea and China's aid to the DPRK can help me to grasp the economic dimension of China-DPRK relations in satisfactory way.

For every major role previously identified in North Korean statements, I will follow the spheres of interaction depicted in Chart 20. I selected these particular spheres as they constitute the core of North Korean interactions with the significant others. In chapters that follow, I deal with the

Chart 20: Spheres of North Korean Interactions with the Significant Others

group of foes	group of friends
negotiations about North Korean nuclear/ballistic missiles program	humanitarian/development aid provision, economic exchanges
humanitarian/development aid provision	diplomatic support/criticism
human rights criticism	negotiations about nuclear/ballistic missiles program
diplomatic isolation and imposition of sanctions	

Source: created by author.

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[78] As far as the process of implementation of Chinese aid to the DPRK is concerned, article of James Reilly (2014) is very useful in this regard. By interviewing various Chinese officials and analysing relevant materials, he was able to map the terrain of Chinese aid provision to the DPRK in satisfactory way (comp. Reilly 2014, 1164–1165).

substantial changes which occur in that particular North Korean role and contextualize them with the DPRK's interactions with significant others. Let me start with *internal developer*.

4.1 *Internal Developer*: Role Changes and Interactions with the Significant Others

As we can see in Chart 19, the strongest downfall in this role's saliency occurred between 1995 and 1996 whereas the year 1996 was the only one when role *internal developer* dropped out of the role set completely. This period was quite dynamic as far as North Korean interaction with the U.S. is concerned. On 21st October 1994, the first nuclear crisis which was brought to its end: the *Agreed Framework*[79] was signed by the U.S. and North Korean representatives. As I pointed out elsewhere (Kudláčová 2014a, 94), the Agreed Framework and the Korean Energy Development Organization (KEDO) which was established in March 1995 to implement the principles of Agreed Framework is often observed as a breakthrough in the North Korean nuclear freeze. In the beginning of 1996, the United States also expressed its willingness to ease its economic sanctions formerly imposed on the DPRK (Arms Control Association 2016).

As Wendt points out in his article, the role change occurs when the actor is unable to deal with a new (social) situation within preexisting roles (Wendt 1992, 419). If I put this claim into the context with above mentioned developments, it is possible to see a new situation indeed arose between 1995 and 1996 for the DPRK. To begin with, it was firstly ever when the DPRK reached a joint agreement with the United States. This can be perceived as a brand new situation for North Korea which only experienced confrontation in its interaction with the United States. Also Leon Sigal (1998,

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[79] By signing the Agreed Framework, the DPRK agreed to freeze its nuclear facility in Yongbyon and enable the international inspectors to enter the country in exchange for two light water reactors that should have been provided by the United States and fuel aid (The New York Times n.d., or Niksch 2003, 9). The Korean Energy Development Organizations was subsequently established as a platform that was supposed to support the implementation of the goals declared in the Agreed Framework (KEDO, non-dated).

6) points out the DPRK indirectly signalized it will abide by the Agreed Framework, i.e. to leave the *internal developer* role in its military development-oriented dimension. For example, it permitted International Atomic Energy Agency (hereinafter referred to as IAEA) inspectors enter and verify the DPRK was not reprocessing the spent fuel from its reactors.

Nevertheless, the drop-out of *internal developer* in 1996 was followed by relatively steep increase of this role's saliency in 1997. Again, this may be interpreted in terms of North Korean interactions with its main foe. In the end of 1997, the negotiations between the United States and DPRK about North Korean concessions in its missile program failed and the United States decided to impose new sanctions on the DPRK for unspecified missile-proliferation activities (Arms Control Association 2016). In the situation of insecurity which was further intensified by significant food shortages,[80] the strategy of threatening and sanctions gave North Korea more of reasons to further proceed with military build-up (Sigal 1998, 12). The rise of *internal developer* role saliency in 1997 in context with newly imposed sanctions can be interpreted as the result of reflected appraisal mechanism described in Chapter 1.3.3.

Role *internal developer* had been gaining stronger position in North Korean role sets since the end of 1990s which may be related to its inconsistent interactions with significant others (see Chapter 3.2). On one hand, the first ever bilateral talks between the U.S. and DPRK took place in New York in June 2000 where Kim Jong Il even spoke of acceding the U.S. military presence on the peninsula and both countries declared (Suh 2014, 157) followed by another visit of North Korean delegation to the U.S. and signing

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[80] North Korean famine which started in the middle of 1990s was caused by many factors. The most important ones were probably the structural problems and economic mismanagement of North Korean government together with the loss of former suppliers of crucial goods and series of floods that hit the country. For more information about it, see for example Haggard and Noland 2007.

of joint NK-U.S. Communiqué in October 2000.[81] On the other hand, the implementation of Agreed Framework turned out to be problematic after 2000 as many delays occurred in case of U.S. heavy fuel oil shipments and the construction of the light water reactors (hereinafter referred to as LWR) was postponed several times. Moreover, the United States refused to lift the past economic sanctions and perceived the high level negotiations with the DPRK as a reward for the DPRK which is somehow a distorted opinion (comp. Sigal 1998, 83). Thus, situation combined with famine emergency inside the DPRK probably deepened North Korean feeling of insecurity which was followed by firmer nesting of *internal developer* role in the North Korean role sets.

As Chart 19 illustrates, the role saliency shows relatively steep fall between 2007 and 2008 preceded by mild decreasing of the saliency starting from 2004. This is also a period of six party talks[82] (hereinafter referred to as SPT), the series of negotiations with North Korea about its nuclear program lasting between 2003 and 2008. By being integrated to SPT where all its important friends and foes were present, the DPRK was confronted with an unusual situation that it was not able to deal with in the framework of continuing rise of saliency of the *internal developer* role. Stable decreasing tendency of the *internal developer* role saliency which correlates with the continuation of the SPT also demonstrates North Korean receptivity to

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[81] By signing the communiqué, the DPRK agreed to abandon its plans for developing of long-range missiles whereas the United States agreed to guarantee North Korean survival together with economic aid. Moreover, both countries agreed they will participate on the four party talks which should also serve as a method for the future reunification of the peninsula (Suh 2014, 167).

[82] The six party talks were negotiations between the DPRK, United States, Republic of Korea, Japan, China and Russia about North Korean nuclear program. Since their inception in 2003 in reaction to the second nuclear crisis of 2002 and North Korean decision to withdraw from Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (hereinafter referred to as NPT), SPT had several phases of negotiations but they have been discontinued in April 2009 in reaction to North Korean test of intercontinental ballistic missile/satellite launch. The Six Party Talks were preceded by four party talks where the DPRK, South Korea, China and U.S. participated between 1997 and 1999. The four party talks are perceived as a failure as the parties were not able to "set agenda items for their talks" (Kwak 2009, 122). As Joo (2009, 208) points out, the participation of Russia in the SPT also contributed to smoother course of the negotiations as Russia (together with China and South Korea in period of sunshine policy) spoke in favour of North Korea and helped to moderate the U.S. hard line position.

negotiations.[83] The fall of *internal developer* role saliency in 2006–2007 and 2000–2001 correlates with other significant events in North Korean interaction with South Korea, i.e. two inter-Korean summits in 2000 and 2007. The first inter-Korean summit of June 2000[84] brought joint declaration that should have ensured peaceful coexistence of both Koreas (Kwak 2009, 119).

Chart 19 shows the strongest rise of *internal developer* role saliency in period after 2009. Again, it is possible to interpret this shift in context with development of DPRK's relations with group of foes. In 2008, South Korean Great National Party led by to-be president Lee Myung Bak who promoted containment of the DPRK on a long term basis published the Vision 3000 through Denuclearization and Openness (also referred as DNO 3000). This document became essential for following South Korean policy towards its northern neighbour.[85] DNO 3000 essentially brought much more tensions into the inter-Korean relations and made inter-Korean communication much more complicated as I have showed elsewhere (comp. Kudláčová 2014b). As Scott Snyder aptly notices, the DPRK carefully refrained from criticizing Lee Myung Bak during the political campaign before 2008 in order to leave "the door open to continuity in the inter-Korean relationship" (Snyder 2010, 155). This changed drastically after Lee Myung Bak won the presidential election (comp. for example, The Pyongyang Times 2008, 1, or Kim 2009, 6). Despite the signals that occurred during the campaign, the newly elected

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[83] Although it is often argued the SPT brought only little results, they led to North Korean agreement to abandon its nuclear program in exchange for the fuel and food aid shipments (Bajoria and Xu 2013).

[84] Nevertheless, it is needed to point out that in March 2000, South Korean president Kim Tae Jung made secret journey to Singapore where he met representatives of North Korean Asia-Pacific Peace Committee and offered them a secret payoff of 450 million dollars together with unspecified shipment of goods for regime in value of 50 million dollars (Kirk 2009, 157–158). Thus, the first summit is sometimes perceived as a mere result of this "bribe" that Kim Dae Jung made.

[85] Basically speaking, the initiative should have raised the DPRK's per capita income to 3000 dollars *if* it abandoned its nuclear program and opened to the world (Snyder 2010, 154). Although the initiative is formulated in very attractive and catchy way in South Korean official documents (comp. Bae 2009), it brought much more pragmatic and conservative policy towards the DPRK together with cessation of flows of South Korean aid to the DPRK.

Obama administration did not bring any changes the DPRK hoped for. The U.S. continued with politics of sanctions and pressure on North Korea in form of the "Strategic Patience" doctrine (Suh 2014, 161). Thus, the rise of *internal developer* role saliency in 2009 and generally stronger emphasis on this role even in the following year correlates with dramatic change of South Korean approach towards the DPRK, with the discontinuation of SPT, with intensification of sanctions imposed against the DPRK in 2009 and also, with the fact the Obama administration retained former confrontational stance.

Chart 19 demonstrates there was relatively strong fall in role saliency in 2011. In this year, the DPRK expressed its will to come back to SPT which was backed by Russia and China. Furthermore, North Korean representative travelled to the U.S. where the United States expressed its willingness to return to the negotiating table as well (Arms Control Association 2016). The improving atmosphere and hopes to restart SPT that seem to correlate with the fall of *internal developer* role saliency in 2011 were nevertheless interrupted by death of Kim Jong Il which started the period of power transition to his son, Kim Jong Un. It is needed to point out at this place that the DPRK underwent the period of relatively unexpected power transition after 2011. This may be perceived as the time of crisis or shock as Nabers (2011, 85–86) defines it and it might have resulted in the fluctuations that occurred in practically all the roles between 2011–2012 and 2012–2013 (again, see Chart 19).

It is also interesting to observe that the amount of aid provided by the United States and South Korea to the DPRK correlates with the developments in *internal developer* role saliency only partially. Although the amount of aid peaked in 1999 and remained very high till 2003 in case of the U.S. aid, the emphasis on *internal developer* role showed growing tendency. On the other hand, in the peaking assistance from South Korea 2005–2007 actually correlates with decreasing saliency of *internal developer* role. When

putting this into the context of debates about the potential influence of aid provision on change of the actual politics of its recipient, North Korean case shows this strategy does not bring consistent evidence about that.

Lastly, there is the sphere of criticism of human rights situation in the DPRK. I have already pointed out above it did not reached stronger contours until 2004 with issuing of the North Korean Human Rights Act.[86] The human rights pressure aimed to the DPRK has been reaching higher intensity mainly after 2011 and still, the criticism did not really impact the DPRK until March 2013 when the CoI was formed by the United Nations Human Rights Council which brought more consistent approach in investigating of human rights violations.[87] Therefore, the consistent and institutionalized human rights pressure did not occur until 2013 which makes the observation of influence of this form of interaction difficult. Nevertheless, there is one interesting connection. As I pointed out above, the statements correlating with *internal developer* role have contained reference to "civilized country building" since 2013. Moreover, I was able to identify the role *civilized country* in North Korean statements in 2012. It is possible to interpret the North Korean references to "civilized nation building" as an expression of its sensitivity to the increased human rights pressure coming from the group of foes. This reminds the debates about the influence of norms and taboos in the international environment as discussed by Richard Price and Nina Tannenwald (1996, 2). They try to find out why the nuclear weapons were not used and provide the alternative explanation to the deterrence theory. In particular, they claim the social and cultural meanings became attached to

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[86] The criticism of North Korean human rights situation gained significant momentum in 2004 when the United States approved the North Korean Human Rights Act (hereinafter referred to as NKHRA). In sum, the document states the North Korean human right will be crucial element for the U.S. when negotiating with the DPRK. Furthermore, NKHRA proposed to establish a multilateral forum in Northeast Asia where the North Korean human rights situation should be debated (Kang 2004, 155 and 167).

[87] CoI's mandate is to "to investigate systematic, widespread and grave violations of human rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea" (UN Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner n.d.a). So far, it initiated public hearings in Seoul, Tokyo, London and Washington during which the witnesses of human rights violations and experts provided their testimonies (UN Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner n.d.b).

these weapons which gradually resulted in the refusal to use them. I argue that similar mechanism may be emerging in case of human rights norms' influence on the DPRK. Although the evidence is still very young, it seems the DPRK has actually started to reflect something what we might call *human rights abuse taboo* by labelling itself as "civilized country" recently.

Surely, this claim is relatively brave and further evidences and investigation would by needed to further support it. Nevertheless, if looking at the overall frequency of North Korean use of word "civilized" in The Pyongyang Times between 1994 and 2015, we can see its occurrence frequency has been significantly increasing as well. In particular, the articles in The Pyongyang Times tend to use this world in connection with the lives of North Korean people or above mentioned civilized nation building after 2012.[88] As the extract of the texts where the reference to word "civilized" were often not declarations of a role, I could not include them to my data sample. Nevertheless, this rise of occurrence frequency supports my statement about possible forming of human rights abuse taboo.

4.2 *Independent*: Role Changes and Interactions with the Significant Others

It is needed to point out that independence and self-reliance have been absolutely crucial values for North Korean regime practically since 1950s. As Charles K. Armstrong points out, ideology of Juche (which embodied the principle of self-reliance) has been "the most extreme and uncompromising expression of national and economic sovereignty in the world" (Armstrong 2013, 53). Thus, we can expect that the role *independent* is rooted very deeply in the North Korean role sets, that it constitutes cornerstone of the DPRK's identity and that the issue of sovereignty and independence is

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[88] Besides many others references, see for example Rodong Sinmun, Josoninmingun and Rodong Chongnyon 2012, 6; The Pyongyang Times 2012, 1; Bok 2013, 2; Bok 2014, 3, or Kim Jong Un 2015b, 1. On the other hand, if going through the Pyongyang Times issues between 1994 and 2011, the word "civilized" in connection with North Korea occurred only very scarcely.

indeed absolute and indivisible for North Korea, as Armstrong (ibid., 292) claims. Given to such a deep nesting of the role *independent* in North Korean identity, it is neither probable this role vanishes from the role sets nor its saliency drops significantly. To put it differently we can expect the North Korean *ego* will prevail over *alter's* influence in their mutual interaction in the international scene. This is actually confirmed by stagnating trend of this role saliency depicted in Chart 10.1.

As we can see in Chart 21, there was relatively strong rise in this role's saliency in 2003 which is the year of the second nuclear crisis on the peninsula. Let me now focus on this complex situation in detail. First, North Korean policy of President Bush was quite inconsistent and produced different signals to the DPRK. On one hand, there was strongly confrontational rhetoric such as the incorporation of the DPRK into so called Axis of Evil in the beginning of 2002[89] or declaration of a possibility to use of nuclear weapons against the DPRK in March of the same year (Arms Control Association 2016). On the other hand, foreign policy representatives announced the U.S. willingness to negotiate with the DPRK without any preconditions (ibid.) and there were some other some hints of cooperative atmosphere, such as the August 2002 ceremony when the concrete base for the first LWR was poured in North Korea or North Korean announcement to indefinitely extend its moratorium on missile testing as a part of former agreement with Japan in the same year. The mixed signals were present even in later years in the U.S. policies towards the DPRK (see below).

Second, there was the atmosphere of insecurity after 9/11 attacks and subsequent U.S. invasion to Iraq in 2003. Third, there were major issues and delays as far as the Agreed Framework and LWR project is concerned. As

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[89] There were more confrontations going from the Bush administration which sometimes even touched the personal level. For example, President Bush resorted to the personal assault against Kim Jong Il declaring he loathed him (comp. The Progressive 2003), the U.S. Secretary of State Powell argued that Kim Jong-il is a dictator (Harnisch 2002, 864), the Secretary of Defence Rumsfeld went so far as to declare that North Korean leaders are "idiotic" (Hwang 2004, 15) and so forth.

Pollack (2011, 131) points out, North Korea had been becoming increasingly frustrated over the slow pace of heavy fuel oil shipments and over only little progress in LWR project. I have already mentioned above that it became clear in 2002 that the LWR will not be finished according to the previously set schedule. Moreover, Bush administration proved to be unwilling both to sustain the Agreed Framework and bring the LWR project into the existence (ibid.).

What I perceive as the crucial turning point and final trigger of upcoming second nuclear crisis (and the factor that strongly contributed to the rise of saliency of role *independent*) were the negotiations between the U.S. and North Koreas in the DPRK in autumn 2002. The then assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific Affairs James Kelly criticized the DPRK for its nuclear and missile programs, human rights violations and abysmal humanitarian situation whereas he brought out the U.S. intelligence reports confirming North Korean nuclear program is still under way. After initially rejecting these accusations, North Korea allegedly admitted it has nuclear program. Nevertheless, there were no specifications available of the exact dimension of this program[90] (comp. Arms Control Association 2016, or Sanger 2002).

The U.S. revelation was followed by full cessation of heavy-fuel oil shipments to North Korea and by the DPRK's announcement to restart its nuclear reactors in December 2002 and to withdraw from the NPT in early 2003. The increased saliency of the role *independent* in 2003 can be interpreted as North Korean reaction to the confrontational situation. In front of its international audiences, the DPRK wanted to fortify itself with its self-reliance, independence and sovereignty (and even with nuclear program of unspecified scale). It wanted to show that first, it will not comply with the U.S. demands despite its pressure and new sanctions imposed in March

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[90] During the meeting North Korean representatives also claimed the DPRK has even "more powerful things" besides the nuclear program (Sanger 2002).

2003 and second, that it is perfectly able to face the pressure thanks to its "powerful" military capacities. Once again, we can see the DPRK shows strong receptivity to pressure and sanctions as they correlate with strengthened North Korean emphasis on its independence and self-reliance. The atmosphere of the U.S. invasion to Iraq in 2003 made significant contribution to North Korean increased emphasis to independence and it probably even contributed to North Korean nuclear "coming out".

Once again, the mechanism of reflected appraisal seems to be relevant for interpretation of the crisis of 2003. This is demonstrated by the statement of North Korean First Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Kang Sok Ju, who declared during the meeting with Kelly: "We are a part of axis of evil and you (the U.S., added by author) are a gentleman. This is our relationship. We cannot discuss matters like gentlemen. If we disarm ourselves because of U.S. pressure, then we will become like Yugoslavia or Afghanistan's Taliban, to be beaten to death" (Kang quoted according to Pritchard 2007, 25). In the escalating situation, North Korea simply reacted by fortifying itself with alleged nuclear program[91] and the rhetoric correlating with role *independent*. It aimed to remind the international audience that the DPRK is not willing to step back in front of the pressure of its main foe.

We can see here that the sharpened stance of the United States actually further supported and strengthened North Korean identity of self-reliance and independence. As the situation of escalated confrontation was not anything new for the DPRK that was used to it from the previous decades of confrontation with the U.S., there simply was no reason to leave or lower the saliency of the old role as it still corresponded with the reality. Simply speaking, there was no reason for the DPRK to think of itself in novel terms.

Similar logic can be used for interpretation of the events in 2006 when the saliency of role *independent* dropped to its lowest level. After series of SPT

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[91] The saliency of role *internal developer* remains on the high level in this period too.

negotiations, the DPRK returned to the NPT in autumn 2005 and declared its willingness to denuclearize, basically in exchange for further debates about the provision of LWR which brought the second nuclear crisis to its end. This also projected in the North Korean role set in 2005 when the saliency dropped. Nevertheless, the next round of SPT showed waste disagreements between the DPRK and U.S. Moreover, the freezing of North Korean funds in the Banco Delta Asia (Macau)[92] in late 2005 cut the DPRK from the foreign currency.

In 2006, North Korean manoeuvring space was further shrinking when new U.S. sanctions occurred and KEDO executive council announced the end of LWR project. In this situation, North Korea was probably shaken and needed to reassure both itself and international audience it is still "independent and powerful nation". The reassurance came into being in the form of ballistic missiles launch and first ever nuclear test in the end of 2006. These events helped the DPRK to reclaim its independence which is demonstrated by the rise of *independent* role saliency in 2007.[93]

Again, it is interesting to observe how the inflows of humanitarian aid did not really impact the crisis described above. Although the total amount of aid provided to the DPRK by the Republic of Korea between 2006 and 2007 peaked – it reached about $270 million annually in both years (comp. Kudláčová 2013, 58) – it did not really make any difference in the course of events. The same may be said about the U.S. massive aid to the DPRK between 1998 and 2002.

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[92] North Korean funds (about 25 million dollars) in the Banco Delta Asia were perceived as the money coming from illegal activities, such as drug trafficking. Therefore, the United States applied the USA Patriot Act and froze these funds.

[93] The North Korean Foreign Ministry also declared the nuclear test was executed in order to prove the DPRK has nukes that can protect its sovereignty. At the same time, it claimed it remains unchanged in its support to denuclearization (comp. DPRK Foreign Ministry 2006, 1).

4.3 *Active Independent*: Role Changes and Interactions with the Significant Others

The *active independent* stands for the only role among the most important ones in the North Korean role sets linked to group of friends. This group is mainly represented by China, who is traditionally perceived as the DPRK's closest ally and by Russia as well. I have already mentioned in Chapter 3.3 very briefly how this role's position in North Korean role sets developed in the beginning of the period I analyse. Let me now proceed with the contextualization of the changes.

One of the strongest downfalls in the saliency occurred in 1997. As the meaning of this role is mainly connected with the DPRK's effort to expand its diplomatic ties and is linked to the group of friends, this shift may be interpreted in the light of consolidation of the DPRK's relations with China and first steps on the way of revitalization of DPRK's relations with Russia. In case of Sino-North Korean relations, The Agreement on Economic and Technology Cooperation signed in May 1996 symbolized significant breakthrough as it ensured stable inflow of aid for next five years and the system of "friendly prices" in the bilateral trade between Beijing and Pyongyang (Choo 2008, 348).

Furthermore, Russia gradually started to work on the revitalization of its relations with Pyongyang since the late 1990s as well. For example, in 1997, Russia expressed its willingness to be active part and regular participant in the nuclear negotiations with North Korea (known as the four party talks in that period)[94] and both countries made a significant step in revitalization of mutual relations by signing the agreement on cultural and scientific cooperation between both countries. The full normalization of bilateral relations did not come into existence until February 2000 when The Treaty of Friendship, Good Neighbourly Relations and Cooperation was signed

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[94] Nevertheless, Russia did not participate in the negotiations on the DPRK's nuclear program in 1990s (comp. Zhebin 1995, 739).

(Vorontsov 2007, 7–8). As Joo (2009, 185) aptly points out, it was the rise of president Putin that meant a clear break with the Kim Jong Ils's past unpleasant memories connected with Yeltsin's Russia. The basic treaty of 2000 (which is the shorter form often used for the Treaty of Friendship) started a new era of active development of relations between North Korea and Putin's Russia. Kim Jong Il reportedly perceived new Russian president in very positive way. After his personal dinner with Putin, he even argued: "If I am treated diplomatically (…) I become a diplomat myself. Putin was sincere with me and I opened my heart to him" (Kim Jong Il quoted in Joo 2009, 187).

North Korean success in revitalization of its relations with its Cold War era friends is also demonstrated in weakening of *active independent* role saliency. The DPRK regained its self confidence after the normalization of its relations with China in 1996 and the same development followed with Russia in period between 2000 and 2002. This is also demonstrated by the composition of the DPRK's role sets. The first downfall of the *active independent* role saliency occurred in 1997, immediately after North Korea reached its agreement with China. After that, there was the rise of saliency between 2000 and 2001 which can be interpreted as North Korean effort to assure its friends (this time mainly Putin's Russia) that it is ready to deepen the cooperation. Indeed, further expansion of relations with Russia materialized between 2000 and 2001 when more agreements were reached (comp. Joo 2009, 187–188). This was followed by steep downfall of *active independent* role saliency between 2002 and 2003 as represented in Chart 21.

To sum up, as the DPRK reclaimed its self-confidence by establishing relations with China and Russia, there was no longer the need to ensure the international audiences of its willingness to develop relations with "friendly countries". Simply speaking, the reason arose for the DPRK to "think oneself

in novel terms" (comp. Wendt 1992, 419) at least temporarily. This is demonstrated in the reconfiguration of composition of North Korean role sets when comparing years 1996 and 1997 and simultaneous gradual rise of saliency of other roles, mainly the *internal developer*. Thus, we can perceive the re-establishment and deepening of relations with China and Russia as an important precondition for the rise of the *internal developer* role's saliency in North Korean role sets which basically signalized Pyongyang focus on its military build-up (comp. Joo 2009, 183–184). Once again, the mechanism of reflected appraisal seems to be relevant even when approaching the DPRK's relations with its friends. This is demonstrated in the above quoted statement of Kim Jong Il about the DPRK's relations with Russia.

Clearly, the second half of 1990s and the very beginning of 2000s was crucial period that probably strongly determined future of North Korean foreign political directions. The rise of U.S. administration of George Bush and the U.S. breaking with the Clinton's vigilant engagement policies towards the DPRK pushed Pyongyang toward Moscow and Beijing. Once the DPRK was able to stabilize its relations with Russia and China, and once the stable trade ties with China was ensured,[95] it has probably started to feel much more confident about its own identity as it was practically reassured it can count on its traditional friends. This at least contributed to the rise of roles which brought reclusive and inimical policies towards the West (for example, the *internal developer* and *isolate*).

If we look closer at the correlation between the sanctions imposed on the DPRK with support of Russia and China and development of *active independent* role saliency, we also arrive to interesting findings. Basically speaking, Russia and China[96] expressed their support to the anti-DPRK

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[95] The Chinese export to North Korea was sharply rising (comp. Hong 2014, 294).
[96] Before 2006, China was not willing to impose sanctions against North Korea. Although it reportedly cut off its oil supplies to the DPRK for three days after North Korea restarted its nuclear program in 2003 (Reilly 2014, 1178), this cannot really be perceived as meaningful sanctioning mechanism.

sanctions mainly since 2006 when the DPRK carried out series of ballistic missile tests and the first nuclear test ever (see above). After China and Russia expressed their support of UN Security Council resolutions against the DPRK mainly in 2006, 2009 and 2013 (Reilly 2014, 1178), the saliency of *active independent* role in North Korean role sets grew as Chart 11.2 demonstrates. This actually indicates worsening of North Korean relations with its friends, especially with China (Hong 2014, 295), whereas the repeated strengthening of saliency of *active independent* role indicates possible reopening of space for a new engagement with the DPRK.

At this place, it is also needed to point out Chinese as well as Russian criticism of North Korean nuclear and ballistic missiles tests in 2006 and 2009 was rather circumspect but it became harsher in 2013 and afterwards (comp. English News 2013; Jun 2013, or The Guardian 2016). Furthermore, China reportedly decreased amount of its export of both grain and fertilizer in 2013 to the DPRK (Yonhap News Agency 2013) and general decrease of Chinese export to North Korea has continued even in 2014 and 2015 (Shim 2016). Again, this may explain the rise in *active independent* role saliency since 2012. By using statements referring to this role, North Korea signalizes its increased need to look for support in the international environment. If we also consider the fact that the aid China provides to North Korea is probably crucial for regime survival (comp. Choo 2008, 343), we may perceive the economic dimension of Sino-North Korean friendship as both formative element for development of *active independent role* saliency and interesting indicator of the development of their mutual relations.

4.4 *Isolate*: Role Changes and Interactions with the Significant Others

Kalevi J. Holsti argues in his article this role arises from given state's threat perception and its insufficient capacities (Holsti 1970, 297). The perception of threat accompanied with the feeling of insecurity is especially relevant when we observe this role's development in North Korean case.

The situation in which the DPRK found itself in 2003 has already been described above in detail (see Chapter 4.2). The Agreed Framework was failing which deepened mutual distrust between Washington and Pyongyang, the U.S. policy towards the DPRK was highly inconsistent releasing different signals to North Korea going from vigilant signs of engagement to sharp containment in the form of sanctions against the DPRK (also comp. Han 2014, 293). Moreover, the U.S. invasion to Iraq became reality in 2003. All these aspects contributed to rise of the role *isolate* to unprecedented level in the same year. I have already demonstrated in case of role *independent* how it functioned as a mechanism of fortification of North Korea against the pressure and sanctions. The role *isolate* seems to have very similar function: the DPRK aims to remind its foes it is ready to face the enemies in any case.

The role saliency dropped from 24 % to a mere 8 % in 2004 when the next rounds of SPT negotiations took place in Beijing which brought an agreement about the next steps in North Korean denuclearization. We can see the saliency of role *isolate* stayed on lower level between 2005 and 2010. This period mostly correlates with ongoing SPT negotiations. Furthermore, North Korea hoped that the forthcoming change of presidential administration in the United States will bring the change of the U.S. politics and revitalization of engagement policies. This argument is widely supported by various scholars dealing with North Korean foreign policy. For example, Kwang Ho Lee argues that the DPRK perceived the inauguration of President Obama as possible opportunity to "(…) start afresh in relations with Washington" (Lee K. H. 2009, 2). This North Korean belief arose from

previous statements of Barack Obama: he expressed his willingness to meet with the DPRK representatives and to negotiate about the nuclear issue (ibid., 3). Olsen (2009, 151) or Paik (2009, 9) arrive to very same conclusion. The conciliatory tone of North Korean regime was also apparent in 2009 New Year Editorial where the denuclearization was emphasized as a key foreign political goal (comp. Rodong Sinmun, Josoninmingun and Rodong Chongnyon 2009, 2). Moreover, the DPRK had probably been experiencing the internal crisis due to the deteriorating medical conditions of Kim Jong Il. Reportedly, he suffered a stroke (Lee K. H. 2009, 4) and did not show up on public since August 2008.

North Korean hopes for the change of course in Washington's policy turned up to be wrong very soon which subsequently projected in North Korean nuclear and missile tests (2009) and in gradual rise of saliency of the role *isolate* since 2010. The situation when the DPRK found out the U.S. resorted to the "strategic patience" doctrine which basically did not bring much changes when compared to Bush's North Korean policy was also one of the factors which resonated in the second peaking of the role *isolate* saliency in 2012. Furthermore, the administration of South Korean conservative president Lee Myung Bak definitely ended the engagement era in 2008 which pushed the DPRK into even more isolated position. However, we should not perceive the U.S.–DPRK and RoK-DPRK interactions as the *only* determinants influencing the rise of saliency of role *isolate* since 2010. This is mainly because this was a highly unstable period of power transition from Kim Jong Il who died in December 2011 to Kim Jong Un.[97]

The instability of the period between 2011 and 2013 is also visible in Chart 19 as strong swings in the role sets were present. There was especially

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[97] The power transition from Kim Il Sung to Kim Jong Il was very different from the recent one from Kim Jong Il to Kim Jong Un. Kim Jong Il had been perceived as Kim Il Sung's successor for a long time before Kim Il Sung died and consequently, Kim Jong Il was able to build his position in the DPRK and gain the support from the senior regime elites. On the other hand, the power transition of Kim Jong Un was very quick which left him in the position where he had to work on the consolidation of his power after Kim Jong Il died.

robust reconfiguration in North Korean role set of 2012 when it became totally dominated by roles *internal developer*, *isolate* and *independent* (together, they stood for 64 % of the role set in this year). At the same time, the saliency of all the roles implying active foreign policy experienced downfall.

North Korean redirection to passive and even isolationist foreign policy after 2010 can be explained as a result of influence of at least four factors. First, there was the issue of unstable and unexpected power transition which has already been discussed above. Second, it is highly probable (although we cannot claim it for sure) that the breakdown of consensus about the North Korean identity occurred in the power succession period. As Wendt (1992, 420) points out, this may result in the changes in role sets. Third, the pressure of North Korean foes rose and so did the intensity of sanctions imposed (comp. Arms Control Association 2016). This actually strengthened North Korean tendency to fortify itself by isolationist tendencies. Fourth, although the newly elected president Park Geun Hye declared the need for *trustpolitik* and *détente* of South-North relations (comp. Park 2013; Lee 2014, or Kang 2013), the actual policy of South toward North retained tense character of the former era.

As far as the last aspect of interaction, i.e. the aid provision is concerned I reached similar findings as in the cases of previously analysed roles. When the aid provided to the DPRK by the United States peaked (roughly between 1998–2002) (comp Kudláčová 2013, 58), saliency of the role *isolate* was low which could indicate certain amount of influence of aid to North Korean foreign policy formation. Nevertheless, the saliency of role *isolate* stayed low even before the massive inflows of the aid were initiated and the correlation of aid provided with the role *isolate* gradually vanished in later years of the researched period. Thus, the leverage of aid supplies is rather weak in case of this role as well.

4.5 *Bastion of Revolution – Liberator*: Role Changes and Interactions with the Significant Others

This role has been constantly present in North Korean role sets in the analysed period but it shows very obvious dropping tendency at the same time. According to Holsti, its actual implementation should involve sending military or other supplies to revolutionary movements in different countries and undertaking extensive programs of ideological propaganda abroad (ibid., 292). Some of these activities are relevant in North Korean case, especially the sending of military supplies abroad or consorting with the leftist governments or parties from Third World countries. There is serious lack of literature dealing with North Korean relations with the countries and actors I called "similarly thinking" above. The article of J. Owoeye (1991, 632) is one of the few. He shows the DPRK strived to gain the voting support of African countries at the UN General Assembly which was essentially aimed at the diplomatic isolation of South Korea.[98]

This role can be linked both to group of friends and foes, i.e. to the group of actors the DPRK aims to liberate and those that it perceives as actors causing the subjugation of those formerly mentioned (see Chapter 3.2). Nevertheless, I have also explained this role mainly serves for North Korean delimitation against its foes (see above). Let me now put the major changes in this role's saliency in context with them.

Despite dropping tendency between 1994 and 1997, the role reached the highest level of saliency in 1998. As Kim (2014, 181) points out, the relations between the United States and DPRK seemed to be improving between 1995

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[98] This tactic is similar to the competition between continental China with Taiwan. The biggest success of the DPRK's anti-South diplomacy in Africa was that it was able to strengthen its ties with Mauritania and Republic of Congo to such an extent that South Korean broke off relations with these countries in 1960s (Owoeye 1991, 633). In 1960s and 1970s, the DPRK even provided aid to its African allies, for example to Tanzania, Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Somalia, Algeria, Sudan, Egypt, Mali, Benin or Togo (ibid., 637–638). Last but not least, North Korea provided its African friends with military supplies as well. In this aspect, it is known it cooperated with Nigeria, Egypt, Libya, Uganda, Zaire, Angolan Front of National Liberation of Angola, or Mozambique Liberation Front (ibid., 639–642). As we can see, the North Korean ties with Africa were really vivid in the Cold War era and many have been preserved till present.

and 1997. The U.S. lifted its economic sanctions in 1995 and the representatives of both countries met in 1996 in Pyongyang and participated on the joint inquiry on exhumation of the U.S. causalities of the Korean War. Moreover, North Korean athletes were present at the 1996 Summer Olympic Games in Atlanta and KEDO began the construction of LWRs in August 1997.

However, a new wave of confrontation occurred afterwards. First, there was the U.S. criticism of North Korean transfers of missile technologies and components to Pakistan which was followed by imposition of sanctions in August 1997 and April 1998 (comp. Arms Control Association 2016).[99] Second, the awaited U.S. crude oil shipments to North Korea did not materialize and the DPRK was re-designated as sponsor of terrorism (Kim 2014, 181). The escalating tensions of 1998 were reflected in the steep rise of *bastion of revolution – liberator* role saliency at the very same year. We can see the pressure and sanctions helped to feed both the enmity for the U.S. and its willingness to act as "a bastion of socialism" as Kim (2014, 184) claims. The tensions deescalated slightly in 1999 in the last moments of the Clinton's administration which selected more conciliatory approach to the DPRK represented by Albright's visit to Pyongyang and other activities. Nevertheless, Bush's presidency designated the DPRK as a main enemy which contributed to the re-increase of saliency of the *bastion of revolution – liberator* role in 2001.

We can see in Chart 13.1 the role saliency was low between 2003 and 2005. This may be interpreted in the light of North Korean shock connected with the U.S. invasion to Iraq (and possibly even by previous one to Afghanistan). Furthermore, we can observe the role sets in these years were dominated by

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[99] As Kim (2014, 181) points out, the relations between the United States and DPRK seemed to be improving between 1995 and 1997. The U.S. lifted its economic sanctions in 1995 and the representatives of both countries met in 1996 in Pyongyang and participated on the joint inquiry on exhumation of the U.S. causalities of the Korean War. Moreover, North Korean athletes were present at the 1996 Summer Olympic Games in Atlanta. Furthermore, KEDO began the construction of LWRs in August 1997.

passive roles, such as *independent*, *isolate* or *internal developer*. Rather than to declare its willingness to support world liberation, North Korea probably tried to fortify itself with its self-reliance, independence and sovereignty in order to show that first, it will not comply with the U.S. demands despite its pressure and new sanctions imposed in March 2003 and second, that it is perfectly able to face the pressure thanks to its "powerful" military capacities. It is possible to interpret the low saliency between 2003 and 2005 by the shift of North Korean attention towards its own troubles in face of standing insecurity connected with the U.S. sanctions and even with the reality of the invasions to Afghanistan and Iraq. Although the DPRK obviously regained its lost self-confidence in terms of self-perceived ability to "fight for the independence of other nations" in 2006,[100] the role bastion of revolution continued with the decrease of saliency in subsequent years.

Basically speaking, in the situation of increased international isolation combined with increasing amount of sanctions imposed on it after 2000, this role was gradually disappearing from North Korean role sets. Thus, we may argue that sanctions and diplomatic isolation actually contributed to gradual decreasing of this role's saliency. Moreover, if considering that this role is connected with North Korean effort to support "similarly thinking countries" (mainly in form of military transfers) at the first place, it is possible to say the sanctions and international isolation might have been the effective instruments for reduction of undesirable North Korean activities in the international arena. Still, we need to be aware of the fact that isolation and sanctions actually seem to be supporting the growth of *internal developer* role's saliency at the same time which mainly implies the DPRK's efforts to boost its military capacities. Consequently, sanctions seem to be double-edged sword when approaching the DPRK.

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[100] In 2006, North Korea carried out its first nuclear test which probably helped to boost its self-perception as a world liberator.

As far as the correlation of aid provided by U.S. and South Korea with development of this role's saliency is concerned, I arrived to contradictory findings. On one hand, when South Korean aid culminated in 2006–2008, the role saliency rose temporarily. It is possible to argue that that these aid inflows helped to boost North Korean confidence to perceive itself as a world liberator. On the other hand, when the U.S. aid was peaking mainly between 1998 and 2002 (comp. Kudláčová 2013, 58), the correlation was ambiguous.

4.6 *Anti-Imperialist Agent*: Role Changes and Interactions with the Significant Others

According to Holsti (1970, 296), the main sources of this role include ideological principles, anti-colonial attitudes and perception of threat. In 1994, 1995 and 1996, North Korean anti-U.S. rhetoric in form of *anti-imperialist agent* role was relatively weak. Once again, this may be linked to generally warm atmosphere of U.S.-DPRK relations as well as to the DPRK's expectations of change of climate due to new presidential administration in the U.S. In both 1993 and 1994 in his New Year speech, Kim Il Sung emphasized the bilateral dialogue with the United States as both the way for improving mutual relations and for resolving the nuclear issue (Suh 2014, 153). Nevertheless, the North Korean expectation did not meet reality after the first few years of Clinton's presidency: the U.S. imposed sanctions on the DPRK in 1996, 1997 and after North Korean test of its ballistic missiles in 1998. These developments manifested themselves in peaking saliency of role *anti-imperialist agent* role in 1999 as Chart 14.2 demonstrates.

Furthermore, the Chart 19 indicates the most obvious change in the *anti-imperialist agent* role development occurred in period of 1999–2000 when the saliency jumped up to 27 % in 1999 whereas it dropped to a mere 5 % of the 2000 role set. This situation is quite interesting when considering the inconsistent patterns of North Korean relations with its significant others I

have already mentioned in case of *internal developer* role. On one hand, the bilateral talks between the U.S. and DPRK took place in New York in June 2000 followed by another visit of North Korean delegation to the U.S. and signing of joint NK-U.S. Communiqué in October 2000. On the other hand, problems occurred in terms of Agreed Framework and LWR project implementation (see the beginning of this chapter). In contrast to *internal developer* role, the DPRK was more receptive to breakthrough in negotiations with the U.S. and at the same time, it seems like it was willing to overlook the other issues and problems mentioned before.

Nevertheless, when G. W. Bush became the U.S. president, the *anti-imperialist agent* role's saliency rose again after he classified the DPRK as part of the Axis of Evil and spoke about the possibility of the U.S. preemptive strike against North Korea in 2002. The rise of this role's saliency in 2003 reflects North Korean rising feeling of insecurity. Similarly to roles *independent* and *internal developer*, the saliency of anti-imperialist role dropped again when SPT were taking place between 2003 and 2009.

It is also very interesting that North Korean emphasis on this role has not rise again recently. This may be an indicator of North Korean foreign policy reorientation later in the post-Cold War era. As Seongji Woo (2011, 195) points out, the DPRK might have "(...) solemnly acknowledged that the 'imperialist-reactionary forces' general offensives against anti-imperialist-independent forces were gaining ground". Nabers (2011, 85–86) argues that the role change may occur when the role performance stops to correspond with actor's identity. Thus, the overall decrease of *anti-imperialist agent* role's saliency can be interpreted also as a signal of gradually vanishing ideological dimension of North Korean identity and subsequent waning of ideological dimension of the U.S.–DPRK confrontation as well.

The aid provision did not really correlate with developments in the role saliency. On one hand, when the amount of the U.S. assistance to the DPRK

was continuously growing from 1995 till 1999, the role saliency continuously grew as well. On the other hand, the saliency grew in 2003 after the United States cut the amount of aid (comp. Kudláčová 2013, 58). In case of South Korean aid, the correlation with the role saliency development did not manifest at all. Thus, the overall correlation between aid and saliency development was weak.

4.7 *Global* and *Regional Peace Protector*: Roles' Changes and Interactions with the Significant Others

I decided not to analyse these roles separately as they basically indicate focus on the same issue (i.e. peace protection). They also share various features and important source of these roles is the threat perception which I have already mentioned before. Both of them are less significant and a complementary part of North Korean role sets which is reflected by the low level of their saliency. As both roles only scarcely occupied prominent position in North Korean role sets, it becomes more complicated to follow the correlation between their saliency and interactions with the significant others in consistent way. In spite of this, I was still able to grasp some patterns there.

The DPRK's commitments to global peace protection were very often connected with the commitments to denuclearization in 1990s (see Chapter 3.2). At the same time, we can see in Chart 15.2 the saliency of this role was dropping between 1994 and 2000 whereas the emphasis on *internal developer* role was growing after 1996 at the same time. In context of debates about the role change, it is possible to argue North Korea was increasingly less confident about the meaning of this role during 1990s which is represented in its dropping saliency. Also, I highlighted before North Korean commitment to global peace protection became strongly connected with its military build-up after 2000 whereas the role saliency

was rising again after 2000. This might be interpreted by increasing threat perception arising from the United States. Simply speaking, facing the confrontations with the U.S., the DPRK perceived its military build-up as an instrument not only for protection of its own integrity but also for ensuring the global stability. This stance may seem quite distorted to us but this is how North Korea articulated its commitment to global peace protection approximately between 2000 and 2010.

It is also quite interesting how North Korea started to put much greater emphasis on its role in regional peace protection since 2009 whereas the saliency of *global peace protector* role was dropping at the very same time.[101] This may indicate North Korea is switching its attention towards the regional dynamics in context of escalating confrontation with South Korea after Lee Myung Bak became president which is further confirmed by the fact North Korean definition of "its" region became more tied with Korean Peninsula after 2010 (see above).

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[101] The simultaneous downfall of both roles to zero occurred in 2012. This was probably caused by the interim shock after death of Kim Jong Il. Nevertheless, both roles regained exactly the same position as they used to have in 2011 again in 2013.

Conclusion

North Korean foreign policy has been in the centre of attention of many scholars for decades. Yet, there are still many blind spots that need to be filled and questions awaiting the answers. By this dissertation thesis, I wanted to contribute to existing knowledge on the field of North Korean foreign policy analysis. In particular, my goal was to better understand how the North Korea perceives the part it plays (or should play) in the international politics and how its interaction with other actors impacts these perceptions as I argue that the revelation of these aspects can potentially help to facilitate the communication with the DPRK. To be able to proceed with the delimited goal, I employed the conceptual and theoretic framework of the role theory which has not been comprehensively used for North Korean case yet.

I analysed the content of relevant parts of two North Korean periodicals, i.e. The Pyongyang Times newspaper and Korea Today magazine. Some could object that analysis of these materials cannot lead us to feasible findings. In response to such criticism I refer to work of Seongji Woo. He argues that although some elements of North Korean discussion of international politics can be perceived as propaganda and a way how the DPRK justifies its actions, "(…) some of it represents genuine expressions of North Korea's worldviews and past, current and future orientations toward the outside world" (Woo 2011, 202). Thus, I argue that that a well-organized and consistent analysis of North Korean statements can bring interesting insight into the process of its foreign policy formation and transformation. At this place, let me summarize the findings of my investigation and answer the questions I delimited in the introduction of this thesis. I will start with answering the research questions and will continue with summarization of main findings I made.

To begin with, I bring forward the research questions as mentioned in the introduction again:

1) What were the national roles North Korea declared in the time framework I examine and how the composition of North Korean role sets looked like?

2) How the saliency of particular roles within the role sets changed over time? Were the national roles subjected to any changes?

3) Which roles declared by North Korea projected into its foreign policy the most?

4) If any changes occurred, what were the patterns of these changes with regard to North Korean interactions with significant others?

As far as the first, second and third questions are concerned I have already answered them indirectly in Chapter 3. In the period of 1994–2015, I was able to identify 20 roles in total. Subsequently, based on their saliency measured by the frequency and regularity of their occurrences in the dataset, I divided them into three categories: major roles, marginal roles and deviances. The *major roles* can be understood as relatively constant, frequently occurring and stable parts of North Korean role sets whose total incidence between 1994 and 2015 reached at least 5 %. In case of *marginal roles*, the total incidence did not reach 5 % but they occurred at least in three subsequent years of the researched period. Finally, I labelled as the *role deviances* these roles in the North Korean role sets which neither exceeded 5 % in their incidence thorough The Pyongyang Times dataset nor fulfilled the criteria set for the marginal roles (i.e. they did not occur at least in three subsequent years of the researched period).

Following the work of S. Harnisch (2012, 55) who states that the roles are organized hierarchically with those being on the top of this hierarchy effecting the role enactment the most, I claim the roles I labelled as *major* ones have the strongest impact on North Korean foreign policy. Thus,

although I identified 20 roles in total, I thoroughly analyzed development of saliency in case of 8 roles that constituted the most important core of North Korean role sets, i.e. *internal developer, independent, active independent, isolate, bastion of revolution – liberator, anti-imperialist agent, global peace protector* and *regional peace protector*. I also put the saliency shifts of the individual roles in the context of North Korean relations with its *significant others.* As Suh (2014, 155) aptly points out, North Korean post-Cold War foreign policy took a turn away from political and ideological course which was typical for bloc-oriented and non-alignment diplomacy. The composition of DPRK's role sets confirms this tendency as the saliency of roles linked with group of friends among significant others (such as *bastion of revolution – liberator* or *active independent)* and those obviously ideologically oriented (such as *anti-imperialist agent*) is obviously dropping. At the same time, Suh argues that the main characteristics of North Korean post-Cold War foreign policy may be found "(…) in its relations with hostile countries, and particularly the United States, which assumed primacy as North Korea pursued security guarantees and economic benefits" (ibid.). Again, this dynamics projects itself into North Korean role sets' composition as the absolute majority of the roles it has declared is related to group of foes represented by the U.S. Thus, it is safe to argue that the United States became North Korean major significant other of the post-Cold War era.

In Chapter 3.3, I also delimited the major roles on the scale active–passive foreign policy (see Chart 18). Chart 21 below further demonstrates North Korean role sets' composition in terms of active–passive foreign policy. The chart is based on the role sets' composition as of The Pyongyang Times dataset whereas the major roles were taken into the consideration. As we can see, North Korea tended to declare roles implying rather active foreign policy thorough the 1990s. Since 2002, it mostly resorted to passivity-implying roles. The general orientation of the DPRK's role sets in terms of activity–passivity scale also correlates with the trends in developments of

major roles forming the very core of the role sets. I divided them into three groups: roles whose saliency is dropping (i.e. *active independent, bastion of revolution – liberator* and *anti-imperialist agent*), roles whose saliency is growing (i.e. *internal developer, regional peace protector* and *isolate*), and roles with stagnating saliency (*independent*).

Chart 21: North Korean Orientation of Foreign Policy Based on Composition of Its Role Sets

year	scale activity - passivity		
	rather active foreign policy	rather passive foreign policy	neither active nor passive
1994	X		
1995	X		
1996	X		
1997		X	
1998	X		
1999			X
2000			X
2001			X
2002		X	
2003		X	
2004		X	
2005		X	
2006	X		
2007			X
2008	X		
2009			X
2010		X	
2011		X	
2012		X	
2013		X	
2014		X	
2015		X	

Source: created by author.

North Korean gradual acceptance of passive and inward-looking roles implying passive and inward-looking foreign policy is also related to the dynamics of interaction with its significant others.

In the beginning, there is North Korean culturally-conditioned *ego* which plays certain roles co-formed by *ego's* former experience with *alters* that I call significant others. The very same ego ceaselessly enters the interaction with alters. This interaction may basically lead to two outcomes as far as the ego's role enactment is concerned. First, the ego may enact new roles or revise the meaning of the old ones in case there is a reason to think oneself in novel terms, in case a new situation emerges that cannot be dealt within pre-existing roles (comp. Wendt 1992, 419). Second, ego may stick with the old roles as they still correspond with the reality in which it finds itself and therefore, there is no need to change anything.

I have already shown before the reason to think oneself in novel term *can* arise from ego's new experience with alter which deviates from previous mode of mutual interaction. One might think this happened in the end of 1990s when Clinton's administration together with South Korean president Kim Dae Jung adopted much less confrontational politics towards the DPRK. However, the problem with this so called engagement effort is that it has never been really consistent. In particular, the U.S. who stands for the main representative of group of foes has never implemented full hearted engagement policies towards the DPRK. Approaching the DPRK with omnipresent mistrust (and being approached by the DPRK by incredulity as well), it always supplemented engagement with some sanctions or punishments, i.e. they always supplemented the engagement with the ingredient of containment. Furthermore, one must not forget that the North Korean culturally-conditioned ego formed by previous experience with alter influences the results of interaction as well. The DPRK's experience with decades of Cold War confrontation accompanied by inconsistent U.S. foreign policy towards the DPRK in post-Cold War are very likely to rather consolidate than change North Korean role sets. Due to this reality, the sufficient space for the deep learning of new roles (see Chart 3 on page 38 of

this dissertation) did not open and rather shallow learning prevailed in North Korean case.

Right now, let me answer the last question I delimited in the introduction, i.e. the one referring to the patterns of North Korean role changes. In general, the case study of the DPRK showed that roles tend to be stable and that the radical change and reconfiguration of role sets is rare. Despite I analysed development of North Korean role sets in relatively long time period of 21 years, their composition did not drastically changed. Still, changes did occur but they were rather conservative. Firstly, some changes took place in the borders of existing roles (e.g. change of meaning of *internal developer* role). Secondly (and more importantly), the changes occurred in the configuration of role sets, in particular, in the role saliency. I depicted these changes in graphs when I was describing individual roles in Chapter 3 whereas I argue they can be interpreted by North Korean interactions with significant others. Let me now focus on this issue in detail.

After examining the developments of all the major roles constituting the core of North Korean role sets across the researched period, I was able to identify a few interesting and formative periods and moments. First one occurred in the beginning of 2000s when the saliency of role *internal developer* reached high level and became firmly tied with North Korean military build-up.[102] Several factors contributed to this. There was the inconsistent politics of the United States and its allies combined with North Korean previous experience with them. I have already mentioned this above. Moreover, the DPRK successfully re-established its ties with China and Russia. This was an essential step by which North Korea re-gained backing together with its self-confidence on the international scene. At the same time,

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[102] As I noted above, the meaning of role *internal developer* has been changing since 2013. This is mainly represented by the emphasis on so called civilized nation building and also by tendency of Kim Jong Un's North Korea to put higher emphasis on economic development which is symbolized by the *byungjin* policy (policy of parallel development of army and economy in English). Nevertheless, it is too soon to evaluate the permanency and impact of these changes.

the U.S. and its allies failed to establish meaningful relations with North Korea which gradually drove it into the arms of China and Russia. This dynamics was even amplified by President Bush's North Korean policy which further contributed to isolationist and inward-looking policies of the DPRK.

Furthermore, North Korean role set underwent quite significant changes in year 2012 which was the first year of Kim Jong Un's regime: it strongly shifted toward the passivity-implying roles. This is illustrated below in Charts 22.1 and 22.2 enabling comparison of 2011 and 2012 North Korean role sets. In this case, we can see how the situation of shock or crisis correlates with the role change (comp. Nabers 2011, 85–86), or reconfiguration of role sets, respectively. Whereas the passivity implying roles constituted about 48 % of 2011 role set, they formed almost 90 % in 2012. Nevertheless, this reconfiguration did not last long as the 2013 role set returned to approximately same shape as it was in 2011.

Chart 22.1: Composition of the 2011 Role Set (PT)

Source: created by author.

Chart 22.2: Composition of the 2012 Role Set (PT)

Source: created by author.

It is also needed to point out that the ability to contextualize the changes in the role sets with North Korean significant others immediately after death of Kim Jong Il seems to be hindered by dynamics of crisis inside the DPRK. Thus, we could see here the crisis or shock situation prevailed over the dynamics of interaction.

In sum, the changes in North Korean role sets were rather conservative (i.e. they mainly occurred in the framework of meaning of existing roles). Thus, the claim that the role change is very slow and gradual process seems to be valid in here. One of the reasons is that the roles are anchored in or at least closely connected with given actor's identity moulded by the experience with its significant others (see Chapter 1.3.3). The political representatives and negotiators should be aware of this when dealing with the DPRK. Still, however, my analysis indicates the DPRK does show receptivity to the way how its significant others approach it. To be more specific, the pressure, sanctions and confrontations often contributed to the rise of saliency of the roles indicating confrontational, isolationist and inward-looking foreign policy (such as *internal developer* or *isolate*). On the other hand, the

negotiations and hints of engagement policies (such as SPTs or Agreed Framework) helped at least partially reduce the saliency of these roles. One exception where the opposite seem to be true apply to *role bastion of revolution – liberator*. In case of this role, the saliency was mostly dropping when the sanctions against the DPRK were intensified. Consequently, my analysis indicates that the containment is at least double-edged sword. Furthermore, it was very interesting to find out the aid provided by significant others did not projected into the role saliency development. This may be quite remarkable finding for the debates about the politicization of humanitarian (development) aid.

The role change is obviously entangled process and in North Korean case, it was further problematized by highly unbalanced and inconsistent interactions with its main significant other (the U.S.) (comp. Han 2014, 293). I have already mentioned this problem on several places in this thesis. Even in Clinton's era (not speaking of Bush's one), the U.S. tended to incline to what I would call *vigilant engagement* characterized by contradictory tendencies, by combining the threats with aid, sanctions with negotiations. Various signals indicate that the period which was favourable to significant changes in DPRK's role sets might have been the middle of 1990s. First, North Korea lost its backing on the international scene (i.e. the support of Soviet Union and China). Second, North Korean leader Kim Il Sung died in 1994 which probably brought certain feeling of insecurity to North Korean regime elites which may be also favourable for the role change, as the role theory scholars point out (comp. Wendt 1992, 420, or Nabers 2011, 85–86). Third, North Korea underwent drastic famine and needed new ties with outer world more than ever. Last but not least, the administration of South Korean president Kim Dae Jung initiated high level and even grass root level contacts with North Korea which established first personal contact between North and South Koreans after decades of separation which may be perceived as crucial step forward which might help to reduce mistrust

between both countries (comp. Kudláčová 2014b, 51). All these factors created atmosphere where the engaging the DPRK could have been viable. Unfortunately the opposite happened and North Korea gradually learned to use threats and its emerging nuclear program as a bargaining chip.

Of course, it would be oversimplified to accuse the U.S. only of what the DPRK became today. As I pointed out above, there is *always* both ego and alter who actually enter the interaction and North Korean ego was corrupted enough even in the beginning of 1990s. Furthermore, from pragmatic point of view, certain roles (especially *independent* or, to certain extent, *isolate*) are probably maintained in the role sets not only due to their firm link to North Korean identity as such (comp. Armstrong 2013, 291–292) but because there are strongly tied with the regime survival as well. In other words, being *independent* functions also as a way for ruling elites to retain power.[103] This claim seems to be relevant especially in the situation when the human rights pressure gained clearer contours and became more consistent recently (see end of Chapter 4.1).

However, I would like to highlight that the DPRK has often signalized it wanted to negotiate and normalize relations with the U.S., South Korea and Japan and in several occasions, its deeds proved the actuality of this intention. Still, as Leon Sigal (1998, 12) notices, the U.S. too often tended to demonize the DPRK and consequently, the DPRK was treated "(…) as an outcast, implacable and inimical, with a master plan to deceive the world and acquire nuclear arms" (ibid.). This one-dimensional image of North Korea as global rogue (comp. Cho 2016) blinded observers including many of the U.S. intelligence community to "(…) contrary evidence of Pyongyang's efforts to accommodate Washington" (Sigal 1998, 12). Thus, the omnipresent accusations of North Korean regime of being isolationist in the

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[103] The experience with disintegration of the Soviet Union probably strengthens North Korean unwillingness to renounce the roles *independent* and *isolate*.

situation where the DPRK is at least partially pushed into the isolation by its main foes are irrational.

If I should closely examine the modes of role changes as depicted in Chapter 1.3.3, the social learning and mechanism of reflected appraisal in particular seem to be relevant for North Korean case. Still, the conceptualization of role change as a process is very young and incomplete and there is wide space for its improvements. The case study of North Korean roles and foreign policy showed that one of the factors that can mould the roles (and subsequently the foreign policy as well) is the threat perception and insecurity feeling arising from confrontational approach of significant others. Furthermore, North Korean case indicates the influence of significant others on its roles and role sets is better observable when no internal crises or shock are present. I also argue that some roles are obviously nested deeper in the role sets and thus, their change will probably be very complicated. In DPRK's example, role *independent* seems to be the case. In the beginning of this thesis, I defined basically two categories of role changes that may arise from actor's interaction with the significant others. One was rather radical (i.e. the emergence of a new role), the other was rather conservative (i.e. the change in the framework of saliency and meaning of existing role). In North Korean case the latter manifested.

What would, then, be the lesson learned from my analysis? I would suggest there is an urgent need to focus on strategies of negotiations with the DPRK and on the confidence building between the DPRK and its foes. This should start at the grass root level – South Korean sunshine policy has put a foot toward it already so as the various U.S. NGOs' activities inside the DPRK did. The U.S. distrust in North Korean intention to denuclearize accompanied by North Korean distrust in U.S. abiding by its promises probably contributed to the fact that only shallow social learning occurred. However, one should also be aware that the confidence and trust building is long term process

which requires a lot of patience. Lastly, we should be aware that if we constantly treat the DPRK *as if it is* nuclear state – rogue state – mad state, it is much easier for it to enact the roles that correspond with this.

Appendix 1: List of Missing Issues of The Pyongyang Times

1994	Vol. 1751, no. 23, 4.6.1994
	Vol. 1760, no. 32, 30.7.1994
	Vol 1768, no. 39, 17.10.1994
1995	Vol. 1804, no. 2, 27.5.1995
	Vol 1825, no. 43, 21.10.1995
	Vol 1826, no. 44, 28.10.1995
	Vol. 1827, no. 45, 3.11.1995
1996	-
1997	Vol. 1889, no. 2, 11.1.1997
	Vol. 1890, no. 3, 18.1.1997
1998	-
1999	-
2000	-
2001	-
2002	Vol. 2192, no. 43, 26.10.2002
2003	-
2004	Vol. 2295, no. 42, 16.10.2004
2005	-
2006	Vol. 2366, no. 8, 25.2.2006
2007	-
2008	Vol. 2472, no. 10, 8.3.2008
2009	Vol. 2557, no. 43, 25.10.2009
	Vol. 2561, no. 47, 21.11.2009
2010	Vol. 2622, no. 4, 22.1.2011
	Vol. 2624, no. 6, 5.2.2011
2011	-
2012	-
2013	-
2014	-
2015	Vol. 2850, no. 23, 6.6.2015

Source: created by author.

Appendix 2: List of Missing Issues of Korea Today

1994	Vol. 450, no. 4
	Vol. 454, no. 8
1995	Vol. 459, no. 1
	Vol. 460, no. 2
	Vol. 461, no. 3
	Vol. 462, no. 4
	Vol. 463, no. 5
	Vol 464, no. 6
	Vol 468, no. 10
1996	Vol. 481, no. 11
1997	-
1998	Vol. 498, no. 4
1999	-
2000	Vol. 525, no. 2
2001	-
2002	-
2003	Vol. 565, no. 7
2004	-
2005	-
2006	-
2007	-
2008	-
2009	-
2010	-
2011	-
2012	-
2013	-
2014	-
2015	-

Source: created by author.

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The codebook enclosed at the very end of this dissertation is based on my analysis of all The Pyongyang Times and Korea Today issues published between January 1994 and December 2015 excluding the missing issues as stated in Appendixes 1 and 2 above.

List of Charts and Appendixes

Abstract

In this dissertation thesis, I analyse North Korean foreign policy between 1994 and 2015 using conceptual and theoretic framework of the role theory which has not been comprehensively used for North Korean case yet. My goal is to better understand how the North Korea perceives the part it plays (or should play) in the international politics and how its interaction with other actors impacts that. After I identify the roles North Korea speaks out using content analysis of North Korean foreign political statements and texts, I examine the correlation between these roles and actual foreign policy of the DPRK. In particular, I aim to identify the situations where significant changes in the role saliency occur, where the DPRK either starts to emphasize some role over another, or where the old roles are refused and new roles show up. After I do so, I contextualize these role shifts with the shifts in actual North Korean foreign policy and with North Korean interaction with its significant others. I aim to do so as I argue that the revelation of these aspects can potentially help to facilitate the communication with the DPRK.

With regard to my goals, the text was divided into four main chapters. First two of them constitute theoretic and methodological part and remaining two form empirical part of this dissertation. In particular, in Chapter 1, I deal with theoretical background (i.e. the role theory) and with operationalization of key concepts. The special attention is paid on role change and its modes as it is essential for this thesis. The issue of role change has not been elaborated on the theoretical level in satisfactory way yet and thus, I provide an alternative grasping of this phenomenon as it better suits the purposes of this dissertation. In Chapter 2, I outline the method of semantical content analysis which constitutes the stepping stone enabling the subsequent course of my investigation. I also introduce and evaluate North Korean English-written media landscape in order to

thoroughly explain why I selected The Pyongyang Times and Korea Today for my analysis. In Chapter 3, I describe the roles I identified, depict the development of their saliency and link them to particular group of significant others. Finally, I proceed with Chapter 4 where the changes that occurred in the major roles are put into context with North Korean interactions with significant others.

After examining the developments of all the major roles constituting the core of North Korean role sets across the researched period, I conclude that the role change is complex process and in North Korean case, it was further problematized by highly unbalanced and inconsistent interactions with its main significant other, the United States which tended to incline to vigilant engagement characterized by contradictory tendencies (at the best), by combining the threats with aid, sanctions with negotiations. Although it would be oversimplified to accuse the U.S. only of what the DPRK became today (there is always both ego and alter who enter the interaction), the omnipresent accusations of North Korean regime of being isolationist in the situation where the DPRK is at least partially pushed into the isolation by its main foes are irrational.

논문초록

본 논문은 기존에는 종합적 측면에서 북한 연구 분석에 사용하지 않았던 역할이론의 개념적, 이론적 방법론을 적용하여 1994 년부터 2015 년까지의 북한 외교정책을 분석하였다. 본 논문의 목적은 북한이 국제정치 무대에서 자신들이 맡고 있는 역할 (혹은 맡아야 하는 역할)에 대하여 어떻게 인지하고 있는지, 그리고 다른 행위자와의 상호작용이 이 과정에 어떻게 영향을 미치는지에 대하여 보다 잘 이해하고자 하는 것이다. 본 논문에서는 이를 달성하기 위하여 우선 북한의 공식 발언과 문서를 활용하여 북한이 스스로를 어떻게 규정하고 있는지 확인한 다음, 이렇게 규정된 역할과 실제 북한의 외교정책 사이의 상관관계를 검증하였다. 특히, 본 논문에서는 역할특성에 중대한 변화가 일어난 상황이나, 북한이 다른 행위자에 대하여 특정한 역할을 강조하기 시작한 경우, 혹은 과거의 역할이 부정되고 새로운 역할이 기대되기 시작한 경우를 중점적으로 분석하고자 하였다. 그리고 이러한 역할변화가 북한의 실제 외교정책 및 북한과 다른 중요 행위자들 사이의 상호작용에서 어떠한 변화를 가져왔는지를 문맥화하였다. 본 논문은 북한의 이러한 측면들을 연구함으로써 잠재적으로 북한과의 실질적이고 안정적인 정치적 대화를 촉진시킬 수 있다고 주장한다.

본 논문은 네 개의 장으로 구성되어 있다. 처음 두 장은 역할이론의 이론적, 방법론적 적용에 대하여 설명하고 있으며 이후의 두 장은 경험사례 분석에 할애하였다. 보다 구체적으로 살펴보면, 제 1 장에서는 역할이론의 이론적 배경과 주요 개념의 조작화에 대하여 설명한다. 이 장에서는 본 논문의 핵심 개념으로 사용되는 역할변화와 그 방식에 대하여 중점적으로 설명하였다. 역할변화의 문제는 아직 정치학에서의 이론적 측면에서 충분히 만족스러울 만큼 연구되지 않았고, 이에 본 논문에서는 핵심 현상을 보다 잘 설명하기 위한 대안적 개념을 사용하였다. 제 2 장에서는 의미적 맥락 분석 방법론에 대하여 개략적으로 설명한다. 해당 방법론은 본 논문의 경험연구 사례조사를 위한 후속 연구를 가능하게 하는 출발점이 된다. 또한 북한의 영문 미디어 지형에 대하여 소개하고 평가하였는데, 이는 왜 본 논문에서 평양신문의 외국어버전인 Pyongyang Times 와 조선중앙 텔레비죤의 Korea Today 를 분석대상 자료로 사용하였는지를 철저하게 입증하기 위함이다. 이를 토대로 제 3 장에서는 본 논문이 북한의 역할을 어떻게 규정하였는지를 설명하고, 북한 역할의 특성이 어떻게 발전해왔는지 묘사하며 다른 주요 행위자 그룹과의 연관성을 살펴보았다. 마지막으로 제 4 장에서는 북한과 다른 주요 행위자들간의 상호작용이라는 맥락 속에서 북한의 주요 역할이 어떻게 변화하였는지를 분석하였다.

북한의 역할설정을 야기시키는 모든 주요한 역할들의 변화 및 발전과정을 살펴본 후 본 논문은 다음과 같은 결론을 내린다. 북한의 경우 역할변화가 매우 복잡한 과정을 거쳐 발생하며 이는 향후 북한과 북한의 주요 상대 행위자인 미국 사이에서 일어나는 고도로 불균형적이고 불안정한 상호작용 과정에서 문제요소로 작용할 수 있다는 것이다. 이는 미국이 북한을 대함에 있어 위협과 원조, 제재와 협상이라는 모순적인 방식을 번갈아 가며 사용하는 데에 의존하고

있기 때문에 발생한다. 물론 미국이 현재의 북한을 있게 한 유일한 요소라고 결론짓는 것은 과도한 단순화의 오류를 범할 가능성이 있다(역할 변화에는 항상 자아(ego)와 해당 상호작용에 참여하는 상대방이 공존하기 때문이다. 그러나 본 논문에서는 현재 나타나는 고립이라는 북한 체제의 특성이 적어도 부분적으로는 주요 경쟁자들의 비합리적인 강요에 의한 것임을 밝히고자 한다.

Abstrakt

Předkládaná disertační práce analyzuje severokorejskou zahraniční politiku mezi léty 1994 a 2015 s využitím konceptuálního rámce teorie rolí, který pro studium severokorejské zahraniční politiky dosud nebyl dosud využit. Mým cílem je lépe porozumět tomu, jak Severní Korea vnímá své funkce či role v mezinárodním prostředí a jak toto ovlivňuje její interakce s dalšími aktéry. Poté, co s využitím obsahové analýzy severokorejských zahraničně-politických textů identifikuji role, které KLDR vyslovuje, zaměřím se na další zkoumání korelace mezi těmito rolemi a severokorejskou zahraniční politikou. Mým cílem je zejména identifikace těch situací či momentů, kdy se objevují zásadní změny ve význačnosti rolí (*role saliency*), kdy KLDR začne upřednostňovat jednu roli nad druhou či kdy zaniknou staré role a na jejich místě se objeví nové. Poté, co identifikuji tyto situace či momenty, uvedu je do souvislosti jak se změnami severokorejské zahraniční politiky, tak s jejími interakcemi s významnými druhými (*significant others*). Tvrdím, že odhalení vzorců interakcí KLDR s významnými druhými prostřednictvím analýzy rolí může potenciálně poskytnout jisté vodítko pro vyjednávání s KLDR.

S ohledem na vytyčené cíle byl text této disertace rozdělen na čtyři hlavní kapitoly. První dvě přitom prezentují mé teoretické a metodologické zázemí, poslední dvě pak tvoří empirické jádro této práce. V první kapitole se vypořádávám s teoretickým a konceptuálním rámcem teorie rolí a rovněž zde přistupuji k operacionalizaci ústředních konceptů. Zvláštní pozornost je přitom kladena na problematiku změny rolí a způsobů, jakými k ní může docházet. Protože tato oblast zatím nebyla na teoretické úrovni zcela rozpracována, přistupuji k vlastnímu alternativnímu uchopení způsobů změn rolí, které jsou lépe aplikovatelné na případovou studii KLDR s využitím stávajících poznatků v této sféře. V druhé kapitole pak představuji metodu sémantické obsahové analýzy, která tvoří odrazový můstek pro další postup mého výzkumu. Rovněž zde předkládám a kriticky zhodnocuji

severokorejskou anglicky psanou mediální sféru a pečlivě přitom vysvětluji, proč jsem pro svoji analýzu zvolila noviny *The Pyongyang Times* a časopis *Korea Today*. Ve třetí kapitole pak popisuji a definuji role, které jsem identifikovala, zaměřuji se na vývoj význačnosti rolí a taktéž jednotlivé role vztahuji ke konkrétní skupině významných druhých. Nakonec pak přistupuji ke čtvrté kapitole, kde jsou změny, ke kterým došlo ve vývoji sad rolí i jednotlivých rolí, uvedeny do kontextu severokorejských interakcí s významnými druhými.

Celou práci pak uzavírám zjištěním, že proces změny rolí je velice komplexní a problematický. V případě KLDR je tento proces navíc dále komplikován velmi nevyrovnanými a nekonzistentními interakcemi s jejím nejvýznamnějším významným druhým, tedy Spojenými státy, které při nejlepším inklinovaly k opatrné politice angažmá, ke kombinaci hrozeb s humanitární pomocí, sankcí s vyjednáváním. Ačkoliv by bylo příliš jednoduché obviňovat pouze Spojené státy z toho, čím se KLDR v dnešní době stala (v interakci jsou totiž vždy přítomni jak ego, tak alter), je třeba si také uvědomit, že neustálé obviňování severokorejského režimu z toho, že je příliš izolovaný v situaci, kdy je KLDR přinejmenším částečně do této izolace tlačena, je iracionální.