

e-ISSN 2300-9918

HUMANITIES | AND SOCIAL | SCIENCES |

Research Journal 28
Quarterly No. 3 (2021)
(July-September)

Volume Editor
Justyna Stecko

HSS Journal indexed, among others, on the basis of the reference of the Minister of Science and Higher Education in The Central European Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities (CEJSH), ERIH PLUS, DOAJ, EBSCO and Index Copernicus Journal Master List 2019.

Issued with the consent of the Rector

Editor in Chief
Publishing House of Rzeszow University of Technology
Lesław GNIEWEK

EDITORIAL BOARD

Editor-in-Chief
Grzegorz OSTASZ

Deputy of Editor-in-Chief
Justyna STECKO

Editorial assistant
Elżbieta KURZĘPA

Associate Editors
Eugeniusz MOCZUK, Tadeusz OLEJARZ, Marta POMYKAŁA
Grzegorz ROŚLAN, Beata ZATWARNICKA-MADURA, Dominik ZIMON

Scientific Board
Alla ARISTOVA (Ukraine), Heinrich BADURA (Austria), Guido BALDI (Germany)
Aleksander BOBKO (Poland), Zbigniew BOCHNIARZ (The USA), Viktor CHEPURKO (Ukraine)
Zuzana HAJDUOVÁ (Slovakia), Wilem J.M. HEIJMAN (The Netherlands)
Tamara HOVORUN (Ukraine), Paweł GRATA (Poland)
Beatriz Urbano LOPEZ DE MENESES (Spain), Aleksandr MEREZHKO (Ukraine)
Nellya NYCHKALO (Ukraine), Waldemar PARUCH (Poland), Krzysztof REJMAN (Poland)
Annely ROTHKEGEL (Germany), Josef SABLİK (Slovakia), Mykoła STADNIK (Ukraine)
Anatolij TKACH (Ukraine), Michael WARD (Ireland), Natalia ZHYHAYLO (Ukraine)

Statistical editor
Tomasz PISULA

Language editors
E-CORRECTOR
Magdalena REJMAN-ZIENTEK, Piotr CYREK

Volume editor
Justyna STECKO (Poland)

Project of the cover
Damian GĘBAROWSKI

The electronic version of the Journal is the final, binding version.

e-ISSN 2300-9918

Publisher: Publishing House of Rzeszów University of Technology,
12 Powstańców Warszawy Ave., 35-959 Rzeszów (e-mail: oficyna@prz.edu.pl)
<http://oficyna.prz.edu.pl>

Editorial Office: Rzeszów University of Technology, The Faculty of Management,
10 Powstańców Warszawy Ave., 35-959 Rzeszów, phone: 17 8651383, e-mail: zeszuty@prz.edu.pl
<http://hss.prz.edu.pl>

Additional information and an imprint – p. 95

CONTENTS

From the Editorial Committee	5
Ryszard BARTNIK: Diagnosis of Threats to the European Union's Internal Security	7
Marta HOŁDYŃSKA: Illegal Migrants and Terrorist Threats in Western Countries after September 11, 2001: Perceptions and Reality	19
Agnieszka MIKLEWSKA: Disturbed Bonds – Consequences for Mental Health of a Child	27
Adrian MRÓZ: The “Work” of Art: Stanisław Brzozowski and Bernard Stiegler	39
Beata PETRECKA: Selected Theoretical Concepts of the Social Elite	49
Dominika ŠAFROVÁ, Pavlína HEJDUKOVÁ: COVID-19 Pandemic and the Sharing Economy	55
Joanna SANECKA-TYCZYŃSKA: The Quality of Governance and the Political Capacity of a Country: Contemporary Polish Political Parties and the Idea of Good Governance	65
Bogusław ŚLUSARCZYK, Patrycja ŻEGLEŃ: Thriftlessness and Food Waste in Households in Poland with Particular Reference to the Podkarpackie Voivodeship	75
Additional Information	95

FROM THE EDITORIAL COMMITTEE

We are giving you the next 28th 3 (2021) issue of the Scientific Journal of the Faculty of Management at the Rzeszow University of Technology entitled “Humanities and Social Sciences”.

The aim of the Publisher is to raise the merits and the international position of the quarterly published by the Faculty of Management, that is why we are still developing the cooperation with foreign team of reviewers, as well as an international Scientific Council. The Editors have also attempted to apply for international databases; currently the quarterly HSS is indexed in **Index Copernicus Journal Master List, The Central European Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities (CEJSH) ERIH PLUS, DOAJ and EBSCO**.

The Journal has been also included in the list of projects qualified for funding under the **“Support for scientific magazines program”**.

The articles published in this publication are devoted to the broader issues of the humanities and social sciences. They are the result both of theoretical and empirical research. The subjects covered vary considerably and reflect the interdisciplinary nature of the Journal. We do hope that the papers published will meet your kind interest and will be an inspiration to further research and fruitful discussions.

On behalf of the Editorial Board of “Humanities and Social Sciences” we would like to thank the Authors for sending the outcomes of their research. We would like to express particular gratitude to the Reviewers for their valuable feedback that greatly contributed to increasing values of the scientific publications.

With compliments
Editorial Committee

Ryszard BARTNIK¹

DIAGNOSIS OF THREATS TO THE EUROPEAN UNION'S INTERNAL SECURITY

There is a common belief that despite the many legal, practical, and supportive solutions that the EU has introduced in recent years in the area of internal security, its citizens still lack assurance. In order to obtain the desired state of security, it is necessary to improve the existing solutions and create completely new ones. This need is associated with a deep awareness of threats, as well as knowledge of the mechanisms of their emergence and functioning. The aim of this article is to identify threats selected by scientists and experts that cause the greatest fear and anxiety in all the EU states and their citizens using theoretical methods such as analysis, synthesis, generalization, and inference. These findings highlight the opportunity to learn about the essence of threats to the internal security of the EU states that arise from contradictions and antagonisms on political, economic, and social bases and are caused not only by human activities but also by natural phenomena, the effects of which may be immediate or anticipated and very severe.

Keywords: European Union, internal security, threats.

1. INTRODUCTION

Over the last few decades, unprecedented progress has been made, which has brought great changes in living conditions, providing a significant part of the world's population with increased wealth and improved quality of life. In EU countries, systematic and efficient work in well-functioning political, economic and social systems has produced the desired results. However, with development, a number of threats have emerged with increasing force and their consequences for the EU's internal security are difficult to assess. Knowledge of the threats increases the chances of preventing and combating them.

Threats, as actual actions that are unfavourable and dangerous to the underlying values and vital interests of a given entity (either individual or collective) cause states to try, individually and in combination with other states, to influence their environment to remove, neutralise or at least dismiss threats and thus eliminate their own fear, apprehension, anxiety and uncertainty (Zięba, 2016). It is difficult to talk about the internal security of the EU without taking into account international and internal factors relevant to the country and its citizens.

¹ Ryszard Bartnik, DSc PhD, Associate Prof., The Faculty of Management and Command, The War Studies University, 103 gen. A. Chruściela „Montera” Ave., 00-910 Warszawa-Rembertów; e-mail: r.bartnik@akademia.mil.pl. ORCID: 0000-0003-2167-5878.

There is a widespread belief that despite the many legal, practical and supportive solutions that the EU has introduced in recent years in the sphere of internal security, citizens of the community still lack a sense of certainty. In order to achieve the desired state of affairs, it is necessary to improve the already existing solutions and create completely new ones. This, in turn, is associated with a high awareness of threats and knowledge of the mechanisms of their formation and functioning.

2. CATALOGUE OF THREATS TO INTERNAL SECURITY

The identification of threats, their causes and consequences in relation to the internal security of the EU is of interest to many researchers and experts preparing opinions of the most important Community institutions.

An example of the authors' interest in threats is the work by Marek Wrzosek *Współczesne zagrożenia w obszarze bezpieczeństwa europejskiego (Modern Threats to European Security)*. He thoroughly analyzed the most likely ones, i.e.: threats of a social nature closely related to population migration, which in turn is a consequence of instability of states and governments; threats of an economic nature in the context of globalization of the economy and diversification of the development of EU states; threats of a technological nature due to the possibility of using cutting edge technologies for criminal purposes; natural threats to the population, such as natural disasters, epidemics, global warming, and threats to the environment caused by human activity (e.g. logging on a massive scale) (Wrzosek, 2013).

A complement to the threats indicated above can be found in the monograph entitled *Dylematy zarządzania europejskiego (Dilemmas of European Governance)*. The authors mention terrorism in the first place among security threats, stressing that contemporary terrorist groups are increasingly better equipped, more closely linked by electronic networks and more inclined to unlimited violence, all in order for their actions to exert a psychological effect on a mass scale. Organized crime, including in particular illicit drug and arms trafficking, smuggling of migrants and human trafficking, is another major cited threat (Wrzosek, 2015).

Their views on security threats were also presented by Waldemar Zubrzycki and Aleksander Babiński in the monograph *Procedury bezpieczeństwa w Unii Europejskiej (Security Procedures in the European Union)*. As the most serious threat, apart from terrorism, regional conflicts and organized crime, they considered the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction both by states and terrorists, as well as attacks in cyberspace, energy danger and the effects of climate change (Zubrzycki, Babiński, 2017).

Furthermore, content on security threats can be found in the study titled *The nightmare of the dark. The security fears that keep Europeans awake at night*. Susi Dennison, Ulrike E. Franke and Pawel Zerka emphasize that today's EU security is being challenged as never before. The core assumptions of the international system that Europeans helped build are eroding, crumbling one by one. Great power competition is increasingly shaping the security environment for Europeans, while other threats, from terrorism and cyber attacks to climate change, are also on the rise (Dennison, Frank, Zerka, 2018).

The result of the work of an international team of researchers and experts on security threats is the *Europejska strategia bezpieczeństwa. Bezpieczna Europa w lepszym świecie (European Security Strategy. A Safer Europe in a Better World)*. In this document, the following are cited as the most important threats: proliferation of weapons of mass

destruction involving both states and non-state actors; terrorism, including perpetration by home-grown groups; organized crime taking multiple forms; cyber-attacks on private and official information systems and networks treated as new weapons in economic, political and military warfare; dependence on energy supplies from a limited number of countries, many of which are on the brink of stabilization; and the implications of climate change (Council of the EU, 2009).

Another important document on the subject under consideration is *Internal security strategy for the European Union – Towards a European security model*, which is a sort of complement to Europe's security strategy from an external perspective. It mentions many important threats common to all EU states, such as: terrorism in all its forms, characterized by an absolute disregard for human life and democratic values; organized crime dealing with illicit drug and arms trafficking, human trafficking and economic fraud; cyber-crime posing a global technical, cross-border and anonymous threat to IT systems and networks; as well as natural and anthropogenic disasters (European Council, 2010).

In addition to the above-mentioned documents, the topic of security threats is addressed in the *Global Strategy for the Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union*. For the purposes of this document, the situation in 136 countries was examined. On this basis, the commitment to mutual assistance and solidarity among EU states in countering, among others: terrorism, cyber-attacks, energy security threats, organized crime and border management was clarified (European External Action Service, 2016).

Security threats were also of interest to the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), which commissioned to find out the views of EU states on the issue. To this end, ECFR experts conducted surveys in all member states, interviews with policy makers and renowned analysts, as well as extensive research of policy documents and academic discourse. The survey clearly showed that there is a widespread perception across the EU that security threats are increasing. Respondents rated the threats facing their countries as having intensified in the past decade and will intensify in the next. The biggest perceived threats in 2018 were (in descending order): cyber-attacks, external meddling in domestic politics, uncontrolled migration into the country, and deterioration of the international institutional order. The respondents felt that the order of these threats would remain largely the same over the next decade, but that each would intensify. ECFR experts estimated that the situation was somewhat different in 2008, when the following threats were most frequently perceived (in descending order): economic instability and terrorist attacks, neighborhood instability and energy supply disruptions, and cyber-attacks (Shapiro, Hackenbroich, 2017).

The threats to the EU's internal security have also been addressed by the European Commission, which, in its *Communication on the EU Security Union Strategy*, notes that globalisation, free movement and digital transformation on the one hand provide prosperity, make life easier and drive innovation for EU citizens, but on the other bring certain inherent risks and costs. These can be used for terrorism, organised crime, human trafficking and the ever-increasing cybercrime. The European Commission believes that the structure of threats to internal security is becoming increasingly complex: attacks are facilitated by the ability to work across borders and interconnectivity; the blurring of boundaries between the physical and digital worlds also contributes to threats; perpetrators exploit vulnerable groups and social and economic differences. Attacks can occur without any warning and perpetrators leave little or no trace (European Commission, 2020).

In summary, according to researchers and experts, the biggest threats to the EU's internal security (in no set order) are: terrorist attacks, cyber-attacks, organized crime, energy insecurity, climate change, irregular migration and epidemics (Figure 1).




Figure 1. Threats to internal security of the EU

Source: Own work.

3. ESSENCE OF THREATS TO INTERNAL SECURITY

Currently, threats to the internal security of the EU have been unchanged for at least ten years. However, the scale and nature of some have changed, making them even more dangerous.

The unlawful use of force against persons and property to intimidate civilians or coerce EU governments has been occurring for several decades. The opening of the Union's borders to refugees arriving from North Africa and the Middle East has undoubtedly contributed to the increased threat of **terrorist attacks** in the EU. Along with the migrants, jihadists emerged in Europe and brought the conflict from the Middle East to the EU. These terrorists quickly became active (Shaffer, 2020). Overnight on 13 November 2015, they carried out a series of bombings in the French capital that killed 129 people and injured 350. Four months later, on 22 March 2016, 32 people and three suicide bombers were killed and 316 injured in three coordinated bombings carried out in Brussels. In Nice on 14 July 2016, a truck bomber drove into a crowd of walkers - 84 people were killed and 202 injured. A similar attack took place in Berlin on 19 December 2016 – 12 people were then killed and 48 injured (Siemiątkowski, Zięba (sc. ed.), 2016a).

The fact that there has not been a major spectacular terrorist attack in EU countries in recent months does not mean that the above threat has been eliminated. Unfortunately, the terrorist threat is still very serious. The detailed extent and nature of terrorism currently occurring in EU countries is revealed in the European *Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2020*. In 2019, 119 thwarted, failed and carried out terrorist attacks were registered within the EU in 13 countries. Most of these occurred in the UK with 64, Italy with 28 and France with 7 (Europol, 2020). The vast majority of terrorist attacks were attacks, using non-advanced technology, directed by individual perpetrators against individuals in public spaces (European Commission, 2020). The explosives used in attacks are mainly obtained by terrorists from areas where armed conflicts have taken place or are still taking place, in

cooperation with organized crime groups. Terrorist propaganda has taken on new importance with the live streaming of attacks carried out.

In the case of Islam terrorism, individuals who fought in the ranks of the so-called Islamic State and later returned to EU countries for various reasons and in various ways are not dangerous, as they can generally be monitored. The same applies to Islamists on EU territory who carry out radical activities, e.g. on Internet forums or in mosques. The most dangerous individuals are those who identify with Islamic fundamentalism and at the same time are willing to use terrorism, but do not publicly disclose their views (Wojciechowski, 2018). Terrorist organizations send their members to EU countries, who blend in seamlessly with the local population. These are usually students and well-educated and wealthy people. This camouflage provides an opportunity for an unsuspecting terrorist group to expand its structures on the EU territory.

Despite the efforts of many security services, terrorism, especially religiously motivated terrorism, has not ceased to threaten the EU; on the contrary, this threat affects not only the UK, Italy or France, but also other EU countries, including those not yet under attack, which is due, among other things, to the fact that the so-called Islamic State needs spectacular successes after its defeat in Syria and Iraq. It is also a manifestation of the strategy of creating new battle fronts, i.e. attacking in ever new places, taking advantage of the determination and radicalism of some of its supporters.

The digitalization over the past three decades of almost all areas of human life has undoubtedly affected their security. The widespread use of computers, networks and wider ICT in both the public and private spheres has come with not only benefits but also increasing vulnerability to their harmful use. With today's rapidly evolving digital techniques and global business environment, banking systems, industrial installations and energy networks are particularly vulnerable to **cyber-attacks**.

There are various motives that can prompt a cyber-attack. One reason may be the cost of regular military action, which is incomparably higher than online activity. Nowadays, to launch a cyber-attack, all you need is access to the net and some skills. An attack can be organized from anywhere on the planet with Internet access. The barriers between state, private, commercial and military are blurred. The origin of the attack and who is behind it are unknown. The attack is sudden and unpredictable, the victim does not expect it, is unaware of the danger and unprepared to withstand it. Anonymity gives the opportunity to manipulate information, makes it difficult to repel an attack. There is a minimal risk of detecting a ready-made attack, and we also do not know the attacker's intentions. A greater propaganda effect and public recognition is given by paralyzing the information system of state institutions than by aggression on innocent people.

Europe has had to deal with cyber-attacks on a number of occasions, as exemplified by data from the Federal Office for Information and Communication Security (BSI), which shows that in the second half of 2018 there were 157 hacking attacks on Germany's critical infrastructure, 19 of them on electricity grids. In the entire previous reporting period (i.e. June 2017 to May 2018), there were 145 digital strikes. And in the previous one (2016/2017) – 34. The BSI also assumes that it does not know about all attacks – some are missed and some are not reported. In December 2018, the largest hacking attack on German politicians to date took place in Germany. It resulted in the data of around a thousand German politicians, including Chancellor Angela Merkel and President Frank-Walter Steinmeier, as well as celebrities and journalists, being leaked online (BusinessAlert, 2019).

Harmful online activity continues to grow. Due to online services being attacked, e.g. through the use of malware, the end user is increasingly vulnerable to hackers. At the same time, the grey market, where cybercriminals sell their illegally acquired information, skills and tools, continues to flourish. Stolen personal and financial data has a tangible monetary value. Many new criminal activities are involved, such as phishing for passwords and confidential data, targeting fake websites, distributing malware and hacking into databases (Stolarski, 2019).

Modern industrial espionage has a significant impact on the economy, jobs and growth in the EU. The cost of cyber theft of trade secrets is estimated at EUR 60 billion and the resulting potential loss of 289,000 jobs (European Commission, 2018).

There are many reasons that make the threat of cyber-attack high and growing. The most commonly cited include: strong economic and business ties between companies, political-economic and military ties between countries, poor resilience and protection of data communication systems against this threat, poor technical infrastructure and detection systems, countermeasure and neutralization systems, low awareness and knowledge of users about the threat and related consequences, lack of appropriate structures for analysis, prevention and improvement of the countermeasure system (Dąbrowski, 2015).

Despite having a modern security system in EU countries with highly developed digital technology, such as: Germany, France or the United Kingdom, political, economic and social ties with countries with poorer and less advanced technical and information infrastructures also make them vulnerable to cyber-attacks and force them to maintain economically large expenditures to counter and protect their own information systems and networks.

Organized crime is a phenomenon that permeates all aspects of social, economic and political life. Europol data included in *Threat Assessment. Crime in the age of technology* shows that in 2017 there were over 5,000 organized crime groups operating in the EU, with members from over 180 countries. Compared to 2013, the number of observed criminal groups increased by nearly 1,500 (SOCTA, 2017).

The activities of organized criminal groups are focused on seeking maximum profits with the least possible risk of suffering the consequences of illegal activities. Criminal groups generate huge revenue, which together exceed an amount of several billion euro per year. The activity of criminal groups manifests itself in many ways, but most often through cross-border illicit drug trafficking, smuggling of irregular migrants, human trafficking, excise fraud and money laundering.

According to the *European Drug Report*, the European drug market receives both local production and drugs trafficked from other parts of the world. South America, Western Asia and North Africa are the main source regions for drugs entering Europe. Organized crime groups are also interested in the production and trafficking of psychoactive substances and precursor chemicals necessary for the manufacture of illicit intoxicants (EMCDDA, 2019).

The structure of a criminal group smuggling migrants is usually a loose network of smaller groups. Most of them have ethnic or other cultural ties to the migrants they facilitate to cross the border illegally. Traffickers are quick to detect and exploit various changes in society, such as changing law enforcement tactics and changes in legislation, as well as the opening of new or cheaper transport routes or new border crossings.

Establishing the exact extent of human trafficking in the EU is currently impossible due to the lack of a harmonized data collection system; the number of victims is estimated to be in the hundreds of thousands. According to data recorded in Europol's systems, 71% of

identified victims of trafficking in human beings were EU nationals and 29% were non-EU nationals, including from West Africa and Asia (Europol, 2016).

Trafficking in human beings can take many forms from organized prostitution, begging, illegal adoption to trafficking in human organs included. In recent years, a new area of criminal activity has been identified – human trafficking for the fraudulent collection of social security benefits and child allowances.

The basic model of transnational VAT fraud involves at least two EU countries. It is perpetrated by criminal groups that structure related companies and individuals, while exploiting various details of national tax systems to mask the real links between participants. The actors involved in VAT fraud that are initially responsible for the tax damage - the so-called disappearing economic entities – are only active for a short period of time, sometimes only weeks (Europol, 2011).

The most problematic aspect of detecting the activities of an organized criminal group is that it does everything to maintain the appearance of legitimacy in order to hide the sources of illicit income. Not only is money laundering closely linked to other forms of crime, it is also a lucrative business that organized crime groups offer to other groups as a stand-alone service. One way to combine legal and illegal profits is through the use of legally operating companies. Criminals can either run such companies directly or do so using intermediaries or intimidated individuals (Bąkowski, 2013).

Europol reports that almost half (45%) of organized crime groups operating in the EU engage in more than one criminal activity. Many of them are very flexible and able to switch from one criminal activity to another or add new illegal activities. They increasingly offer their support and expertise to individual criminals. The majority of organized crime groups (70%) are active in more than three EU countries and one in ten in seven or more (SOCTA, 2017).

Undoubtedly, factors linked to scientific and civilizational progress have had an impact on facilitating the development and operation of organized crime in EU countries. These include: instant communication (GSM technologies, the Internet, social media), increased mobility (the opening of the Schengen borders, convenient transport links within the EU), easy access to advanced technologies and the ease of making financial transactions.

Climate change is recognized as a serious threat to international security and stability. The devastating impact of a changing climate on all continents is expected to take its toll in this century (Pérez de las Heras, 2020). Most experts take the position that climate change is a “threat multiplier” and that all countries of the world, especially rich EU countries, should engage in actions to both prevent undesirable climate events and respond to crises caused by them (Bremberg, Sonnsjö, Mobjörket, 2019).

One of the most serious consequences of climate change destabilizing internal security, not only in the EU, is the restriction of access to water. Rising temperatures, due to increased levels of greenhouse gases, particularly perfluorotributylamine, which has a warming potential more than 7,000 times greater than carbon dioxide (Pawlowski, 2020), affect the amount of precipitation and the rate of melting of mountain glaciers, which impacts available drinking water supplies. The latter is particularly important, since at least half of the water consumed by about 40% of the human population comes from the summer thaw of mountain glaciers. A reduction in agricultural production is also indicated. Every 1°C rise in temperature above the current average causes a 10% drop in cereal crops. This, combined with projections that global food demand will increase by half by 2030, could pose a serious problem for humanity. Climate warming is increasing the area of infectious

diseases transmitted by insects, for example – Dengue fever and malaria in particular. This can have a particularly negative impact on the level of security in geographical regions where these diseases did not previously exist. The rise in temperature and the associated process of melting glaciers will not be without impact on sea and ocean levels. Its potential consequences are population displacement on a massive scale, all the more so as approximately two thirds of the population (including the EU countries) live close to the coastline. This phenomenon threatens infrastructure, which plays a major role in the functioning of both EU economies and the global economic system (Skoneczny, 2011).

As climate change deepens, the existing civilizational conflict between the rich North and the poor South may be exacerbated. Northern countries believe that one of the causes of global warming is the rapid population growth of the South and its rapid economic growth, which does not take into account ecological factors. Developing countries, on the other hand, point to the North's excessive consumerism and its link to the greenhouse effect.

Further, even more intense, global warming is predicted, and this trend seems a foregone conclusion for at least a few decades. If a major volcanic eruption occurs, there may be a short-term (up to a few years) cooling, but then the temperature will continue to rise. This is because the concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere is already high, and – despite some attempts to limit emissions – there is no end in sight for the increase (Kundzewicz, 2008).

Although in the early 1990s there were large movements of people from the countries of Central and Eastern Europe to Western Europe, they did not pose serious threats to the internal security of the EU in the same way as immigration from non-European countries, especially from North Africa and the Middle East.

According to the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex), the sum of violations on all European migration routes in the first eight months of 2019, although 26% lower than the year before, was still high, with about 68,700 cases (Muczyński, 2019). Factors affecting immigration include the break-up of multinational states and directly related ethnic and religious conflicts, natural disasters, discriminatory government policies, poverty, lack of adequate social welfare programs and uncontrolled population growth (Konarzewska, 2010).

Illegal migration is an acute problem of today's Europe. It is mainly the southern countries of the continent that complain about it. Human trafficking routes are constantly evolving, and the conditions under which they are carried are an affront to human dignity. The main beneficiaries are organised criminal groups, reaping enormous profits. Illegal migration threatens not only the internal security of the EU, but also, and perhaps above all, the migrants. Migrants are often exposed to death while attempting to cross borders illegally, physical and sexual violence and abduction for trafficking purposes.

The migratory threat of recent years is linked to the influx of people who have a different system of beliefs from those of the European population, and thus their own rites, traditions and customs. Undoubtedly, the presence of large numbers of migrants, especially those from other cultural and civilizational backgrounds and poorly integrated into the host society, causes strong social tensions, often finding vent in protests and street riots that constitute serious breaches of public order.

It is not possible to assess the scale of irregular migrants arriving in Europe due to the hidden nature of the phenomenon, and published information contains only estimates (Wawrzusiszyn, 2017).

Infectious diseases have constantly accompanied man, and the modern world creates conditions for their more rapid spread. The development of means of transport has greatly accelerated the movement of people from place to place. Changes in location carry the risk of transmitting viruses that can infect humans, animals and plants. The spread of viral infections is undoubtedly facilitated by illegal migration.

Large-scale **epidemics**, involving countries or even continents, are particularly dangerous. Epidemics not only affect human health, but can also cause serious economic, social and political disruption. In 2017, scientists and public health organizations, including the World Health Organization, warned that another epidemic was imminent and that no country was sufficiently prepared to face the coming waves of disease (Dokos, 2019).

Two years later, an influenza virus (COVID-19) emerged that became dangerous to the entire population on Earth. The disease caused by COVID-19 was initially not treated as a serious threat by the authorities of EU countries. It was only after the increase in the number of cases and especially of fatalities that health protection of EU citizens became an absolute priority. To avoid further spread of the virus, various restrictions (e.g. mass events were banned, schools and shops were closed) were introduced in the EU. The lockdown period and the need to maintain social distance resulted in shifting many processes to the digital space, which, on the one hand, proved to be salutary in the time of crisis, but on the other hand contributed to the growth of many abuses, especially financial ones.

The fight against the epidemic forces an increase in budgetary spending on public health and government support for the most vulnerable economic sectors and social groups. During an epidemic, all sectors of the economy experience disruption. Scarcity of certain goods leads to an increase in their prices. Reduced economic activity produces lower tax revenues. Because this happens when the government increases spending, so it increases the fiscal deficit and public debt. This in turn is the cause of a deep economic and social crisis.

Countries around the world are vaccinating on a massive scale. But beyond the logistics and coordination of such a large operation, there is another challenge – fighting the trade in fake vaccines.




Figure 2. Essence of threats to internal security of the EU

Source: Own work.

It is likely that no country EU will emerge from the crisis caused by COVID-19 without compromising its capacity. Economic hardship and rising unemployment can fuel recruitment of individuals for organised crime groups. Conversely, home isolation and hours spent online provide an excellent 'opportunity' to learn the anti-systemic narrative used by terrorists (Europol, 2020).

To sum up, the results of the conducted research point to complexity, inter-penetration, trans-borders, different sources of origin, causing significant losses and being linked to scientific and technological progress as the basic features of the current threats to EU internal security (Figure 2).

4. CONCLUSION

Threats are an inseparable part of human life. They destabilize it, deprive of a sense of security and in many cases lead to the collapse of value systems. Threats are subject to constant re-defining and evolution. In the conditions of growing international interdependence and globalisation processes military threats cease to be the only threats. Next to them there are political, social and economic threats creating their non-military dimension.

The greatest threats to the internal security of the EU today are undoubtedly associated with the unlawful use of force against people and property, illegal activities in cyberspace, the activities of organized crime groups, energy insecurity integrated with primary fuels, climate change as a result of global warming, an excess of illegal migrants and highly contagious diseases with a wide range. From the perspective of the last year, the COVID-19 epidemic has proven to be particularly threatening to the internal security of the EU, which has been recognized as a multidimensional threat with extreme economic, social, political and even cultural consequences.

The current threats to the EU's internal security are a complex phenomenon. They arise against a background of political, economic, social and other contradictions and antagonisms. Threat carriers are state and non-state actors. They are caused not only by human actions, but also by natural causes. They occur on a global, regional and local scale. They do not occur individually. They are intertwined. In certain situations, one threat can take the form of another. They evolve using the latest technology. They often have an avalanche character. They also have a high capacity to negatively affect most aspects of state (community of states) functioning.

Although the primary responsibility for internal security lies with the Member States, recent years have shown that the security of each individual Member State is equivalent to the internal security of all EU countries. The Union responds to threats in a multidisciplinary and integrated way, providing Member States' security services with the tools and information they need. Practice shows that current legal, practical and support mechanisms are insufficient and need to be strengthened and improved. Close cooperation not only within the Union but also with third countries and at the global level is essential to fight threats effectively and comprehensively.

REFERENCES

- Bąkowski, P. (2013). *Organised crime in the European Union* [Access: 20.12.2020]. Access on the internet: <https://www.movimentoeuropeo.it/images/Organised%20crime%20in%20the%20European%20Union.pdf>

- BiznesAlert (2019). *Germany: Rośnie liczba cyberataków na infrastrukturę krytyczną, w tym energetykę* [Access: 20.12.2020]. Access on the internet: <https://biznesalert.pl/niemcy-cyberataki-energetyka>
- Bremberg, N., Sonnsjö, H., Mobjörket M. (2019). *The EU and climate-related security risks: a community of practice in the making?* "Journal of European Integration", Vol. 41, No. 5. DOI: 10.1080/07036337.2018.1546301.
- Dąbrowski, M. (2015). *Cyberatak zagrożeniem XXI wieku. „Możliwości porównywalne z oddziaływaniem militarnym”* Access on the internet: <https://www.cyberdefence24.pl/cyberatak-zagrozeniem-xxi-wieku-mozliwosci-porownywalne-z-oddziaływaniem-militarnym-raport>.
- Dennison, S., Franke, U.E., Zerka, P. (2018). *The nightmare of the dark: The security fears that keep Europeans awake at night* [Access: 10.12.2020]. Access on the internet: https://ecfr.eu/special/the_nightmare_of_the_dark_the_security_fears_that_keep_europeans_awake_at_n
- Dokos, T. (2019). *Threats and Challenges to European Security and the Need for Well-informed Parliamentarians*. Access on the internet: <https://www.mercatoreuropeandialogue.org/download-file/983>
- EMCDDA (2019). *European drug Report. Trends and Developments*. DOI: 10.2810/546710.
- European Commission (2020). *Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on EU Security Union Strategy*.
- European external Action Service (2016). *A global strategy for the European Union's foreign and security policy*. DOI: 10.2871/565395.
- Europol (2011). *General Report on Europol Activities*. European Police Office.
- (2016). *Situation Report. Trafficking in human beings in the EU* [Access: 25.01.2021]. Access on the internet: <https://www.europol.europa.eu/publications-documents/trafficking-in-human-beings-in-eu>.
- (2020). *Pandemic Profiteering. How criminals exploit the COVID-19 crisis* [Access: 28.01.2020]. Access on the internet: <https://www.europol.europa.eu/publications-documents/pandemic-profiteering-how-criminals-exploit-covid-19-crisis>
- (2020). *Europol's EU Terrorism Situation and Trend report (TE-SAT)* [Access: 28.01.2020]. Access on the internet: <https://www.europol.europa.eu/activities-services/main-reports/european-union-terrorism-situation-and-trend-report-te-sat-2020>
- Forsal.pl (2019). *Oto kraje UE, które są najbardziej uzależnione od importu ropy naftowej* [Access: 15.01.2021]. Access on the internet: <https://forsal.pl/artykuly/1428385.oto-kraje-ue-ktore-sa-najbardziej-uzalezni-one-od-importu-ropy-naftowej-infografika.html>
- Konarzewska, A. (2010). *Migracyjne problemy Unii Europejskiej*. „Zeszyty Naukowe Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego”, No. 824.
- Kundzewicz, Z. W. (2008). *Konsekwencje globalnych zmian klimatu*. „Nauka”, No. 1.
- Muczyński, R. (2019). *Nielegalna migracja do Europy maleje*. „MILMAG. Magazyn Militarny” [Access: 8.01.2021]. Access on the internet: https://www.milmag.pl/news/view?news_id=2885
- Pawłowski, A. (2020). *Covid-19, Environmental Engineering and the End of the World*. „Problemy Ekorozwoju”, No. 2.
- Pérez de las Heras, B. (2020). *Climate security in the European Union's foreign policy: addressing the responsibility to prepare for conflict prevention*. “Journal of Contemporary European Studies”, Vol. 28, No. 3. DOI: 10.1080/14782804.2020.1731438.

- Rada Europejska (2010). *Strategia bezpieczeństwa wewnętrznego Unii Europejskiej. Dążąc do europejskiego modelu bezpieczeństwa*. DOI: 10.2860/91252.
- Rada UE (2009). *Europejska strategia bezpieczeństwa. Bezpieczna Europa w lepszym świecie*. DOI: 10.2860/16160.
- Shaffer, R. (2020). *Homegrown Terrorism and Responses in Europe*. "Terrorism and Political Violence", Vol. 32. DOI: 10.1080/09546553.2020.1776994.
- Shapiro, J., Hackenbroich, J. (2017). *Opportunities amid disorder: Europe and the World in 2018*. [Access: 14.01.2021]. Access on the internet: https://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/Opportunities_Amid_Disorder.pdf
- Skoneczny, Ł. (2011). *Wpływ zmian klimatycznych na bezpieczeństwo Unii Europejskiej – wybrane zagadnienia*. „Przegląd Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego”, No. 5.
- SOCTA (2017). *Threat Assessment. Crime in the age of technology*. European Police Office [Access: 29.12.2020]. Access on the internet: <https://www.europol.europa.eu/activities-services/main-reports/european-union-serious-and-organised-crime-threat-assessment-2017>
- Stolarski, M. P. (2019). *Ataki cybernetyczne jako współczesne źródło zagrożeń bezpieczeństwa*, rozprawa doktorska. Warszawa: ASzWoj.
- Wawrzusiszyn, A. (2017). *Illegal migration to modern Europe. Methods, tendencies, trends*, "Doctrina. Studia Społeczno-Polityczne", No. 13. Access on the internet: <http://hdl.handle.net/11331/2690>
- Wojciechowski, S. (2018). *Terroryzm wciąż zagraża Unii Europejskiej* [Access: 16.12.2020]. Access on the internet: <https://rcb.gov.pl/terroryzm-wciaz-zagraza-unii-europejskiej>
- Wrzosek, M. (2013). *Współczesne zagrożenia w obszarze bezpieczeństwa europejskiego*. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Menedżerskie PTM.
- (2015). *Dylematy zarządzania europejskiego*. Warszawa: AON.
- Zięba, A. (2016a). *Oczekując nieoczekiwanego: zagrożenie terrorystyczne w Unii Europejskiej*. Siemiątkowski, Z., Zięba, A. (sc. ed.), *Służby specjalne we współczesnym państwie*. Warszawa: Elipsa.
- (2016). *Współczesne wyzwania i zagrożenia dla bezpieczeństwa międzynarodowego [Contemporary Challenges and Threats to International Security]*. „Stosunki Międzynarodowe – International Relations”, 3(52). DOI: 10.7366/02090961320160.
- Zubrzycki, W., Babiński, A. (2017). *Procedury bezpieczeństwa w Unii Europejskiej*. Warszawa: Difin.

DOI: 10.7862/rz.2021.hss.19

The text was submitted to the editorial office: March 2021.

The text was accepted for publication: September 2021.

Marta HOŁDYŃSKA¹

ILLEGAL MIGRANTS AND TERRORIST THREATS IN WESTERN COUNTRIES AFTER SEPTEMBER 11, 2001: PERCEPTIONS AND REALITY

This article provides a preliminary assessment of the relationships between illegal migration, jihadist terrorism, and the perceptions of migrants by citizens of Western countries. The research was based on officially available data on terrorism provided by Europol and the results of surveys conducted by the Pew Research Centre or IPSOS. Assessments of the migration-terrorism nexus used a quantitative and qualitative analysis method, as well as a document and scientific literature research method. The results of most studies on the links between terrorism and migration indicate that there are insufficient correlations between these phenomena. However, the issue of the vulnerability of second and third-generation migrants to radicalization is significant. Vigilance on this issue is important in order to maintain adequate security for those who could become victims of potential terrorist attacks.

Keywords: illegal migration, terrorism, security, European Union, United States.

1. INTRODUCTION

A significant number of deaths resulted from the terrorist attacks carried out in the United States on September 11, 2001. These attacks have influenced the perception of migrants, mainly from countries with large Muslim populations. A 2016 IPSOS survey found that a large proportion of the US and the UK citizens considered migrants to be potential terrorists. Most of citizens of the European Union countries also feared the terrorist threat from migrants. The exceptions were Spanish citizens. The views of citizens of European countries on the potential threat from migrants depended on political views. The terrorist attacks carried out in the United States in 2001 had also a significant impact on public opinion thereafter regarding Donald Trump's intended entry ban.

The claim about the link between terrorism and migration has prompted researchers to undertake studies to prove the validity of this formulation. The example of the terrorist attacks in Paris in 2015 has often served as an argument supporting the thesis that there is a direct link between illegal migration and terrorism. However, most studies did not show such a correlation between migration and terrorism. Instead, the relationship between foreign-born population growth and Islamist terrorist activity in the United States was significant. The number of terrorist attacks bearing the hallmarks of Islamic terrorism

¹ Marta Hołdyńska, MSc, University of Natural Sciences and Humanities in Siedlce, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Security Studies, 39 Zytnia St., 08-110 Siedlce; e-mail: martaholdynska@gmail.com. ORCID: 0000-0003-0513-1643.

increased in 2001, influenced by the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center. While the largest population of Muslims came from the Asia-Pacific regions, the number of Muslims migrating to the United States increased in 2012. There was a general view that Islamists were behind most terrorist attacks, but this was only a small proportion of all attacks. However, the issue of the vulnerability of second and third generation migrants to radicalisation, due to factors such as discrimination, cultural marginalisation or religious fundamentalism was important.

The change observed after 2001 in the way migrants are perceived by the citizens of Europe and the United States, due to potential links with terrorist attacks, makes this issue directly related to the area of research interests of the security sciences. This subject, due to its sensitive nature and the ease of making an biased assessment, has not been taken up too often in the scientific literature so far. This article attempts a preliminary assessment of public perception of the relationship between illegal migration and jihadist terrorism. Assessments of public perceptions of the links between migration and jihadist terrorism used a quantitative and qualitative analysis method, as well as a document and scientific literature research method. Officially available data on terrorism provided by Europol and results of studies on migration and terrorism conducted by Pew Research Centre or IPSOS provided background information for further discussion on interrelationships between illegal migration and the terrorist threat in the Western countries.

A review of research findings on the public debate surrounding the topic of migrants' links to terrorism provides a starting point for further considerations related to assessing the perceptions of illegal migrants by citizens of the United States and the European Union after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. The second part of the article contains an analysis of research results devoted to the problem of links between illegal migration and jihadist terrorism. In the further part of the article there is an attempt to verify the stereotypes of public opinion on the links between illegal migration and jihadist terrorism after 11 September 2001, based on an earlier analysis of the results of research on this issue.

2. PUBLIC DEBATE ON THE LINKS BETWEEN ILLEGAL MIGRATION AND JIHADIST TERRORISM

The consequence of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 was a significant loss of life. About 3,000 people were killed with about 2,000 of them in the terrorist attacks that took place on September 11, 2001 (Shamlan, 2018). This situation have greatly influenced the way migrants were perceived by citizens of the European Union and the United States during the migration crisis. These countries have significantly tightened immigration laws and introduced policies that put pressure on migrants to integrate into host countries. Restrictions on migrants' rights such as surveillance and sanctions have been introduced. These actions were motivated, among other things, out of concern that the more foreigners live in a country the higher is the risk of terrorist attacks (CESIFO, 2017). Immigration crisis invigorated public debate on negative effects of migration. Migrants were often blamed for the problems in the labour market and access to social benefits. Public debate pointed more frequently at difficulties in assimilation or integration of immigrants, threats to national identity, the growth of organised crime and terrorism (Raczyński, 2015). Based on a 2016 IPSOS survey, it was revealed that 72 percent of UK citizens considered migrants as potential terrorists, who intended to carry out an attack in their country. 77 percent of Americans were as likely to say the same as UK citizens (IPSOS 2016). The situation was

similar in other European countries. Most of European citizens feared a terrorist threat from migrants. According to a 2016 opinion poll compiled by the Pew Research Centre, British respondents were 52 percent likely to say that an influx of migrants could increase the threat of terrorism, while 41 percent of respondents thought there was no correlation between mass migration and terrorist attacks. In other EU countries, a large proportion of people feared threats from migrants. Among them were countries such as Hungary and Poland, where terrorist attacks were feared by 76 percent and 71 percent of citizens respectively. As an example of countries where the percentage of people fearing terrorist attacks from migrants was relatively high, we can mention also Germany (61 percent), the Netherlands (61 percent) and Italy (60 percent). A different view was held by Spanish respondents. Only 40 percent of them were concerned about terrorist attacks by migrants (Wilke, Stokes, Kimmons, 2016).

It is also worth noting an important fact about the views of citizens of the European Union countries on the potential threat from migrants. The views and assessments depended largely on political views. The situation on the United Kingdom may serve as an illustrative example of the situation. In 2016 87 percent of the Independence Party's supporters said that migrants could contribute to the risk of terrorist threats on European soil. The situation was different for the supporters of the Labour Party, only 39 percent of whom were concerned about increasing terrorist threat. The Conservative Party supporters held the most extreme views, with 60 percent of them believing that terrorism would increase due to the influx of migrants to Europe (Wilke et al. 2016).

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 were also reflected in the public's opinion of President Donald Trump's 2017 ban on people entering the United States. A significant number of Americans have expressed support for a ban on six countries with a majority Muslim population. Overall, about 60 percent of respondents expressed support for the ban and only 28 percent were against it. However, it is worth noting that the majority of the plan's supporters, 84 percent, were also supporters of the Republican Party. Slightly less extreme opinions on banning entry to the US for Muslims, circulated among non-partisans. 56 percent of non-partisans supported the ban, while 30 percent opposed it. The most divided opinions on banning Muslims were shown by the results of surveys conducted among supporters of the Democratic Party. 46 percent of such respondents were against the ban, while 41 percent supported Donald Trump's idea (Politico, 2017).

In conclusion, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 have greatly affected the perceptions of migrants by citizens of the European Union and the United States. Americans and citizens of European Union countries were concerned that migrants could significantly contribute to the risk of terrorist attacks. The views of the US and the EU citizens on the occurrence of a potential threat from migrants were highly dependent on political views. The supporters of conservative and right wing parties were more concerned about increased terrorist threat caused by migrants than the supporters of liberal and left wing parties.

3. THE LINK BETWEEN MASS MIGRATION AND THE NUMBER OF TERRORIST ACTS AFTER 2001

The emergence of the claim in the International Organization for Migration's report that terrorism, due to its transnational nature, and migration are linked has prompted researchers to undertake research to examine the issue in more detail (IOM, 2010). Some researchers have argued that terrorism and migration are related and that it would be significant to use

migration as a tool to combat terrorism. The rationale for this claim was to emphasize the importance of a well-functioning migration system to serve as the most important tool in the fight against terrorism (Krikorian, 2002).

The terrorist attacks in Paris in 2015 have often been used as an argument to support the thesis that there is a direct link between migration and terrorism because some of the terrorists involved in the attack entered Europe with the influx of migrants (Kis-Benedek, 2016). Other researchers, however, disagreed with the claim that migration and terrorism are related. As an example, a report published by the United Nations Rapporteur on Counter-Terrorism and Human Rights makes clear that there is no evidence to support a link between migration and terrorism (OHCHR, 2016). Another argument to negate the link between migration and terrorism was the claim about the global economic market on which the power of the West was mainly based. Western adoption of stricter migration procedures could be detrimental to the economic market and lead to economic isolation (Kerwin, 2005).

Analyzing the problem of the relationship between migration and terrorism, it is worth using studies that show the relationship between these phenomena. Most studies do not find a correlation between migration and terrorism. The relationship between terrorist attacks and migration flows in the United States between 2000 and 2016 was weak. The situation was similar in the United Kingdom, where in the same years as in the United States, the influx of migrants was weakly correlated and the number of terrorist attacks decreased significantly after 2001. It is worth noting that during that period, there was a renewed increase in terrorist attacks in the UK for which the Northern Ireland dissidents were responsible (Shamlan, 2018).

The correlation between migration flows and deaths from terrorist attacks in the United States between 2000 and 2016 also shows no significant relationship. However, it is worth mentioning that in the history of the United States, in 2001, a record number of deaths were registered as a result of terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center. Nevertheless, the overall death toll from terrorist attacks between 2000 and 2016 was not significant. The situation regarding the relationship between illegal migration and the number of deaths from terrorist attacks in the UK between 2000 and 2016 also showed no significant correlation (Shamlan, 2018).

However, it is worth mentioning that there is a correlation between foreign-born population growth and Islamist terrorist activity in the United States. The number of terrorist attacks bearing the hallmarks of Islamic terrorism increased in 2001, then dropped to zero and began to increase again in 2012. Between 2000 and 2011, there were no significant correlations between foreign-born population growth and Islamist terrorist activity. Instead, the correlation between 2012 and 2016 was significant, meaning that the increase in the foreign-born population during those years could be responsible for about 87 percent of Islamic terrorist attacks. The situation was different in the UK where no link was observed between the increase in the foreign-born population and Islamist terrorist activities within the UK (Shamlan, 2018).

In summary, the emergence of the claim about terrorism and its transnational nature and its relationship with migration has prompted researchers to undertake research to analyse this problem in more detail. A number of researchers have argued that terrorism and migration are related, but others have disagreed with this assumption. Most studies did not show a direct relationship between migration and terrorism. The United States recorded a significant number of deaths from terrorist attacks in 2001, but the overall number of

deaths between 2000 and 2016 did not show a significant correlation with migration. However, there was a correlation between the increase in foreign-born population and Islamist terrorist activity in the United States. The number of terrorist attacks bearing the hallmarks of Islamic terrorism increased in 2001. Another significant increase in terrorist attacks occurred again in 2012 and continued consecutively until 2016.

4. THE IMPACT OF STEREOTYPES ON SOCIETY'S PERCEPTION OF MIGRANTS AFTER 2001

Assessing the religion of migrants based on their country of origin is difficult. The largest population of Muslims comes from the Asia-Pacific regions. (Desilver, Masci, 2017). Studies estimate that the number of Muslims migrating to the United States increased from about 50,000 in 1992 to 100,000 in 2012. There were, some annual differences in the number of Muslim migrants, but overall an increase in the number of migrants to the United States between 1992 and 2012 was observed (Pew Research Centre, 2013). In 2017, research estimated the number of Muslims at about 3 million or 1.1 percent of the US population (Pew Research Centre, 2018). In contrast, the 2011 census showed that the number of Muslims in the UK was 4.8 percent of the population of England and Wales (The Muslim Council of Britain, 2015). However, it is worth noting that Islamists who are believed to be behind the majority of terrorist attacks were responsible only for 1.74 percent of all terrorist attacks in the United Kingdom and 10.5 percent of all terrorist attacks in the United States (Shamlan, 2018). Jihadist terrorist attacks were conducted mainly due to a mentality that rejected democracy on religious grounds. The medieval Crusades were equated with a situation, in which it was claimed that Sunni Islam was facing a “crusader alliance” consisting of Shiites, Christians and Jews (TESAT, 2017). Jihadist terrorist attacks caught public attention because of their focus on inflicting human losses. Overall, jihadist terrorist attacks resulted in 97.8 percent of deaths of all terrorist attacks in recent two decades. However, this number includes the 9/11 fatalities, which account for nearly 95 percent of the deaths from jihadist terrorist attacks. Given the high death toll from jihadist terrorist attacks, counter-terrorism vigilance is important, but the stigmatisation of migrants arriving in the Western countries and the stereotypes created by politicians and the media must be avoided. It is also worth noting that the findings of most studies on the jihadist-migration nexus suggest that there are insufficient correlations between the phenomena and that there is no concrete evidence to influence how migrants are perceived.

Evidence that migrants should not be seen as increasing the risk of terrorism prompts consideration of migrants' exposure to transnational terrorist organisations. Factors such as social environment, discrimination, identity problems, economic conditions, cultural marginalisation and the influence of the country of origin mean that migrants can often become victims of radicalisation. Radicalization is the phenomenon of people adopting ideas that can lead to terrorist attacks. The basis of radicalization is often religious fundamentalism, but it is often the case that this is not the only factor influencing radicalization. It is not uncommon for this process to be influenced by frustration with one's own life and the country's domestic and foreign policies. People who often experience discrimination and a sense of loss of identity, from marginalized groups are more prone to radicalization. Additionally, Western Europe's involvement in conflict zones such as Afghanistan and Syria also contributes to radicalization, especially of migrant communities (European Parliament, 2021). One can observe the phenomenon of diaspora communities

acting against their adopted homelands. Diasporas can also act as support for terrorist objectives by raising funds from organized crime practices, recruiting new candidates and acquiring weapons. Terrorists who come from Muslim diasporas can be divided into three categories. The first is those who have converted to Islam. Two sub-categories can be distinguished here such as “hardcore” or long-term jihadists trained in camps and “walk-ins” or self-radicalized jihadists. These are individuals who have joined the jihadist movement. The second group of terrorists hailing from Muslim diasporas are those who have undergone a failed second-generation assimilation process. Such descendants of immigrants are particularly dangerous because they are difficult to identify. Additionally, so-called “homegrown terrorists” have knowledge of potential targets for terrorist attacks, speak languages, and are able to move freely around the world (Kobzarska-Bar, 2014). The third group were first-generation migrants who could not fit into the new society and lived on the margins (Hoffman, 2007). It is also worth noting that currently radicalization processes are mainly based on social networks that allow people to join groups that incite violence. The Internet is one of the most significant channels through which extremist views are preached and individuals are recruited for terrorism-related activities. In addition, restrictions on travel and physical encounters caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, may have led to increased use of online external content and networking (TESAT, 2021).

In summary, after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the public's views of Western countries about migrants coming from Muslim countries often referred incorrectly to the facts of the situation. The stereotypes created by the media and politicians were not really reflected in reality, which is precisely confirmed by numerous studies conducted on the relationship between migration and terrorism. The terrorist attacks were mainly due to jihadist religious views. The misjudgement of migrants and the attribution of blame for terrorist attacks to this group as a whole prompts us to analyse the problem from a different perspective. Migrants have often, through factors such as cultural marginalization and discrimination, fallen prey to transnational terrorist organizations. Western Europe's involvement in the conflict with Afghanistan and Syria further contributed to the vulnerability of migrant communities to radicalization. It was not uncommon for terrorists in Western European countries to come from diasporas. These included second-generation migrants who had undergone an unsuccessful assimilation process and first-generation migrants unable to fit into Western societies. Nowadays, the Internet is one of the main channels that foster radicalization processes. Restrictions on physical encounters due to the COVID-19 pandemic have led to intensifying online terrorist related activities.

5. SUMMARY

The terrorist attacks that took place on September 11, 2001 resulted in a significant number of fatalities. Due to this event, the public perception of migrants coming mainly from Muslim countries has changed in most of the Western countries. Numerous studies found that the US and the UK citizens considered migrants as potential terrorists. Citizens of the European Union countries were also concerned about the terrorist threat from migrants. The views of the EU citizens on the link between migration and terrorism were highly dependent on political views. The emergence of the claim that terrorism and migration are linked has prompted research to examine this issue in more detail. It must be noted that most of research did not find a direct correlation between migration and terrorism. Nonetheless, the relationship between foreign-born population growth and Islamist terrorist

activity in the United States was significant. Second-generation migrants who went through an unsuccessful assimilation process were more prone to radicalization, and as a consequence they contributed to increase in terrorist threat in the Western countries. Factors such as religious fundamentalism, discrimination or frustration with their own lives and dissatisfaction with the policies of Western European countries also made second and third generation migrants more vulnerable to radicalisation. The results of most studies on the links between terrorism and migration show that there is not enough correlation between these phenomena, which is significant evidence that migrants should not be seen by society as the main source of terrorist attacks. At the same time it is important to pay attention to the problem of radicalization of subsequent generations of migrants and to take action to prevent this phenomenon, among others by improving assimilation policies. Such an approach may limit terrorist threat posed to Western societies by migrants who failed to assimilate.

REFERENCES

- CESIFO Working Papers (2017). *The Effect of Migration on Terror – Made at Home or Imported from Abroad?* [Access: 1.09.2021]. Access on the internet: <https://www.cesifo.org/en/publikationen/2017/working-paper/effect-migration-terror-made-home-or-imported-abroad>
- Desilver, D, Masci, D. (2017). *World's Muslim population more widespread than you might think*. Pew Research Center [Access: 25.06.2021]. Access on the internet: <http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/01/31/worlds-muslim-population-more-widespread-than-you-might-think/>
- Europol (2017). *European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TE-SAT)* [Access: 25.06.2021]. Access on the internet: https://www.europol.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/tesat2017_0.pdf
- (2021). *European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TE-SAT)* [Access: 16.07.2021]. Access on the internet: https://www.europol.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/tesat_2021_0.pdf
- European Parliament (2021). *Radicalisation in the EU: what is it and how can it be prevented?* [Access: 16.07.2021]. Access on the internet: <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/pl/headlines/security/20210121STO96105/radykalizacja-w-ue-czym-jest-i-jak-mozna-jej-zapobiec>
- Hoffman, B. (2007). *Radicalization, Terrorism, and Diasporas*, RAND Corporation, 7–10 [Access: 16.07.2021]. Access on the internet: https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/conf_proceedings/2007/RAND_CF229.pdf
- IOM (2010). *International Terrorism and Migration*. IOM.
- IPSOS (2016). *Global Views on Immigration and the Refugee Crisis* [Access: 26.06.2021]. Access on the internet: <https://www.ipsos.com/en/global-views-immigration-and-refugee-crisis>
- Kerwin, D. (2005). *The use and misuse of national security rationale in crafting US refugee and immigration policies*. “*International Journal of Refugee Law*”, Vol. 17, No. 4.
- Kis-Benedek, J. (2016). *Illegal immigration and terrorism*. “*Journal of Security and Sustainability Issues*”, Vol. 5, No. 4.

- Kobzarska-Bar B. (2014) *Fundamentalizm religijny muzułmańskich organizacji terrorystycznych a stan zagrożenia w Europie*. „Rocznik Bezpieczeństwa Międzynarodowego”, t. 8, nr 1.
- Krikorian, M. (2002). *Asymmetrical Warfare and Immigration*. “Centre of Immigration Studies”, Vol. 1, No. 6.
- OHCHR (2016). *Refugees and terrorism: “No evidence of risk” New report by UN expert on counter terrorism* [Access: 26.06.2021]. Access on the internet: <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=20734>
- Pew Research Center (2013). *The Religious Affiliation of U.S. Immigrants: Majority Christian, Rising Share of Other Faiths* [Access: 27.06.2021]. Access on the internet: <http://www.pewforum.org/2013/05/17/the-religious-affiliation-of-us-immigrants/>
- (2018). *Muslims in America: Immigrants and those born in U.S. see life differently in many ways* [Access: 27.06.2021]. Access on the internet: <http://www.pewforum.org/essay/muslims-in-america-immigrants-and-those-born-in-u-s-see-life-differently-in-many-ways/>
- Politico (2017). *Poll: Majority of voters back Trump travel ban* [Access: 27.06.2021]. Access on the internet: <https://www.politico.com/story/2017/07/05/trump-travel-ban-poll-voters-240215>
- Raczyński, R. (2015). *Wpływ migracji międzynarodowych na bezpieczeństwo wewnętrzne państw*. „Bezpieczeństwo. Teoria i Praktyka”. Kwartalnik Krakowskiej Akademii im. Andrzeja Frycza Modrzewskiego, nr 2.
- Shamlan, A. (2018). *The Securitization of Immigration and its Correlation with Terrorism*. Tallinn: University of Technology School of Business and Governance Department of Law.
- The Muslim Council of Britain (2015). *British Muslims in Numbers*. “Muslim Council of Britain”.
- Wilke, R., Stokes, B., Kimmons, K. (2016). *Europeans Fear Wave of Refugees Will Mean More Terrorism, Fewer Jobs*. Pew Research Centre 1–44.

DOI: 10.7862/rz.2021.hss.20

The text was submitted to the editorial office: August 2021.

The text was accepted for publication: September 2021.

Agnieszka MIKLEWSKA¹

DISTURBED BONDS – CONSEQUENCES FOR MENTAL HEALTH OF A CHILD

The article is a theoretical analysis of consequences arising from shaping disturbed bonds for the mental health of a child. It describes a typology of attachment disorders and indicates their consequences for the psychosocial development of a child and an adolescent in terms of psychosocial development, regulation of emotions, motivation, and cognitive skills. This knowledge may be an important element in the prevention of disturbances in the emotional development of children and their possible treatment. Bonds are a relatively permanent construct, significantly affecting a child's mental health, however, they may change as a result of a change in their relationship with the primary caregiver and a better adjustment between them, appropriate responses to the child's needs, or worsening of these relationships. Particular attention in prevention of mental health disorders in children should be paid to the abilities and limitations of cooperation among professionals of different fields: judges, experts, advisors, mediators and therapists.

Keywords: disturbed bonds, child's mental health, psychosocial development, a typology of attachment disorders.

1. INTRODUCTION

From the early stage of life, a child develops its emotionality, motivational system, social relationships, and cognitive curiosity in response to and on the basis of bonds built with the closest caregiver. Creating around the child an atmosphere based on the feeling of security, showing them acceptance, and responding adequately to the child's needs are the foundation for their optimal development in all spheres and for maintaining mental health. Properly shaped bonds, defined as safe, also at subsequent stages of life affect people's trust in the surrounding, experiencing peace and the belief that they have sufficient resources for their activities.

Lack of emotional bonds with their closest caregivers or shaping them in a disturbed manner results in a loss of trust in the immediate surrounding which is necessary for the proper mental development of a child. Such relationships are connected with improper care provided by caregivers manifested by the abuse of power: use of physical or mental violence, but also by neglecting the child, up to abandoning the child in extreme situations. The development of health and mental disorders is often associated with relational trauma experienced in childhood or adolescence, in particular its influence on the formation of

¹ Agnieszka Miklewska, PhD, Department of Psychology, Jan Długosz University in Częstochowa, 4/8 Waszyngtona St., 42-200 Częstochowa; e-mail: a.miklewska@ujd.edu.pl. ORCID: 0000-0002-3044-1232.

internal operating models of bonds. There is a belief that these models significantly determine the development of certain mechanisms which regulate emotions and motivation (Grzegorzewska, Cierpiąłkowska, 2020). Relational traumas are most often of repetitive nature, and when they significantly extend over time, they largely affect the development and maturation of various aspects of personality, presenting different levels of generalization.

2. DEVELOPING BONDS

The first months and years of a child's life are essential for developing a safe bond between the child and the caregiver, which in turn translates into the ability of a person in adolescence and adulthood to develop healthy relationships with their surrounding, to present proper social, emotional, and motivational functioning and, consequently, proper cognitive functioning. Availability of the caregiver for the child, as well as predictability and responsiveness of the caregiver, which is an active and adequate response to needs, build the feeling of security. Noticing that the closest caregiver responds to the signalled needs, especially when calming down and comfort are needed, the child learns to trust and satisfy the feeling of security. All behaviours related to understanding signals sent by the child contribute to the improvement in the quality of the caregiver-child relationship, which is crucial for development. Stability, repeatability of reactions and tension-reducing behaviour become the foundation for shaping a safe style of attachment, which is also connected with the so-called synchrony, a harmonious interaction between the child and the caregiver, which is their mutual adjustment of reactions in response to behaviour and feelings of the other person in the relationship.

Early experiences of a child in contact with the caregiver constitute the foundation not only for the development of personality, but also become dynamic operational models that are used to regulate, interpret, and predict behaviours, thoughts and feelings both towards others and towards oneself. They highly determine behaviour of the child which the child will use to achieve closeness with others. They shape self-esteem, beliefs about oneself and the way a person regulates emotional states. Thus, they contribute to the formation of mechanisms of regulation in difficult situations and coping with agitation. Maternal sensitivity is a key factor in the development of a safe attachment style, and the term covers a set of cognitive, emotional, and social characteristics which are part of the caregiver's competences. Mother, characterised by a high level of activity, creates a safe style of attachment with her children – the representation of a caregiver who is a source of comfort and safety is the basis for coping with developmental challenges during later stages of life.

2.1. The theory of attachment

Disturbed bonds with the closest caregiver and improperly formed attachment style in the early childhood period were analysed by John Bowlby (2007). The author noticed the consequences of these problems manifested in various aspects of adult life (Cierpiąłkowska, Górska, 2017). He considered attachment in two dimensions, i.e. interpersonal and intrapsychic. He considered the first one as a motivational and behavioural system, the aim of which is to maintain closeness with the caregiver in a threatening situation, and later on also between two adults. On the other hand, he considered the second one as shaping mental representation of attachment in the form of the so-called internal operating model concerning the figure of attachment, self and the relationship between them.

Bowlby believes (Bolby, 2007; Bee, 2004) that in the period of mental development, the physical umbilical cord is replaced by the mental need for closeness with the caregiver – most often with the mother. A child is born equipped with instinctive behaviours – crying, smiling, making eye contact, which provoke others to take care of the child. On the other hand, parents, in particular mothers, have an instinctive ability to respond to the signals sent by the child. These patterns initiate a complex chain of stimulus-reaction relationships, which in turn lead to the development of specific attachment patterns based, among others, on meeting the need for security. This way, synchrony is created, i.e. an adjustment between the child and the caregiver. The ontogenesis of the attachment process develops in three phases. Initially, during the first three months of life, these are unspecified reactions of a child who learns to signal its needs to the surrounding. In the next stage (between 3 and 6 months), the child establishes a relationship with its caregivers smiling at them, and then, between 6 and 8 months of age, the child refers to other people guided by their facial expressions and searching for confirmation of its own emotions. At around 6 months of age, the child shows fear of strangers, and starting at around 10 months of age, the child is afraid of separation, which increases until the age of 16 months. According to Bowlby (2007; Bee, 2004), as early as 6 months of age, a sincere attachment develops between the child and the caregiver, which is also called a secure base. The author believes that achieving mental health requires that an infant and a young child experience a warm, intimate, and safe relationship with their mother or another caregiver. The types of attachment distinguished by Bowlby (Cierpiałkowska, 2013) are considered to be a significant risk or protective factor for the development of disorders. Erikson (Brzezińska, 2000) also emphasised that the basic trust in the caregiver which develops in infancy is a key resource for further proper development. People who stay with a child for a long period and who bring strong feelings in the child (significant people) become objects of identification and a point of reference in the process of socialisation. With properly shaped relationships between parents and children, the strength of their influence decreases with the age of the child. According to Cholewa, Krzywicka and Jadczyk-Szumiło (2008), functions of attachment can be applied to five main spheres of human life, i.e., biological, emotional, cognitive, social, and spiritual. In the biological sphere, attachment fulfils the function of protecting against danger, satisfying biological needs (food, etc.), and ensuring survival. In emotional sphere, its function is reduced to modification of physiological agitation and regulation of an affect in the sense of obtaining the ability to self-calm down. In relation to cognitive area, attachment translates into a person's ability to learn about themselves, others, and the world, as well as to freely explore the surrounding. On the other hand, in social aspect, thanks to attachment, it is possible to acquire social and interpersonal competencies and to build relationships with others. As far as the last, spiritual sphere is considered, attachment refers to shaping a basic attitude – trust vs. distrust, hope.

Bowlby (2007) assumes that behavioural attachment system is one of the systems that enable a child to gain elementary knowledge about the world and others, to learn to trust another human being. By the end of the first year of life, when attachment becomes a fact, the affective, cognitive, and behavioural systems create mental representations of interactions with the caregiver, when, where, and how the caregiver becomes available. Based on this process, a self-regulatory system is developed. This process transforms slowly from sensorimotor into symbolic, and these representations become the basis for seeing oneself and others, and for anticipating the future and one's place in relations with others

(Oatley, Jenkins, 2003). The attachment system related to the indicated areas of life shapes the later functioning of a person in various areas.

2.2. Types of bonds and attachment

The key to the attachment relationship is the responsiveness of caregivers, which has already been mentioned. It is the ability to notice signals sent by the child, but also the ability to properly interpret them and to respond adequately. Depending on the relationship between the child and the caregiver, patterns of attachment are formed which can already be seen in the first year of life. They can be secure or insecure styles, i.e., avoidant, anxious-ambivalent, or disorganised.

Referring to the already mentioned Bowlby's theory and observing the behaviour of children aged 12–18 months in laboratory conditions, Ainsworth (Bee, 2004; Cierpiałkowska, 2013; Cierpiałkowska, Górska, 2017) has developed the concept of attachment. She distinguished 3 types of bonds connected with responsive behaviours of mothers and satisfying by them the feeling of security of their children. The first type of bond she distinguished – the so-called B, or secure attachment, was characteristic for children who were able to cope with separation from their caregiver and quickly engaged in exploring their surroundings. Feeling threatened, they looked for contact, it was easy to calm them down in the absence of their mother, and after her return they showed joy and did not resist contact. If the relationship between the child and the closest caregiver has been formed properly, the feeling of trust and safe bonds have been developed, thus the absence of the caregiver does not cause strong anxiety in the child, as the child realizes that the parent will return. Moreover, when the caregiver is present, the child is not focused on watching him/her as not to be abandoned, and freely explores the surroundings. This is because the child experiences security when the caregiver behaves predictably and shows sensitivity to information sent by the child as well as adequately responds to such information. Such behaviour was observed in 60% of children.

The second type of attachment: A – was defined by Ainsworth (Bee, 2004; Cierpiałkowska, Górska, 2017) as an insecure type shaped on the principle: disconnection/avoidance. It characterised 15% of children and was associated with experiencing repeated rejection by the closest caregivers. As a result of such experiences, children avoided contact with their caregiver, in particular after the caregiver's absence. They did not prefer relationships with the caregiver over other people, and when the caregiver made contact, they did not resist but did not initiate it either. Due to repeated abandonment, the child does not trust the caregiver and does not know if the caregiver responds with help when the child needs it – the child rather expects rejection. Due to the lack of helpful responses from the caregiver, the child makes an effort to cope without any support and builds a coping strategy based on emotional self-sufficiency. It also learns to suppress negative feelings or to show false positive feelings. The formed bonds are of anxious and avoidant type.

Another type of insecure attachment – C, refers to the resistance/ambivalence relationship, and it was observed in 10% of respondents (Bee, 2004; Cierpiałkowska, Górska, 2017). Children characterised by this type of attachment showed little interest in their surroundings and were distrustful of strangers. They became worried when the caregiver left the room, did not allow themselves to be comforted in the absence of the caregiver, and after the caregiver returned, they still did not calm down or even showed anger towards the caregiver. Such behaviour of children was explained by the unpredictable attitude of caregivers, who sometimes were available and helpful and sometimes were not

or used separation and threats of abandonment as a form of control of the child. Children experienced uncertainty as to whether the caregiver would be available, would respond, and would be helpful when needed, and due to lack of trust and unsatisfied need for security, they exhibited separation anxiety, showed the tendency of being clingy, activated exaggerated attachment behaviour, and abandoned activities connected with exploring the surrounding. Through intensive control of the surroundings and the compulsion to be close to the caregiver, the children tried to create a substitute for the feeling of security.

Ainsworth's research was continued by Main (Cierpiałkowska, Górska, 2017), distinguishing one additional type of insecure attachment – disorganization/disorientation (type D). It was observed in children who experienced violence, neglect, or various types of abuse. These children reacted to the absence of the caregiver with bewilderment and confusion, and in the company of the caregiver they engaged in disorganised behaviour, such as rocking, covering the face, etc. When the caregiver took them in their arms, they turned their heads away. Characteristic for this type of attachment is the lack of a consistent strategy for coping with stress in the child. The child exhibits various behaviours, often contradictory and bizarre, as they simultaneously experience fear and attachment, and the inability to solve this conflict. This pattern has been observed in abused children and children of mothers suffering from depression. The caregiver is often a threat to the child.

Literature indicates the significance of the four of the above-mentioned styles of the child's attachment to the caregiver: trusting, ambivalent, avoiding and disorganised in the emergence of separation anxiety in children, as well as in the further development of personality disorders or depression (Cierpiałkowska, 2013; Cierpiałkowska, Górska, 2017). Referring to the Bowlby's theory, procedures and techniques based on internal representations of attachment are created. They take into account the impact of internal attachment models on the course of the disorder, the type of relationship created, but also the effectiveness of specific therapeutic strategies and interventions (Rajewska-Rynkowska, 2005).

3. TYPES AND CONSEQUENCES OF DISTURBED BONDS

Disorders of bonds resulting in a lack of a proper sense of security in a child are nowadays perceived as a significant cause of disorders, e.g., anxiety (Cierpiałkowska, 2013), as well as in a broader aspect – the cause of personality disorders (Cierpiałkowska, Górska, 2017). Attachment disorder syndrome was first mentioned in the standard classifications of psychological disorders in DSM-III, in 1980, after collecting evidence on children raised in orphanages (<http://www.teczaserc.pl>). Criteria included the requirement for the disorder to appear before the age of 8 months and they were compared to abnormal development. Both features were rejected in DSM-III-R in 1987. Instead, the disorder onset period was changed to the first 5 years of life, and the disorder itself was divided into two subcategories: inhibited and disinhibited. These changes resulted from further research on abused children and children from orphanages and remained in the current version, DSM-IV, dated 1994, and its 2000 text version, DSM-IV-TR, as well as the ICD-10 dated 1992. Both classifications focus on small children who are not only in the group of an increased risk of developing further disorders but already exhibit clinical disorders.

3.1. Reactive attachment disorders – the rad syndrome

In situations of specific emotional problems emerging in childhood, it happens that the explanation is incorrectly formed bonds and the failure to satisfy the feeling of security in the early years, and the observed irregularities are a consequence of them. The RAD syndrome (Pużyński, Wciórka, 2007) develops in children up to 5 years of age in response to the failure to satisfy the need for security and in response to improperly formed relationships with caregivers. Improper care typically involves mental and physical neglect or abuse of the child, constant lack of responses to child-initiated contact, and severe punishments. Symptoms are often observed by adoptive families who, by putting a lot of effort into creating a safe and accepting surrounding for their child, have the impression that the strength of their feelings was “tested” by children, who in turn react with rejection and even aggression to the attempts of showing them love and affection.

In addition, the disappearance of the closest caregivers from the child's life – that is, the inability to form normal bonds with them early in life may cause permanent emotional problems of the child and the development of the RAD disorder, which is abnormal reactions of the child in response to an attempt to build a close relationship with the child. This syndrome is characterised by clearly disturbed and inappropriate in terms of development ways of establishing social bonds, in particular a lack of emotional responses, withdrawal (e.g., curling up on the floor), or aggression towards malaise in oneself and others, as well as by excessive fearful alertness. The child may show strong contradictory and ambivalent social reactions in various situations and does not react to the attempts of its surrounding to comfort it, nor it looks for support in difficult moments. A certain ability of social reciprocation and reactivity in interactions with adults is observed, but it is quite typical to limit social interactions with peers. In children diagnosed with RAD, aggression towards oneself and others and the sense of unhappiness are often observed, and in some cases, there may even be disturbances of growth and physical development.

Children with RAD have severely disturbed internal patterns of behaviour in relationships with other people, which can lead to social and behavioural disorders later in life. Research on children raised in institutions suggests that they are not very attentive and hyperactive, no matter the quality of the care they receive. Children aged 3 to 6, diagnosed with the RAD disorder, are characterised by much lower empathy than their peers with proper bonds with their caregiver, and they experience difficulties with accurate self-assessment and adaptation to the environment. They often judge their personality traits too positively and at the same time show far more behavioural issues than children without such problems. Hence, the importance of the closeness and safe bond between children and their caregivers cannot be overestimated for their proper emotional and social development.

It should be emphasised that children with reactive attachment disorders present normal ability for social interaction and social response, hence disturbed patterns of social interaction largely subside if they are placed in an educational environment that provides them with continuous and responsible care. The cognitive development of children suffering from RAD is normal and they do not have permanent deficits, nor they experience limited, repetitive stereotypical patterns of activity and interests.

Although the main reason for the appearance of the RAD syndrome in the child's functioning is the failure to satisfy the need for security on the part of the closest caregivers, due to the chronic and broad nature, including also neglecting the child's other needs, the consequence is impaired social functioning, which suggests a greater severity of the

problem than only resulting from the loss of the feeling of security. While a child does not feel safe with one caregiver, they can establish a safe relationship with another one, and as a result, social relationships are not disturbed (Namysłowska, 2015).

Bonds disorder in the form of RAD is often referred to as the “inhibited form” – as opposed to DAD – “disinhibited form”. An important criterion for the diagnosis of RAD and DAD is the fact that they are reactive disorders, i.e. they are the result of specific negative relationships with people, without originally physiological basis, associated with the unsatisfied feeling of security, belonging, and love in early childhood.

3.2. Disinhibited attachment disorder – the dad disorder

Another disorder resulting from the failure to develop safe bonds with caregivers in childhood is the DAD syndrome (Puzyński, Wciorka, 2007), i.e., the lack of bonds selectivity. It develops in the first 5 years of a child's life (same as RAD) and is often observed in children placed in various types of institutions. Children who have such problems try to establish close relationships with all the adults they meet, excessively shortening the distance from them and perceiving each of them as the possibility of satisfying the need for security and belonging, which may be associated with uncritical sociability, in the form of excessive intimacy with strangers, the so-called “disinhibited form”. These children look for comfort and support in their surroundings, however, the person they turn to is irrelevant to them. Social interactions with strangers are poorly modulated by children suffering from DAD, and depending on their age, they have a specific character: during infancy “clingy” behaviours are dominant, whilst in the early childhood and preschool periods, they are characterised by intense attention-seeking and overly friendly behaviour towards all people from their surroundings. Children have difficulties in establishing close relationships with their peers, which may also be accompanied by behavioural and emotional disorders (Puzyński, Wciorka, 2007; Namysłowska, 2015).

The DAD disorder develops as a result of the coexistence of early lack of selective bonds, the persistence of weak social interactions, combined with a lack of their specificity concerning the situation. Children seek in all adults the satisfaction of the need for security and belonging without making a selection or preference for such relationships.

The consequence of early problems related to functioning in important relationships and creating lasting relationships are problems in establishing friendships, close relationships with peers and the opposite sex in later life. Early, effective therapeutic intervention reduces the severity of symptoms and may lead to their disappearance. The first principle of treating childhood bonds disorders is to ensure security to the child. Establishing contact with extended family and engaging them to cooperate in creating a safe place can be very effective. Due to the lack of other options to ensure security to the child, placement in an institution should be considered, although, as mentioned above, frequent changes of caregivers may also harm the emotional development of children (Namysłowska, 2015). A commonly practised solution nowadays is cooperation with small, professional foster families.

3.4 Induced bonds disturbances – parental alienation syndrome

Gardner's syndrome, known in Polish literature also as parental alienation syndrome (Namysłowska, Heitzman, Siewierska, 2009; Czerederecka 2010; Czerederecka, 2010; Zielona-Jenek, 2012), was described by an American psychiatrist, who was the first to

notice the symptoms emerging in children in a situation of prolonged divorce cases and the context of the ongoing fight between the spouses for custody of their children, or motivated by the desire to harass the partner after splitting. The doctor noticed a specific disorder of children's bond with the so-called secondary parent when the caregiver who exercises direct custody strives to obtain a favourable judgement at the expense of deteriorating the relationship of the child with the other parent as a result of specific actions taken by the first parent.

Important symptoms of the PAS syndrome (Grzegorzewska, Pisula, Borkowska, 2016; Zielona-Jenek, 2012), i.e. parental alienation, is engaging the child by the parent who has custody in deprecating and criticizing the other parent, unjustified or/and exaggerated, poorly argued criticism, and showing clear hostile attitude towards the so-called secondary parent. The strong influence of the main caregiver, e.g., by hindering contact, or presenting the other parent in a less favourable light, as well as subtle ones, e.g., showing disrespect or disapproval for maintaining relationships with the other caregiver, showing distance, use of specific (hostile or disrespectful) intonation in statements about the other parent contributes to the development of disorders in children. The belief of the child that it expresses its own judgement is necessary to diagnose parental alienation syndrome. A symptom of PAS is also the presence of the so-called borrowed scenarios in relationships of the child – that is, quoting the same arguments, situations, and even the same words as the main caregiver and spreading animosity towards the other parent to the parent's friends and extended family.

PAS is closely related to the destruction and distortion of the child's relationship with the parent who does not have direct custody of the child. On the other hand, a close bond with the primary parent is pathologically used to destroy the child's sense of security in contact with the other parent. Gardner (Zielona-Jenek, 2012) states that involving a child in a conflict with the other parent and setting the child against the other parent, consequently leading to alienation is a form of psychological abuse by the primary parent and as such may cause irreversible destruction of the relationship with the other parent, together with all its consequences for the functioning of the child. Parents striving for parental alienation are unable to see the emotional needs of their children or the consequences of their deprivation in the long term. They do not predict psychological consequences of their actions.

Potential consequences of PAS in children include self-destructive behaviour, blocking one's individuality, ease of becoming addicted, lowered self-esteem, anger, aggression, depression, anxiety, and even suicidal tendencies. In addition, the consequences of parental alienation syndrome include difficulties in building intimate relationships, problems with identity throughout life, mental illness, emotional problems and sexual disorders in adulthood. PAS may also be accompanied by hyperactivity and anxiety, and in its advanced stage - neurotic and psychosomatic problems such as headaches, stomach-ache, asthma, problems with metabolism, and difficulty falling asleep, and the child may be bound with the primary caregiver even by paranoid fantasies about the secondary caregiver (parent).

Parental alienation syndrome (PAS) is criticised (Namysłowska, Heitzman, and Siewierska, 2009 Czerederecka 2010; Zielona-Jenek, 2012) as insufficiently proven by scientific research and therefore it is not included in the classification of diseases and disorders. However, it should be emphasised that the criticism of the PAS syndrome mainly concerns the imprecision and common language in the diagnosis and the lack of nosological status of the syndrome, whilst the problem of alienation itself is not questioned (Grzegorzewska, Pisula, Borkowska, 2017). There is no doubt, however, that the child's

involvement in the fight of parents for the so-called primary custody and elimination of the second parent from it entails high emotional costs for children and is a significant disturbance of their bond with their parent. Conflicts between parents or just a lack of understanding between them increases the child's feeling of danger (the child ceases to feel that the parent will ensure security to them) and generates the so-called conflict of loyalty (the child feels that it has to hide from his parent information about its relationship with the other parent). It is not uncommon for children to take over the role of the guardian of one of the parents who they consider to be the aggrieved or weaker – the phenomenon of parentification. They are often uncertain about which information and feelings they can and cannot share with each parent. Such uncertainty can lead to hiding difficult feelings, problems, and thoughts that need to be discussed with the adult. However, the child does not reach for the parent's help, because it is not certain if this can and will not lead to another conflict. The child tries to cope by itself, which it often cannot do. The likely consequences of parental alienation syndrome are difficulties in building intimate relationships, life-long identity problems, mental illness, emotional problems, and sexual disorders in adulthood.

4. Consequences of disturbed bonds for mental health and functioning

Based on the analysis of the attachment styles developed during childhood, Bartholomew and Horowitz (Cierpiałkowska, 2013; Cierpiałkowska, Górska, 2017) have noticed that during adolescence, and later in adulthood - one can notice specific personality traits as a consequence of specific relationships with parents in the early years of life. Creating a bond based on the feeling of trust and security, or in the absence of them, has led to distinguishing four patterns of attachment, described on two dimensions: dependence/avoidance and positive/negative, which in turn lead to the emergence of specific personality traits. They identified the following patterns:

- trusting – associated with a positive image of oneself and others, as well as with a low level of dependence and avoidance;
- preoccupied – characteristic to people with a negative self-image and a positive image of others, showing high dependence and a low level of avoidance;
- rejecting – observed in people with a positive self-image, and negative in others, with a low level of dependence and high avoidance;
- anxious – associated with a negative image of oneself and others, a high intensity of dependence with a high level of avoidance at the same time (Cierpiałkowska, 2013).

Disturbed patterns of attachment occurring in childhood can be preserved in the form of internal operational models, which in adulthood will become a source of the feeling of threat, anger, anxiety, and fear (Cierpiałkowska, 2013). The readiness to experience them is in turn conducive to the development of many mental disorders – especially personality disorders and anxiety disorders. Bearing in mind the above findings regarding the concept of attachment models in adulthood, Lydon and Sherry (Cierpiałkowska, Górska, 2017) have identified the sources of development of individual types of personality disorders in terms of intrapsychic, insecure attachment models.

In-depth research conducted by Lydon and Sherry (Cierpiałkowska, Górska, 2017) has shown, however, that some types of personality disorders coexist with more than one attachment pattern, e.g., borderline type turned out to be associated not only with a disorganised attachment style but also with anxiety-absorbed style. Apart from these additional and significant factors for the development of personality disorders, which

changed dependencies indicated in tab. 4 were, for example, addictions. Undoubtedly, however, the lack of a secure bond during childhood significantly influences the development of disturbed features of functioning and feeling.

The concept of attachment is also an attempt to explain depressive disorders in adults (in dynamic terms). According to Thompson (Cierpiałkowska, 2013), the anxiety style of attachment characterised by the fear of loneliness and helplessness in difficult situations gives predispositions to the occurrence of affective disorders. The author showed that shame, low self-esteem, and a tendency to worry and self-blame occur in people with an anxious and avoiding attachment style (Sęk, 2016). Other psychoanalytical concepts also explain depression and manic-depressive disorders with the circumstances of object loss in ego development disorders in the course of object relations in the early stages of development.

5. SUMMARY

The type of bond built up in early childhood is relatively stable over time but may change as the child's relationship with the primary caregiver becomes more closely aligned with or mismatched with his needs. The formed attachment style, which is an internal operational model of bonds, affects the psychosocial development of the child and adolescent, their ability to regulate emotions, the ability to get to know themselves and explore the world, as well as the ability to maintain interpersonal relationships and deal with difficult situations.

REFERENCES

- Bee, H. (2004). *Psychologia rozwoju człowieka [Psychology of Human Development]*. Poznań: Zysk i S-ka.
- Bowlby, J. (2007). *Przywiązanie [Attachment]*. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN.
- Brzezińska, A. (2000). *Spółeczna psychologia rozwoju [Social Psychology of Development]*. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar.
- Cierpiałkowska, L. (2013). *Psychopatologia [Psychopathology]*. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar.
- Cierpiałkowska, L., Górska, D. (2017). *Psychologia zaburzeń osobowości [Psychology of Personality Disorders]* [In:] Cierpiałkowska, L., Sęk, H., ed., *Psychologia kliniczna. [Clinical Psychology]*. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, p. 281–304.
- Cholewa, K., Krzywicka, L., Jadczyk-Szumilo, T. (2008). *Przywiązanie [Attachment]*. Unpublished workshops materials for foster families.
- Czerederecka, A. (2010). *Potrzeba profesjonalnej dyskusji na temat PAS [The Need of Professional Discussion on PAS]*. "Psychiatria Polska" [Polish Psychiatry], No 44, 1.
- Grzegorzewska, I., Cierpiałkowska L. (2020). *Psychopatologia rozwojowa [Development Psychopathology]*. *Integrujące podejście do zdrowia i zaburzeń dzieci i młodzieży. [Integrating Approach to Health and Disorders in Children and Adolescents]* [In:] Grzegorzewska, I., Cierpiałkowska, L., Borkowska, A., ed., *Psychologia kliniczna dzieci i młodzieży [Clinical Psychology of Children and Adolescents]*. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, p. 137–164.
- Grzegorzewska, I., Pisula, E., Borkowska, A. R. (2017). *Psychologia kliniczna dzieci i młodzieży [Clinical Psychology of Children and Adolescents]* [In:] Cierpiałkowska, L., Sęk, H., ed.,

- Psychologia kliniczna [Clinical Psychology]*. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, p. 451–498.
http://www.teczaserc.pl/files/98_Zesp%C3%B3%C5%82%20zaburzenia%20wi%C4%99zi.pdf
[Access: 20.06.2020].
- Namysłowska, I. (2015). *Psychiatria dzieci i młodzieży [Child and Adolescent Psychiatry]*. Warszawa: PZWL.
- Namysłowska, I., Heitzman, J., Siewierska, A. (2009). *Zespół Gardnera – zespół oddzielenia od drugoplanowego opiekuna (PAS). Rozpoznanie czy rzeczywistość rodzinna? [Garnder's Syndrome – Alienation from the Secondary Parent Syndrome (PAS) Diagnosis or a Family Reality?]*. „*Psychiatria Polska*” [Polish Psychiatry] No. 1(43).
- Oatley, K., Jenkins, J. (2003). *Zrozumieć emocje [Understanding Emotions]*. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN.
- Rajewska-Rynkowska, K. (2005). *Przywiązanie i trauma a psychopatologia [Attachment and Trauma and Psychopathology]* [In:] Cierpiałkowska, L., Gościniak, J., ed., *Współczesna psychoanaliza: Modele konfliktu i deficytu [Contemporary Psychoanalysis: Models of Conflict and Deficit]*. Poznań: Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu, p. 223–246.
- Pużyński, S., Wciórka, J. (2007). *Klasyfikacja zaburzeń psychicznych i zaburzeń zachowania w ICD-10. Opisy kliniczne i wskazówki diagnostyczne [Clinical Classification of Mental Disorders and Behaviour Disorders in ICD-10. Clinical Descriptions and Diagnostics Indications]*. Kraków: Vesalius.
- Sęk, H. (2016). *Psychologia zaburzeń osobowości [Psychology of Personality Disorders]*, [In:] Cierpiałkowska, L., Sęk, H., ed., *Psychologia kliniczna. [Clinical Psychology]*, Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, p. 347–263.
- Zielona-Jenek, M. (2012). *Przesłuchanie małoletnich świadków [Questioning of Minors]*. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN.

DOI: 10.7862/rz.2021.hss.21

The text was submitted to the editorial office: June 2021.

The text was accepted for publication: September 2021.

Adrian MRÓZ¹

THE “WORK” OF ART: STANISŁAW BRZozowski AND BERNARD STIEGLER

This article relates the ideas of Stanisław Brzozowski (1878–1911) with those of Bernard Stiegler (1952–2020), both of whom problematize the “work” of art understood as a labor practice. Through the conceptual analysis of epigenetics and epiphylogenetics for aesthetic theory, I claim that both thinkers develop practical concepts relevant to contemporary art philosophy. First, I present an overview of Brzozowski’s aesthetics, for whom literature and the arts are linked with ethics, and aesthetic form is tied with moral judgment. Then, I continue with an outline of Stiegler’s, for whom the role of artists is to sculpt a new culture and historical epoch called the Neganthropocene. Finally, the notion of “work” as a type of memory practice is analyzed. The comparison shows that Stiegler develops epigenetics phenomenologically via memory (“tertiary retentions”) and phylogenetics to epiphylogenetics. Both philosophers argue against determinism. This study suggests that their key ideas advance and complement each other.

Keywords: art, work, Bernard Stiegler, Stanisław Brzozowski, aesthetics, Marxism.

1. INTRODUCTION

This essay² is a conceptual analysis of the socio-economic and equivocal notion of “work” present in the thought of two significant philosophers and within the philosophy of art. In response to a call for submissions for a congress on Polish philosophy, this essay aims to develop some idiosyncratic elements of Brzozowski’s reflections, rooted in Polish intellectual and cultural heritage in search of the originality of Polish philosophy. Moreover, if the universality of thought is to be scrutinized, it would probably be best to compare the reflections of at least two philosophers from different cultures. It is common knowledge that travel is an excellent way to change one’s immediate surroundings and modify one’s exposition to the complex conditions of social-cultural cognition, such as heuristics, behavioral programs, and patterns, or traditions (Wojciszke, 2019). Metaphorically speaking, this essay travels in time, from the early 20th century to the 21st century, and across cultures, from Poland to France and back again.

¹ Adrian Mróz, M.A., Department of Aesthetics at the Institute of Philosophy of the Jagiellonian University in Kraków, 52 Grodzka St., 31-044 Kraków; e-mail: adrian@doctoral.uj.edu.pl. ORCID: 0000-0001-6813-7490.

² This essay was presented remotely at the First Congress of Polish Philosophy organized by the University of Opole and held on September 25–26, 2020 at the renovated palace in Orla, Krotoszyn County, and digitally via Korbank teleconference systems.

There may be an objection that this comparison is anachronistic, but it should be noted that philosophers – despite living in different times – universally search for truths that transcend their epochal conditions. For instance, contemporary philosophers still find inspiration in the two-thousand-year-old writings of their predecessors, such as Plato and Aristotle. In addition, from the perspective of evolution, humans’ biological, cognitive faculties could not have significantly changed within a century. However, their technologies of “extended cognition” (Clark & Chalmers, 1998) have, which is a point I will return to later. In other words, the epochal³ situation is not irrelevant. So, to study Polish philosophical thought, I have selected one feature that both philosophers share as a point of reference. They belong to what we could call the present epoch that has been shaped in some respect by the Industrial Revolution, which provided the grounds for Marxism to take root in Europe (Hobsbawm, 2013). Consequently, both authors have been selected due to their similarity in this regard. The two continental thinkers will be read with and against each other to identify universalities and their cultural similarities and differences.

The two philosophers selected for analysis are Stanisław Brzozowski (1878–1911) and Bernard Stiegler (1952–2020). This selection is motivated by the fact that both thinkers share similarities despite their chronological and cultural separation. Both thinkers analyzed in this essay write about labor practices within the framework of the philosophy of art, where special attention is given to the notion of “work”, understood as both artwork (product) and labor (process). Brzozowski’s core idea is based on the concept of a socially engaged intellectual or artist. Culture constitutes work, and work constitutes culture.

Brzozowski argued that literature and the arts were linked with ethics, where aesthetic form concerns moral judgment (Stanisław Brzozowski, 2010). Likewise, Stiegler’s core idea is based on the problem of individuation and the concept of the work [*œuvre*] (as distinguished from employment or use) of art as a social sculpture, which he developed while analyzing the practice of the German artist Joseph Beuys (Fitzpatrick, 2014; Stiegler, 2017b; 2017a; 2017c). His 2018 lecture at the Work Marathon is especially noteworthy⁴.

³ This term should be understood as both *ἐποχή* and time. According to Stiegler the latter is constituted by technics, especially novel inventions that disorder, shock, and suspend cultural norms and practices. Phenomenologically, the notion of *epoché*, “*epokhē*”, or a detachment is reconsidered in light of the phenomenon of retention. When it comes to the discipline of aesthetics, revolutions in the technologies adopted by artists disrupt shared thinking, i.e. feeling and being—what had been previously “retained” by traditions and practices, which are materialized in the tools and instruments of art, called “tertiary retentions”. Furthermore, psycho-social individuation is negatively affected by alienation brought about via innovation or technology that has not been properly socialized. During the absence of a re-constituted epoch, this break results in one undergoing “symbolic misery” and a feeling of hopelessness or no common future, which all lead to transgression or acting out. These “epochal” shocks require cultural programs of “therapy”, which are “thoughtful” practices of rational care that reintegrate disruptive technics within ethnic tradition through inter- and intra-generational processes of individuation, shaping a contributively shared vision of a desired future of the affected society, thus re-constituting an epoch. (Stiegler, 1998a; 1998b; 2011; 2014a; 2015; 2019).

⁴ The Work Marathon – an international bringing-together of artists, sociologists, anthropologists, writers, musicians, architects, scientists and philosophers – was held on September 22, 2018 at the Serpentine Galleries in London of the United Kingdom. That is where swiss art curator Hans Ulrich Obrist and Stiegler initiated debate on the future of work in the 21st century. A distinction should be noted: “work” [gr. *ἔργον, ὄργανον*] is understood as the creation and continuous renewal of knowledge. It is not equal to “employment” (a use, which could be mindless and nonreflective), nor

Besides that, Stiegler argues, particularly in *Symbolic Misery*, that the separation of politics from aesthetics (understood broadly as *αἴσθησις*) is a catastrophe (Stiegler, 2014a; 2015). For him, the role of artists is to sculpt a new culture and historical epoch, which he envisions as “The Neganthropocene” (Stiegler, 2018). Stiegler’s philosophy consists of the politicization of phenomenology and the anthropogenic importance of the default [*défaut*], understood existentially as a type of inadequacy, and advances the significance of failure and absence (Stiegler, 1998a; 1998b; 2011). In addition, both philosophers apply the notion of historic epigenetics, where Stiegler expands the notion to include memory (tertiary retentions) in terms of phylogenetics (what he calls “epiphylogenetics”). Both argue against determinism (Stanisław Brzozowski, 1910a; 1910b; Stiegler, 1998b).

First, I present a sketch of the philosophy of art of Brzozowski. I follow this with an overview of the aesthetics of Stiegler. I then claim that the writing of both philosophers advances each other’s philosophies in a valuable way. I briefly compare Brzozowski’s epigenetic theory of history and Stieglerian “epiphylogenetics” in *Technics and Time*. After that, I argue that much of the Polish thinker’s key ideas advance and complement the philosophy developed by Stiegler, whose ideas, in turn, advance Brzozowski’s thinking. What makes Polish philosophy distinct in this regard is that we can see that Brzozowski was “ahead of his time,” so to speak.

2. A BRIEF OUTLINE OF STANISŁAW BRZozowski’S AESTHETICS

As Tadeusz Szkołut asserts, one of Brzozowski’s aims was to advance Polish culture through the development of philosophical and humanistic thought, which hopefully would produce a national culture that could face the main problems that arise out of modernity (Szkołut, 2008). At the same time, Brzozowski’s controversial intellectual activity was not contained by strict disciplinary boundaries; instead, he wrote inter-disciplinarily. The Polish thinker connected and used various perspectives – whose separation was treated as relative and disputable – such as the philosophy of culture, poetry, literature, theater, art criticism, sociology, and political journalism. He viewed culture, which served the demands of Life in a broad sense, as an organic formation and art as the nucleus of the historical and social phenomena that constitute an axiological culture.

During the early 20th century, he noticed that the main problem with modernity lies in the expansion of a “historical sense” and post-romantic individualism, which paradoxically erodes personality and undermines individuality itself. Individualism refers to a person having strong, clearly defined convictions which condition their fitness (and will) to act (Stanisław Brzozowski, 2007). However, this same “historical sense” also is essential for artistic creation and involves empathy or the ability to feel what the Other feels. In his works *Głosy wśród nocy* [Voices in the Night] and *Sztuka i społeczeństwo* [Art and Society], he maintains that the emergence of a *psyche* (or I) is mutually conditioned by the social. The optimal conditions that cultivate a rich personality are beneficially allied with diverse, abundant, and intensive living relationships between autonomous individuals who compose a sentient and self-conscious culture. In its own best interest, society should take care of ensuring an individual’s freedom to act (operate, put in the effort, take measures, in other words: work), thereby fostering their spirit and creative potential. Of course, we all belong

labor and toil [gr. *πóνος*]. See: (Serpentine Galleries, 2018; *Work Marathon* / *Serpentine Galleries*, 2018).

to many social circles, affecting one's worldview and behaviors. This belonging is why the ability to empathize with others and tune into their different psyches without losing one's sense of self is crucial for pursuing a shared future. Dissolving one's own identity – as the power of making decisive choices concerning worldview and values – into an externality then results in a grave paralysis of creative potential.

Moreover, Brzozowski distinguishes *artistic truth*, defined by authenticity, which is treated as a moral value and protects personality from *artistry*, conceived of as the persistent and socially detached post-romantic pursuit of new ways of expression. Art, a psychosocial phenomenon, must invent remedies in the struggle against artistry, against modernistic nihilism, which are expressions of generational pessimism and feelings of exhaustion. Szkołut affirms that for Brzozowski, art is not an end in itself; the fundamental goals of art lay outside art in the realm of social and cultural reality. In terms of motivation, this reality is the only “absolute” reference point available to a person within which they can exercise their creative powers: it is necessary to believe in something outside art in order not to be imbibed by art, but instead be its master; it is necessary to aspire to something beyond art in order to resist art (Szkolut, 2008).

More importantly, Brzozowski treats artwork as *work*. Artistic creation is a form of labor that exercises freedom and which spontaneously develops and invents itself. It is constituted in effort and overcoming resistance, which takes time, multiple failures, false starts, torment, anguish, and bitterness. The primary goals of art appear in the *artist's spirit*, but the far-reaching ends of art, the *effects* of artwork, and the creative process are to be situated in the social sphere. The creation of an artwork is the construction of a new world within which the experience of freedom reigns. This experience liberates the artist's desires and aspirations, which generally are inhibited in social reality. As an expression of spirit, the work involved in making art enhances personality by emancipating drives and desires that *work on society*. In other words, art's remedial function unifies the individual and the social, anticipating a different social future for all parties involved in the *work* of art. Art is a discipline of shared *spiritual* freedom for everyone.

Brzozowski claims that the standard measure of all values is the quality of the act aroused by them. He develops the notion of an activist individuality. This notion is tinged with an optimistic belief in the possibility of transforming the world to make a place for authentic freedom in the creative act. What is at stake is creating a framework for developing an integrated, strong personality capable of fulfilling intangible activity. The future culture should be an integral one, in which every person's freedom to fulfill themselves in the creative act completely constitutes an inalienable right. The arts, supported by art criticism, contribute to establishing an environment conducive to the proliferation of the values of liberty, activity, and creativity. It is a form of organizing the consciousness of the arts.

3. A SKETCH OF THE AESTHETICS OF BERNARD STIEGLER

The following sketch is written in comparison and contrast to the previous one. The philosophy of art of the continental philosopher Bernard Stiegler is also situated within a wide-ranging politicized inter-disciplinary approach that draws on phenomenology, existentialism, deconstruction, post-structuralism, critical theory, and anti-consumerism, media theory, Marxism, psychoanalysis, anthropology, and classical Greek philosophy. His *opus magnum*, three published volumes with the main title *Technics and Time* (with several

unpublished volumes), are works that analyze the notion of *τέχνη* in-depth and lay the foundation for the critique of the financial politicization of *αἰσθησις* (understood broadly as sensibility: feeling and sensory perception), especially within the context of industrialization and deliberations on technological advancements. Subsequently, Stiegler claims that “aesthetic war” is waged against the “oeuvre”⁵ of aesthetic experience in general since the symbolic follows the hegemonic rules of the market and industrial development, which is criticized for aesthetic conditioning. As a digression, Annie Le Brun’s notion of “globalist realism”⁶ complements this understanding well (Le Brun, 2018). Le Brun argues that a catastrophic war is indeed being waged on that “which is priceless,” such as beauty, sleep, boredom, the ability to think for oneself, and all other valuable aspects of life, which make life worth living and escape what she describes as the wasteful short-sighted violence of financialization (Velthuis & Coslor, 2012). Nonetheless, further comprehensive analysis on aesthetics by Stiegler can be found in the two volumes of *Symbolic Misery*, where he discusses the works of Alain Resnais, Bertrand Bonello, Andy Warhol, and Joseph Beuys. Additional texts on the philosophy of art can be found scattered throughout his *corpus*, such as in an issue by the journal *Boundary 2*, titled “Bernard Stiegler: Amateur Philosophy”.

One of Stiegler’s aims is to elevate the value of the *spirit* [*esprit*] (Stiegler, 2014b) or de-proletarianize contemporary industrial consciousness. Through the association *Ars Industrialis*⁷ he worked to create a new economic model rooted in contribution. Through the organization *Internation*⁸, he aimed to cultivate the becoming of what is called the Neganthropocene. This new culture now faces problems that arise out of globalization, climate change, and neoliberalism. However, Stiegler argues that culture is technics. Technics is problematized as a method of pursuing the demands of life through ways foreign to life. He develops this thinking in terms of negentropy and anti-entropy. Art is studied within the framework of a methodology Stiegler coined as General Organology. This term borrows from the practices of musicology but generalizes to include all instruments of humanity. General Organology analyzes the mutual relationship between a triad of organs: biological organs, artificial organs, and social organizations. He applies this method to the

⁵ Understood as both the *work* of art – as an intermittent struggle, activity, and labor or birthing – and an *opening* – singularity and indeterminacy.

⁶ This term alludes to Socialist Realism as developed by the Soviet Union. However, the major difference in the contemporary case consists in the fact that artistic depictions or representations of globalist ideals are not important at all. What is important is that processes of producing contemporary art perfectly aligned with the desensitizing processes of the financialization of the world as pursued by neoliberal doctrines, protocols of cynically converging culture and finance. This cynicism involves “a whole ensemble of protocols, behaviors, and postures that authorize a domineering attitude that allows people to advance something and its opposite [at the same time], with the sole aim that nothing should change. This is the official art of globalization; [...] which acts at a deep level to inaugurate a system of servitude that is voluntary, but also involuntary, if not unconscious” (Sugy, 2018).

⁷ <http://www.arsindustrialis.org/>. The group is made up of volunteers dedicated to the development of industrial policy within the scope of technologies of the mind, with the aim of securing personal and communal ways of life. It has been recently renamed to *L’Association des Amis de la Génération Thunberg* (The Association of the Friends of the Thunberg Generation).

⁸ <https://internation.world/>. As of May 2017, *Ars Industrialis* has redefined some of its priorities so as to gain a better understanding of the future of the Anthropocene. This redefinition was based on the idea of the “Internation” laid out by Marcel Mauss for the League of Nations founded on January 10, 1920 in Geneva.

study of art. In this sense, extended cognition can be applied. The human, and its instruments, tools, and inventions, are mutually co-constituted. Consciousness, memory, and its supports are not only limited to the functions and retentions of the brain, but the phenomenological retentions are supplemented by technics, or what he calls tertiary retentions, such as musical notation, the painter's brush, digital networks, and the like.

Moreover, he pursues a genealogy of aesthetics or sensibility, which is an organological study of how an *eye* (to see as a painter) or *ear* (to hear like a musician) constitutes aesthetics in the broad sense (feeling). This genealogy is directly entangled with his notion of epiphylogenetics, which the next section discusses. Culture is understood as cultivation, i.e., education and the production of knowledge. The work of artists is to sculpt society.

The expansion of industrialization has penetrated so many aspects of life that Stiegler describes the current condition as one of hyper-industrialization. Today's main problem lies in the loss of all kinds of knowledge, such as *savoir-vivre*, *savoir-faire*, how to theorize, how to love, etc. He also notices a loss of empathy, rooted in the feeling of not existing, which leads to transgressive cases of acting-out, such as suicide or terrorism. This loss of the sense of living, is a nihilism rooted in the idea of the end of history and the inability to imagine a future. It is also analyzed in terms of the process of individuation. He argues that individuation and (consumerist) individualism are antagonistic. Neoliberal governmental policies deprived the person of their individuation, paradoxically in the name of individuality. Individualism (also called de-individuation) represents a widespread system of equivalence in which everyone and everything is equal; in contrast, individuation involves a philosophy in which nothing is equal. In other words, the individual is singular, incalculable, irreproducible, and not substitutable, as they are not particularized, reproducible, or calculable. The place and role of the individual cannot pre-exist the being of that singularity.

The work of artists is "originally engaged in the question of the sensibility of the other" and one's self as other. For politics, this means that "being together is feeling together" or "sym-pathic." He writes, "art is the *experience* and the *support* of this sensible singularity as an invitation to symbolic activity, to the production and discovery of traces in collective time" (Stiegler, 2014a). Not only does artistic experimentation involve the ability to feel what the Other feels, the amateurs cultivate the emergence of a *psyche* (or I) which is transductively constituted by the communal, or the We, both intra- and inter-generationally. However, the loss of singularity – as a power of individuation – due to a lack of industrial politics of mental/spiritual technologies results in symbolic misery or the inability to form aesthetic attachments to singular objects.

Furthermore, Stiegler distinguishes *aesthetic experience* or *investigation*, a discovery of an-other feeling or future communal sensibility, from *aesthetic conditioning*, which is practiced by drive-based marketing estranged from shared artistic experimentation, where the aesthetic dimension of the individual is conditioned according to the demands of industry for the adoption of the behaviors of consumerism. So, we are living amid Aesthetic War. Each tool, instrument, or other technology is problematized as a pharmakon, an auto-antonym: the conjunction of both a remedy and a poison.

Artists have a very specific "pharmacological" or therapeutic responsibility in an organic (technological) culture. Their political role in aesthetic war is to fight conditioning with associative and participative practices that engage the historical transindividuation of a symbolic milieu. Likewise, art is not an end in itself. Stiegler also talks of artistic work in terms of existential energies. Work (*otium*) is the time of libido, love and passion, captured

and channeled. It is antagonistic to the time of employment, use, or exploitation (*negotium*). The work of art is to initiate a new circle of transindividuation, which leads to a new era. In terms of general organology, “an amateur is a psychological individual whose psychological apparatus is augmented by a critical apparatus and who is organologically equipped with practical knowledge, with an instrument, and with a social apparatus supporting the circuit of transindividuation, which is thereby made possible” (Stiegler, 2017c).

4. FROM EPIGENETICS TO EPIPHYLOGENETICS. ON THE WORK OF ART.

Ever since Aristotle wrote about the embryonic development of organisms, at least two different scientific and philosophical schools debated the concepts of “preformation” and “epigenesis” – a general process responsible for developing a form – and concerning life. From the eighteenth century, “epigenesis was understood as the idea that there was no pre-established organization whereas, with preformationism, the parts were already determined.” (Maienschein, 2017; Nicoglou & Wolfe, 2018). Brzozowski’s text, *An Epigenetic Theory of History* (1907)⁹, analyzes technical and epistemic problems embodied deep within the philosophical notion of the historical “fact,” which he presents in terms of the absolute, insoluble, and rationalizing claim: “it was so” [*tak było*] (Brzozowski, 1910a). In other words, he polemizes with pre-formed, i.e., set, fixed, or static, historical “facts” understood as independent from communal human life. In contrast to what we could describe as the pre-formed theory of history, Brzozowski emphasizes the “epigenetic” sphere of human life that developed over time. This means that the form of human life and its histories are not pre-formed but made. In the language of Stiegler, we could say they are trans-individuated.

History wrought epigenetically consists of the existential-phenomenological selective dimension orientated by the temporal memories of a discursive Being, vividly conceiving “facts” from the dynamic point-of-view cultivated by its epoch. Such facts emerge from the infinite ordeal of trying to *imagine* something about the diverse, epistemically open, collective life, which has passed. Specifically, “events are defined by the person who lives through them, but history demands a consistent and self-sustaining identity of the subject of experiencing” (Brzozowski, 1910a). In other words, the historian’s “facts” are artificial and teleological selections and categorizations of organic, individual and collective, consciousness, i.e., interests and desires (Brzozowski, 1910a). Understanding the *past* requires *effort* and is a form of active struggle. Brzozowski argues that these facts must be grounded in a concrete identity of Will (i.e., through work). Likewise, facts should be grounded in what is defined through their (re)cognition and the consciousnesses defined by their occurrence. So, the historian is tasked with tracing the idea of *work* in the past intermittent continuity of living embodied consciousnesses facing and struggling against the Cosmic Elements, an epistemic awareness of and distinction from Nature¹⁰. Brzozowski argues that this approach liberates history or “facts” from all kinds of conceptualism and ideology to which the pre-formative theory of history alludes. That is to say; he advances the assertion that the belief in determinate *laws* of history and historical materialism are mutually exclusive.

⁹ For an in-depth rhetorical and genealogical analysis of this text, see (Klaman, 2005).

¹⁰ The Idea of Nature consists in experience understood as the work of humanity; the World as the thinkable object of humankind’s technical activity (Brzozowski, 1910a).

Next, I would like to point our attention to the notion of *techne*. Bernard Stiegler argues that philosophy has historically privileged *episteme* and repressed *techne*. However, Brzozowski looks like an exception and comprehends the relationship between *techne* and *episteme*. He writes, “epistemology is the goal-oriented work of humanity, the intentional work of beings for whom life is a struggle and toil, who possess only what they have acquired. The technical, relative point of view must eliminate the absolute, unconditional viewpoint from the theory of knowledge. The objective of such a theory of knowledge is to organize a given branch of knowledge in a more purposeful way. Epistemology is a technique of our knowledge, its technical legislation” (Brzozowski, 1910a).

The manner or techniques in which humans seek regularities in historical research depends on shared views about regularities in Nature (an idea or object of epistemic consciousness). Indeed, history is plotted and marked by the whole of human observations (eyes, ways of seeing) concerning Nature, which means that the questions and categories governing historical research are conceptually co-dependent with the field of Natural Science. Such disciplinary diffraction affects the selective course followed by historical researchers, who perceive – and overlook – “facts” concerning what was and how it was. (*Ibid* 120). History grows and develops as it spreads and complicates the influenced knowledge about “it was so” and the biased “facts” that emerge from the interests and motivated pursuit of discovering natural laws and regularities. When it comes to the perspective from which history can be viewed, an axiological question is raised in terms of the values of our positions with respect to Life (*Ibid* 123).

Stiegler’s philosophy can expand on this idea through the notion of epiphylogenesis or tertiary retention. Technics is subordinate to the demands of Life, but it also provides the conditions that shape the way Life develops. This development is why it is called epiphylogenetic. The flint tool is not inherited phylogenetically through the genome since we do not grow it. The epigenetic expression of genes involved with the neural connections and shape of the muscles formed by cutting is lost when an individual organism dies. So, art is epiphylogenetic because it provides hereditary conditions and information of organic expression that shape the physiological organs through means alien to biological life. In some respect, technics transcend Life and opens future courses of the evolution of the species.

Subsequently, according to Brzozowski, if a point of view is to be recognized as valuable by epistemology, then such a viewpoint must show its worthiness in Life itself, it must withstand the criticism of Life, and it must be a perspective that we inhabit in Life and which helps us to live our lives. According to Brzozowski, the imperative viewpoint of humankind towards the universe is determined by work. Thinking has an existential, vital meaning only insofar as it directs action, insofar as thinking is made real through work. In other words, the valency of *thought* depends on whether it is *put to work*. Brzozowski claims that all other perspectives are arbitrary, random, and volatile. For him, only the point of view as defined by work is necessary. Humanity lives and grows while working. But he fails to emphasize that work has been carried out through various technics: tools, instruments, and inventions, as well as changes and differences in the way work, can be done.

Work is a fundamental and universal value that shapes epistemological categories. Brzozowski describes work as the “true organ” of cognition or knowledge (*Ibid*. 124). The perceptive needs of work (or its aesthetics), natural science models, and historical research influence each other. He claims that the perspective afforded by the experience of working

is what connects the past with the present. The only historical facts that truly matter, what separates *doxa* from *episteme* or illusions from reality, are the ones that have been demarcated by the criteria and demands (as well as means) of a historically *conscious* (in terms of feeling and understanding the needs of) labor, which provides meaning for organized working people throughout time. Stieglerian philosophy enriches this perspective through its opposite: the loss of knowledge caused by labor exploitation or the disorganization of employed de-individuals.

The phenomenological analysis of consciousness is significantly advanced by the category of tertiary retention, which is valuable for re-reading Brzozowski's works on the importance of consciousness in Western culture. In other words, an essential task for modern Polish culture is to develop a philosophical understanding of technics as rooted in the axiology of work in an era of increased automatization and digitalization. Work needs to be understood as different from employment. Work is the relationship in which thought becomes a reality. Brzozowski acknowledges work as a basis of human existence, as the only basis for thoughts and activities, subordinated to values. A person does not come to know existence but instead creates a basis for being through personal work. The world, created by labor, subordinated to work, conquered by technology, is the basis for human livelihood. In science, humans generalize the rules of their work or create mental possibilities for further technological advancements. Stiegler, while drawing on Aristotle, distinguishes between subsistence (survival, vegetation), existence (bestial, drive-based living without spiritual fulfillment), and consistence (the proper mode of being of Humans aided by Ideals, imagination, and the spiritual/symbolic). For Brzozowski, work must become in itself the source of law, science, and art. They must become questions, objects of human awareness. In this way, the notion of the work of art as developed by Brzozowski and re-read with Stiegler advances the concepts of labor in terms of consciousness and future studies. Then we can try to answer the questions: How do we make a person a conscious creator of culture, i.e., work, technology, law, science, art? The creator of themselves?

REFERENCES

- Brzozowski, S. (1910a). *Epigenetyczna teoria historii* [In:] *Idee*. Lwów: Księgarnia Polska B. Połonieckiego, p. 112–139.
- (1910b). *Materyalizm dziejowy jako filozofia kultury* [In:] *Idee*. Lwów: Księgarnia Polska B. Połonieckiego, p. 1–13.
- (2007). *Głosy wśród nocy: Studya nad pozysaniem romantycznej kultury europejskiej* (wyd. 2, krytyczne). Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Krytyki Politycznej.
- (2010). *Wybór pism estetycznych* (T. Szkołut, ed., wyd. 1). Kraków: Universitas.
- Clark, A., Chalmers, D. (1998). *The Extended Mind*. "Analysis", 58(1). DOI: 10.1093/analys/58.1.7
- Fitzpatrick, N. (2014). *Symbolic Misery and Aesthetics – Bernard Stiegler*. "Proceedings of the European Society for Aesthetics", 6.
- Hobsbawm, E. J. (2013). *Jak zmienić świat: Marks i marksizm 1840–2011* (S. Szymański, Trans.). Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Krytyki Politycznej.
- Klaman, J. (2005). "Our Points Of View" in Stanisław Brzozowski's "Epigenetic Theory of History." *Pamiętnik Literacki*, 96(3).
- Le Brun, A. (2018). *Ce qui n'a pas de prix: Beauté, laideur et politique*. Stock.

- Maienschein, J. (2017). Epigenesis and Preformationism [In:] Zalta, E. N., ed., *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Spring 2017). Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Access on the internet: <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2017/entries/epigenesis/>
- Nicoglou, A., Wolfe, C. T. (2018). *Introduction: Sketches of a conceptual history of epigenesis*. "History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences", 40(4), DOI: 10.1007/s40656-018-0230-1.
- Serpentine Galleries. (2018, November 15). *Work Marathon 2018: Bernard Stiegler - Too Late? The Final Warning*. Access on the internet: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EsGVN7UE0pw>
- Stiegler, B. (1998a). *Technics and Time, 1. The Fault of Epimetheus* (G. Collins & R. Beardsworth, Trans.). Stanford University Press.
- (1998b). *Technics and Time, 2. Disorientation* (S. Barker, Trans.). Stanford University Press.
- (2011). *Technics and Time 3: Cinematic Time and the Question of Malaise* (S. Barker, Trans.). Stanford University Press.
- (2014a). *Symbolic Misery, Vol. 1: The Hyperindustrial Epoch* [In:] *Symbolic Misery*. Polity Press. DOI: 10.1353/con.2010.0011,
- (2014b). *The Re-Enchantment of the world: The value of spirit against Industrial Populism* (T. Arthur, Trans.). Bloomsbury.
- (2015). *Symbolic Misery. Vol. 2. The Catastrophe of the Sensible*. Polity Press.
- (2017a). *Kant, Art, and Time* (S. Barker & A. De Boever, Trans.). "Boundary" 2, 44(1). DOI: 10.1215/01903659-3725845.
- (2017b). *The Proletarianization of Sensibility* (A. De Boever, Trans.). "Boundary" 2, 44(1). DOI: 10.1215/01903659-3725833.
- (2017c). *The Quarrel of the Amateurs* (R. Hughes, Trans.). "Boundary" 2, 44(1). DOI: 10.1215/01903659-3725857.
- (2018). *The Neganthropocene*. Open Humanities Press.
- (2019). *The Age of Disruption: Technology and Madness in Computational Capitalism*. Polity Press.
- Sugy, P. (2018, June 30). *Annie Le Brun: «L'art contemporain, c'est l'enlaidissement du monde!»*. Le Figaro.fr. Access on the internet: <https://www.lefigaro.fr/vox/culture/2018/06/30/31006-20180630ARTFIG00066-annie-le-brun-l-art-contemporain-c-est-l-enlaidissement-du-monde.php>
- Szkołut, T. (2008). *Estetyka Stanisława Brzozowskiego* [In:] Wilkoszewska, K., ed., *Wybór pism estetycznych*. Kraków: Universitas.
- Velthuis, O., Coslor, E. (2012). *The Financialization of Art*. Oxford University Press. DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199590162.013.0025.
- Wojciszke, B. (2019). *Psychologia społeczna*. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar.
- Work Marathon | Serpentine Galleries* (2018). Access on the internet: <https://www.serpentinegalleries.org/exhibitions-events/work-marathon>

DOI: 10.7862/rz.2021.hss.22

The text was submitted to the editorial office: December 2020.

The text was accepted for publication: September 2021.

Beata PETRECKA¹

SELECTED THEORETICAL CONCEPTS OF THE SOCIAL ELITE

This paper deals with issues related to theoretical concepts of the elite. The concept of the elite emphasizes the hierarchical nature of the diversity of society and the importance of dividing societies into two groups: the ruling elite and the ruled masses. By elite, one generally means a social stratum, a social group, or a category of people that are perceived to be superior in some respect to the rest of the social whole. The issue of the elite is extremely interesting for many researchers, as it is related to the question of who has real influence in the political and social life of the country. The present paper systematizes the concepts of the elite and presents an essential definition. For this purpose, a comparative method was applied. A full understanding of the mechanisms of distinguishing elites in society will allow people who really influence the lives of citizens to be identified.

Keywords: social elite, the ruling class, elite theory.

The term "elite" derives from the French *élite* (*choice, delicious*) and Latin *eligere* (*making a choice*). This source indicates that the elite are selected from among a certain group of people, individuals particularly skilled in the highest abilities in their field of activity (Antoszewski, Herbut, 2004).

This concept has changed its meaning over the years. Originally, the elite referred to material value, selected military units, as well as the highest social strata of "well-born people". Only at the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries this term was associated with social sciences, and it was then that the elite began to be defined as "a group of people distinguished or privileged in relation to the rest of society due to having certain qualities or goods valued socially" (Pawłowska, 1998) The term elite quoted above, although referred to in sociological and political science literature, is rather associated with colloquial language. The professional term used by science defines the elite as "leadership groups that stand out among the masses of people of a given society, from among which these groups are selected through various social selections, such as competitions, elections, plebiscites and the like" (Sztumski, 2003).

In the literature on the subject there are many definitions and theoretical approaches to elites. One can notice that despite many discrepancies, the elite is always a minority and stands out from the rest of society. The theoretical foundation in the theory of elitism is the view that any form of political social organization determines the hierarchy of its structure.

¹ Beata Petrecka, PhD, State Higher School of Technology and Economics in Jarosław, Institute of International Relations, Department of Administration; e-mail; beatapetrecka@interia.pl. ORCID: 0000-0002-0671-7446.

Its shape is most often compared to a geometric figure of a triangle or a pyramid, and the minority that forms the apex or the peak of such a structure is more politically empowered than the majority that forms its base. Such a situation always implies a division into the elite and the masses. From this point of view, each society has its own elites, regardless of the forms of class-layer divisions existing within it (Nocoń, 2004).

The theoretical concepts of elites in literature are described in various ways. The dominant trend is to present the concept from a historical perspective. In Polish literature, M. Stefaniuk in *The Teoria elit by Vilfred Paret* (Stefaniuk, 2001) makes a holistic review of the theory of the elite, and shows that already in ancient times pioneering elitist doctrines can be found.

The second approach to present the theory of the elite is the division into the classical, conflicting and functional interpretation of the elite. Gaetano Moska and Vilfredo Pareto are believed to be the founders of the classical theory of elites. The very concept of the elite was introduced into sociology by Pareto. Moska believed that the term elite brought with it an evaluative element unnecessary in science, which is why in his works he used the term ruling class or political coffers (Pawłowska, 1998). He also claimed that

in all societies, from the least developed, which have not yet developed the threshold of civilization, to the most developed and powerful ones, two classes of people appear: the ruling class and the class which is ruled. The first of these classes, the less numerous, always performs all political functions, monopolizes power and enjoys the benefits that power brings, while the second, more numerous, is directed and controlled by the first in a more or less lawful, less legal way, or more arbitrary and brutal. It is the class which provides the former, at least seemingly, with material livelihoods and instruments conditioning the vitality of the entire political organism (Żyromski 1996).

As Moska continues, "individuals making up the ruling class are distinguished from the ruled mass by having certain features that give them a certain material, intellectual or moral superiority" (Żyromski 1996). These qualities include bravery, wealth and origin, and personal abilities.

V. Pareto divided society into two strata: lower (non-elite) and higher (elite). He, in turn, divided the elite into the ruling elite and the non-ruling elite. He included people who achieve the highest indicators in a given field (Pawłowska 1998). He called the elite those who directly or indirectly play a role in ruling (Stefaniuk, 2001). Belonging to the elite also depended on having individual features, i.e. residuals that were not equally distributed in society and of varying intensity. The residuals mentioned by Pareto include, among others, showing feelings through external actions and the integrity of an individual with what is subject to them.

Pareto argued that

the ruling class employs people of the ruled class to maintain its power. The ruled class can be divided into two categories that correspond to the two principal means of exercising power. The first category consists of soldiers, police officers, mercenary thugs – in the old days; the second category uses cleverness and consists of it from the Roman times to the present day, the clientele of politicians (Pawłowska, 1998).

A. Pawłowska, when comparing the theories of Paret and Mosca, lists common features of these theories. One of them is to emphasize that the elite is not a detached enclave from society. The relationship between society and the elite is mediated by a sub-elite made up of middle-class members. The sub-elite provides the elite with new members, and is also a condition for its stabilization (Pawłowska, 1998).

The conflicting theories of the elites are based on the belief that the interests of the elite and the rest of society are opposing, and that the masses cannot control the elite. The very fact of the existence of elites is a source of social conflict as it is an expression of depriving the rest of society of values that are important to it. The conflict takes place both on the material and axiological levels, while the masses prefer the implementation of egalitarian values, the elites implement anti-egalitarian values (Pawłowska, 1998).

Representatives of the conflict's interpretation of the elite included Robert Michels, James Burnham and Charles W. Mills, among others.

R. Michels interpreted history as a series of rivalries between new and old elites. For Michels, the constant struggles between aristocracy and democracy were the struggles of the old minority, which tried to defend its rule against a new and greedy minority that wanted to mix with the old minority or even get rid of it. Any class changes that take place are merely a substitution of a ruling minority over another. The position of the elite is ensured by the organization that gives rise to the dominance of the elect over the elect over the represented (Szczupaczyński, 1995). According to Michels, organizations are oligarchies, so they will be the owners of power and will pursue their goals under the guise of equality (Stefaniuk, 2001).

J. Burnham sees the elite in the group of managers, and claims that the capitalist system is in decline and with the scattered ownership of the means of production and the inability to control the economy by numerous owners, it will be politically and economically dominated by this group. The complexity of economic management issues requires specialist knowledge and experience that only this social group may have. Thus, the resulting managerial elite is, in Burnham's interpretation, an elite distinguished on the basis of relatively rare skills in managing the means of production. Thanks to these exclusive qualities, the managerial class controls not only the market, but also the sphere of politics, placing its people in strategic positions and thus creating the power elite (Pawłowska, 1998).

C. W. Mills showed that the ruling elite consisted of people who held positions that enabled them to rise above the ordinary environment of ordinary people. This enabled them to make decisions with great consequences. Whether or not they made such decisions was less important than the mere fact that they occupied these key positions. The determinant of belonging to the power elite were institutional affiliations and without them it would not be possible to make significant decisions on a national scale (Mills, 1961).

The elites, according to Mills, are concentrated around three types of economic, political and military institutions. At the very tops of these institutions, prestige and power accumulate. The political elite is not only a group with an ability to make decisions, it is also a social class at the top of the social hierarchy. In addition, there are social and professional ties, often family ties, and above all common interests (Pawłowska, 1998).

Functional elite theories refer to the basic assumptions of functionalism, which, among various theoretical and methodological paradigms used in political science, created one of the well-established visions of the political world (Szacki, 2003). In general, the purpose of

analytical papers in this trend is primarily to study individual segments of the social system in terms of their impact on the satisfaction of the needs of the entire system, as well as to determine the functions of individual elements of the social structure.

Society in functional terms is an integrated unity based on a catalog of universal needs of individuals and groups that make up it. A structure is formed in society, whose elements are functionally oriented towards meeting the needs and maintaining the stability of a given structure. As a consequence, the functions performed by individual elements of the social structure are positive components of the system and, as such, are necessary for its existence (Wróbel, 1997). The roles and status of individual elements of the structure are functionally determined. From this perspective, functional approaches assume that the elite and social masses are complementary and coherent elements of the political system which, mutually conditioning each other, co-define the nature of tasks performed in the social system. The existence of a political elite is justified by the sphere of its influence, defined as functions. Their implementation is an essential element of the stabilization and development of the social system, not only in its political dimension.

In theory and practice of the elite, functionalists look for elements that stabilize the social structure. From the functionalists' point of view, it is important to find a consensus between the principles of representative democracy and the existence of political elites. Functionalists are generally elitists, i.e. supporters of the view that elites are inalienable in the historical process and their causative nature (Pawłowska, 1998).

Representatives of the functional trend, among others, were Karl Mannheim, Harold Lasswell, John Higley, G. Lowell Field, and Talcott Parsons.

Functionalists, guarding the assumption that the elites are inalienable, focus on the relationship between the needs and interests of social groups and the actions of the elite. It is in this trend that K. Mannheim distinguished the main types of elites, i.e. political, organizational, intellectual, artistic, moral and religious elites. He believed that the main goal of the political elite was to "integrate a great number of political aspirations" (Mannheim, 1974).

H. Lasswell distinguished the elite on the basis of the criterion of access to multiple goods and understood by it those who "receive the most of what is available. The available values can be classified as prestige, security income. Those who receive the most are the elite, the rest are the masses". By the power elite he meant holders of power in a political system (Pawłowska, 1998). Power holders consist of leaders and social formations from which leaders come and to whom they are responsible at a given moment.

T. Parsons applied leadership to people with influence on the basics and behavior of other people. This influence is a consequence of a specific social status and position. From this point of view, leadership can be defined as the functions of political elites, and the political elite performing leadership functions as one of the elements of the system distinguished due to the primary functional significance for society related to its normative subsystem, serving to achieve the goals of the social system (Nocoń, 2004). There is a certain feedback here, the political system has a decisive influence on the shape and structure of the elite, through the nature of institutions and political solutions, while the elite participates in shaping the structure and character of the state organization, social and political forces.

In the concepts of J. Higley and G. L. Field, elites are people who occupy strategic positions in public and private bureaucratic organizations (e.g. in state administration, political parties, production companies, trade unions, mass media, religious and educational

institutions, organized protest groups). When we are interested in the general social elite, we take into account those organizations which, due to their size or otherwise defined importance, enable the people who run them to exert an individual, regular and significant influence on macro-social decisions (Pałeczki, 2007). Political elites dominate in the process of making sovereign decisions, but they are limited in the actions taken by the social majority. In order to push through a particular type of political endeavor, the elite must develop a sufficient degree of public support that is necessary for its implementation. This dependence, in a sense, results in the development of a social consensus (Szczupaczyński, 1993). According to J. Higley and G. L. Field, the elites always need the support of various social groups. To obtain, even minimal, this support must be consistent with the basic and dominant orientation of societies (Halamska, 2001). Higley and Field believe that the elite can be analyzed in two aspects: in terms of the degree of structural integration, i.e. the formal and informal links existing within the elite, and in terms of the agreement on political values, the principles on which political life is organized. Taking these two criteria into account, they developed a typology of political elites:

- Fragmented elites – are characterized by a minimal degree of structural integration and a lack of agreement as to the rules of conducting the political game. As a result, the strict ruling elite is unstable, and is subject to frequent personnel changes, which can even be done by force. This has a disastrous effect on a political system whose functioning is unpredictable.
- Ideologically integrated elites – are characterized by a high degree of structural integration and unlimited agreement as to the principles of the course of political life. They operate on the basis of a broad social movement whose *raison d'être* is the lack of other social movements (due to deliberate elimination). Therefore, the cohesiveness of this movement is achieved thanks to the universal acceptance of a single ideology that defines not only the principles of political life, but also all manifestations of social life. The political system does not allow the existence of opposition groups. Power in the hands of one political group is not subject to succession, although the composition of the elite is changing, the power is still exercised by people from the same ideological circle.
- Normatively integrated elites – are characterized by a high degree of integration. However, there is a high degree of agreement as to the rules of conducting the political game. The political system is characterized by a multitude of political groupings that compete with each other for gaining power, but agree on a certain canon of rules regulating social life – these are the principles of democratism in political life and liberalism in economic life. The rules of power succession are fixed and inviolable (e.g. general elections), which guarantees the stability of the system. The normatively integrated elite is an element that constitutes the democratic order (Szczupaczyński, 1993).

Functional elitism rejects particularism, typical of a conflicting approach to politics or the class model of society. The elites, which are the product of constantly taking place processes of social selection, reflect the aspirations, priorities and development trends of the entire social system (Nocoń, 2004). J. Sztumski emphasizes that "the elites are an emanation of the entire society, not just some class or some social classes" (Sztumski, 2003).

To sum up, it can be stated that in all the approaches presented, most definitions of the concept of elite found in the literature have certain common features. M. Simlat distinguished three of them that make up this concept:

1. Limited population of the elite – the elite is a small group,
2. Members of the elite occupy a high position in the institutional structures of the social and political system,
3. A possibility of elite influence on politics (Simlat, 1997).

Summing up these features, it is possible to quote the concept of the elite, following Szczupaczyński (1995), that the elite is a set of individuals who, thanks to their strategic position in key social organizations, are able to shape decision-making processes on a regular and substantial basis. The elite consists of the main decision makers of the largest and richest in sources political, government, military, professional, economic, communication and cultural organizations and movements.

REFERENCES

- Antoszewski, A., Herbut, R., red. (2004). *Leksykon politologii*. Wrocław.
- Encyklopedia socjologii* (1998). T. I. Warszawa.
- Field, G. L., Higley, J. (1980). *Elitism*, Routledge and Kegan Paul. London.
- Halamska, M. (2001). *Reprodukcja czy wymiana? Przekształcenia lokalnych elit politycznych w Polsce w latach 1990–1998*. Warszawa.
- Mannheim, K. (1974). *Człowiek i społeczeństwo w dobie przebudowy*. Warszawa
- Mills, C. W. (1961). *Elita władzy*. Warszawa.
- Nocoń, J. (2004). *Elity polityczne – studium interpretacji funkcjonalnej*. Toruń.
- Pałecki, K., red. (2007). *Elity polityczne w Polsce*. Toruń.
- Pawłowska, A. (1998). *Władza, elity, biurokracja – studium z socjologii polityki*. Lublin.
- Simlat, M. (1997). *Współczesna amerykańska teoria elit*. „Rocznik Naukowo-Dydaktyczny WSP w Krakowie”. Zeszyt 185. Kraków.
- Stefaniuk, M. (2001). *Teoria elit Vilfreda Pareta*. Lublin.
- Szacki, J. (2003). *Historia myśli socjologicznej*. Warszawa.
- Szczupaczyński, J. (1993). *Elity, demokracja, wybory*. Warszawa.
- Szczupaczyński, J., red. (1995). *Władza i społeczeństwo. Antologia tekstów z zakresu socjologii polityki*. Warszawa.
- Sztumski, J. (2003). *Elity ich miejsce i rola w społeczeństwie*. Katowice–Warszawa.
- Wróbel, S., red. (1997). *Władza polityczna, koncepcje i ujęcia zjawiska*. Katowice.
- Żyromski, M. (1996). *Gaetano Mosca – twórca socjologicznej teorii elity*. Poznań.
- (2007). *Teorie elit a systemy polityczne*. Poznań.

DOI: 10.7862/rz.2021.hss.23

The text was submitted to the editorial office: January 2021.

The text was accepted for publication: September 2021.

Dominika ŠAFROVÁ¹
Pavλίna HEJDUKOVÁ²

COVID-19 PANDEMIC AND THE SHARING ECONOMY

The sharing economy has become an integral part of our lives, being in the areas such as transport, accommodation or others. The current situation caused by the COVID-19 pandemic has had unavoidable effects on the sharing economy. This paper aims to determine the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on the sharing economy based on expert papers, studies, and available data dealing with its current development. The impact that the pandemic will have can be considered an important topic to determine the direction that the sharing economy will take or how the sharing economy could be sustained if the pandemic does not improve soon. The current situation can cause changes and adaptations to individual forms of the sharing economy, as well as the loss of their significance.

Keywords: COVID-19 pandemic, sharing economy.

1. INTRODUCTION

The effects of the ongoing pandemic are a topical issue. The pandemic has affected the economy as a whole; this paper, however, will focus on the sharing economy. Anti-pandemic measures affect business, being the provision of services or other areas. The measures include restricting the movement of people, closing retail trade and closing services. The impacts of individual measures or the effects of people's fears of infection affect sectors of the economy.

The measures to stop the pandemic are accompanied by a slowdown in economic growth. Reasons for this include the closing of borders or decline in financial and industrial markets. Several examples of these measures have already been mentioned, and some countries have closed schools, restaurants, libraries, sports facilities etc. (Kanda and Kivimaa, 2020).

It can be assumed that it will take some time for the world to recover. However, the effects of the pandemic may not only be negative. Here, for example, we can mention the area of tourism, which is related to accommodation provided within a sharing economy. The current situation will bring about a cleansing of the tourism market, and if there is no improvement, only those who will be able to adapt and offer quality services have a chance

¹ Ing. Dominika Šafrová, Department of Finance and Accounting, Faculty of Economics, University of West Bohemia, Univerzitní 8, 301 00 Pilsen; e-mail: dsafrova@kfu.zcu.cz (corresponding author). ORCID: 0000-0003-1694-8528.

² Ing. Pavλίna Hejduková, Ph.D., Department of Finance and Accounting, Faculty of Economics, University of West Bohemia, Univerzitní 8, 301 00 Pilsen; e-mail: pahejdu@kfu.zcu.cz. ORCID: 0000-0003-3387-1198.

to remain. Online communication services can expect an increase in interest. To address a pandemic, it is important to have an overview of the negative and positive impacts for future resolutions. The pandemic has highlighted inequalities and environmental devastation (Česká spořitelna, 2020; Silný, 2020).

This paper deals with the COVID-19 pandemic and the sharing economy. It uses expert papers, studies and available data to analyse the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the sharing economy. The first section introduces the sharing economy, its functioning and the areas in which it operates. The following section is devoted to used materials and methods and defines the objectives of the paper. Furthermore, the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on the sharing economy are determined through content analysis. Subsequently, the paper includes a discussion of the direction that the sharing economy will take. The discussion will take place based on the analytical section. Finally, the findings of the paper are summarized.

2. SHARING ECONOMY

A system of transactions in which technology platforms bring together providers and users for exchange without transferring ownership is called a sharing economy. Within a sharing economy, these are digital platforms that facilitate interaction to gain access to unused assets between providers and consumers, who are either small businesses or normal individuals. Unused assets can include things like free office space, individual skills, extra seats in a vehicle, etc. The development of a sharing economy consists of using the free capacities of assets owned by ordinary individuals and mediating earnings through the use of access instead of ownership (Belk, Eckhardt and Bardhi, 2019; Gerwe, 2020).

The sharing economy is linked to the goals of sustainable development. It provides job opportunities, flexibility, and benefits in the form of alternative solutions to current consumption (e.g. reduction of production). It also affects personal relationships and community bonds, which in turn affects social sustainability. In this way, the sharing economy contributes to decent work and economic growth, sustainable cities and communities and responsible production and consumption (Chen et al., 2021).

The sharing economy has created new opportunities for travel in the form of accommodation via Airbnb, transport via Uber or shared bicycle, etc. Many sectors are related to the sharing economy, and sharing is gaining more attention in the current situation. Within a sharing economy, unused resources are utilized while promoting efficiency, community and sustainability (Hossain, 2020).

Godelnik (2020) mentions the features of a sharing economy in the form of the release of overcapacity and a change in business-to-consumer relations. The sharing economy is based on unused assets and unused capacity. The sharing economy affects whole industries, and specific cases include the effects of Airbnb on hotel markets, the effects of carsharing on car ownership, etc. The sharing economy is seen as a strong trend that will continue into the future.

The sharing economy covers many areas including transport, accommodation or the workforce. Within the field of transport, the company Uber is widely known; in the case of accommodation there is Airbnb and, in the case of the workforce, we can mention TaskRabbit as an example. Forms of the sharing economy are also developing directly in the Czech Republic. An example is Mojechaty, which operates in the accommodation sector (Marek et al., 2017).

The COVID-19 pandemic has affected areas of the sharing economy. Anti-pandemic measures affect the provision or use of services that are provided within a sharing economy, be it accommodation, transport or others. To determine these impacts, the methods and materials that will be used in the paper are defined, including the definition of objectives.

3. MATERIALS AND METHODS

The paper will examine the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on the sharing economy based on its current development. The purpose of this research is to determine the direction that the sharing economy will take or whether it could be sustained if the pandemic situation does not improve soon. As an introduction, the issue of the sharing economy has been described and explained above. The aim of the paper will be achieved via analysis of expert papers, studies and available data dealing with the current development of the sharing economy. The output obtained based on the analysis determines the direction of the sharing economy using the synthesis method. The research is segmented into two sub-aims:

- Determining the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the sharing economy.
- Determining the direction that the sharing economy will take.

In the case of the first aim, the impacts on the providers and their revenues are included. The impacts of a pandemic, both positive and negative, are discussed. In the case of positive ones, it is mostly a matter of adapting the business to the current situation and functioning even during a pandemic, which in some cases results in a creative solution that is likely to affect the future development of the business.

The second considers the role of digital technologies used in business, including the impact of the new technology trend. Specifically, this concerns the effects of the use of digital technologies during the COVID-19 pandemic, which in some situations saved businesses from being completely closed down. The use of digital technologies and the identification of the impacts of a pandemic on the sharing economy help to determine the direction that the sharing economy will take. This finding can be considered important for future research in this area.

As mentioned above, the paper was created using expert papers, studies, etc., which made it possible to gather information about the state of the sharing economy and the impacts that the current situation has on it. The following are specific examples of the studies and expert papers that were used to process the analytical section of the paper. The paper by Krouk and Almeida (2020) focuses on Airbnb in pandemic conditions, specifically analysing the effects of COVID-19 on Airbnb's sustainability. Hossain (2020) examines the effects of the pandemic on providers. Chen et al. (2021) focus on providers within a sharing economy and accounting framework. Gerwe (2020) discusses the sharing economy in connection with the pandemic, and also deals with its future. Deloitte (2020) focuses on the pandemic's effects on consumer behaviour. The study by Raj, Sundararajan and You (2020) examines the implications of access to food delivery platforms, which can have a significant impact on the functioning of restaurants. Ravenelle (2017) focuses on the experience of workers in a sharing economy.

To meet the research goals, it is first necessary to perform a content analysis of the impacts of the pandemic on the sharing economy. It will fulfil the first goal and at the same time provide the basis for determining the direction of the sharing economy.

4. ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACTS OF THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC ON THE SHARING ECONOMY

The measures and hygiene conditions that must be observed because of the ongoing pandemic significantly affect business. To prevent closures, businesses must adapt to the current situation. Digital technologies offer this customization, allowing businesses to continue running. Service providers can be considered the most vulnerable group, as they have to adapt to the current situation. Within the sharing economy, the paper will first focus on Airbnb accommodation providers. Overall, the analysis focuses mainly on accommodation, but other areas are also mentioned. Hosts that provide accommodation as their main activity are a concrete example of this vulnerable category. To satisfy consumers with the advent of the pandemic, Airbnb has begun to refund all money in the event of cancellation for pandemic-related reasons. Accommodation providers via Airbnb are therefore losing income as a result of the current situation. As an example of the aforementioned adaptation, we can mention online experiences concerning cultures and traditions, e.g. cooking classes. Experiences make it possible to get to know places despite measures that restrict the movement of people (Krouk and Almeida, 2020).

It is worth mentioning the company Globe, which has adapted to the current situation. The company operated on a similar principle as Airbnb and, during the pandemic, adapted its services to provide premises for out-of-office work. The company's offer now includes free space for office work (The Economist, 2020).

One problem is the aforementioned limited movement of people, which has caused a significant reduction in the number of people interested in accommodation. In some cases, services have been completely cancelled. Negative effects on accommodation providers have already been mentioned, and there are cases in which hosts can lose all income due to the pandemic. This is a negative impact especially if the host has a mortgage on his/her property. The sharing economy is threatened by the COVID-19 pandemic, especially in the accommodation and transport sectors. However, the effects of the pandemic on the sharing economy can also be positive, especially for food businesses like Uber Eats. In the case of accommodation, long-term rentals for domestic residents should be considered (Hossain, 2020).

Gráf (2021) mentions that since 2017 the Ministry of Finance in the Czech Republic has considered shared accommodation to be a trade business in the area of accommodation services. It has already been mentioned that long- and medium-term rentals should be considered. The pandemic has led to the return of flats to the long- and medium-term rental market, which in the future could lead to accommodation providers more greatly diversifying their portfolios and thinking about which flats to offer for short-term rental and which for long-term rental. The current situation will also have an impact on hotels; in this context, it is necessary to highlight the small hotels most affected by the financial crisis and the rise of Airbnb, as these hotels are mostly located in city centres and have the potential to be converted into apartments.

In their study, Chen et al. (2021) state that the loss of revenue due to the COVID-19 pandemic is causing much greater harm to the service providers mentioned several times above than to the Airbnb platform itself. The sharing economy creates additional jobs for earning extra income, but it has also been used as the main source of income over the course of its development. It is important to be aware of the risks that these platforms pass on to service providers, as they often then lack the programs that are commonly available to

employees. A study looking at the specific case of Australia highlights the need to include service providers in the sharing economy into the social welfare system.

A pandemic does not affect the digital side of the sharing economy; i.e. anti-pandemic measures do not affect online sites. The problem is seen in the limited possibilities of providing and using services that are mediated within digital platforms. Here we can cite the specific example of Airbnb, which is still operating but cannot use accommodation where measures prohibit it. Hygiene measures should also be mentioned. As part of carsharing, one vehicle is used by more than one individual, as is the case with accommodation (Gerwe, 2020).

Deloitte (2020) speaks of an increased risk of infection in shared spaces, which may affect the demand for services within the sharing economy. It assumes that the sharing economy will be the most affected sector of the economy. It focuses on sharing mobility and draws certain conclusions from a survey. Following the end of the pandemic, the survey estimates that the demand for car-sharing and ride-sharing will fall by 30%. The potential can be seen in shared scooters or bikes, where increased use is expected for 15 % of users. Compared to other forms, this is a substantial increase. The main reason for this increase is that users want to avoid the risk of infection in public transport, i.e. for safety reasons. Mobility sharing can therefore be considered endangered, but some forms have the potential to grow as compared to public transport, where a higher risk of infection can be expected.

One of the other most affected areas is the restaurant industry and especially small businesses within it, as large restaurant chains can be assumed to have the financial reserves to survive any difficulties. Restaurants had no choice but to adapt to the current situation and try to continue doing business using digital technologies. Specifically, this is done via the use of food delivery platforms such as the aforementioned Uber Eats, which is a food service provided by Uber (Raj, Sundararajan and You, 2020).

For the field of the restaurant business in the Czech Republic, we can mention Nesněženo, which gives restaurants the opportunity to offer their surplus food. In the current situation, through these options, restaurants receive support. They can offer the surplus through Nesněženo and monetize food that would no longer be used. More than 600 companies have already joined, and the largest expansion can be seen in Prague (Nesněženo.cz, 2021).

However, the question of the relationship between sharing platforms and service providers such as Uber drivers or Airbnb hosts is still up in the air. Instead of employees or workers, they are considered suppliers for lower liability. To prevent the effects of a pandemic, it is important to secure insurance policies, change the status of providers (specifically by bringing it closer to an employment relationship) and, in general, work on security measures (Hossain, 2020).

Hawley (2019) also discusses the issue by mentioning the conditions of workers who have low wages, inappropriate legal employment benefits due to the position of a self-employed person, etc. The Uber platform does not have employees, but customers or driving partners. As a result, they have lower social protection.

Responsibility for employees or independent workers differs between the US and the UK. In the case of independent contractors in the USA, there are no entitlements to unemployment benefits, leave, retirement etc. Workers are considered independent but still adhere to the requirements set by companies, which change over time, and workers are expected to adapt (Ravenelle, 2017).

Table 1. The impacts of COVID-19 on providers and sharing economy platforms

Specific impacts	Loss of income
	Need to adapt
	Loss of interest
	Relationship between sharing platforms and service providers

Source: own (2021).

Table 1 summarizes the results of the analysis, specifically the impacts of the pandemic on the sharing economy, which are discussed in this part of the paper. It forms a simple overview of the impacts for the next section, which discusses the direction in which the sharing economy is heading. The overview is based on the professional papers, studies, and available data used above.

The outputs listed in the table will be summarized. The impacts include a loss of income, which is more likely to affect service providers, especially in cases in which the entire income is lost. The need to adapt stems from measures that affect interest in the services, which may be completely cancelled. In terms of platforms, there is a need to adapt in order to function even in the current situation, such as online experiences or home office spaces. The need for providers to adapt stems from securing income in this time; it is in this context that the return of apartments to the market with long-term and short-term rentals is mentioned. Furthermore, the table includes the impact on the relationships between the platform and the providers that are considered to be suppliers. The COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted the fact that, to prevent its impacts, the relationship should be more of an employee type. The relationship affects responsibility.

The following section focuses on Airbnb in Prague in 2019 and 2020. The data point to the impacts of the pandemic on this form of the sharing economy, specifically to the effects on interest in the service and providers' revenues. Table 2 shows the number of new Airbnb reservations for a stay in Prague. The evolution of the number of reservations shows that the pandemic has indeed affected this form of the sharing economy.

Table 2. Number of new Airbnb reservations in Prague in 2020

Date	6.1.	3.2.	2.3.	6.4.	4.5.	1.6.	15.6.
Number of reservations	8,329	8,071	4,289	1,330	1,246	2,673	4,588

Source: own (2021) based on (Chorá, Nevyhoštěný and Chripák, 2020).

Table 3 presents a comparison of data for 2019 and 2020. AirDNA, whose data is used by Chorá, Nevyhoštěný and Chripák (2020), monitors factors such as supply, demand, occupancy, revenues, average daily rates, and provides expected development in the future, including the current number of booked nights in Prague. The data refer to accommodation via Airbnb and Vrbo.

Table 3. Comparison of revenues, supply and demand

Date	Revenues (CZK)	Supply (number of nights)	Demand (number of reservations)
01.07.2019	70,685,500	60,719	27,595
29.06.2020	18,489,716	43,196	8,361

Source: own (2021) based on (Chorá, Nevyhoštěný and Chripák, 2020).

Table 3 provides an overview of the impacts of the pandemic on revenues, supply and demand. The comparison shows a decrease in revenues by CZK 52,195,784. In the case of supply, there is a decrease of 29%, but in the case of demand, the decrease reaches 70%. Based on the data above, it can be said that there is indeed a decline in income, interest and the need to adapt, especially if the situation does not improve.

5. DISCUSSION ON THE FUTURE DIRECTION OF THE SHARING ECONOMY

The analytical section discusses the current situation of the sharing economy with a focus on the situation of providers. It concludes by summarizing the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on the sharing economy. It also provides specific data that point to the effects of the pandemic. Based on the content analysis, we can claim that the sharing economy can maintain itself despite the pandemic, but certain changes in sharing can be expected, especially if the situation does not improve soon. Vinod and Sharma (2021) point to crises in history when the economy recovered along with new advances in technology and industry. New opportunities can be seen for the economics of sharing in the field of entertainment, for example in the form of providing entertainment equipment.

Digital technologies also influence customer's habits, a specific case being the tourism industry, where people gain access to information and experiences via these technologies (Krouk and Almeida, 2020). Due to digital technologies, some areas of business have the opportunity to function. Based on the above, it can be said that the role of digital technologies used in a business is very important, and this fact can be seen in the case of restaurants, which, thanks to platforms, may have avoided completely closing.

Raj, Sundararajan and You (2020) discuss changing existing businesses in terms of increasing the use of digital technologies. In the case of restaurants mentioned above, it can be assumed that the current situation is best handled by those who use digital technology. Due to the firmly-established digital world, resilience can be expected in the future in similar situations. Digital platforms can provide access to customers and thus influence business opportunities.

The analytical section points out specific examples of adaptation and forms of the sharing economy that have the potential to grow under the current conditions. Attention should be paid to the relationship between providers and platforms highlighted by the pandemic. Hossain (2020) also emphasizes the importance of the relationship between providers and platforms, which should be more like an employment relationship. It is also important to pay attention to hygiene and safety conditions.

The potential of the sharing economy can be seen in many areas, and one of them is in companies. Paajanen (2017) mentions several possibilities for sharing between companies, namely materials, spaces, equipment, knowledge, skills, and transport capacity. Brkljač and

Sudarević (2018) talk about the fact that the sharing economy is based on technologies and innovations, through which efficiency is increased both in consumption and in production. There is also a reduction in costs, waste, etc.

Despite the many negative effects on the sharing economy, we may assume it can be sustained, as there are paths towards adaptation or even development. Some changes can be expected, but the sharing economy has great potential in both the development of digital technologies or in the development of sharing within companies.

6. CONCLUSION

The paper discusses the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on the sharing economy. The first section introduces the sharing economy and used materials and methods. The following is a content analysis of the effects of the pandemic on the sharing economy and a discussion of the direction that the sharing economy will take in the future.

The sharing economy offers many possibilities. Consumers are given access to goods that they cannot own. Providers have the opportunity to receive extra income from their property. The result is the utilization of free capacity in the economy. Competition in the form of the sharing economy leads to higher quality services. As part of the discussion on the direction that the sharing economy will take, other benefits are also mentioned, namely increased efficiency in both consumption and production, cost reduction and waste reduction. Within the definition of a sharing economy, it is mentioned that the sharing economy offers new job opportunities, for example in the field of travel (Marek et al., 2017).

The analytical section summarizes the main impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on the sharing economy with the use of specific examples. These impacts include loss of revenue, need to adapt, loss of interest and the relationship between platforms and providers. In determining the direction of the sharing economy, it is assumed that the sharing economy can be sustained. This section focuses on the role of digital technologies and the potential of the sharing economy.

The paper provides an overview of the sharing economy in the current situation. The discussion on the direction of the sharing economy highlights the importance of digital technologies, which currently facilitate the operation of business and influence consumer behaviour. The COVID-19 pandemic has had rather negative effects on the sharing economy, but it can adapt and, given its benefits and potential (at least in the case of certain companies), can be expected to withstand and continue to develop.

Some changes will likely take place within the sharing economy. The relationship between the platforms and providers highlighted by the pandemic should be more of an employee type. To prevent the effects of a pandemic, insurance policies should also be considered. Also, hygiene and safety conditions will need to be emphasized. Future research could focus on the relationship between providers and sharing platforms, which has been accentuated by the sharing economy, or the role of the sharing economy in Society 4.0.

* * *

This paper was created within the project SGS-2020-026 "Economic and financial transformation in the context of digital society" at the University of West Bohemia, Faculty of Economics.

REFERENCES

- Belk, R. W., Eckhardt, G. M., Bardhi, F. (2019). *Introduction to the Handbook of the Sharing Economy: the paradox of the sharing economy* [In:] Belk, R. W., Eckhardt, G. M., Bardhi, F., *Handbook of the Sharing Economy*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, p. 1–18.
- Brkljač, M., Sudarević, T. (2018). *Sharing economy and “Industry 4.0” as the Business Environment of Millennial Generation – a Marketing Perspective* [In:] Katalinic, B. et al., *Proceedings of the 29th International DAAAM Symposium 2018*. Vienna: DAAAM International, p. 1092–1101. DOI: 10.2507/29th.daaam.proceedings.156.
- Česká spořitelna (2020). *Jaké pozitivní dopady může mít ekonomická krize způsobená koronavirem?* [Access: 18.03.2021]. Access on the internet: <https://www.csas.cz/cs/firmy/articles/jake-pozitivni-dopady-muze-mit-ekonomicka-krize-zpusobena-koronavirem>
- Chen, G., Cheng, M., Edwards, D., Xu, L. (2021). *COVID-19 pandemic exposes the vulnerability of the sharing economy: a novel accounting framework*. “*Journal of Sustainable Tourism*”. DOI: 10.1080/09669582.2020.1868484.
- Chorá, M., Nevyhoštěný J., Chripák, D. (2020). *Velcí hráči ustupují, byty se pronajímají Pražanům. Získali jsme data o pádu Airbnb* [Access: 20.03.2021]. Access on the internet: <https://zpravy.aktualne.cz/ekonomika/airbnb-2020/r~37a5787cc68a11eab0f60cc47ab5f122/>
- Deloitte (2020). *Impact of the COVID-19 crisis on short and medium-term consumer behaviour* [Access: 16.03.2021]. Access on the internet: <https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/de/Documents/consumer-business/Impact%20of%20the%20COVID-19%20crisis%20on%20consumer%20behavior.pdf>
- Gerwe, O. (2020). *Is the Sharing Economy Over?* “*Entrepreneur & Innovation Exchange*”. DOI: 10.32617/505-5e9f356c0d6be
- Godelnik, R. (2020). *The sharing economy dilemma: the response of incumbent firms to the rise of the sharing economy*. “*International Journal of Innovation*”, 8(2). DOI: 10.5585/iji.v8i2.17391.
- Gráf, V. (2021). *Hotely čeká těžká transformace. Václav Gráf o novém normálu v ubytování* [Access: 12.03.2021]. Access on the internet: <https://forbes.cz/hotely-ceka-tezka-transformace-vaclav-graf-o-novem-normalu-v-ubytovani/>
- Hawley, A. J. (2019). *Should Europe regulate labour platforms in the sharing economy?* [In:] Belk, R. W., Eckhardt, G. M., Bardhi, F., *Handbook of the Sharing Economy*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, p. 1–18.
- Hossain, M. (2020). *The effect of the Covid-19 on sharing economy activities*. “*Journal of Cleaner Production*”, 280(1).
- Kanda, W., Kivimaa, P. (2020). *What opportunities could the COVID-19 outbreak offer for sustainability transitions research on electricity and mobility?* “*Energy Research & Social Science*”, 68(2020). DOI: 10.1016/j.erss.2020.101666
- Krouk, R., Almeida, F. (2020). *Exploring the impact of COVID-19 in the sustainability of Airbnb business model*. “*Journal of smart economic growth*”, 5(3).
- Marek, D. et al. (2017). *Sdílená ekonomika: Bohatství bez vlastnictví* [Access: 23.03.2021]. Access on the internet: <https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/cz/Documents/deloitte-analytics/Sdilena-ekonomika.pdf>
- Nesněženo.cz (2021). *Nesněženo* [Access: 16.03.2021]. Access on the internet: Available 15.03.2021 at: <https://nesnezeno.cz/#about>

- Paajanen, S. (2017). *Business-to-Business Resource Sharing* [Access: 17.03.2021]. Access on the internet: https://eppnetwork.com/files/eppn/post/2019/01/7901_7dd68aa9a9a2580ad33419fabe9d1ae3.pdf
- Raj, M., Sundararajan, A., You, C. (2020). *COVID-19 and Digital Resilience: Evidence from Uber Eats* [Access: 13.03.2021]. Access on the internet: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3625638
- Ravenelle, A. (2017). *Sharing economy workers: Selling, not sharing*. "Cambridge Journal of Regions Economy and Society", 10(2). DOI: 10.1093/cjres/rsw043
- Silný, J. et al. (2020). *Krise a příležitost: Ekonomické a sociální dopady epidemie COVID-19* [Access: 22.03.2021]. Access on the internet: https://rosalux.cz/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/RLS_brozura_2020-10_covid_03_WEB.pdf
- The Economist (2020). *What's mine is yours: The sharing economy will have to change* [Access: 10.03.2021]. Access on the internet: <https://www.economist.com/business/2020/06/04/the-sharing-economy-will-have-to-change>
- Vinod, P. P., Sharma, D. (2021). *COVID-19 Impact on the Sharing Economy Post-Pandemic*. "Australasian Accounting, Business and Finance Journal", 15(1). DOI: 10.14453/aabfj.v15i1.4.

DOI: 10.7862/rz.2021.hss.24

The text was submitted to the editorial office: April 2021.

The text was accepted for publication: September 2021.

Joanna SANECKA-TYCZYŃSKA¹

THE QUALITY OF GOVERNANCE AND THE POLITICAL CAPACITY OF A COUNTRY: CONTEMPORARY POLISH POLITICAL PARTIES AND THE IDEA OF GOOD GOVERNANCE

The capacity of a state in political terms is a relatively new area of political thought. In the debate on the condition of the state, Polish political parties agree on which areas of governance require specific actions on the part of public administration. Politicians have described the desired ways of governing and have formulated concepts of good governance and methods for their implementation. The objective behind this article is to analyze contemporary Polish political thought from two angles – the capacity of a state and its relationship with governance quality. Political thought is analyzed from the perspectives of the system and the problem. The general objective has two sub-goals: (1) to determine the definition and meaning of the term *capacity of a state* in political thought across various ideological currents (conservative, liberal, people's, social democratic, and nationalist), and (2) to investigate how *good governance* is defined in the political debate and how it is linked with state capacity.

Keywords: good governance, state capacity, political thought, Polish political parties, political debate.

1. INTRODUCTION

The capacity of a state in political terms is a relatively new area of political thought. In the debate on the condition of the state, Polish political parties agree which areas of governance require specific actions on the part of public administration. Politicians have described the desired ways of governing and have formulated concepts of good governance and methods for their implementation.

This discussion about the capacity of a state follows findings reported in international scientific literature. The capacity of a state can be understood as the ability to govern, and includes three correlative elements. The first one is policy capacity, which, in very simple terms, is the ability to identify strategic directions for action and to manage the available resources. The second one is administrative capacity, which can be defined as efficient management of the human and physical resources which the state needs in order to function. The third one is state capacity, which focuses on state's relationships with its population,

¹ Joanna Sanecka-Tyczyńska, DSc PhD, Maria Curie-Skłodowska University in Lublin, Faculty of Political Science and Journalism, 45 Głęboka St., 20-612 Lublin; e-mail: j.sanecka-tyczyńska@poczta.umcs.lublin.pl. ORCID: 0000-0002-0344-4307.

and covers its ability to mobilise social and economic forces in order to achieve its public goals. The capacity of a state can be realised through decision-making, implementation (assigning tasks to state administration), and supervision. (Painter, Pierre, 2005; Fritz, 2007).

Political capacity is associated with the idea of good governance, which has been described extensively in Polish and international literature. In a way, good governance is intended to bring the government closer to its citizens. In line with the principles of democracy and the rule of law, they must not be afraid of governance or definition of their responsibilities, and, moreover, should become involved in these processes and seek to actually influence them. In view of this, scholars have identified six pillars of good governance: (1) democratic rule of law, which guarantees state efficiency; (2) accountability, meaning that governance mechanisms operate in such a way that the authorities and civil servants are responsible for the decisions they make; (3) principle of social inclusion, which guarantees extensive participation of citizens in decision-making across different levels of political power; (4) efficiency and effectiveness, (5) transparency, so that the state operates in an open and transparent manner, and guarantees the availability and clarity of public information, monitoring of public authorities' actions, and clear law-making; and (6) participation, understood as the involvement of citizens and social organisations in state governance. (Weiss, 2000; Rothstein, 2011; Eaton, Akers, 2007; Grindle, 2007; Rotberg, 2014; Ghani, Lockhart, 2008).

The objective behind this article is to analyse contemporary Polish political thought from two angles – capacity of a state and its relationship with governance quality. Political thought is analysed from system and problem perspectives. The general objective has two sub-goals: (1) to determine the definition and meaning of the term *capacity of a state* in the political thought across various ideological currents (conservative, liberal, people's, social democratic, and nationalist), and (2) to investigate how *good governance* was defined in the political debate and how it was linked with state capacity.

2. CONSERVATIVE THOUGHT

For Law and Justice (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, PiS), state capacity meant especially internal governance, understood as the ability of the political apparatus to act. And this, in turn, largely depended on the quality of political leadership, including its intellectual abilities, patriotism, and analytical skills (Szczerki, 2010).

The starting point for the discussion about the political capacity of Poland was the assessment of the Third Republic of Poland, which led to the conclusion that following 1989 Poland became a weak state. This negative assessment of Poland as a state was built on four generalisations. (1) In Poland, political power, and the responsibility of the government for the state, became fragmented; (2) Domination of so called *transactional politics* – especially during the PO-PSL coalition administration in 2007–2015 – understood as a governance philosophy based on “entering into certain agreements and transactions with various pressure groups” (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, 2015); (3) Moral and competence crisis among the elite and bodies that govern the state was largely responsible for the poor capacity of Poland (Marcinkiewicz, 2005; Matyja, Bugaj, Dorn, 2007); (4) The centre of political power was weakened (Marcinkiewicz, 2005).

For conservatives, this was tantamount to reducing the state to “an arena where different interests and pressure groups can compete”, and to excluding citizens from decision-

making. This situation resulted in the disappearance of political community, replacement of politics with administering, political disputes with expert discussions, and democratic decisions with technocratic solutions. The consequence of this was poor internal coherence of the Third Republic of Poland, which, in the opinion of PiS, became “a confederation of departments”, managed by interest groups, lobbyists, professional associations, or local communities (Kaczyński, 2013a). Corporatism, as the source of various pathologies, was considered a threat to the state and citizen freedom.

According to PiS, the poor political capacity of the Third Republic of Poland, actually threatened the existence of the sovereign state. And only a strong and efficient state system, with a great political capacity, could provide citizens with optimum living conditions, combat pathologies, and prevent subjugation to external decision-making centres. In line with its *raison d'état*, the state was to mobilise forces and resources for the purposes of social and economic projects, act for the common good, which was the basis for what is known as *pragmatic legitimacy* (Kaczyński, 2013b).

In addition to the negative assessment of the Third Republic of Poland, PiS argued for the inevitability of the transformation of the contemporary state, which has lost its monopoly over decision-making by becoming one of many centres and sources of power. In the global world, the role of state authority was losing its importance, as states, as the elements of the global network, were to some extent dependent on international organisations and global corporations. PiS politicians were aware that the weaker the state was, the worse its position was in this network (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, 2019; Staniszkis, 2003).

It seemed natural to reform state structures to ensure its high capacity and efficiency, central government supervision over the processes taking place within the state, and to maintain social cohesion. Good governance was to be the answer to the challenges related to state management. It included five elements. The first was to include businesses and citizen organisations in decision-making for the state administration to appropriately respond to any local “impulses”. The second element was to improve management in administration and to introduce strategic planning. The third was a “flexible” model of the public service, aligned with the professional development of the personnel in private companies, involving personnel mobility. Administration was to be oriented towards high quality rather than “stability and routine”, as in closed professions. The fourth element of the improvement in state management quality was to be a structural reform of the administration, and the fifth, an improvement in the transparency of administrative decision-making, fight against corruption, and aligning the work of civil servants to business-like quality management principles (Kaczyński, 2019; Błaszczak, 2008). But this idea has never been introduced in practice.

3. LIBERAL AND SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC THOUGHTS

Civic Platform (Platforma Obywatelska RP, PO), a representative of the liberal current, similarly to most political parties, associated the political capacity of the state primarily with its capacity for efficient management, i.e. effective making and implementation of political decisions. What was especially important for PO was the state's institutional capacity, which is part of political capacity. It was defined as the efficiency of the government across various areas of internal, international, and European policy, and reasonable management of public administration resources, resulting in improved work

quality and reduced costs of labour (Platforma Obywatelska RP, 2007b). The efficiency of administration and the judiciary, and the consistency and stability of the legislation, were to help strengthen social capital and develop entrepreneurship (Kancelaria Prezesa Rady Ministrów, 2013).

The views represented by PO were influenced by the evaluation of the reality in the Third Republic of Poland, which emphasised negative phenomena that affected state capacity. Those included the arbitrariness of administrative decisions, corruption, politicisation of the public service, lack of civil servants' responsibility for the consequences of their poor decisions or negligence, and low social trust in public institutions. The state crisis was to be tackled by directing the changes in administration towards increasing civil liberties and empowering citizens, rather than strengthening central political institutions (Platforma Obywatelska RP, 2006; Platforma Obywatelska RP, 2007b; Platforma Obywatelska RP, 2011).

High state capacity meant "opening up to citizens." A high capacity state had four important characteristics which were to positively affect the citizen-state relations. These were helpful, friendly, participatory, and transparent. The helpful state was to support the development of social capital, ensuring the enforcement of civil rights and liberties, and citizen creativity and independence, while also respecting their privacy. The "network society" born this way was to contribute to the development of participatory democracy. The construction of the friendly state was to involve changing its *modus operandi* to more open, based on bilateral communication with citizens. Participatory meant easy access to knowledge and involvement in the exercise of power via social consultations and public debates. Finally, the transparent state was to "explain its decisions in a way that was clear and easy to understand for all citizens", rather than just making them. All the proposed changes were designed to ensure civil liberties and local governments, in collaboration with government administration, deregulation, simplification, and qualitative improvement of legislation to make it more useful for citizens (Platforma Obywatelska RP, 2011).

PO put special emphasis on two approaches to state management. The first was the idea of *good governance*. The outline of a good governance strategy was included in two key documents prepared by the Ministry of Regional Development and the Ministry of Administration and Digitisation after the PO-PSL coalition rose to power in 2007. It included specific measures for two areas, legal/institutional and civil, especially concerning the relations between the state and citizens. In the first area the priority was to decentralise the state and to have governance rely on cooperation between the government and local governments, NGOs, and various communities (business, scientific etc.) (Ministerstwo Rozwoju Regionalnego, 2007; Platforma Obywatelska RP, 2007a). In the second area, PO focused on regaining Poles' trust in state institutions. On the one hand, the party recognised the negative consequences of the lack of state administration's trust in citizens, which resulted in inconsistent new law. And on the other hand, citizens were found to have no trust in one another and in public institutions. The directions for action identified in government strategies were expected to improve the quality of social and civil skills among Poles (including an improvement in their ability to collaborate), increase social participation and cultural activity, and unlock their creative potential, understood as artistic abilities and technical skills (Platforma Obywatelska RP, 2005; Kancelaria Prezesa Rady Ministrów, 2013).

Another approach to state management was *New Public Management* (Platforma Obywatelska RP, 2007a). Its guiding principle was to give priority to the art of management

over the art of administration, and its goal was to achieve a high quality of delivered public services oriented towards the needs and expectations of citizens, who were treated as “administration clients” (Młodzik, 2015). This way, PO wanted to abandon the traditional (bureaucratic) public administration, based on the Weberian model (Marchewka-Bartkowiak, 2014). However, PO was not able to implement this idea in practice.

Similarly as for liberals, for social democrats a high state capacity was to serve especially citizens. According to social democrats, the power of a state, in terms of this capacity, was to be expressed as efficiency and help extended to its citizens, rather than as “being suspicious and controlling”. A state with a considerable political capacity was based on social trust. This considerable political capacity could be achieved mainly through political means, and especially state democratisation, respecting human rights, and free functioning of NGOs. Efficient functioning of state structures was predicated on the ability to gather and process information, uninterrupted decision-making, capability to respond in emergency situations, and a citizen-friendly attitude, which makes administrative matters easy to handle (Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej, 2011; Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej, 2010).

4. PEASANT THOUGHT

In the political thought of Polish Peasants' Party (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe, PSL) the starting point for the discussion on state capacity was assigning it the role of the key social institution, “the partner and ally of every citizen” (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe, 2007). PSL's assessment of Poland's capacity included the fundamental problems of the Polish state. These included, in particular, poor efficiency of political institutions, especially in the economic domain, and a crisis of parliamentary government, which manifested itself in the lack of citizens' trust in the political class. In PSL politicians' view, this poor institutional capacity blocked the economy. The dominant view was that introducing a democratic system and establishing economic and political institutions was not enough for the institutional capacity of the state to drive development. An important addition were “clear rules of the game”, such as speed, efficiency, rule of law, and integrity. This would guarantee an environment that is conducive to citizen initiatives and aspirations, and ensures efficient management of public funds by competent public and local government institutions (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe, 2008).

Peasant party members associated two things with state capacity. The first was efficient functioning of democratic state (across all levels of power). And the second was the involvement of local governments and citizens organised into social organisations and NGOs in decision-making processes. An efficient democratic state was considered prerequisite for defending and advancing Polish national interests in the face of globalisation and integration. And local governments was seen as “the school of efficiency and subjecting politics to the interests of local communities”. This was to serve as the foundation for building a positive image of politics as an important social activity. Two types of action were proposed – eliminating “empty rhetoric and social engineering without an ideology”, and supporting civic participation and social involvement (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe, 2008).

PSL considered the loss of social trust in the political class and the lack of agreement between parties on crucial *raison d'etat* matters as factors that made it difficult to take strategic action, make political decisions, carry out reforms, and bringing society round to

them. It was considered particularly dangerous for state's existence to putting current party interests above state ones, and preferring tactical over strategic action consistent with Polish *raison d'état* (Kalinowski, 2003).

Corruption, one of important social problems, was to be curbed by introducing the transparency of decision-making procedures, including in public procurement and privatisation agreements, and the obligation of high-ranking government officials to disclose their previous positions with public authorities or businesses. The goal behind these measures was to be the transparency of state institutions and tackling corruption (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe, 2004). These objectives were in opposition to political practices. In reality, PO-PSL coalition followed the policy of weakening the role of citizens by depriving them of any influence over governance. With a significant majority of society believing that Poland was less and less the state of the sovereign, and the means of sovereign expression, Platforma Obywatelska and Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe lost in the 2015 election (Gazeta Wyborcza, 2012; Rzeczpospolita, 2013).

5. NATIONALIST THOUGHT

League of Polish Families (Liga Polskich Rodzin, LPR) also described state capacity as meaning efficient and effective state institutions (Dobrosz, 2007). State effectiveness was about being able to accomplish state's policies based on national interests, and relied on taking actions across three areas – assessment of reality, methodology of change, and implementation of decisions. What was important was to accurately evaluate the state in terms of its social and economic situation to identify any problems, to select methods and tools for addressing those, and to implement political decisions in an undisturbed manner.

The starting point for the development of a good governance concept by LPR was the assumption that the state was only an instrument and that it was the property of the nation, and an expression of its will to exist and function within a common organisational structure. Therefore, a strong and effective state with a high political capacity corresponded to "efficient organisation of the nation", based on citizens' responsibility for the quality of state structures. It was not possible to "heal" Poland "without healing it at grassroots level". So, on the one hand, it was important to secure professional resources in the form of competent public service members, and on the other hand, efficiently enforce the law. Civil servants and regular citizens were to share "concern for the wellbeing of their homeland, public service, and lawmaking that generates consistent, logical, and society-serving regulations". In a strong state, citizens would universally trust political institutions (Dobrosz, 2004; Dobrosz, 2005; Giertych, 2008).

Importantly, nationalistic state was to be a strong organisation "not to protect itself against citizens, but to protect its citizens against threats, such as internal (police) and external (army) banditry. We grant power to the state so that it protects our nation, our families, and each of us individually" (Giertych, 2005). Only a strong state, build on truth and justice, could gain social trust. Any devolutionary factors that could weaken the state and its structures, such as anti-state activities of the power elite, political parties, and international organisations, were opposed.

It was argued, that the low capacity of the Third Republic of Poland was due to the poor condition of the elite, who were characterised by an anti-state mentality and lack of patriotism, who showed disrespect for ethics and morality, and treated power as a chance to get rich easily. In their behaviour, they flouted the principle of equality in the eyes of the

law and social justice. This criticism against the political elite also included the lack of intellectual qualities and skills necessary for serving major public functions, and reliance on external decision-making centres.

6. CONCLUDING REMARKS

The analysis of the expressions of contemporary Polish political thought from the perspective of state capacity and methods for governing public institutions leads to three conclusions.

Firstly, politicians have recognised that attention to state capacity, meaning *de facto* its condition, is among the most important state interests. On the one hand, political capacity, defined as the effectiveness and power of institutions, efficient decision-making and implementation, determines state existence and development. But on the other hand, for state interests to be advanced, the state needs to be strong and have efficient executive instruments. What is equally important is the ability to define values, needs, interests, and goals underlying state policies and strategies. Whether a state can fulfil its fundamental functions actually decides its survival. Weak states (with low capacity) are more vulnerable to losing their primary attributes of sovereignty, weakening their institutional capacity, and becoming dependent on strong members of the international system. Consequently, it is crucial for state existence to improve state capacity across many areas.

Secondly, in the political thought of contemporary political parties in Poland there was a consensus that government authorities had to constantly enhance state functioning so that the state could serve its purpose without let or hindrance. The factors that were most often cited as preventing the state from operating efficiently were poor political elite, corruption, politicians acting in party and individual interests rather than furthering *raison d'état*, inefficient public administration, bureaucracy, social conflicts, mutual blocking of various decision-making centres, etc.

Thirdly, there are three main approaches that emerge from the many political statements about state capacity. The first, traditional and state-centric, represented by PiS, assumes strengthening of state power at the expense of other decision-making centres (civil, local-government, and international). State capacity is associated with building a strong state organisation, which is as powerful as its institutions. Liberals, peasant party members, and social democrats, proponents of the second approach, argued that the primary beneficiaries of changes in governance were citizens. A strong state, with interconnected areas of competence, implemented at different levels of governance, including state, local-government, and community levels, was to serve citizens first. The third approach, characteristic of the nationalist political thought, associated state capacity with an efficient organisation of the nation. The efficacy of political power corresponded to the ability to accomplish the goals of state policy, which were based on national interests.

REFERENCES

- Błaszczak, M. (2008). *The shorthand report from the 26th session of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland* [Access: 10.03.2021]. Access on the internet: <http://orka2.sejm.gov.pl/Debata6.nsf/main/1366E8CF>
- Dobrosz, J. (2004). *The shorthand report from the 78th session of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland* [Access: 10.03.2021]. Access on the internet: <https://orka2.sejm.gov.pl/Debata4>.

- nsf/5c30b337b5bc240ec125746d0030d0fc/720c0e143a283157c1257478004690df?Open Document
- (2005). *The shorthand report from the 95th session of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland* [Access: 11.05.2021]. Access on the internet: <http://orka2.sejm.gov.pl/Debata4.nsf/main/3A92D6CE>
- (2007). *The shorthand report from the 41st session of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland* [Access: 10.03.2021]. Access on the internet: <http://orka2.sejm.gov.pl/Debata5.nsf/main/007C91CA>
- Eaton, T. V., Akers, M. D. (2007). *Whistleblowing and Good Governance*. "CPA Journal 77" No. 6.
- Fritz, V. (2007). *State-Building. A Comparative Study of Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus and Russia*. Budapest: Central European University Press.
- Gazeta Wyborcza (2012). *Sejm. »Nie« dla referendum w sprawie podwyższenia wieku emerytalnego* [Access: 27.05.2021]. Access on the internet: https://wyborcza.pl/1,75398,11448974,Sejm___Nie__dla_referendum_w_sprawie_podwyzszenia.html
- Ghani, A., Lockhart, C. (2008). *Fixing Failed States. A Framework for Rebuilding A Fractured Word*. Oxford University Press.
- Giertych, M. (2005). *Z nadzieją w przyszłość*. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Ars Politica.
- (2008). *Moralność na co dzień*. "Opoka w Kraju", No. 68.
- Grindle, M. (2007). *Good Enough Governance Revisited* "Development Policy Review", Vol. 25.
- Kaczyński, J. (2013a). *Chcę uratować Polskę przed dwiema katastrofami*. "Do Rzeczy", No. 21.
- (2013b). *Żeby Polska mogła trwać, trzeba ją przebudować. I to musi być zmiana bardzo daleko idąca* [Access: 17.05.2020]. Access on the internet: <https://wpolityce.pl/polityka/156651-premier-jaroslaw-kaczynski-dla-wpolitycepl-na-swieto-konstytucji-3-maja-zeby-polska-mogla-trwac-trzeba-ja-przebudowac-i-to-musi-byc-zmiana-bardzo-daleko-idaca>
- (2019). *Żeby dobrze rządzić, trzeba być kompetentnym i uczciwym* [Access: 17.05.2020]. Access on the internet: <https://businessinsider.com.pl/wiadomosci/j-kaczynski-zeby-dobrze-rzadzic-trzeba-byc-kompetentnym/n326y77>
- Kalinowski, J. (2003). *The shorthand report from the 54th session of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland* [Access: 05.05.2021]. Access on the internet: <http://orka2.sejm.gov.pl/Debata4.nsf/main/OEB7C097>
- Kancelaria Prezesa Rady Ministrów (2013). *Polska 2030. Trzecia fala nowoczesności. Długookresowa Strategia Rozwoju Kraju* [Access: 11.03.2021]. Access on the internet: <http://polska2030.pl/dlugookresowa-strategia-rozwoju-kraju-polska-2030-trzecia-fala-nowoczesnosci/>
- Marchewka-Bartkowiak, K. (2014). *Nowe zarządzanie publiczne*. "Infos", No. 18.
- Marcinkiewicz, K. (2005). *The shorthand report from the 2nd session of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland* [Access: 10.03.2021]. Access on the internet: <http://orka2.sejm.gov.pl/Debata5.nsf/main/6925B14F>
- Matyja, R., Bugaj, R., Dorn, L. (2007). *Jaka prezydentura?* "Nowe Państwo", No. 1.
- Ministerstwo Rozwoju Regionalnego (2007). *Narodowe Strategiczne Ramy Odniesienia 2007–2013* [Access: 19.07.2020]. Access on the internet: https://stat.gov.pl/gfx/poz_za_5_nsro.pdf
- Młodzik, E. (2015). *Założenia koncepcji New Public Management*. "Współczesne Problemy Ekonomiczne", No. 11. DOI: 10.18276/wpe.2015.11-17

- Painter, M., Pierre, J. (2005). Unpacking Policy Capacity: Issues and Themes [In:] Painter, M., Pierre, J., eds., *Challenges to State Policy Capacity. Global Trends and Comparative Perspectives*. Palgrave Macmillan UK, p. 1–18.
- Platforma Obywatelska (2005). *Państwo dla obywateli. Plan rządzenia 2005–2009* [Access: 10.09.2020]. Access on the internet: https://www.dobrowol.org/drobiazgi/Panstwo_dla_obywateli.pdf
- (2006). *PO stronie obywateli. Uchwała III Krajowej Konwencji Platformy Obywatelskiej RP* [Access: 19.07.2019]. Access on the internet: <http://www.platforma.org/uchwały/PO-stronie-obywateli/>
- (2007a). *Polska Obywatelska. Podstawy programu politycznego Platformy Obywatelskiej RP* [Access: 19.07.2020]. Access on the internet: http://www.zientarski.pl/pliki/artykuly/artykul_38_1301443909_zalacznik_sciezka.pdf
- (2007b). *Polska zasługuje na cud gospodarczy* [Access: 10.03.2019]. Access on the internet: <http://www.platforma.org/program/>
- (2011). *Następny krok. Razem. Program wyborczy Platformy Obywatelskiej RP* [Access: 21.07.2020]. Access on the internet: <http://www.szejnfeld.pl/index.php/analizy/nastepny-krok-razem-zalozenia-ideowe-programu-wyborczego-platformy-obywatelskiej/>
- Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe (2004). *Naród, Państwo, Człowiek, Środowisko. Wizja, misja i priorytety programowe Polskiego Stronnictwa Ludowego. VIII Kongres Polskiego Stronnictwa Ludowego* [Access: 11.04.2017]. Access on the internet: <https://zachodniopomorskie.psl.pl/dokumenty-kongres/>
- (2007). *Razem tworzymy lepszą przyszłość. Narodowe priorytety PSL na lata 2007–2011* [Access: 27.07.2019]. Access on the internet: http://www.psl.pl/upload/pdf/dokumenty/priorytety_1_.pdf
- (2008). *Dokumenty X Kongresu Polskiego Stronnictwa Ludowego* [Access: 27.02.2021]. Access on the internet: <https://docplayer.pl/1962924-Dokumenty-x-kongresu-psl.html>
- Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (2014). *Zdrowie. Praca. Rodzina. Program Prawa i Sprawiedliwości* [Access: 11.03.2021]. Access on the internet: <http://pis.org.pl/dokumenty>
- (2015). *Jarosław Kaczyński na spotkaniu z Akademickim Klubem Obywatelskim im. Lecha Kaczyńskiego w Poznaniu* [Access: 12.06.2019]. Access on the internet: old.pis.org.pl
- (2019). *Polski model państwa dobrobytu. Program Prawa i Sprawiedliwości* [Access: 11.03.2021]. Access on the internet: <file:///C:/Users/HP/AppData/Local/Temp/Program%20PiS%202019.pdf>
- Rotberg, R. (2014). *Good Governance Means Performance and Results. "Governance – An International Journal of Policy, Administration and Institutions"*, Vol. 27.
- Rothstein, B. (2011). *The Quality of Government. Corruption, Social Trust and Inequality in International Perspective*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Rzeczpospolita (2013). *Sejm odrzucił wniosek o referendum ws. sześciolatek w szkołach* [Access: 27.07.2019]. Access on the internet: <https://www.rp.pl/artykul/1059379-Sejm-odrzucil-wniosek-o-referendum-ws-szesciolatek-w-szkole.html>
- Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej (2010). *Lewica dla Polski* [Access: 27.07.2019]. Access on the internet: <https://cpofpoland.files.wordpress.com/2013/06/lewica-dla-polski.pdf>
- (2011). *Zmian@ – Cyfrowa Polska 2011–2015* [Access: 27.07.2019]. Access on the internet: http://www.rksld.home.pl/uploads/pliki/PROGRAM_Zmiana_-_Cyfrowa_Polska_2011-2015.pdf
- Staniszki, J. (2003). *Władza globalizacji*. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Scholar.

- Szczerski, K. (2010). *Jakość struktur państwa a jego zdolność do realizacji polityki zagranicznej* [Access: 18.02.2021]. Access on the internet: <https://www.omp.org.pl/artukul.php?artukul=230>
- Weiss, T. G. (2000). *Governance, Good Governance and Global Governance. Conceptual and Actual Challenges*. „*Third World Quarterly*”, Vol. 21.

DOI: 10.7862/rz.2021.hss.25

The text was submitted to the editorial office: June 2021.

The text was accepted for publication: September 2021.

Bogusław ŚLUSARCZYK¹
Patrycja ŻEGLIŃ²

THRIFTLESSNESS AND FOOD WASTE IN HOUSEHOLDS IN POLAND WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO THE PODKARPACKIE VOIVODESHIP

This article investigates the phenomenon of food waste and thriftlessness in Polish households. The authors attempted to determine the extent of thriftlessness and food waste on international, regional, and local scales. Research on food waste was carried out from December 1, 2020, to January 31, 2021, in the Podkarpackie Voivodeship. A questionnaire was used to conduct the research. Three hundred and ten respondents from towns and villages located in the Podkarpackie Voivodeship of various ages and levels of education took part in this study. The research methods used were a diagnostic survey and an analysis of the literature. The survey was conducted in a written interview, while the research tool was a questionnaire. Research shows that the number of people who admitted to throwing away food is constantly increasing. This trend is expected to continue, and food waste will increase rapidly. Therefore, all possible countermeasures should be taken to draw consumers' attention to the problem of food waste and how it can be reduced. This study contributes to the literature on food waste around the world by demonstrating the problem occurring at global and local levels. The research and conclusions may determine future research directions and provide the basis for larger-scale research (both in terms of the number of respondents and the area of research).

Keywords: food waste, problem, world, households, research.

1. INTRODUCTION

Nowadays, considerations about thriftlessness and food waste are becoming the most important problem in expanding the areas of poverty, especially hunger and malnutrition of many societies of individual continents, countries, regions, or local towns. Despite the deepening analysis concerning food waste in a global context, few studies have paid enough attention to the problem from a local perspective, which means from households' and their members' perspective.

¹ Bogusław Ślusarczyk, DSc PhD, Associate Prof., Institute of Economics and Finance, University of Rzeszów, 2 Ćwiklińskiej St., 35-601 Rzeszów; e-mail: boguslaw.slusarczyk@gmail.com. ORCID: 0000-0003-0567-8470.

² Patrycja Żegliń, PhD, Institute of Economics and Finance, University of Rzeszów, 2 Ćwiklińskiej St., 35-601 Rzeszów; e-mail: pzegele@ur.edu.pl (corresponding author). ORCID: 0000-0002-6815-6488.

This study attempted to determine the extent of thriftlessness and food waste both on an international, regional and local scale. Food is lost and/or wasted throughout the agri-food chain, including agricultural production, post-harvest and storage handling, processing and distribution, and consumption. It should be emphasized that these phenomena occur in all links of this chain, and their intensity varies and depends on the geographical region of the world.

The main purpose of the paper is to present the phenomenon of thriftlessness and food waste in the world, which is undoubtedly an important problem that remains unsolved on a global scale. Its significance and the need to search for its solutions are undoubtedly worth the attention of scientists worldwide. It should be emphasized that solving this problem may result in an increase in food security, a reduction in the scope of poverty and hunger, and a reduction in mortality, especially of children. The current state of the research field (Higgins et al., 2008, Kloppenburg et al., 1996, Hendrickson & Heffernan, 2002, McMichael, 2009, Hartmann, 2011) shows that there are much research concerning food waste all over the world but most of them present the results from a broad point of view. The authors of the paper tried to analyze the problem from a regional and local perspective with particular reference to households' food waste. Consumption and food waste grow especially with the lifestyle associated with urban areas, which are currently hosting more than half of the world's population and by 2050 will host more than two-thirds of the world's population (Andreola et al., 2021).




Figure 1. Food losses and waste along the agri-food chain by world region

Source: (HLPE).

Food is lost throughout the agri-food chain, from agricultural production post-harvest storage, processing, and consumption. In developing countries, the greatest losses of food occur in the initial stages of the chain, i.e., during agricultural production and storage. It is related to the lack of access to modern agricultural techniques and the inability to appropriate storage and transport. The greatest waste in agricultural production is recorded in Latin America (13.4%) and Sub-Saharan Africa (12.5%), while in the post-harvest treatment and storage phase in countries such as Sub-Saharan Africa (12.7%) and Southeast Asia and South Asia (9.6%). At further stages, i.e., during consumption and distribution, the greatest losses occur in highly developed countries. The highest food loss and the waste rate is recorded in North America and Oceania (12.6%), which is caused by the production of food in greater quantities than needed, lack of respect for food that is widely available in these countries, poor eating habits of the inhabitants of these countries, market mechanisms, institutional and legal framework, including restrictions on international trade. The largest losses in the entire agri-food chain were reported in North Africa, East Asia, and Central Asia (36%), followed by Sub-Saharan Africa (35.5%), Latin America (33.7%), China, Japan, and Korea. South (33.4%), North America and Oceania (32.4%), Europe, including Russia (31.4%); the least losses were recorded in South Asia and Southeast Asia (28.2%) (Figure 1).

The total food losses and waste in individual continents and their regions ranges from 28.2% in South Asia and South-East Asia to 36% in North Africa, West and Central Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa. Although in a slightly smaller size, this phenomenon also occurs in Europe, i.e., in the European Union countries.

Each European Union member has a different rate of food waste *per capita*. The Greeks turned out to be the most economical, where the rate *per capita* was 45 kg annually. The Dutch waste the most food – 556 kg of food *per capita*. Countries whose consumption *per capita* exceeds 100 kg are: Slovakia, Latvia, Denmark, Romania, Germany, Portugal, France, Italy, Spain, Luxembourg, Finland, Hungary (from 108 kg in Slovakia to 189 kg in Hungary). Poland shamefully ranked fifth with 236 kg of food wasted *per capita* annually, right after Estonia, Cyprus, Belgium, and the Netherlands (Figure 2).

In the household sector, the greatest amounts of food losses and waste occur – 42%, of which as much as 2/3 of food thrown away could be avoided. Food producers are in second place by sector with 39% of total food waste. Food suppliers, including restaurants and catering chains, are responsible for 14% of losses, while retailers and sales networks generate the least food losses – 5% (Figure 3).

In the light of the discussion above, we propose the following hypothesis: in the modern food economy, there are phenomena of food waste, both in highly developed and developing countries, as well as in urbanized and agricultural areas. The structure of the work was subordinated to this hypothesis.

The paper is organized as follows: we introduced briefly the problem of food waste and its reasons, then we presented a review of the literature on food waste and thriftlessness in households all over the world with particular reference to Polish households from the regional and local perspective. The principal conclusions provide the basis for recommending solutions aimed at minimizing food waste and associated losses.




Figure 2. The amount of food losses in European Union countries expressed in kilograms *per capita* in 2018

Source: (Financial Observer, <https://www.obserwatorfinansowy.pl>).




Figure 3. Food waste in individual sectors of the European Union (in %)

Source: Authors' elaboration based on (Food banking, <http://foodbanking.org>).

2. LITERATURE REVIEW

The authors of the study would like to emphasize that limiting the phenomenon of thriftlessness and food waste in the world is undoubtedly an important problem because as a result of its solution, food security may increase, the scope of poverty and hunger may be reduced, and mortality, especially of children, may be reduced. Based on the review and analysis of the literature on the subject, it can be stated with all responsibility that this is a problem of highly developed, poor, and developing countries. According to the European Union Report Council, reducing food losses and food waste by only a quarter would be enough to feed all the hungry people in the world (European Union Council, 2016). The total economic cost of food waste in Europe, with estimates of food loss and food waste ranging from 158 to 298 kg *per capita*, would be around EUR 143 billion annually (Stenmarck et al., 2016). Research shows that about 2/3 of these costs are caused by food waste at the household level. It is confirmed by the research conducted in Hungary, which was carried out in two stages. The first empirical study was carried out using the FUSIONS methodology (FUSIONS, 2016) in 2016, the second – in 2019. Research based on the physical measurement of household food waste was carried out in 2016. The measurement covered 100 households during one week. In 2019, 165 households participated in the research. Based on the research results in the first stage, it was found that annually, the average Hungarian wasted 68.04 kg of food, of which 33.14 kg could be avoided. However, in the second study, i.e., in 2019, it was found that during the measurement period (one week), 165 households participating in the study generated 532.79 kg of food waste, of which the unavoidable food waste was 246.52 kg, and that which could be avoided – 265.56 kg (Kasza et al., 2020).

Also, in a study conducted in Greece among 101 urban households, it was found that over two weeks, the amount of total food waste *per capita* was 76.1 kg, of which 25.9 kg was considered avoidable (Report of Polish Food Banks Federation, 2012). It has also been proven that the fraction of the part that could be avoided is similar in Finland – 23 kg *per capita* (Quested & Johnson, 2009). In studies, which should be explained, it is recommended to distinguish between avoidable and unavoidable food waste, and it is used in the vast majority of measurements (Koivupuro et al., 2012; Elimelech et al., 2018; Giordano et al., 2019; Schanes et al., 2018; Schneider & Obersteiner, 2007; Lebersorger & Schneider, 2011).

It is worth adding that, according to research carried out by *The Waste and Resources Action Program* (WRAP) (Borowski et al., 2016), the phenomenon of food waste also takes place in Great Britain. It is estimated that more than 22% of the food purchased by households is wasted, of which at least 14% could be reused for consumption, and the annual financial loss per household is GBP 480.

The structure of household food waste varies from country to country. However, research has shown that perishable foodstuffs are among the most discarded products. When considering the avoidable category, these foods include fresh fruit and vegetables, breadstuffs, and dairy products. However, according to Hungary's quoted research results, this type of product includes meals, breadstuffs, fresh vegetables, dairy products, and fresh fruit (Szabó-Bódi et al., 2018). On the other hand, in Serbia, breadstuffs and ready-to-eat food products also top the list. An analysis of the structure of food waste in Norway shows that bread and bakery products are at the top of the wasted list. Fresh vegetables and drinks are on this list in the UK (Quested&Johnson, 2009). In Greece, Denmark, Israel, as in Great

Britain, vegetables were the most frequently wasted food products (Edjabou et al., 2016; Abeliotis et al., 2019). The research shows that food waste also occurs in Poland, where the level of food losses per year is estimated at 9 million tons of food. In the ranking of EU countries, Poland is in 5th place (Marszałek, 2018). The Polish government (following the example of other EU countries), on July 19, 2019, developed an act on preventing food waste (Act on preventing foodwaste). The act defines the rules of dealing with food and the obligations of food sellers to counteract food waste and negative social, environmental, and economic effects resulting from food waste. Unfortunately, there is no scientific research on thriftlessness and food waste in Poland. This research could cover the stages of the agri-food chain as well as all food products. Estimates for the European Union can only be followed in foreign literature (Bräutigam et al., 2014). Every year, Poles waste 247 kg of food *per capita* (compared to the average of 173 kg *per capita* in the EU), which ranks Poland in 5th place in the European Union. In 2018, 42% of respondents reported throwing food away (Polish Economy Institute, 2020). It should be noted that the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) food balance sheets used in the research do not allow for the differentiation between the amount of food consumed in households and domestic consumption in places such as canteens, restaurants, or fast food outlets (Bräutigam et al., 2014). The presented research results are only the estimates, which unfortunately are burdened with a large error. Such estimates are considered because there is no effective method for collecting official data on the amount of food losses and waste in the European Union countries and Poland. Work is currently underway on introducing a unified program to monitor food losses and waste in the European Union countries. In 2016, the FUSION project presented the results in which it is possible to develop a collective and substantive EU protocol controlling the measurement of food loss and food waste reduction; the project was adopted by the Council of the European Union (European Union Council, 2016). Polish Food Banks disseminate data related to food waste in Poland. It will result in drawing attention to the issue of unmet food needs among members of Polish households. A survey conducted by the Central Statistical Office (GUS) in 2019 shows that approximately 2.8 million people lived on a level of expenditure below the extreme poverty line (below the minimum subsistence level). On the other hand, in households with expenditure below the relative poverty line – i.e., expenditure in these households accounted for less than 50% of the average expenditure for general households in Poland – approximately 4.6 million people. It is estimated that there are 4.6 million people in Poland living on the poverty line and below (Statistics Poland, 2015). The Public Opinion Research Center (CBOS) conducted a study entitled “Poles' declarations regarding food waste” and asked Poles how often food ends up in the trash in their households and what should be done to prevent this practice. The survey results are as follows:

- every fourth respondent admits having thrown away food in their household during the last week;
- young people admit to throwing away food more often than adults, who have a harder time admitting to poor food management;
- the declaration that their households do not throw away food was confirmed by 94% of respondents aged 65 and over, 88% of people who describe their material conditions as bad, and 93% of people who have lower secondary or primary education;

- wealthy people with higher education and holding managerial positions are more prone to throw away food;
- fruit, vegetables, leftovers, and breadstuffs most often end up in the garbage can.

Poles currently waste less food than in 2005, but with some categories of products, such as cured meat, milk, and its products, fruit, vegetables, or fruit preserves, more of them end up in the trash than in 2000 (European Union Council, 2016). The Federation of Polish Food Banks has conducted many information campaigns over the years. According to the Food Banks Report, “I do not waste food”, breadstuffs (49%), fruit (46%), and cured meat (45%) were among the top three discarded products. It was followed by vegetables (37%), yogurts (27%), and milk (12%). Products such as meat, cheese, ready meals, fish, eggs, and other not mentioned products, obtained below or equal to 10% (Figure 4).




Figure 4. Food products that were usually thrown away in 2018 expressed as a percentage
Source: (Food banking, <http://www.foodbanking.org>).

Figure 5 shows a comparison of the most thrown food products in 2012, 2014, and 2018. The amount of food wasted, unfortunately, increases with each passing year. Polish society threw out 13% more yogurts than in 2018. The amount of fruit discarded remains roughly the same in 2014 and 2018, but in 2012, it was much smaller. The amount of wasted milk increased by 8% over the years studied, the amount of meat increased by 5% in 2014 and remained constant in 2018, the amount of vegetables increased by 4% from 2014 to 2018. The research carried out at TNS Poland (Taylor Nelson Sofres) showed a certain dependence. Wealthy people, who spend less time at home due to their profession, more often make reckless and unjustified food purchases, thus controlling the contents of their refrigerators to a lesser extent. People in this situation are more likely to feel they waste food. People who live on a lower social threshold cannot afford to waste food and careless




Figure 5. Food products that were most often thrown away in 2012-2014 and 2018

Source: (Food banking, <http://www.foodbanking.org>) Authors' elaboration.

shopping (TNS Poland 2012). Food waste creates large expenses on soft drinks and food. The amount of expenses in 2014 amounted to PLN 1,078.74 *per capita* monthly, of which 24.4%, or PLN 263.34, were expenses for food and drinks. It should be emphasized that when consumers throw away food, they also throw away money (Borowski et al., 2016).

3. MATERIALS AND METHODS

Research on food waste was carried out in December 2020 and January 2021 in the Podkarpackie Voivodeship. The choice of the voivodeship was determined by its location (south-eastern parts of Poland) and its agricultural character. The authors wanted to show that food is wasted not only in urbanized areas but also regardless of urbanization.

The following hypothesis was put forward in the paper: in the modern food economy, there are phenomena of food waste, both in highly developed and developing countries, as well as in urbanized and agricultural areas. The study uses data from two sources: desk research and down research. First, the work was prepared based on analyses of current data from reports and studies by non-governmental organizations devoted to food waste, both in Poland and worldwide. The main source of data is the results obtained during primary research. A questionnaire was used to conduct the research. Of various age groups, three hundred ten respondents from towns and villages located in the Podkarpackie Voivodeship and different education took part in the study. The research methods used in the research were a diagnostic survey and an analysis of the literature. The survey was conducted in the form of a written interview, while the research tool was a questionnaire.

4. RESULTS

The research was conducted among respondents from different age groups, different environments (urban and rural), and different education. The authors hope that the results of these studies will broaden the information and knowledge about wasted food and the causes of this phenomenon and show that regardless of residence place, age or education, food waste is a global, regional and local problem.

In the survey, most respondents (56%) were between 19 and 25 years old. Respondents aged 26 to 40 (18%) were in second place, while respondents aged 41 to 50 constituted 11%. Next, 10% were respondents aged 51 to 64, and only 5% respondents aged 65 and more. The respondents aged 16 to 18 did not take part in the study (Table 1).

Table 1. Age of examined people

Age of the respondents	Percentage
16–18 years old	0%
19–25 years old	56%
26–40 years old	18%
41–50 years old	11%
51–64 years old	10%
65 years old and more	5%
Total	100%

Source: Authors' elaboration.

The vast majority of respondents (78%) turned out to be rural residents, while 11% of the respondents came from cities with more than 5,000 inhabitants. Slightly fewer respondents came from cities with up to 1,000 inhabitants – 6%, and from cities with more than 1,000 to 5,000 inhabitants – 5% (Table 2).

Table 2. Place of residence

Place of residence	Percentage
Village	78%
A city with up to 1,000 inhabitants	6%
A city with more than 1,000 to 5,000 inhabitants	5%
A city with more than 5,000 inhabitants	11%
Total	100%

Source: Authors' elaboration.

As far as education is concerned among the respondents, 3% had primary or lower secondary education. 16% of the respondents had vocational education. Most people had secondary or post-secondary education (72%) of the respondents. In turn, 9% had higher education (Table 3).

Table 3. Education

Respondents' education	Percentage
Primary or lower-secondary	3%
Vocational	16%
Secondary or post-secondary	72%
Higher	9%
Total	100%

Source: Authors' elaboration.




Figure 6. The respondents' expenditure on food during the month

Source: Authors' elaboration.

When asked how much per month the respondents spend on purchasing food products, 38% of the respondents answered that they spend over PLN 300, 29% of the respondents from PLN 101 to PLN 200. In turn, 19% spend from 201 to 300 PLN on shopping during the month, 9% – from 51 to 100 PLN, and only 5% of respondents – about 50 PLN.




Figure 7. Structure of respondents' expenditure on food products

Source: Authors' elaboration.

The respondents in this question could select more than one answer, and the question was: What food products do you buy most often? Most of the respondents (16%) buy breadstuff, 12% – buy meat, and the same number (12%) buy cured meat, 9% of respondents buy fruit, and the same (9%) – milk. Then, 8% of respondents buy vegetables, 7% – eggs, 37 (7%) yogurts, and 7% – cheese. Definitely less, only 6% buy fish, 4% – potatoes, 3% buy ready meals. The respondents had the opportunity to answer their questions, 1% of

them replied that in addition to the products mentioned above, they also purchased butter, pasta, and frozen food.




Figure 8. Declaration of the respondents regarding throwing away food
Source: Authors' elaboration.

The vast majority of respondents (89%) indicated that, unfortunately, they sometimes throw away food. Only 11% of the respondents answered that they did not throw away food at all.




Figure 9. The structure of the food thrown away
Source: Authors' elaboration.

The respondents could also select more than one answer in this question, and the question was: What food products are thrown away most often? Most of the respondents (as many as 19%) throw away breadstuff, and only 2% declared that they do not throw away anything. On the other hand, 11% of respondents throw away vegetables. Subsequently, 5% throw out fruit, 8% – cured meat, 7% – potatoes, 7% – cheese, 6% – milk, and the same number – ready meals and milk. Definitely less (only 4% of respondents) throw away fish, 3% – eggs and meat. The respondents had the opportunity to answer – 1% answered that they did not throw food away but gave it to animals.




Figure 10. The frequency of food throwing away by respondents

Source: Authors' elaboration.

The answer “several times a week” was the most frequently chosen one. As many as 32% of the respondents answered in this way. *Ex aequo*, 10% of the respondents indicated that they sometimes throw away food once a week and several times a month. Among all respondents, some people said that they were not throwing food away (3%).




Figure 11. Determinants of food selection

Source: Authors' elaboration.

By analyzing the data presented in Figure 11, it can be concluded that the main factor influencing consumer choices is the economic factor, i.e., the price of the product (14% of the respondents answered this way), and then they pay attention to the quality of the product (11% of the respondents). The analysis of the literature on the subject confirms this research. This dependence is highlighted by, among others, Hanus (2017) emphasizing that economic factors play an important role in the choice of food products by older people and inhabitants of rural areas and small towns, with low income compared to other social groups. They suggest themselves *ex aequo* in terms of taste and habits (9%). 1% of respondents mentioned other factors influencing their choices.




Figure 12. Reasons why respondents throw away food

Source: Authors' elaboration.

The respondents' main reason for throwing away food is the end of the expiry date, rather than exceeding it (43%). The second major reason why food is thrown away is too much shopping, which results in food waste due to the inability to eat it. It is disturbing that 17% of the respondents replied that they did not think about the reasons for throwing away food. It proves that we are insensitive to the problem of food waste. Poor food storage is also one of the main reasons we throw away food (10% of respondents).




Figure 13. Declaration of the respondents regarding the attempts to reduce food waste

Source: Authors' elaboration.

Responding to the question: Are you trying to reduce food waste at the level of your household?, the vast majority (85%) answered “yes”. Only 15% of the respondents answered negatively to the above question. It is comforting that most respondents are willing to reduce food losses and thus their waste.



Figure 14. Ways to reduce food waste

Source: Authors' elaboration.

The way, in which respondents try to reduce food waste, is mainly by making purchases with a list of necessities (25% of respondents), which may contribute to limiting the purchase of unnecessary products. Almost a quarter of the respondents (21%) stated that one way to reduce food losses was to use leftovers and not buy in stock (13%).




Figure 15. Ways to minimize the problem of food waste

Source: Authors' elaboration.

One of the proposed solutions aimed at minimizing the problem of food waste is – according to almost half of the respondents (47%) – making people aware of the importance of the problem. According to 30% of respondents, the number of food collection points should be increased, restrictions on food waste (13%), and food production control (10%) should be increased.




Figure 16. Actions limiting excessive purchases

Source: Authors' elaboration.

The proposals for measures to reduce food waste are very evenly distributed. It is shown by the research results (Figure 16). The highest number of respondents (19%) suggested planned meals related to the deliberate use of food products. According to 18% of respondents, it is also necessary to prepare as many meals as they need (no less, no more) to reduce excessive purchases and stockpiling. In turn, 16% of the respondents propose to make a shopping list, 15% – to store food properly. *Ex aequo* 10% of respondents propose to share excess food with those in need and compost leftovers.




Figure 17. Declaration of the respondents regarding the donation of unnecessary food products to other entities

Source: Authors' elaboration.

The vast majority of respondents (71%) did not declare giving away unnecessary food products to other entities. Only almost 1/3 of the respondents (29%) answered the above question in the affirmative.




Figure 18. Food thrown away per month (%)

Source: Authors' elaboration.

Most respondents (66%) throw away about 5% of their food a month. Subsequently, 18% of respondents throw away about 18% of the food they purchased. It is disturbing that 1% of respondents throw away more than 20% of the purchased food per month or 1/5 of what they buy unnecessarily. On the other hand, it is comforting that 11% of respondents declared that they did not throw away food at all.




Figure 19. Value of food thrown away per month (in PLN)

Source: Authors' elaboration.

According to almost half of the respondents (43%), the value of food thrown away does not exceed PLN 10. Nevertheless, 33% of respondents (over 1/3) believe that the value of the food they throw away does not exceed PLN 25. 10% of respondents believe that they lose over PLN 50 a month on food waste.




Figure 20. Respondents' awareness of the amount of food wasted in the world
Source: Authors' elaboration.

It is disturbing that 40% of respondents do not consider food waste on a global scale. Nevertheless, more than half of the respondents (56%) declared that the problem of food waste is important, and it is worth considering (Figure 20).




Figure 21. Food sectors wasting the most food
Source: Authors' elaboration.

The last was the question of respondents' awareness of who is most responsible for food waste. The respondents concluded that the greatest waste of food takes place in the sector of sellers and retail chains (52% of respondents), then — households are responsible for food waste (30% of respondents) — which would confirm the hypothesis put forward by the authors of the study in the introduction. Food producers are also responsible for food waste, according to 14% of respondents (Figure 21).

5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

According to the research, most of the respondents admit to throwing away food, and the primary reason for throwing them out turned out to be exceeding the use-by date. The most frequently thrown out are: breadstuff, vegetables, fruit, and cured meat. Ways that respondents take to prevent food waste make thoughtful and wise purchases without buying large supplies of food and feeding animals with food residues. Appropriate storage of products turns out to be equally important. The main assumption aimed at minimizing the problem of food waste is to make the public aware of the importance of the problem. It is heartening to know that more than half of the respondents wonder how much food is wasted globally, and most of those polled try not to waste water.

From the perspective of previous studies, it is worth mentioning that the causes of food waste are known worldwide, and there are ways to reduce them. The most beneficial way is to donate food to the poor and needy. The analysis of the research results and the available literature on the subject show the problem of wasted food and its threat to the whole world and the threat to the natural environment through inappropriate use of natural resources. One such example is inappropriate water consumption. The amount of loss and food wasted is constantly increasing, and so is the number of people who admit it. The expected growth could have catastrophic consequences for the environment and society. All attempts should be made to make consumers aware of the importance of the problem and indicate ways of minimizing this phenomenon on a global scale. Besides, a key aspect of waste reduction is the proper management of food in households. Research shows that the number of people admitting to throwing away food is constantly increasing. This trend is expected to continue, and food waste is expected to increase rapidly. Therefore, all countermeasures should be taken to draw consumers' attention to the problem of food waste and how it can be reduced.

The research and conclusions may determine future research directions and provide the basis for larger-scale research (both in terms of the number of respondents and the area of research).

REFERENCES

- Abeliotis, K., Lasaridi, K., Boikou, K., Chroni, C. (2019). *Food waste volume and composition in households in Greece*. "Glob. Nest J.", 21.
- Act on preventing food waste from 19th of July (2019) (J. L. 2019, pos. 1680).
- Andreola, M., Pianegonda, A., Favargiotti, S., Forno, F. (2021). *Urban Food Strategy in the Making: Context, Conventions, and Contestations*. "Agriculture", 11. DOI: 10.3390/agriculture11020177.
- Borowski, M., Kowalewska, M., Kwasek, M., Obiedzińska, A. (2016). *Z badań nad rolnictwem w społeczeństwie zrównoważonym. Analiza strat i marnotrawstwa żywności na świecie i w Polsce*, ed. Kwasek, M.. Warsaw: Institute of Agriculture Economics and Food Economy – National Research Institut.

- Bräutigam, K.R., Jörisen, J., Priefer, C. (2014). *The extent of food waste generation Agros EU-27: Different calculation methods and the reliability of their results*. "Waste Management & Research", 32(8).
- Edjabou, M.E., Petersen, C., Scheutz, C., Astrup, TF. (2016). *Food waste from Danish households: Generation and composition*. "Waste Management", 52.
- Elimelech, E., Ofira, A., Eyal, E. (2018). *What gets measured gets managed: A new method of measuring household food waste*. "Waste Management", 76.
- European Union Council, Food waste and food losses – Council's conclusions. 2016, 10730/16, Brussels.
- Financial Observer. [Access: 3.01.2021]. Access on the internet: <https://www.obserwatorfinansowy.pl>.
- Food banking. [Access: 3.01.2021]. Access on the internet: <http://www.foodbanking.org>
- FUSIONS. *Estimates for European Food Waste Level*. 2016 [Access: 14.12.2020]. Access on the internet: <https://www.eufusions.org/phocadownload/Publications/Estimates%20of%20European%20ood%20waste%20levels.pdf>
- Giordano, C., Alboni, F., Falasconi, L. (2019). *Quantities, determinants, and awareness of households' food waste in Italy: A comparison between diary and questionnaires quantities*. "Sustainability", 11.
- Hanus, G. (2017). *The pro-healthy behaviors of consumer on global food market*. "The Central European Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities", 326.
- Hartmann M. (2011). *Corporate social responsibility in the food sector*. "Eur. Rev. Agric. Econ.", 38.
- Hendrickson M.K., Heffernan W.D. (2002). *Opening spaces through relocation: Locating potential resistance in the weaknesses of the global food system*. "Sociol. Rural.", 42.
- Higgins V., Dibden, J., Cocklin C. (2008). *Building alternative agri-food networks: Certification, embeddedness and agri-environmental governance*. "J. Rural Stud.", 24.
- HLPE (2017). *Food losses and waste in the center of sustainable food systems*. A report by the High Level Panel of Experts on Food Security and Nutrition of the Committee on World Food Security, Rome (Italy).
- Kasza G., Dorkó A., Kunszabó A., Szakos D. (2020). Quantification of Households Food Waste in Hungary: A Replication Study Using the FUSIONS Methodology. *Sustainability*, 2020, 12, 3069, doi: 10.3390/su12083069, 1–14.
- Kloppenburg J., Hendrickson J., Steverson G.W. (1996). Coming into the foodshed. *Agric. Hum. Values*, 1996, 13, 33–42.
- Koivupuro H.K., Hartikainen H., Silvennoinen K., Katajajuuri J.M., Heikintalo N., Reinikainen A., Jalkanen L. (2021).: Influence of socio-demographical, behavioural and attitudinal factors on the amount of avoidable food waste generated in Finnish households. *Int. J. Consum. Stud.* 2012, 36, 183–191.
- Lebersorger S., Schneider F. (2011). Discussion on the methodology for determining food waste in household waste composition studies. *Waste Management*, 2011, 31, 1924–1933.
- Marszałek A. (2018). *Czy możliwe jest przezwyciężenie problemu marnotrawstwa żywności? „Nierówności Społeczne a Wzrost Gospodarczy”*, nr 54 (2/2018). DOI: 10.15584/nsawg.2018.2.35
- McMichael P. (2009). *A food regime analysis of the 'world food crisis'*. "Agric. Hum. Values", 26.
- Polish Economic Institute (2020) [Access: 12.01.2021]. Access on the internet: <http://pie.net.pl>

- Quested T., Johnson H. (2009). *Household Food and Drink Waste in the UK*. Final Report. WRAP: Banbury, UK, November [Access: 14.12.2020]. Access on the internet: www.wrap.org.uk/sites/files/wrap/Household_food_and_drink_waste_in_the_UK_-_report.pdf
- Report of Polish Food Banks Federation. Food waste in Poland and in Europe (2012). Warsaw.
- Schanes K., Dobernig K., Gözet B. (2018). *Food waste matters-A systematic review of household food waste practices and their policy implications*. "J. Clean. Prod.", 182.
- Schneider F., Obersteiner G. (2007). *Food waste in residual waste of households – Regional and socio-economic differences*. In Proceedings of the Eleventh International Waste Management and Landfill Symposium, Sardinia, Italy, 1–5 October.
- Statistics Poland (2015) [Access: 20.01.2021]. Access on the internet: <http://stat.gov.pl>
- Stenmarck A., Jensen C., Quested C., Moates G., Buksti M., Cseh B., Juul S., Parry A., Politano A., Redlingshofer B., Scherhauser S., Silvennoinen K., Soethoudt H., Zübert C., Östergren K. (2016). *Estimates of European food waste levels* [Access: 3.02.2021]. Access on the internet: <http://edepot.wur.nl/378674>
- Szabó-Bódi B., Kasza G., Szakos D. (2018). *Assessment of household food waste in Hungary*. "Br. Food J.", 120.

DOI: 10.7862/rz.2021.hss.26

The text was submitted to the editorial office: March 2001.

The text was accepted for publication: September 2021.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

The Journal annually publishes a list of reviewers: in the last issue of the quarterly – No. 4 (2021) and on the website:

<http://oficyna.prz.edu.pl/pl/zeszyty-naukowe/humanities-and-social-sciences/>

<http://hss.prz.edu.pl/pl/recenzenci-wspolpracujacy/>

Previous name of the Journal: *Ekonomia i Nauki Humanistyczne*, ISSN 1234-3684

<http://oficyna.prz.edu.pl/pl/zeszyty-naukowe/ekonomia-inh/>

<http://eih.prz.edu.pl/>

The journal uses for reviewing, as described on its website:

<http://oficyna.prz.edu.pl/pl/zasady-recenzowania/>

<http://hss.prz.edu.pl/pl/podstawowe-informacje/standardy-recenzowania/>

Information for authors available at:

<http://oficyna.prz.edu.pl/informacje-dla-autorow/>

<http://hss.prz.edu.pl/pl/podstawowe-informacje/informacje-dla-autorow/>

Review's form available at:

<http://oficyna.prz.edu.pl/pl/zeszyty-naukowe/humanities-and-social-sciences/>

<http://hss.prz.edu.pl/pl/podstawowe-informacje/formularz-recenzji/>

Instruction for Authors

<http://oficyna.prz.edu.pl/pl/instrukcja-dla-autorow/>

<http://hss.prz.edu.pl/pl/podstawowe-informacje/instrukcja-redakcyjna/>

Contact details to Editorial Office available at:

<http://oficyna.prz.edu.pl/pl/zeszyty-naukowe/humanities-and-social-sciences/>

<http://hss.prz.edu.pl/pl/komitet-redakcyjny/>

Electronic version of the published articles available at:

<http://oficyna.prz.edu.pl/pl/zeszyty-naukowe/humanities-and-social-sciences/>

<http://hss.prz.edu.pl/pl/wersja-elektroniczna/>

Reviewing standards, information for authors, the review form, instruction for authors and contact details to HSS Editors and to Publishing House are also published in the fourth number of *Humanities and Social Sciences*, 28, No. 4 (2021).

Manuscript completed in September 2021.

Printing Publishing House, 12 Powstańców Warszawy Ave., 35-959 Rzeszów

