

What do you expect from your country? From the Sumerian King List to the Last Words of Assyrian Governors, before the End

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1 Introduction

Today, perhaps as never before, our generations born and raised in democratic “Western” countries after the end of World War 2 have the opportunity to feel, reflect and discuss the limits of the current “security” situation. A deeper awareness of the conditions that determine our presence in the world finally makes us doubt the likelihood of a future for humanity. Some of us who have so far unscrupulously exploited the wealth and leisure of life in the post-war period still trust in the will of human beings to survive, confident that states and sciences will find solutions to deal with the approaching catastrophes. Others, often among the younger ones, read recent events as signs of an apocalyptic context that is already real, beyond the possibility of a global conversion to better ways of living – and, of course, beyond any messianic intervention.

So we are in the right place to turn to the past and see how other cultures in other historical eras have faced the same kind of problems.¹ Admittedly, this is perhaps the first time that climate and environmental crises have been

¹We would like to thank the organisers of this congress for inviting us to share our reflections.

identified as the most dangerous enemies for the survival of our species, societies, and cultures, replacing in this capacity the invasions of savage humans, monsters or barbarians coming from other landscapes and/or following other ideologies. While capitalism, imperialism and colonisation are sometimes evoked as triggers for apocalyptic situations, the next collapse seems to have already become a “natural” event, so that neither political structures nor economic changes can reverse ongoing processes. To balance such a sense of danger, insecurity and even panic, citizens are asked to evaluate their personal behaviour and consumption choices, or to accept their “crime and punishment”.

2 Catastrophic narratives and the continuity of kingship

In order to discuss and represent “end of the world” situations in which every form of social, individual and economic security fails and disappears, since the end of the third millennium BCE the ancient cultures of the Near East have introduced both patterns of thought: wars and invasions on the one hand and catastrophic natural events on the other. The collapse of the Akkadian Empire, an already mythologised supreme form of beauty, balance, strength and order, was developed in the literary tradition as a narrative about the *hybris* of a king who no longer acknowledges divine authority, and it was depicted as a consequence of the invasion of the Mesopotamian plain by mountain peoples.² Somewhat later, in the same atmosphere, the same intellectual milieu may have elaborated the *Atra-ḥasīs* poem.³ In this text, the extinction of the first humanity and the environment in which it lived occurs through the Great Flood decreed by Enlil, the head of the pantheon. In both cases, the global crisis is ultimately triggered by disloyal or inappropriate behaviour on the part of the kings who govern these societies. They were unable to fulfil the task for which they had been appointed, namely to regulate the relationship between gods and humans – even though in *Atra-ḥasīs* story the reason for Enlil’s irrational anger is explicitly motivated by the unruly, free attitude of the growing mass of humanity, which generates *hubūru*, the sound of their agency, and natural capacity to act.⁴ In both situations, the divine response corresponds to the challenge: it is a violent incursion into the organised world of an unlimited mass from above – barbarians from the mountains and water from the sky – impossible to withstand.

² Attinger, 1984; Cooper, 1983.

³ Lambert / Millard, 1999; Foster, 2005: 227–280.

⁴ Rendu-Loisel, 2016: 97–99; Cassin, 1968: 36.

These catastrophic narratives, which seem to destroy any sense of security and trust in institutions as well as in nature itself and in the attitude of the gods, actually support a different ideological interpretation. Regardless of their crimes, the continuation of society is always ultimately guaranteed, partly because the gods need a living and functioning humanity in order to survive. The very existence of these stories testifies to the reconstruction after punishment. History must go on; present and future remain open and secure, especially because kingship still exists – in the form of the dynasty of Ur III and later the Amorite powers. The description of the collapse, the astonishment and finally the lamentations it evokes already announce positive “works in progress” to restore society and culture to their previous state,⁵ even to improve them, under the impetus of new powers and other political identities. New kings are always keen to revive old models while offering the image of an affordable future for all and sundry.

Royal inscriptions, which are meant to document the legitimacy and right of each king to rule,⁶ are not informed by an interest in the continuity of the institution itself, considered as established forever. Rather, their historical perspective is limited to the duration of a reign or dynasty⁷ and to armed conflicts between contemporary powers. Although some texts invoke the imperial and cosmic authority of the protagonist that spans time, only the constant commitment of kings to restore, enlarge and improve ancient buildings, temples, palaces, and city walls shows an echo of concern for preservation and stability.⁸

The presence and visibility, even from a distance, of monumental buildings in the urban landscapes⁹ possibly conveyed a sense of permanence and security to the entire population, not just the urban elites, combined with a form of cultural identification.¹⁰ For others who lived in the steppe or in the mountains, identity and hope for survival depended on various elements – from the features of the landscape to kinship and tribal ties. However, these more intangible structures have left little or no trace, giving the impression that in Mesopotamia only the city, state and kingship provided justice, balance and freedom. The logic that emphasises the survival and continuity of kingship beyond interruptions and changes – and thus offers good reasons to trust the system – is more evident in non-narrative texts such as the king lists, from the Sumerian to the Assyrian ones, as well

⁵Michalowski, 1989.

⁶Fales, 1981; Tadmor, 1997.

⁷On the process of creating genealogical legitimacy, see Pongratz-Leisten, 1997.

⁸Masetti-Rouault, 2019: 149. See also Masetti-Rouault, 2004.

⁹Harmansah, 2013; Leick, 2001; Osborne, 2015; Van de Mieroop, 1997.

¹⁰Liverani, 1979.

as in other compositions organised according to a diachronic, chronological order – even if fictional.¹¹ The *Sumerian King List*¹² is certainly the best example of an intellectual production that reflects this need. It anchors the real beginning of Mesopotamian history not at creation but at the landing of kingship from above, the realm of the gods, that transformed humanity into a series of cities/states. Without theological explanations, the *Sumerian King List* shows by its own structure how this institution, which moved through a series of cities over time, was embodied by different dynasties – all of whom presumably correctly looked after the welfare of society.¹³ The reason for the change of location and leader is never quoted, but it can be attributed to a human issue, a military defeat, with an implicit reference to royal inscriptions and other chronicle texts. Only in two cases – the Flood and the Fall of Akkad – does the list pause in the sequence of events. The mention of the Flood is astonishing in that this extraordinary natural and climatic phenomenon is not presented in its details: its quotation was enough to evocate the crisis. Its effects required a new political beginning: kingship had to descend from heaven once more.¹⁴ The Fall of Akkad, on the other hand, was closer to the authors of the *Sumerian King List* and was therefore described in terms of its political impact, highlighting the confusion created in the historical sequence by the uncertainty about the identity of the king himself.¹⁵ After the fall of the empire, several names emerge, including a Gutian dynasty against which the Ur III dynasty had to fight to assert its right to the Akkadian inheritance.¹⁶

Unlike the *Sumerian King List*, both literary traditions about the Flood and the Fall of Akkad acknowledge the reasons for the destruction of society and the state as decisions of the gods, but they also emphasise the role of the kings who were involved in this process. Naram-Sin is portrayed in the texts as an arrogant, even criminal character, while Atra-ḫasis, though following the advice and secret plan of the god Ea, is unable to save his people from drowning. Later in the story, he finally represents the possible model for the second kingship descended from heaven. By reminding the gods of their dependence on the services of humans and assuring them of the continuity of human labour and cults, Atra-ḫasis is able to make a pact with Enlil so that there will be no more apocalypses, no more floods: the gods will never again attempt to destroy the whole world. But the literary

¹¹Glassner, 1993.

¹²Jacobsen, 1939.

¹³Michalowski, 1983.

¹⁴Jacobsen, 1939: 76–77 (col. i, 39–42).

¹⁵Jacobsen, 1939: 112–115 (col. vii, 1–7); Cooper, 1993. On this general issue, see Charvát / Maříková Vlčková, 2010.

¹⁶Jacobsen, 1939: 116–121 (col. vii, 25 – col. viii, 3).

tradition of the later standard Babylonian version of the Epic of Gilgamesh shows that, while humanity is now certain to live forever and to be freed from the fear of the end of the future, the gain is not obvious. A kind of birth control through high newborn mortality and an “early” death for every adult are now introduced into human life, to limit the mass of the livings. Atra-ḥasis himself, for all his wisdom, has finally lost his royal function. Now that he is immortal by Enlil’s decree, he disappears from history, while the new society is rebuilt in a different atmosphere, in search of prosperity for all.¹⁷

3 Alternative visions of the ideology of kingship in 2nd millennium Mesopotamia

The Amorite, Old Babylonian culture and civilisation developed in this perhaps optimistic, if not euphoric, historical and intellectual context, sustained by a new vision of life and social expectations, to which the writing of the ‘Code’ of Hammurabi bears particular witness.¹⁸ The text shows a strong interest in the right of every “citizen” to lead a better life, to demand and receive justice guaranteed by the authority of the king. Depending on the administration and power of kings, state structures were reshaped as instruments to ensure order and balance in society so that everyone could and did feel safe and protected. It is possible that the Amorite concept of social management, which emerged in extra-urban institutions and was designed to integrate different populations and economies,¹⁹ eventually enabled and even encouraged the development of economic plans and systems that better connected the Mesopotamian world with other regions, centres and peripheries, mountains, steppes and river valleys. The wealth produced by this economic system supported a civilisational transformation, but the new culture did not reject the past: on the contrary, it strove to show that nothing of tradition had been lost. Continuity in every aspect of life was assured even after the fall of the Ur III empire. However, from the Old Babylonian period onwards, a new meaning was given to the actions of kings that related directly to the protection of citizens and their rights, at least for some groups of the population. For example, the royal decrees called *andurārum*,²⁰ the extraordinary cancellation of debts, show the explicit willingness of the state to intervene and “save” part of the population

¹⁷Masetti-Rouault, 2009: 3–7.

¹⁸Finet, 1973; Foster, 2005: 126–135.

¹⁹Burke, 2021.

²⁰Charpin, 1987; 1990.

in a difficult economic situation, even if not everyone, like the “bankers” and financiers, fully appreciated this step.

We can neither know nor imagine what the “real people” who lived scattered in the Syro-Mesopotamian world thought of this alleged atmosphere of “new age” and political change “after the Flood”. Given the cycles of conflict and war that the relations between states throughout the Middle and Late Bronze periods, we certainly cannot believe in the golden age of peace and progress that was to be expected after Atra-ḫašis’s agreement with the gods. Nothing in the royal ideology of the states during this long period suggests that the military activities, often referred to as the main undertakings of kings, were understood as part of the royal function of protecting the people and the country. They are not described as a kind of “policing” presence to ensure local security, nor is the king’s war decided to defend society against invasions or ethnic movements, or simply to improve the economy and way of life. Rather, the message conveyed by the royal media is a demonstration of the king’s power and legitimacy, as his ultimate victory is a positive sign of the gods’ approval and support.

It is still not clear to what extent the same royal power was seen either as the force that ensured order, security, and development for all social classes, or, on the contrary, as an oppressive and exploitative presence that demanded taxes, corvées and conscription, to be avoided as much as possible. However, from the Late Bronze Age, especially towards the end of the second millennium BCE and up to the Iron Age II, there are some literary texts that may have been written by the same intellectual elites that formed the royal and political chancelleries where these points were discussed. They expressed a profound critique of the ideological, religious and moral system, although it is difficult to assess to what extent such a polemical attitude was widespread among the population beyond the elites. In this respect, the Standard Babylonian version of the Gilgamesh epic²¹ can also be understood as an attack on the ideology of kingship as well as on the philosophical positions of the Atra-ḫašis poem, for the gods do not provide what they seem to have promised in terms of security and happiness. The epic not only criticises the royal wars and conquests, such as the expedition to the Cedar Forest,²² which turns out to be a murderous but futile attempt by the king of Uruk to improve his image and gain fame and recognition. Even in the case of the execution of the “Bull of Heaven”,²³ which is presented as a heroic intervention to free Uruk from the effects

²¹George, 2003.

²²George, 2003: 602–615; 2014.

²³George, 2003: 624–629.

of a catastrophic (climatic) crisis, a drought, the poem ultimately shows Gilgamesh's responsibility for the event itself, his conflictual relationship with Ishtar.²⁴ A strong criticism is also made of the agreement Atra-ḫasis made with Enlil, who accepted an early death in human life. Gilgamesh's protest is clear: death destroys the meaning of life as well as any kind of security, contentment, trust and joy in relationships, even for a king. It was a terrible mistake to allow this for human fate: this conclusion appears in the final tablet of the poem, in the dialogue between the two "wicked" kings who have failed their people, abandoning their cities. Although there are no immediate solutions, the narrative suggests another way of looking at life and security, defined as a cultural and political knowledge capable of transcending nature, death, time, and religion. Back in Uruk, Gilgamesh writes down his experiences, what he has done and learned, a collective memory of the past for the people of the future.²⁵

The poem of the *Righteous Sufferer*,²⁶ particularly famous because its content was later integrated into biblical wisdom, sends the same kind of message, namely to find a way to limit and avoid the power of death and the power of those who can use it indefinitely – gods and kings, the same ones who were expected to provide life and security. The perspective now shifts from that of a king and a collective experience to a personal one: the sufferer is a successful representative of any Mesopotamian elite who suddenly sees his social standing, family connections, wealth and personal health wiped out by several evil attacks – for no apparent reason.²⁷ Destitute and alone in the ruins of his "castle", he still knows himself to be in the right and righteous, innocent of any offence or sin against the king and the gods, even though the sufferings he has to endure look like a punishment, an expression of god Marduk's judgement. He had applied in vain the traditional procedures of religion, cults, and science to find an explanation and then perhaps a solution or a remedy to restore his status with the help of the god. When death is near, dreams announce that Marduk has taken pity and suddenly restores all that has been robbed to him. The *Righteous Sufferer* is often considered a pietistic composition, apparently advising those who have lost all security to never stop trusting in the attention, care, and pardon that the gods eventually grant their faithful servants. In describing the terrible experiences of the sufferer, the text at the same time suggests to the readers never to feel too sure of their behaviour, to be ready to admit some guilt and accept the punishment: there is no other way out.

²⁴Abusch, 1986.

²⁵Masetti-Rouault, 2019: 152–153.

²⁶Annus / Lenzi, 2010; Foster, 2005: 392–409.

²⁷Masetti-Rouault, 2009: 2–3.

Notwithstanding the final celebration of the god – for Marduk is praised as “wise” and merciful²⁸ – the happy ending of the story does not seem to be good enough to restore trust in society and the king as well as in religion and the cults. If it is impossible for people to understand the intentions and logic of the gods, attempts to change their will are also fruitless. This narrative also implicitly suggests that humanity must find an alternative way to ensure its own future and security.

4 The making and unmaking of the world order

Against the background of such a critical attitude, the writing of the mythological and theological text *Enuma elish*²⁹ at the beginning of the Iron Age is an attempt to restructure the Old Babylonian conceptual system and to define a new kind of order. The kingship of Marduk is now based not only on his power and violence, but above all on the legitimisation of his status, which is formally recognised once and for all by the entire society represented in the narrative by the assembly of gods, even before the fight started. After his victory over the masses and chaos, by which he ensured the survival of the pantheon, Marduk, as king, has created a perfect, orderly world in which the gods are fully satisfied, and humans have their place by serving them: no more floods are needed to correct their relationship.³⁰

Thus, when apocalypses occur again and society is destroyed by political catastrophes, this must be due to a mismanagement of the divine government. The (human) king, who is responsible for the state, plays no role in the social tragedy: this point is strongly emphasised in the *Erra* poem.³¹ With this text, the Assyrian king Esarhaddon’s chancellery demonstrates that the unimaginable destruction of Babylon, its people, temples and gods, carried out by his father Sennacherib and described in his inscriptions as a Flood,³² was actually caused by the plan of the god Erra during his short-lived “coup d’état” against Marduk. Fortunately, reason triumphs over force, as god Ishum suggests, and we can assume that the rightful head of the pantheon will eventually return and restore order, just as Esarhaddon did, engaged in rebuilding all that had been destroyed in Babylonia by his father – as the audience well knew. This “novel” was probably written in the heyday of the Neo-Assyrian Empire to support Esarhaddon’s policies

²⁸Cf. for example *Ludlul I* 1–18; see Horowitz / Lambert, 2002.

²⁹Lambert, 2013: 3–134.

³⁰*En. el.* VI; cf. Lambert, 2013: 108–121.

³¹Cagni, 1969; Foster, 2005: 880–911.

³²See for example RINAP 3.2, No. 168: 36b–44a. On this issue, see Brinkman, 1983; 1984.

and ultimately the legitimacy of his kingship, which may also have been threatened by the “sin” of his father. In doing so, he was surely responding to accusations that criticised Sennacherib’s attack on Babylon.³³ The justification by the myth was intended to convince the general audience and appease the political opposition, but at the same time both the structure and the content of the poem show how deep the crisis was at this time and that there was complete uncertainty about its resolution, in Assyria too. The Babylonian urban society is depicted in the poem on the path of disintegration, starting from the family structures and bonds, involving all areas of cults, politics, and economy, possibly just like the Assyrian society.³⁴ The system of religious and ideological conceptions that gave legitimacy to state institutions and created a context in which people could live believing in the present as well as in the future was already weak, unstable and ready for overthrow. The *Erra* poem plays on the contrast between the narrative and the knowledge people had about recent events, showing that the “normal” alliance of kings and gods was broken – their roles were possibly reversed.³⁵ Marduk could not and did not stop the destruction of his city by Sennacherib, who had acted like Enlil, and the new king of the pantheon had to take some responsibility for the disaster. And since Sennacherib was eventually murdered by his “evil” sons, the myth also explains that his death had nothing to do with his “sin”³⁶ – because there was no (royal) sin at all. Seen in this light, his successor Esarhaddon had no reason to fear the consequences of his father’s actions, nor the lack of legitimacy of his own kingship.

5 Towards a conclusion: people’s security through Neo-Assyrian historiographical sources

In the Neo-Assyrian period, the late Assyrian kings, supported by their court, government, and army, gradually tried to achieve a new status, almost liberated from the authority of the gods, even if they insisted on choosing iconographic motifs that emphasised their dependence on the pantheon. Since the reign of Sargon II, these kings have wanted to show that they could control and protect their people, the Assyrians, in a more direct and autonomous way, not only by satisfying the needs of the gods, but also by using new scientific and technological means, especially related to the use

³³Masetti-Rouault, 2010; Franke, 2014.

³⁴Calini, in press; George, 2013.

³⁵Calini, 2018. See also Masetti-Rouault, 2019: 153.

³⁶Weaver, 2005.

of water. Because of the wealth they had acquired through the expansion of the empire, the Assyrian kings were able to change the landscape, intervene in natural and social processes and thus change the rules. Sennacherib, who claims to have used the waters of the Euphrates to drown Babylon, had also built a very long canal, introducing irrigation to a region where dry farming was the usual technique of agricultural production.³⁷ The king says his project changed the natural landscape also for the comfort of the farmers, who had to face the dangers of drought, so that they were no longer dependent on the will of the Storm's god.³⁸ His policy of combining irrigation with the construction of a new capital for the empire is also conveyed to as large an audience as possible through monumental reliefs on which he greets the gods in a reverent posture and prays to them, just as his father Sargon II had chosen to be depicted.³⁹

The coronation of his grandson Assurbanipal marks the beginning of an Edenic world that began in this way, thanks to the king's deep understanding of his function, and conforms to the model of happiness different from the one Atra-ḥasīs had received after the Flood, as a letter from a court intellectual to the king shows:

“A good reign – righteous days, years of justice; abundant rains, huge floods, a good exchange rate! The gods are appeased, there is much fear of God, the temples are full. The great gods of heaven and earth have become exalted in the time of the king, my lord.

The old men dance, the young men sing, the women and girls are merry and rejoice; women are married and given earrings; boys and girls are born, the births prosper.

The king, my lord, has revived the guilty one who was condemned to death; you have released the one who was in prison for many years. Those who were sick for many days have been made well; the hungry are satisfied; the parched are anointed with oil; the needy are covered with clothes.”⁴⁰

The king is now presented, instead of the gods, as the guarantor of the security and well-being of the whole people, but this function could apparently not yet be separated from his relationship with the divine – probably

³⁷Bagg, 2000; Van de Mieroop, 2003; Fales / del Fabbro, 2014; Morandi-Bonacossi, 2018: 89–98; Reade, 1978; Ur, 2005.

³⁸Masetti-Rouault, 2018. On Assyrian building projects that changed the physical landscape of the empire, see also Smith, 2003: 180–183; Wilkinson et al., 2005.

³⁹Morandi Bonacossi, 2022.

⁴⁰SAA 10 226: ob. 9 – r. 3; Foster, 2005: 1015–1016.

because the kingship and the empire alone did not yet have enough authority and legitimacy to be trusted. Assyrians, aware of the reality of their situation, still resisted and did not accept that their security and survival depended only on the king and the palace. Gods and other religious ideas, cults and networks were still present and had a place in the administration of society. Even though internal revolts and civil wars are recorded in chronological texts and in some administrative letters and reports, awareness of the weakness, even crisis, of the state was systematically obscured and suppressed by the cultural production of the court, and it did not lead to an alternative political model or plan to survive. However, some texts written outside the Assyrian royal chancelleries show that this situation was real and perceptible even before the Sargonid period, and the foundation of the Neo-Assyrian Empire.

Around the middle of the 8th century BCE, the “new”, independent rulers of the region of “Suhu and Mari”, in the bend of the Euphrates valley downstream of the southern border of the Assyrian “province” of Laqû and upstream of the territory controlled by Babylon, asked their chancellery to compose a series of inscriptions modelled on the Assyrian ones. In these texts, the arrival at the “sheikh” Ninurta-kudurri-usur’s court of the Assyrian governor of the Laqû province Adad-da”ānu, who is portrayed as a miserable neighbour, is described with some irony and in great detail.⁴¹ The governor kisses the ground in front of Ninurta-kudurri-usur and asks for his help to ward off the dangerous attacks of Aramean clans roaming the area. The text reports the governor’s request and quotes his admission that without the sheikh’s support he will surely die, as neither imperial aid nor the gods are willing to save him. And he is right: the text dutifully adds later that even the powerful governor of the larger Assyrian province of Raṣappa, further north, had given up and avoided fighting the attackers:

Relying on their (own) strength, [the Ḫatallu (tribesmen), from the Sarugu (clan) to the Luḫuāyya (clan)] went on to the land of Laqû (and) conquered a hundred villages of the land of Laqû. They made countless spoils and turned the land of Laqû into a heap of ruins. Adad-da”ānu, the governor of the land of Laqû, came before me with four chariots (and) two hundred soldiers. He kissed the ground in front of me and then begged me (for help). I accepted his supplication.⁴²

⁴¹RIMB 2, Ninurta-kudurri-uṣur 02; <http://oracc.org/suhu/Q006212/>.

⁴²RIMB 2, Ninurta-kudurri-uṣur 02: i 27b – i 32; <http://oracc.org/suhu/Q006212/>.

This episode helps to better understand the feelings of another later Assyrian governor who settled at Tushan/Ziyaret Tepe in southern Turkey in the last days of the empire. When he responds to the order from the court to prepare his troops for military action against the invading Neo-Babylonian army, he offers a desperate picture of his administration: he is already alone, waiting for the enemy. Everyone else has left, abandoning him, the palace, the city, and the empire. Desperate, but still in his right mind, he too announces his imminent death, this time with no saviour nearby:

[Of all the horses, Assyrian (and) Aramaean scribes, cohort commanders, officials, craftsmen, coppersmiths, smiths, those who clean the tools (and) equipment, carpenters, bow makers, arrow makers, weavers, tailors (and) those who do the repairs – to whom shall I speak, what shall I say, what shall I do? [...]
Our [goal is] one. (So) am I a[lone] going to die? [...] Now not one of them is there. How can I command? [...] Death will come out of this! No one [will escape]. I am finished!⁴³

His message never left Tushan, so that was really the end. But where did all the other people go? Where did they find help, how did they manage to survive and live, after the war and the apocalypse of the empire? In a way, history continued, even though the empire, with its memory, culture, ideology, and religion, was quickly erased and disappeared from our view. Probably, unlike what we modern historians think, people's security has always depended on many other factors, ideas, social and political relations, experiences, and knowledge that we cannot see. Identifying them is the new frontier of our studies.

⁴³Parpola, 2008: 86–88 (No. 22).

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